


INTROCEPTUALISM

PHILOSOPHY OF CONSCIOUSNESS
WITHOUT AN OBJECT

VOLUME II



FRANKLIN MERRELL-WOLFF


INTROCEPTIONALISM

THE PHILOSOPHY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

WITHOUT AN OBJECT

VOLUME 11

FRANKLIN MERRELL-WOLFF
INTRODUCTORY ESSAY BY MAEL MELVIN, PH.D.



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OTHER WORKS BY FRANKLIN MERRELL-WOLFF

YOGA

RE-EMBODIMENT

PATHWAYS THROUGH TO SPACE

**PHILOSOPHY OF CONSCIOUSNESS WITHOUT
AN OBJECT, VOLUME 1**

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THE PUBLISHERS WISH TO THANK

©

FRANKLIN MERRELL-WOLFF
for his devotion to humankind

•

MAEL MELVIN, Ph.D.
for his edifying preface and for all editorial advisement

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for her unflagging faith

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for his sensitive portrait, cover design and illustrations

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John W. Flinn III

Introductory Essay by the Editor:

Infinity and Consciousness

Saying ascribed to Buddha:

"How can there be any understanding or teaching
of that which is wordless (i.e., inexpressible)?
That can be understood and taught only by
Samaropa - an ascribed mark."

from The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana by Th. Stcherbatsky with
comprehensive Analysis and Introduction by Jaideva Singh, p. 51 (Gordon
Press, N.Y. 1973)

INFINITY AND CONSCIOUSNESS

". . . pure mathematics, in which the discerning student will find veiled the Wisdom Religion, may serve as a means to the Realization."

from the early book "YOGA, Its Problems Its Philosophy Its Technique" by Franklin Merrell-Wolff under the pseudonym Yogagnani (Skelton Publishing Co., Los Angeles, 1930.)

Great clarity, great precision, great honesty — such are the characteristics of the individual man Franklin Merrell-Wolff, the author of this book. Since 1936 there is added a transcendental component. He is one of our precious fellow beings in whom has occurred a transfinite widening of consciousness. "Recognition" was his name for it in his first major book¹ which was a personal record of transformation in consciousness. He would now describe this as the opening up of the faculty of "Introception".² This is a term which we owe to Dr. Wolff in whose books — more than any others — we find described in precise Western terms the noetic quality of the yogic consciousness. The term introception is constructed from the Latin intro: "within", "into", "in" and capere: "take". We may suggest as a capsulized definition of the "introceptive" or "yogic" consciousness that it is a "cosmic introspection". In contrast to ordinary introspection, as considered in psychology, here the individual consciousness becomes cosmic while looking inward.³ The introceptive consciousness is responsive in the sense of "witnessing" but with a non-reactive detachment. This detachment from small self-interest orients the consciousness towards what is ultimately complete altruism — the non-ulterior Love often spoken of in religions. Introception is also affirmed to have other

¹ Franklin Merrell-Wolff: Pathways Through to Space. A personal record of Transformation in Consciousness. (Richard R. Smith, Publisher, New York 1944; reprinting by Julian Press—now Crown—New York 1973; paperback reprinting by Warner).

² The Philosophy of Consciousness Without an Object Reflections on the nature of Transcendental Consciousness. (Julian Press—now Crown—New York 1973).

³ Dr. Wolff has many discussions of introceptive faculty in his books. One of the earliest technical definitions is found on p. 228 of Pathways Through to Space.

— noetic — value in providing us with a supremely vivid awareness of the intrinsic nature of all that is. Thus the introceptive or yogic consciousness complements as well as contrasts with the creative technological consciousness.

The evidence is overwhelming that the transformation in which the introceptive consciousness is awakened actually occurs in individuals. Further — as with the experiences which transformed Gautama to Buddha, or Jesus to Christ — they may affect human history to an extraordinary degree. Both the yearning for and realization of transcendental states of consciousness seem then to be individual and social facts, though it appears up to the present that the number who yearn far exceeds the number who realize. The question then arises for the "usual" human consciousness: how to live with this radical challenge — whether to deny or accept the reality of transformation of consciousness, and whether the denial or acceptance be unconditional or conditional. In view of the diversity of structures in which humans are immersed — religious, political, social, economic, academic and others — one can hardly speak of a single "usual" human consciousness. Nevertheless if one limits consideration to the generally recognized major psychological faculties — perception and conception — the issue becomes more clearcut. How are the usual perceptions and conceptions, even highly evolved and refined, to accommodate what is purported to be a third organ of cognition — "introception", in the apt nomenclature of Franklin Merrell-Wolff? Certainly the highly symbiotic perceptive and conceptive faculties do not easily give affirmation to this mysterious third faculty which is strictly neither perceived nor conceived. Here we must steer a course between arrant reductionism on the one hand and naive credulity on the other — between a sweeping dismissal, with a "nothing but" attitude, and an "everything claimed is true" attitude. However, we honestly own that though we eschew the extreme of naive credulity, we do take the position of resolute acceptance towards the existence of introceptive consciousness. It is our conviction that the advances in understanding of the universe, growing out of ordinary consciousness, not only remove the barriers but point the way towards accepting the existence of an extraordinary noumenal consciousness different in nature from the perceiving and conceiving generally known.

It will help remove some critical doubts if we recognize that our perceptions and conceptions constitute the contents of consciousness whereas the presumptive third — introceptive — faculty might relate to the context or "screen" of consciousness on which the contents are projected. It is thus possible in principle that, with the perceptual and conceptual contents reduced to a low noise level, a sensitized awareness of the context or screen could manifest — introception. This would be non-interfering or orthogonal to the contents. In the limit of zero noise, introception would be associated with "pure" consciousness

— "Consciousness Without an Object", the title and subject of the author's book¹ immediately preceding this one. (The present volume is a continuation which may be read independently.) However much such remarks are evocative of the possibility of this fresh and wonderful cognitive faculty which opens the door on the previously unknown, they do not necessarily compel conviction of its existence. They do not strictly remove the conceptual or intellectual obstacles even to conditional acceptance. Only direct experience would give certainty. Such experience would establish the conditional existence of introceptive pure consciousness we would say further that it exists unconditionally if it could be shown that it is potentially within the range of all consciousness — human, and in whatever other form it may occur within the cosmos. Notwithstanding these reservations, clear powerful and precise analysis, speaking the language of conception itself, can lower and even remove the conceptual obstacles. This might be done individually in the realms of various major categories of thought — philosophical, mathematical and in the domain of the natural sciences. With the obstacles removed by effective analysis and parallels, these conceptual domains become allies in opening the door.

The present book, along with the larger work of which it is a part, is, in my opinion, a major landmark in the history of philosophy. In it the author accomplishes the indicated task of removing the obstacles to introception in the realm of philosophic thought. His qualifications for this task are impeccable. As a young man, having completed his studies and already teaching philosophy at Harvard, he renounced the prospective academic career; he had become convinced that this renunciation would facilitate his movement towards realization. This conviction was vindicated on August 7, 1936 when there began the profound series of transformations of consciousness described in his subsequent writings.^{1,2} In the ensuing years he has subjected these experiences to a thorough philosophical analysis affirming with great power that introception is the crowning empirical experience of philosophy.

There remain as possible allies in the effort to open the door to introception the domains of pure mathematics and of the natural sciences. Of the two, the former stands on its own foundation as an apex of human reasoning and also appears as the conceptual language of the sciences — certainly in the physical sciences and increasingly in

¹ The Philosophy of Consciousness Without an Object Reflections on the Nature of Transcendental Consciousness. (Julian Press-now Crown-New York 1973).

² Franklin Merrell-Wolff: Pathways Through to Space. A personal record of Transformation in Consciousness. (Richard R. Smith, Publisher, New York 1944; reprinting by Julian Press-now Crown-New York 1973; paperback reprinting by Warner).

the biological and social sciences. Hence the motivation for this essay in which we wish to give convincing analogues, metaphors, or paradigms, in modern mathematics, for introception. Franklin Merrell-Wolff (again by academic education, as well as a great natural gift for precision) is highly sympathetic to pure mathematics, and confirms its supportive role for introception. He indicates this in several places. In Chapter III on the New Realism he writes:

"(c) The third view, which is here called the "gnostic", maintains that mathematical, and therefore logical, knowledge is essentially a priori, by which is meant that it exists independent of experience. It may be true that this knowledge does not arise in the relative consciousness, in point of time, before experience. Yet it is not derived from experience, however much it may employ language which is derived from experience. It is thus in its essential nature akin to mystical cognition — and hence gnostic in character — rather than similar to empiric knowledge."

In Chapter VI on Idealism he writes:

"But when mathematics is related to introception it carries a religious force which is a kind of applied mathematics, but in quite a different sense. In the latter case, Truth is not an incidental notion employed by mathematics, but so largely becomes its soul that the word must be spelled with a capital T."

In the Epilogue of this volume we read:

"There is frequent reference in the book to mathematical analogues. There is a reason for that. The underlying thesis is that the factuality of pure mathematics might be as much in doubt as the factuality of pure metaphysics. But as the factuality of pure mathematics is abundantly proven, there is the presumption that equally well the factuality of pure metaphysics may be proven."

Finally, his view is most fully expressed in the original experiential record¹ under the dateline of October 4, 1936:

"Once one recognizes the fact that the relative world, or primary universe, is a valid part within the Whole and is

¹ Pathways Through to Space (p. 208)

relatively real, then the problem of cross-translation from the level of Cosmic Consciousness to that of subject-object consciousness is realized as being of high importance. The possibilities of cross-translation are admittedly limited. The immediate content of the Higher Consciousness cannot be cross-translated, but certain formal properties can be through the use of systematic symbols. In some respects it is like the old problem of the evaluation of irrationals in terms of rational number. The ultimate content of the irrationals cannot be given in the form of the rationals, yet, in the radical signs, we have symbols representing the essential unity binding the two sets of numbers. Just so soon as the mathematicians abandoned the effort completely to reduce the irrationals to rational form, and accepted the radical sign as an irreducible symbol of profound meaning, then they did succeed in integrating in their consciousness two quite differently formed domains of reality. This integration meant that the two domains were found to be logically harmonious, although that which we might call the 'affective' content was discrete. Cross-translation, in something of this sense, is possible with respect to Cosmic and subject-object consciousness. In fact, if the consciousness-equivalents of the entities and operations of pure mathematics were realized, we would find that, in that great science and art, cross-translation in a lofty sense already exists. The Root Source of pure mathematics is the Higher or Transcendent Consciousness, and this is the reason universal conclusions can be drawn with unequivocal validity in pure mathematics. The greater bulk of mathematicians fall short of being Sages or Men of Recognition because their knowledge is not balanced by genuine metaphysical insight. But they do have onehalf of the Royal Science. Up to the present, at any rate, the Fountainhead of the other half is to be found mainly in the Orient. The union of these two represents the synthesis of the East and the West, in the highest sense, and is the prerequisite of the development of a culture which will transcend anything the world has known so far."

This masterly statement corresponds exactly to the saying ascribed to Buddha which is quoted at the beginning.

It is in amplification of these statements that the present remarks are contributed by the editor.

We in modern science do not claim to have more than embryonic ideas about consciousness. In contrast, the traditional East, particularly in its ancient Shavite and Vedic scriptures, together with

the derivative six systems of Indian philosophy, and their formidable Buddhist opponent — the Madhyamika, does claim to have a well-developed understanding of consciousness. In the West, by practising 'outsight' energetically 500 years, we have been able to reach a powerful understanding of the outer physical (and, to some extent, biological) universe. It stands to reason and intuition that the wise men and women of the East by practising insight for thousands of years would have come to a deep understanding of the inner universe of consciousness. Nevertheless, the success resulting from the insistence on a refined analytical and formalizable description of perceptual experiences of the outer world (which is standard in modern science) leads us to expect that these same analytical or mathematical methods may illuminate the subject of consciousness. Particularly relevant to our present inquiry is the analysis of "infinity" — a central theme in Dr. Wolff's reports of his own Yogic transcendental experiences as well as the visions of cosmogony in the ancient scriptures. In this essay we discuss infinity as considered in modern mathematics where it has undergone some fascinating developments. We then consider some further parallels with the foundations of modern physical science.

THE CONCEPT OF INFINITY IN MODERN MATHEMATICS

There is a statement in the Upanishads¹ which speaks of the two infinities — 1) the universal Supreme Brahman or Self and 2) Creation or the visible universe: when the second emerges from or merges into the first, the first remains the same infinity. This is a remarkable anticipation of the concept of infinity as it is understood today. Infinite sets, which we discuss in the following in somewhat more technical terms, have just that characteristic property which no finite set has: in an infinite set a part can be equivalent to the whole. This means also that, unlike the finite set, no matter how many facsimiles of its parts are added to the whole, the infinite number of elements in the whole is not changed. This is quite opposed to what happens with a finite set.

Let us take an example to engage the imagination. Suppose we have an infinite hotel, with a principle of privacy so that there

¹ From the Brihad-Aranyaka Upanishad, Fifth Adhyaya, First Brahmana (also in the Prologue to the Isa-Upanishad, as quoted from the White Yajur Veda, 40th the last chapter): "OM Infinite is that (the supreme Brahman) infinite is this (the conditional Brahman, or the visible universe). From the infinite (Brahman) proceeds the infinite. (After the realization of the Great Identity or after the cosmic dissolution) when the infinity of the infinite (universe) merges (in the Infinite Brahman), there remains the Infinite (Brahman) alone. Translation of Swami Nikhilandana The Upanishads, (Bell Publishing Co., New York, 1962).

is only one guest to each room; suppose also that there is one room to each guest so that every room is filled and that there are no guests left out. Then a new guest arrives. Now if this were a finite hotel the management would have to say, 'Sorry, try the hotel across the way', but if it is an infinite hotel there is no problem: Install the new guest in Room No. 1, move 'old' guest No. 1 to Room No. 2; move 'old' guest No. 2 to Room No. 3, and so on. No guest is left unroomed and no room is left unoccupied. Now not only can the hotel accommodate one more guest but it can accommodate a million more or infinitely many more. And in fact, if we have infinitely many hotels, each of them infinitely large and all of them occupied, and we decide to dismantle all but one of these hotels, we can put infinitely many infinite hotel populations all into one hotel.

It is a characteristic property of an infinite set that a part can be equivalent to the whole; and from this follow all the consequences in the foregoing example. As we have said, this property was anticipated in the beautiful saying in the Upanishads in which, in some translations, the word 'fullness' is used to designate what we call 'infinity'. It was a brave mathematician named Georg Cantor, (after the pioneering work of Bernhard Bolzano in 1851) who introduced the concept of infinity consistently, through the concept of 'set'. The "new math" in which many modern children were educated is based on this concept of set.

Cantor's own definition of a set was that 'it is a multitude conceived of by us as a one'. We consider a collection of objects as one population and that makes a set. More picturesquely and explicitly, it has been suggested that we think of a set as follows: Imagine a transparent closed bag or impenetrable shell. Suppose that all elements of a given collection 'A', and no other objects, are present within the shell. This is a good way to visualize uniting all the elements into the set 'A'.¹

A set can be either finite or infinite, since it can contain either a finite or an infinite number of objects. Thus the concept of a set provides a very good foundation both for the mathematics of the finite and the mathematics of the infinite.

For an example of the finite case, consider the set of all living people on earth. There is also a set of all living people who have passed their 21st birthday; it is a 'subset' of the first set.

Sets and subsets can be infinite too. One of the first things that Cantor pointed out is that an infinite set has the property that an infinite subset can be equivalent to the whole (as with our infinite hotels). Now, how can that be? What do we mean by 'equivalent'? And

¹ Stories About Sets, by N. Ya. Vilenkin, (Academic Press, New York and London 1969).

what does it mean for an infinite set to be not equivalent but "less than" or "greater than" another.

CARDINALITY

Even primitive peoples have two concepts of number: 'cardinal' and 'ordinal'. Ordinal number is the kind we are used to on an elementary level (1, 2, 3, . . .), when we not only encounter a finite set but have all its elements arranged in a definite order. Then ordinal number is based on straight counting. But this system of counting is not practical even for large finite groups (such as people in a big hall). There is, however, another way of measuring the size of a set — finite or infinite — by what is called 'cardinal number' or 'cardinality'. The cardinality concept involves matching between sets without restricting the orders of elements within the sets. We shall first explain the meaning of 'equal cardinality', and later the meaning of 'greater' and 'lesser' cardinality.

Suppose we come into a large hall and are able to have a really good look at everything there. We see many people and many seats, with one person to each seat, and one seat to each person; every seat is occupied and no persons are standing. We see at once that there are just as many persons as seats because they are all paired off. This kind of one-to-one matching is what is usable with an infinite as well as with a finite set. It is the way we measure one infinite set against another infinite set, and find them equal. What does it mean for one infinite set to be cardinally "smaller" or "larger" than another? Suppose that the hall is infinite and there are infinitely many chairs and infinitely many persons, but we see that by some systematic procedure — extrapolated to infinity — we can match all the chairs to a subset of all persons but we cannot by any procedure match all persons to chairs. In other words, although to every chair there is a person, there is not to every person a chair. (Every chair is occupied but for an unmatchable infinity of persons there is "standing room only"). We would immediately say there are fewer chairs than persons. This is how one defines "smaller than". Alternatively expressed there are more persons than chairs. This is how one defines "larger than".

It is possible to construct an unending sequence of higher and higher infinite cardinal numbers — so called "transfinite cardinals". The example with chairs and persons, while suggestive, is misleading. It is only the first of the transfinite cardinals which is "countable", or "describable" by sentences made up of a finite number of words.

The transfinite cardinals are labelled not by Greek, or Roman, or Chinese characters but by the Hebrew alphabet letters. The first one is called Aleph₀, that is, the countable infinity, and the next one is called Aleph₁. There arose the great question: Is the number of

points C (for continuum) on a line, the next transfinite number following the cardinal number of integers? Or is there an Aleph_1 between C and Aleph_0 ? The hypothesis that there is nothing between is technically known as "the continuum hypothesis" and if it is valid then C is Aleph_1 .

Some very clever people tried for several generations to confirm or refute the continuum hypothesis. Finally it was proven by K. Gödel — whose general studies of the problem of consistency revolutionized formal logic — and P.J. Cohen, that one can either accept (Gödel) or reject (Cohen) the continuum hypothesis. One has a consistent theory either way. The situation is similar to that which occurs with non-Euclidean versus Euclidean geometry. It is perfectly consistent either to abandon Euclid's fifth postulate concerning the existence of a unique parallel to a given line through an outside point, or to accept this postulate. In the first case we have the two consistent systems of non-Euclidean geometry and in the second case we have the consistent system of Euclidean geometry. So in the same way it is possible to have numbers in-between Aleph_0 and C or not to have such numbers. Thus we are allowed to have different consistent systems of transfinite arithmetic.

The further development of the theory of sets is very interesting. It led to a revolution in mathematics because it provides a basis for both the mathematics of the finite and the infinite. One finds the theory these days in all kinds of books, some still called 'set theory', others 'measure theory', others 'theory of real variables', and so on. All the great branches of modern mathematics — functional analysis, topology, higher algebra — have set theory at their foundation. They in turn have many applications in modern science and technology. Even in that grand old branch of mathematics, geometry, concepts which were originally taken for granted, such as 'curve', 'surface' and 'volume', have been revised. Propositions which everybody had thought were obvious, such as that a square is two-dimensional, a cube three-dimensional, and so on, had to be re-examined, and very strange results were found by the mathematicians. Using Cantor's definitions, they found all kinds of new and bizarre mathematical objects coming into the mathematical zoo. For example, they found that there are infinitely prickly curves and also curves which have non-zero areas. If we define a curve as carefully as we can by a significant definition, then there are curves which are so complex and cover so much of a plane that they have a well defined positive area. In contrast, there are domains which look two-dimensional — which look like surfaces — but which have no well defined area. This can come about because we are dealing with a region for which the boundary curve turns out to have non-zero area. Therefore, if one adds the boundary to the region one has a larger area; if one takes it away one gets a smaller area. All kinds of strange properties like this have emerged,

and the mathematicians have become very careful in their definitions and very strict in their arguments.

And so, too should we be in all formal matters. As we know, however, there are aspects of Reality which are not formalizable, and here the door must be left open to the intuition and insight by which alone the unknown may be experienced. The fact that, the set of almost all real numbers, finite though each real number may be, requires an infinite expression in terms of the integers, evokes a resonance with the deeper levels of consciousness. Likewise the existence of an unending sequence of ever higher infinities is an intimation to us of the existence of higher levels of consciousness.

Referring back to the discovery of alternative different systems of arithmetic one can hardly overestimate the importance of the discovery that "both" possibilities are true in such instances but — let it be noted — not in conjunctive affirmation, but what may be called disjunctive or complementary affirmation: There exists more than one geometry, more than one algebra, more than one transfinite arithmetic, etc. This is a good place to refer to the devastating tetralemma dialectic (Catuskoti) of the great Buddhist anti-logician Nagarjuna (1st — 2nd century A.D.). The structure of this four-cornered negation which Nagarjuna employed to knock down (in good mathematical spirit by demonstrating internal contradictions) the arguments of those who attempt to analyze reality logically is as follows: There are four alternatives:

- (i) A positive thesis
- (ii) The opposite counter thesis
- (iii) A conjunctive affirmation of the first two
- (iv) A disjunctive denial of the first two

Clearly the fruitful development of mathematics shows the possibility of another alternative, modifying number (iii): both thesis and counterthesis are true but in different systems, each self-consistent in itself. Thus might be resolved the remaining differences — subtler and lesser than the protagonists of each may have maintained — between Kashmir Shaivism or Sankara's Advaita Vedanta and Nagarjuna's Madhyamika Buddhism. Then the indescribable and translogical fullness of Shiva-Brahman and absolute subjectivity of Nirvana are complementary and equivalent.

Again, an informal response is evoked by the extraordinary theorem in formal logic which Godel proved: in every sufficiently rich formal logical system there exist unformalizable elements which can neither be proved nor disproved. Such statements are called 'undecidable statements'. (Echos of Buddha and Nagarjuna!)

This theorem means that there exist unformalizable elements in every sufficiently rich formal system. It is not surprising that

Godel's discovery is regarded as one of the most profound of our time. It is a tremendous revelation to modern man that formal logic can prove its own limitations. One feels that this discovery is connected in a deep way with the principle which appears over and over again in Vedic science and in the entire Eastern traditional world view: the principle of inclusion or co-existence of opposites or, sometimes, the co-nonexistence of opposites. For example, the great Hymn of Creation in the Rig Veda begins: 'There was not non-existence, there was not existence at that time . . .,' One does indeed feel that an ancient door has been opened again by such theorems as Godel's theorem. There is some profound nuance of meaning in that the principle of inclusion of opposites makes its appearance centrally in the ordering of those very infinities which provides such an evocative parallel to higher states of consciousness.

As Dr. Wolff himself has described it¹ his realizations came in five stages. The first stage can be summarized in the statement: "I am Atman" (universal consciousness — wherein the usual "point-I" has expanded to an "illimitable sphere" containing all objects); the second: "I am Nirvana" (pure subjective consciousness—context without content); the third: Substantiality is inversely proportional to ponderability ("reality is inversely proportional to appearance" or objects are structures of "lessness" not "moreness" in the fundamental field of reality — an insight which goes with "a state of inconceivable delight"). The fourth and fifth realizations which he denotes as "transcendental" relative to the first three are: "I am Atman" (in a profounder sense than the first — involving the actuality of the mystic death and disappearance of the difference between all selves) and the "High Indifference". Dr. Wolff does not assert that these five stages in the evolution of consciousness constitute the whole of truth. He is open to the possibility that there is an infinite sequence of ever more comprehensive levels of consciousness analogous to the sequence of ever increasing transfinite numbers. And we should remember the enormous subtlety of each of these infinite levels. As we have seen a part can be equal to the whole for each of the levels of infinite systems, which is reassurance to all of us because at any given level our consciousness is a part of the whole. And we can only be part of the whole and equal to the whole if we are infinite; so there is an ultimate truth.

THE INTROCEPTIVE COGNITION, SHAIIVISM AND MODERN PHYSICS

¹ The quoted phrases in this paragraph are taken from an abstract of his philosophy given by Dr. Wolff in a tape recorded at Lone Pine on July 12, 1975.

A further remarkable parallelism, which I think will make a lot of difference in the future evolution of Yogic thought, is that the concepts implicit in Dr. Wolff's cognitions come very close both to the grandfather spiritual tradition from India — Shaivism or Shakta Vedānta — and modern physics. The present scientific picture of the physical world can be described as being in terms of fundamental entities and interactions. The entities are of two types: matter and radiation. (The entities of radiation travel with the speed of light — the entities of matter with a lesser speed.) The entities are often called "particles" but actually they have aspects of vibrational patterns so that we can just call them "entities". Similarly the processes of Nature are often described as based on "forces" but actually a better word for the basic processes is "interactions". The most fundamental theory of the elementary entities and interactions that we have is the Quantum Field Theory. The central concept in this theory is that of the field, which exists everywhere and everywhen and which contains the potentiality of all possible states or conditions in the universe. Of these states the most fundamental is the Ground State (or "vacuum" state) out of which everything — the totality of "excited states" — arises by creation processes and into which everything subsides by absorption processes. The ground state is characterized by the fact that it stretches to infinity uniform and changeless. It is the same everywhere and everywhen. In contrast to every other state it never changes under any process. One can expect that some day the universal quantum field will be recognized as the physical aspect of the Universal Consciousness — Chit or Brahman or transcendent Shiva-Shakti; the ground state will be recognized as the physical aspect of Nirvana or immanent Shiva (Nirvishesha) and the totality of excited states as the physical aspect of Shakti (Atman or Savishesha).

The universal quantum field could be likened to a great cosmic piano capable of playing an infinity of tones and combinations thereof. The ground state, or immanent Shiva, would then be represented by that state in which the piano is quiet; no tone is being sounded. What about Shakti or the dynamic aspect of the Atman in modern physical science? All fundamental processes or 'interactions going on in the physical world are also described in quantum field theory. All the elementary entities of matter and radiation arise out of the ground state by the application of creation operators (analogous to the piano keys which are struck to make a tone sound). Then there are sustaining operators — which are called "propagators" in the technical language — which apply during the time of manifestation of the entity. (These correspond to the piano pedals which, as long as they are applied keep tones sounding.) Then there are the absorption operators, one for each creation operator, which cause the entity to disappear. (These would be represented in the piano analogy by dampers — one for each key.)

The correspondance of these with three of the fundamental five "deeds" or processes ascribed to Shiva-Shakti as basic attributes in all Shaivite philosophy, is striking. For instance, with a slight change of order, these are (1), (2), and (3) in the classic Tantra text, Svachchanda, which then reads (1st Patal, 3rd verse): "(I bow to the) Divine who brings about (1) emanation (srsti), (2) re-absorption (sanihara) (3) maintenance (of the world) (sthiti), (4) concealment (vilaya), who dispenses (5) grace (anugraha), destroying the affliction of those who have bowed down (to Him)". Or as stated in that great classic of Siddha Yoga, Pratyabhijnahridayam [The (Heart) Secret of Recognition] Sutra 11 (again changing the order slightly): "Manifesting, experiencing as self, relishing, settling of the seed, dissolution."¹ Though there is striking agreement with three out of the five, it is to be noted that the correspondents of two of the fundamental process in the "five-fold act" are missing in the present quantum field theory.

By contrast the correspondence between Franklin Merrell-Wolff's stages of realization and the five-fold act of Universal Consciousness seems to be complete: The first three stages where a (non-egoistic) center was still evident, correspond to the processes of emanating — manifesting, reabsorption — experiencing-as-self, and maintaining — relishing of the world. The last two stages, comprising the decentering process — the mystic death and return to the universal field with a state of "well-nigh inconceivable delight" turning to High Indifference — correspond to settling of the seed and the grace-bestowing limitation-destroying dissolution of the center. Or if, once again, we may use the language of physics — perhaps in its future — this marks the return to the universal field to whom the values of the ground state and excited states are all one.

¹ Pratyabhijna Hridayam ed. by Jaidev Singh (Motilal Banersides, Delhi, India — 1963). The translation given here is from Appendix II of Introduction to Kashmir Shaivism by Swami Tejomayananda (S.Y.D.A. Foundation, P. O. Box 11071, Oakland, CA 94611). An extraordinary experiential account of Kashmirshaivism in practice is given by Swami Muktananda in his Play of Consciousness, Harper & Row, N.Y. 1978.

Introduction

Religion, Philosophy and Psychology: these three orientations of human consciousness in their total range and meaning embrace fields of interest or attitude that are, in considerable measure, identical, but each extends into zones which are more or less disparate. Thus, the distinctive quale of religion remains forever outside the zones of philosophy and psychology, so long as the latter are conceived in their purity as abstracted from the concrete totality of consciousness. But it is no less true that much of psychology is concerned with psychical and psycho-physical fact and process which is of entirely neutral concern with respect to the religious attitude, and, likewise, has little or no value for philosophical integration. Finally, philosophy expresses a mode of consciousness which is not reducible in its inner content to any possible psychology, however much its functions employed may be objects of psychological interest, and which is, in many respects, quite neutral with respect to the religious quale. But there is a common area of human attitude and interest wherein these three fields of human interest and function overlap and intersect, and it is just in this common field that we find the most vital and persistent problems and concerns which have compelled the attention of man in all times and places. We are probably quite safe in saying that all problems and interests which lie outside this common zone are, relatively, of only secondary or of transitory interest and significance. Thus if mankind could conceivably solve all of these secondary and transitory problems, but failed in dealing with the concerns of the common field, then it would have failed in the most profound sense and would find its successes empty and futile. For while the successes might mean a conquest of a world and the preservation of a vital animal existence, yet the adjustments necessary to a healthy and happy soul would be lacking and the basis for a higher culture would be lost, and, therefore, the achievements, such as they might be, would be but a vain success. A world thus conquered and possessed and a vital life thus maintained would be empty and valueless, with nothing to offer for inner adjustment or to serve the yearning soul. So, before and beyond all

other considerations, we must face and master, if possible, the great common concerns which lie equally before philosophy, religion and psychology, giving to other affairs the residual attention which is their due. Succeeding in this, we may die early or late, rich or poor in outer possessions, with much or little factual information, but in any case Victor in the larger issues.

In the the earlier book, The Philosophy of Consciousness Without an Object there was described, at some length and in considerable detail, an instance of a transformation in consciousness, which is, unquestionably, part and parcel of the central religious problem, as that problem is understood by the greater religions. But it is equally a problem of profound concern for that phase of psychology which has sometimes been called "meta-psychology". Finally, it implies a theory of knowledge and a metaphysics and, therefore, affords a subject-matter for philosophy. Thus this transformation satisfies the conditions which place it within the zone of coalescence of religion, philosophy and psychology, and gives to it a value that may well be of central importance.

In the present work it is proposed to devote the primary attention to the philosophical implications which the psychological and religious aspects occupying only a subsidiary position. It is not intended to depreciate either the religious or psychological values and attitudes in any ultimate sense, but merely to subordinate them for the present purposes. The question as to which of these three deals with the most fundamental problems, interests or attitudes is not raised at all. Probably, the relative valuation of these three can never be separated from human subjectivity, so that always some will value the one more than the other two, and yet there will always be those who give a reversed valuation. Perhaps it is pertinent to an evaluation of the whole present discussion that the writer should acknowledge that, for him, the problem of transformation has always appeared as primarily a question of philosophy, with the religious quale present as undertone, while the pertinent psychological interest in the transformation developed mainly after the event. The factors which played the leading part in the individual consciousness before the event were primarily philosophical, so that philosophy enters the picture as an effective agent and not exclusively as an interpretation afterwards. But spontaneous — i.e., not individually and consciously willed — factors entered into the total picture, with the result that a final world-view emerged which is not identical with the one which helped to initiate the transformation process. In some sense or degree, there is incorporated or permitted within the present system of thought something of all the leading current philosophical schools, whereas the earlier orientation was almost exclusively Idealistic. Withal, this broadening and modifying effect, the Idealistic orientation was most largely confirmed. Yet, the present philosophy does not seem to be completely congruent with any other extant

system. Thus, for example, the present system is non-relativistic in its profoundest ramifications and yet it may not be called absolutistic, if the latter term is to be understood as predicating that the Ultimate is an absolute Being. The Root of All is conceived, not as an Absolute, but as an unconditioned Non-Relative, which may be viewed as an Absoluteness which is ever unknowable to relative consciousness, but which may be Realized through a process that essentially cancels relative cognition.

No orientation which properly may be called philosophical may ignore or disparage the functions of logic. But philosophy is more than bare logic, for the reason that it deals with content in some sense that is not exclusively identical with pure logic. The formal or logical relations which unite variables are necessary but not sufficient for the formation of a real philosophy. A real or vital philosophy, of necessity, must give to these variables some particular or general valuation or meaning. But these valuations or meanings cannot be derived by logic operating exclusively by itself. Something more is required. Now, this "something more" transcends the necessities of logic and may well open the door to all those human yearnings and needs that would be closed if the necessitarianism of logic alone were valid. When both are properly understood, religious need and human purpose do not require the repudiation of logical necessity in order to realize their proper freedom. We can build conceptual figures which unite apparently incompatible lines of development, or forms of experience, and logical requirements by introducing the notion of multiple dimensions. Thus, while within its own dimension, logic has the final say and wields an unequivocal authority, but the variables which enter into logical relations may have any degree of extra-logical development within other dimensions. Hence, it is quite conceivable that certain attitudes, interests or modes of consciousness may focus themselves in dimensions wherein logic is quite irrelevant, yet this fact would not at all render necessary a repudiation of the authority of logic within its own realm. However, an attitude to which logic is irrelevant is simply not philosophy, though it may form part of the subject-matter of philosophy. The philosopher, perforce, must think and produce within the framework of logic as one of his determinants, though he may carry into this structure extra-logical components of unlimited richness and variety.

The content, quality, mode or way of consciousness which is the ultimate product of the transformation process, previously reported, will supply here the particular valuation or content given to the logical variables insofar as such material may be conceived as an instance of terms in relation or of implicatory development. All this is a content or material given through immediacy. But, whereas the immediate material which enters into by far the greater part of philosophic literature is of the nature of experiential data of quite wide general occurrence in the consciousness of human individuals, it must be recognized that much of the material which is introduced here is not part of widely common experience.

To be sure, much of it is not without representation in extant and even current literature, but these literary references are, relatively, far from numerous, and they are often distinctly obscure and baffling to the rational mind. A large proportion of the immediacy which is here the primary referent is not a sensible datum, but rather implies the activity of some function of consciousness other than the four which supply most of the content of modern analytic psychology.¹ As a consequence, we are faced with a real practical difficulty. The typical content of philosophy is not a self-determined whole. There is, in the formulation, an inevitable reference to a meaning which derives its content from the congruence of experience common to both the writer and the reader. Philosophy is not written like rigorous and formal mathematics wherein all implicit intuitions are thoroughly expunged. Thus the reader understands a philosophy — as far as he does understand it — because of a content immediately known and beyond the word, and which is known as well and in the same sense by the writer. This, together with logic, supplies the common domain of discourse essential for the uniting of the writer and the reader. But when the philosophical content becomes available only through a psychical function which is not commonly active, then, in general, the philosophical writer and the reader will not hold much more in common than the logical structure of the discourse. This, in turn, places the critic at a real disadvantage, for, while he may supply a critique of the purely formal logical structures, he often will prove unqualified in an evaluation of the immediate content itself. If the requisite psychical function is not in some measure active within his own consciousness, he can neither affirm nor deny the actuality of the immediate content in other than arbitrary or dogmatic terms, since for him the affirmed content is not known immediately, and, therefore, the material — as distinguished from formal or logical relations — must fall short of being wholly clear.

Much of the criticism of philosophic Idealism centers in the contention that this philosophy has developed into an airy abstraction wherein nothing but a formal statement without real content remains. In terms that William James has made famous in philosophic literature, Idealism has seemed to many to have become so "thin" that it has lost all substantiality whatsoever. This would seem to imply that James views Idealism as a formal philosophy without real content. Now, if we are to view all content as necessarily being of a sensible or experiential nature, then there is much justice in James' criticism. Idealism in its ultimate and most rigorous formulation is, in high degree, empirically empty. But there remains the question whether empiric emptiness implies emptiness in every sense. The thesis here is that such is not the case

¹ The four are Thinking, Feeling, Sensation and Intuition. See C. G. Jung's Psychological Types, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. (1971).

but, rather, that through a latent psychical function, non-empiric but substantial content may be realized in a sense that is not less compelling than immediate experience — it being understood that the word "experience" is limited in its reference to a psychical state or modification of consciousness produced by sensation in the time-stream. To one who is oriented to the trans-experiential content, the apparently empty abstractionism of rigorous Idealism may become transformed into an abundant fullness and "thickness", in contrast with which it is just precisely the empiric philosophies that tend to seem empty, shallow and "thin". Since I have known this to be the case in my own private reading of Idealistic philosophies, I feel justified in suspecting that the Idealistic philosophers — or, at least, some of them — refer to a content which is not explicit in their systems. In a word, it appears that there is more in back of these systems than the formal logical structure which is available for the critical evaluation of all readers. Thus, Idealism may be an expression which is true to its own substantial and immediately realized meaning, and so have a value in the supermundane sense greater than that of any other school of Western philosophy.

Some proponents of objective Absolute Idealism have endeavored to establish their thesis as a necessity which may be made manifest by a sufficiently acute analysis of the common elements of consciousness. But criticism seems to have established very clearly that this endeavor has failed. It does not appear that it is possible to derive from the common features of a mundane consciousness either the actuality or the necessity of a supermundane consciousness. The attempt to do so is an analogue of inductive reasoning which never can prove the universal validity of its generalizations. From the base of a transcendent consciousness it may be possible to infer the actuality, or, at least, the possibility, of a derived mundane consciousness, but from the latter as an initial premise it is impossible to deduce a more comprehensive root-source. Hence, one either knows the Transcendental Reality immediately or he does not know It at all, and consequently such a Reality is not discursively provable from the ground of common experience. It can be speculatively affirmed, but this is less than knowledge, though consequences may be deduced from the affirmation which may be verifiable. It must be Realized to be known. Therefore, the effort to establish the thesis of Idealism by dialectics alone is bound to fail.

But if the effort to establish the thesis of Idealism by dialectics has failed, we are left with but two alternatives; either we must abandon the thesis entirely or ground it upon the authority of direct Realization which is an outcome of a transformation in individual consciousness. We are thus forced to face the question: Is it a valid endeavor to formulate a philosophy which is oriented to a private Realization which is held in common with a small minority of fellow human beings? No doubt this question is debatable. Clearly, if the private

Realization had no chance of receiving a sympathetic response in the heart or mind of any other human being, there would be little reason for producing a philosophic formulation, save as an act of artistic production. But if one searches the appropriate literature he will find that this private Realization is not so private as at first it may appear, for there are others who have written from the base of comparable realizations, and that which some among the human whole have realized is, by the sheer fact of the realization itself, shown to be a possibility of the human psyche as such. To learn of this possibility may, indeed, be enough to supply the impulse toward further instances of Self-Awakening, or may strengthen the assurance of those who have had partial glimpses of a Beyond but are not yet well grounded on the new Base. To be sure, this purpose may be achieved through art, poetry, religious practice and other non-philosophic means, but it still remains true that for some natures the Path to Self-Realization or to the Higher Consciousness is through philosophy. These facts would seem to justify an affirmative answer to the question.

In any case, if it is once granted that there is, or may be, another way of consciousness, outside the field of common experience, then this is a matter of real concern for any psychology or philosophy which seeks to achieve a comprehensive view of all the possibilities of consciousness. Of course, it is possible to build philosophies and psychologies upon the bases of arbitrary assumptions which exclude from the first the possibility of the Realization of a Transcendent Reality, but this would be valid only as a conceptual exercise. Thus, we may say: "Let us assume mechanism as a universally and comprehensively valid principle and see what consequences follow." From this we would derive some form of Naturalistic philosophy, and this might prove to be an interesting, and, in some measure, useful excursion. But it is quite another matter when one, instead of assuming, dogmatically affirms mechanism as universally and comprehensively valid. Such a standpoint is at once seriously challenged when any individual says: "I have immediate knowledge of that which cannot be comprehended within the limits of mechanism." Likewise, one may assume the standpoint which affirms the categories of empiric life as fundamental and from this derive the anti-intellectualistic instrumentalism of pragmatism. The resultant philosophies are unquestionably valid for considerable sectors of experience and thought. But when such presuppositions are taken as universally and exclusively valid, they arbitrarily rule out standpoints from which Mechanism and Pragmatism are seen to have a validity which is only derivative and partial. Affirmation of acquaintance with such larger perspectives at once challenges the universal validity of the lesser standpoints. Thus, if there is a perspective from which the whole of empiric life may be viewed as derivative and but a partial manifestation of a larger Reality, then Pragmatism would have only a pragmatic validity, i. e., a stepping stone to something more durable, and

only that. Finally, it is possible to assume that ultimate reality is such that it makes no difference whether it is known or not. With the Neo-Realists, one may say that this reality can enter into relations with consciousness, or can be considered in relation to consciousness, and, yet, again be treated as quite independent of consciousness, in either case remaining unaltered in its own nature. But here we have little more than a logical exercise relative to an essentially unknown and unknowable somewhat since knowledge cannot be derived from beyond the field of consciousness. To be sure, this point of view may well have some pragmatic utility, but it does not wield metaphysical authority. As a universal and exclusively valid philosophy, it would deny forever all hope to those who yearn for certainty, giving in place of this the inflated and unsecured currency of mere probable or possible truth. He who says, "I KNOW", challenges all this.

In what follows it will not be attempted to prove a point of view as the only possible or valid one. It is granted that human beings may be scrupulously logical and think otherwise. But it is also insisted that a Realization in Consciousness which finds no place or adequate recognition in other systems proves the inadequacy of these. The universally valid system, if such may ever be found or created, must embrace the rarer contents of consciousness as well as those which form the mass of common experience. It is proposed here to present the outlines of a system which, while not excluding the contents of the more common experience, yet embraces the wider ranges opened by the Door of Realization. But, first, to prepare the ground and to make evident the need of a further formulation, there will be a brief survey of the principal schools of modern Western philosophy, with a view to showing wherein they fall short of adequacy as a philosophic form for the present purposes.

PART I

THE FOUR SCHOOLS OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY

Chapter I

Introduction to Part I

When human consciousness at some time in the unknown past reached that point in its development where it turned a reflective vision upon its experience, taken as a comprehensive totality, it early discovered two seemingly opposed, yet complementary, components which are ineluctible parts, like poles, of that totality. These we know today as Spirit and Matter, or as Purusha and Prakriti, in the terminology that is most widely employed. Reflective man, ever conditioned by his own individual psychology, has tended to realize and value one or the other of these components most completely. Some, indeed, have seen them as interdependences inhering in some common root, while others, less integral in their vision, have seemed to find the ultimate in the one or the other pole. And even those with the more integral vision have tended to accentuate the one or the other component. Inevitably, then, when man became philosophically conscious he tended to divide into schools of thought in which the common denominator of emphasis or even exclusive recognition was either Matter or Spirit, however these two may have been conceived. Thus even a casual perusal of the history of philosophy leaves the student with the strong impression that there are always, in varying terms and forms, two main patterns conditioning the orientation of the world view of reflective man.

In modern Western terminology the division and contrast between these diverse lines of philosophic orientation are commonly represented by words such as Materialism, Naturalism, Realism, standing in contrast to Spiritualism, Idealism and Subjectivism. In schools of thought these diverging and opposed orientations are most forcibly represented in the modern West as Naturalism and Idealism, the former lying closer to science and the latter to religion. But, in addition to these most radically contrasting systems of philosophy, within recent decades two other schools have arisen which occupy positions intermediate between the more extreme formulations. One of these, Neo-Realism, occupies a position definitely closer to Naturalism than to Idealism, but conceives its objective reality as something considerably more subtle than that of Naturalism, while the other, Pragmatism, diverges from Neo-Realism to a viewpoint rather closer to Idealism, though definitely less absolutistic and more empiric than the latter. These two later schools may be said to be more humanistic than the older and more classical ways of thought, in that they more definitely restrict themselves to the actual human processes of cognition, feeling, conation, with the corresponding contents and valuations. In any case the

divisions between these various schools are sufficiently notable to justify a four-fold classification, based upon a root two-fold division.

All these systems or ways of thinking bring into relief by accentuation authentic elements or complexes which are to be found in actual human experience or consciousness. Thus none may be wholly neglected and a truly synthetic philosophy, when and if it is ever written, must do justice to, or at least find room for, the positive values of each. But there is a strong tendency on the part of representatives of these various schools to formulate their positions in more or less exclusive or privative terms, and this produces features which must be expunged if there ever is to be a synthetic system. It is proposed here to examine the primary features—i.e., those held in common by various representatives of a school—of these various schools, with the central purpose of showing in what respect they are adequate for the purpose of an integration sufficiently comprehensive to embrace the values and knowledge derived from Gnostic Realization. The purpose of this is to clear the ground for the formulation which will follow, and, as well, to show that a need for such new formulation exists. The discussion will start with Naturalism, pass through Neo-Realism, Pragmatism and Idealism, culminating in Introceptionalism, the term by which I have designated the systematic contribution, which is in some sense and degree new.

Chapter II

NATURALISM

Naturalism, as it is understood in philosophical usage, has three distinguishable connotations, all of which have in common the meaning of an attempted speculative explanation of every component of experience by means of existences and forces which are viewed as natural or mundane, the latter conceptions being understood as excluding everything which may be regarded as spiritual or transcendental. The three meanings of the term may be classified as, (a) general, (b) Materialism and (c) Positivism. We shall proceed to a brief consideration of these three meanings.

(a) In its more general and less objectionable sense, Naturalism is the view which attempts to explain everything by reference to natural causes or processes in the sense of that which is normal. It thus eliminates as a factor in explanation any event or process which may be called supernatural or supernormal. It consequently excludes any interpretation which may be based upon the miraculous, mystical insight, or enlightenment, and, in general, any factor which may be viewed as transcendental. But, in this sense, Naturalism does not imply an attempt to explain everything in exclusively physical terms, particularly mechanistic physical terms. Mental and biological phenomena, as they are found to exist normally, are accepted as natural, though unreducible to ultimate physical conceptions. Thus, the emphasis is upon the norm rather than upon the conception of the ultimate reducibility of everything to matter and force. Naturalism, in this sense, is very widespread and appears to be the normal view among the professional classes whose orientation is to natural science either in the pure or applied sense.

Naturalism, in this most general sense, can and does have positive value as long as it is viewed as no more than an heuristic principle. It often serves as a salutary protection against over-imaginative and superstitious tendencies and attitudes, which are often far from wholesome. But this positive value is lost and this Naturalism may and does become actively malicious when, instead of serving as a simple heuristic principle, it is raised to the dogmatic thesis that the natural is the all in all—capable of serving as the ground of interpretation of all elements and complexes of human experience.

The naturalistic attitude is of very wide occurrence among biologists, psychologists and sociologists of the present day, as well as in the engineering profession. But it appears as an interesting and very

significant fact that the naturalistic tendency appears to be weakening among those who form the vanguard of that most advanced of natural sciences, i.e., physics. Much in modern physics sounds even more like Transcendentalism than like Naturalism. Perhaps the other professional groups may discover the implications of this tendency in another century or so.

(b) In contrast to Naturalism in the first sense, that may mean only an heuristic attitude, Materialism is a metaphysical theory. It is "that metaphysical theory which regards all the facts of the universe as sufficiently explained by the assumption of body and matter, conceived as extended, impenetrable, eternally existent, and susceptible of movement or change of relative position." In particular, Materialism attempts to explain all phenomena, including psychical phenomena and the phenomena of consciousness in general, in terms of transformations of material molecules. They were Materialists who said that thought was secreted by the brain as bile is secreted by the liver and that man is what he eats. On the whole, the materialistic philosophy is so crude, undiscerning and uncritical that it scarcely rates serious philosophical attention. Today, pure natural scientists, though often Naturalists in the philosophical sense, only exceptionally are crude Materialists, for they know too well the essentially postulational character of their concepts to fall into the error of hypostatizing them into absolute metaphysical existences.

However, while free scientists are rarely philosophical Materialists, nonetheless, Materialism is today of enormous importance in the field of sociological theory and practice. The vast current of Marxism or so-called scientific socialism is explicitly and dynamically materialistic. In fact, it is even designated "Dialectic Materialism". But here we have a materialism which is not quite identical with the mechanistic materialism of the above definition, nor is it wholly identical with the biological materialism that has grown out of the findings and teaching of Charles Darwin. However, Marxism is explicitly materialistic in three specific senses which are of philosophical importance:

1. It affirms an anti-positivistic, realistic epistemology. The meaning intended is rendered explicit by a quotation from Lenin, who has said: "For the sole 'property' of matter—with the recognition of which materialism is vitally concerned—is the property of being objective reality, of existing outside our cognition." While the phrase "existing outside our cognition" does not by itself necessarily mean existing outside consciousness in every sense, yet the

¹ Quoted from Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. II p.45.

general context of dialectic materialism reveals that this is implied. Further, since the standpoint is non-positivistic, the complete implication is of an independent self-existent matter. This is enough to define an essential materialism.

2. Marxism especially affirms a dialectical movement in nature and society which is explicitly conceived in the materialistic sense. The conception of the dialectical movement was taken from the philosophy of Hegel but given a radically inverted meaning. This is evident from the following quotation from Karl Marx: "For Hegel the thought process, which he transforms into an independent subject under the name idea, is the creator of the real, which forms only its external manifestation. With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material transformed and translated in the human brain."¹

3. Marxism affirms the labor theory of value, which means that value is produced by labor in such a sense that all productive activity, whether manual or mental, can be reduced to some multiple of the simplest form of manual production. This conception is by no means original with Marx, but its implications are carried out by him with the greatest consistency. It stands opposed to the psychological theory of value in which it is affirmed that it is human desire which gives value to produced objects, a view essentially non-materialistic since a factor in consciousness is regarded as the value-producing determinant. One consequence of this view is that, in the Marxist program, exercise of individual wish or preference in the consumption of economic objects tends to be curbed, since the value of what is to be consumed is produced by labor, not by the desire of the consumer.

While most ideological Materialism, as distinguished from practical non-reflective materialism, is not an important social or philosophical force, yet in the Marxist form it is today an extremely important social, political and economic movement. We have now a rare opportunity for observing just what materialism in action can and does mean. The ethical characteristics of this movement, as actually revealed, are not something extraneous added to the original idea. The student of dialectic materialism, who is familiar with the enunciations of Marx and Lenin, is rather impressed with the consistency of the development. We have, indeed, a rare opportunity for a pragmatic evaluation of materialism in action.

(c) The third, and philosophically more important form of Naturalism, is that which is known as Positivism. Positivism differs from Materialism in that it does not hypostatize the conceptual entities of physical science into substantive metaphysical existences. It is no less grounded upon natural science than Materialism, but it may be said to

¹ Quoted from article on "Socialism" in ninth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica.

be oriented to the method of science rather than to the substantive content of science. It is essentially "the theory that the whole of the universe or of experience may be accounted for by a method like that of the physical sciences, and with recourse only to the current conceptions of physical and natural science; more specifically, that mental and moral processes may be reduced to the terms and categories of the natural sciences. It is best defined negatively as that which excludes everything distinctly spiritual or transcendental."¹ It is thus evident that Positivism excludes, in theory at least, from the realm of valid knowledge every element that is a priori or speculative. Also, since it views the terms, categories and methods of science as the exclusively valid source of knowledge, it provides no place for a kind of knowledge which may be derived from a third or other ways of cognition.

Commonly the word "Positivism" is associated most closely with the name of Auguste Comte but, in terms of the more generalized meaning given here, it is not so restricted. Thus, in this wider sense, Locke, Hume and Spencer are Positivists, as well as several other thinkers who, while naturalistic in their orientation, are yet too critical in their thinking to fall into the naive errors of Materialism. Positivism may be said to differ from naturalism in the first sense largely in that it is more systematically and philosophically developed.

Of all philosophies, Positivism is probably most closely married to natural science. However, it differs from the special sciences in that it extends or extrapolates their methods into ultimately and exclusively valid means for the attainment of knowledge. The program of the special sciences is much less pretentious in that each merely integrates its knowledge of fact by means of hypothesized postulates which possess only a pragmatic validity that may, indeed, have no more than a transitory life. Thus the special sciences cannot lay claim to having discovered the central truth of phenomena but only warranted assertibility, to use the term of John Dewey. The question as to whether warranted assertibility is the final possibility of knowledge cannot be answered by any of the special sciences. This is preeminently a question for philosophy, and, before the latter can hope to achieve an ultimately satisfactory answer, it must at least consider the claim that there is such a thing as a mystic or gnostic cognition falling quite outside the methodology of all natural science. At any rate, Positivism is a philosophy which, basing itself on scientific method, affirms that the warranted assertibility of science is the last word of positive knowledge that is possible.

Positivism does not so much assert that there is no metaphysical or noumenal reality as take an agnostic attitude with

¹ Quoted from Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy & Psychology, Vol. II P.137

respect to the possibility of such an existence. At times, as in the case of Spencer, it is simply called the Unknowable, and then dropped as not relevant for human concerns. We can readily agree that such a noumenal Reality is unknowable by the cognitive methods of natural science, and if the Positivist meant no more than this he would be correct enough. But he goes further and both dogmatically and arbitrarily affirms that the scientific form of cognition is the only possible form of cognition, and thus the unknowable for natural science is an absolute Unknowable of which we cannot even predicate substantive existence.

A critique of Positivism involves more than a critique of natural science, for the latter critique does not resolve the question as to whether the scientific form of cognition is the only possible form of knowledge. It gives a delimitation and evaluation of scientific knowledge as such, and, in general, affords us an objective perspective with respect to it. It can be contrasted with other, at least supposed, kinds of knowledge such as Gnosticism, and so we are enabled to see just what science is. So far we have determined that warranted assertibility is the last word of natural science, but we have not ascertained that warranted assertibility is the final possibility of all knowledge. However, it is just the question as to whether warranted assertibility is final that constitutes the crux of the critique of Positivism and, indeed, of Naturalism as a whole. In general, the Positivists have not dealt with this question, or at least they have not done so adequately.

One may perhaps suggest that it is possible to investigate the problem as to whether there is an extra-scientific way of knowledge in the scientific spirit. Would not such a procedure be more in conformity with the fundamental assumption of Positivism than that of dogmatic affirmation without investigation? A way or ways of cognition could conceivably be a proper object of scientific study. To be sure, a positive finding of such a study would be in the form of a warranted assertibility, since this is all that scientific method can give, but it would be a scientific recognition that a way of cognition other than scientific cognition probably exists. And such a recognition would give the same justification for at least the attempt in the form of practical procedure in terms of the probably existent way of cognition that science gives for such procedure in other fields. Such an additional way of cognition could not become part and parcel of scientific cognition altering the form and nature of scientific knowledge more or less radically, but at least the factuality of other possibilities of cognition would be determined as far as is possible for natural science.

As a matter of fact, there exists today, and has existed for some years, a study of the type suggested above. I refer to the investigation of extra-sensory perception. The subject-matter of this study has embraced telepathy, clairvoyance, pre-cognition and telekinesis, and, while these supposed functions or faculties involve less than the cognition implied in the notion of a gnostic knowledge, yet,

if existent, they transcend in their content and procedure the way of cognition of natural science. The results of this investigation to date have been strongly positive, but the conclusions have been reported in the form of a warranted assertibility rather than as a categorical judgment, as is quite sound. But the degree of assertibility is represented as an explicit mathematical probability which is rendered possible by the methods employed. It is difficult to see how the results of these experiments can be seriously questioned as long as the theory of the mathematics of probability is viewed as sound. The final consequence of this research is that we may view the factuality of extra-sensory perception as scientifically established to a degree of reliability that is not inferior to much of the body of general scientific knowledge.

What becomes of the positivistic assumption that the only type of possible knowledge is the scientific kind of knowledge when science establishes, in the sense of this knowledge, the factuality of a non-scientific type of knowledge? For now doubting the factuality of this non-scientific kind of knowledge implies a doubt of the reliability of scientific knowledge itself. There are those who have found this dilemma quite disturbing. The alternatives are either a thorough going agnosticism with respect to all cognition, including scientific knowledge, or the positive acceptance in principle of non-scientific cognition along with scientific knowledge.

The conclusion which seems to be constrained by the foregoing argument is that Positivism, in so far as it asserts or implies the categorical denial of the possibility of a metaphysical, transcendental or spiritual knowledge, is simply unsound, and stands condemned by the voice of the science to which it appeals for its authority. For the establishment by scientific method of the factuality of a non-scientific kind of cognition of any sort simply forces ajar the door of possibility for any other sort of non-scientific cognition for which existential claims may be advanced, particularly if made by individuals of proven intellectual competency. However, Positivism may well remain valid as an heuristic attitude, provided it is reasonably flexible; and it may render valuable service as a check against a too active and too credulous will-to-believe. Beyond all doubt, scientific method is a valuable monitor of human cognition so long as it does not presumptuously arrogate to itself the voice of an authoritarian dictator.

Viewing Naturalism as a whole, rather than in terms of its three specific forms, we can identify its general cardinal principle as Realism. By Realism in the modern, as distinguished from the medieval, sense is meant "the doctrine that reality exists apart from its presentation to, or conception by, consciousness; or that if, as a matter of fact, it has no separate existence to the divine consciousness, it is

not in virtue of anything appertaining to consciousness as such."¹ Realism is the view that ultimate reality is not consciousness nor dependent upon consciousness for its existence. But Realism is not simply another name for Naturalism, as it has a much wider comprehension; in fact, the philosophic school known as the New Realism and the, perhaps, more developed wing of Pragmatism would have to be classified with Naturalism in this respect. Of the three schools, Naturalism is the most obviously and intensely realistic, and thus stands at the opposite pole with respect to Idealism. Also, of all the types of philosophy which have developed in the West, it stands in the strongest contrast to the thesis affirmed in the second part of the present work. It will, therefore, be necessary to prepare the ground for the present philosophy by a polemical examination of these opposed realistic systems, but inasmuch as this critique will be centered upon the realistic standpoint, as such, it is postponed until we take up the discussion of the New Realism.

As is in general true of all schools of philosophy, Naturalism has features in which it is relatively strong and offers a positive contribution and even attitude, but it is no less marked by inadequacy with respect to its treatment and offering in other respects. With regard to its contribution relative to the factual or empiric side of science, it does have a degree of positive value, provided its too categorical and unsound generalizations are properly pruned. But even as a development grounded in natural science, Naturalism fails to consider, or at least to consider adequately, phases or aspects or perspectives which are ineluctable parts of the total discipline or meaning which we agree to call science, and which are of no less importance than the empiric or factual. Science is not simply a body of empiric fact; it is, as well, a logically organized conceptual system, grounded upon a particular kind of orientation of consciousness. It is thus a compound of fact, system and orientation. As a consequence, an adequate scientifically grounded philosophy must deal with the systematic and orientational as well as the factual aspects of the scientific totality. It must incorporate a critique and due appreciation of the orientational and systematic, or logical, components as well as an appreciation of the purely factual. This Naturalism fails to do, or at least fails to do in adequate terms. By this it is not meant that Naturalistic philosophers lack orientation or are necessarily deficient in logical capacity, but rather, that they fail, more or less completely, to consider logic and orientation as objects for critical examination and evaluation. In this respect the three remaining schools of philosophy are more complete, and, therefore, sounder.

¹ Quoted from Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. II p.45.

Even as a philosophy based upon the factual side of science, Naturalism, in the technical sense, is incomplete, for its general orientation is to those branches of science known as "physical". It would be possible for a naturalistic philosophy to be oriented to the biological sciences, or even to the sum-total of all forms of science. We would thus have a broader and sounder Naturalism, and, in fact, we do find a considerable degree of this enriched Naturalism in both Neo-Realism and Pragmatism. Indeed, much of Pragmatism may be viewed as a Naturalism primarily based upon the biological sciences. But in this respect technical Naturalism is highly deficient.

If we are to consider man in the totality of his consciousness, experience, interest, attitude, etc., as constituting the proper subject-matter for philosophy, then any philosophic system which is exclusively oriented to the scientific dimension of human-interest is far from complete. For human consciousness as a comprehensive whole cannot be equated with that part of it which is scientific in its orientation. Man is a vital and mental being as well as an embodied creature, and in these larger dimensions of his nature he has interests and attitudes, both rational and irrational, that are not comprehensively embraced by the scientific dimension of his total interest. Thus there are dimensions of human consciousness, such as the ethical, aesthetic, the spiritual or religious, etc., that are essentially other than science. To be sure, all these aspects of the complete consciousness of man, with their objective manifestations, may be and have been objects for scientific study. But the last word of science here is of value only as giving objective factuality and nothing of the inner meaning. On the other hand, philosophy is in duty bound to deal, in so far as lies in its power, with this inner content as well as with the objective factuality. In this respect Naturalism, in the technical sense, is almost a complete failure. References to this other side of man are to be found in the writings of the Naturalists but not in such a way as true insight would dictate. It was a Naturalist who said: "Religion is the opiate of the masses." Now, while there have undoubtedly been manifestations classed as religious which are little better than an opiate, yet to judge religion as a whole in such a way is just as stupid as the evaluation of a savage who regards a mechanistic construction of applied science as a form of ceremonial magic. In these dimensions Naturalism fails, sometimes even egregiously, and so we may leave this subject, giving due appreciation for the positive contributions of this school, but recognizing its more notable inadequacies and incompetencies.

Chapter III

THE NEW REALISM

In a history of modern philosophy in which the systems and schools were arranged in chronological order, the New Realism would be the last of the four schools discussed since it arose, in large measure, out of a polemic directed against the other three. But if the treatment of the subject is based upon classification by similarity of content, evaluation and orientation, it seems quite evident that the New Realism would have to be placed in a position intermediate between Naturalism and Pragmatism, for, like the former and one wing of the latter, it is quite naturally realistic in its orientation. This defines a general attitude toward the office of consciousness which, for the present purpose, is the feature of most importance. To be sure, there are important differences in the form and nature of the reality as conceived by the different schools, but all agree in viewing the object as transcending the subject, and both Naturalism and the New Realism alike affirm the transcendence of the thing or the existent with respect to consciousness in any sense.

For Realism, in the modern sense, there is no such thing as a physical or metaphysical self-existent substance, and thus it defines a position of greater similarity to Positivism than to the other forms of Naturalism. Representatives of this school seem generally to have an acute feeling for the limitations in the empiric knowing process, and so have clearly perceived that, in its ordinary manifestations at least, cognition does not supply us with an immediate knowledge of substance in any sense, but only with relations connecting various terms. Much of its destructive analysis parallels that of the Pragmatists, but it differs from Pragmatism in not granting to activism the status of immediate authority. Like Naturalism, it very largely discredits intuitive insight, but, unlike Naturalism, its primary orientation is not to a sensual datum. As compared to Naturalism, the thinkers of this school reveal a far superior philosophic acuity, and as a result the claims of logic and of ethics are given a recognition that is hardly, if any, inferior to that given to those of physics and biology. In the relative importance attached to logical entities and processes this school occupies an outstanding position. On the whole, as a line of thought, both critical and constructive, it offers much of interest and value.

The New Realism, like all modern and self-conscious philosophy, begins with a consideration of the problem of knowledge. Since the time of Immanuel Kant, it has been realized that it is impossible justly to evaluate the meaning of knowledge unless the thinker has first become familiar with the nature and limits of knowledge. In

other words, knowledge as such, together with the knowing process, must themselves be objects of study before a valid evaluation of the cognitive content can be achieved; otherwise, one may fall into the error of projecting the meaning of the content beyond valid limits. Clearly, no part of the philosophic discipline is more important than this since obviously it is useless to define Reality in terms of knowledge if we do not know the nature of knowledge qua knowledge. Further, the problem presented is not one of interest exclusively for technical philosophy but has ramifications bearing upon the office of knowledge in all domains, including the scientific, the religious and the pragmatic utilitarian. Thus, for example, in the case of the special sciences, even though great critical care has been employed in technical observation and in theoretical construction, the question remains as to the essential meaningfulness of the knowledge produced. Does it give a substantial truth? Is it, perhaps, merely a useful symbol? Or, is it an essentially meaningless formalism that is not true knowledge at all? Since a great mathematician like Hilbert has affirmed the last view concerning the constructions of that most rigorous of all sciences, i.e., mathematics, we cannot, offhand, exclude the possibility that all scientific constructions are no more than such meaningless formalisms. In support of such a general view it might be well to recall that the Zen Buddhists seem to hold a view relative to all conceptual knowledge which is essentially of this sort. It is not my purpose here to suggest that Hilbert and the Zen Buddhists are necessarily correct in their evaluation, but simply to point out how vitally important the epistemological problem is. Thus, although the great driving motive of all philosophical effort is the determination, and even the realization, of ultimate Reality, yet before such a search can hope to attain dependable results there must be a critical evaluation and examination of the instruments employed in the search. It is, consequently, very much to the credit of the New Realism that it recognizes the methodological primacy of the epistemological problem. Whether or not the solutions offered are adequate is quite another matter.

For an intelligent understanding of the New Realism it is absolutely essential to comprehend the theory of external relations since this plays a vital part in the Neo-Realistic conception of knowledge and reality. The peculiar feature of this theory of external relations is the doctrine that the elements or terms which enter into various relations with each other are not altered in their intrinsic nature by reason of entering into the relationship. Thus, if an object a enters into a relationship of effect with respect to another object b, in one instance, and into a relationship of consciousness with respect to another object c, then, in both cases a remains precisely the same in its own essential nature. This gives to terms, of which a is a general sign meaning any entity whatsoever, a fixed definitive character which remains forever unaltered. The opposed view is that terms cannot be completely separated

from their relations since the meaning and even the content of the term is in part determined by the relations into which it enters. This is the viewpoint which is known as the theory of internal relations and when it is consistently developed results in an absolute Monism, whereas the theory of external relations results in a world-view that is pluralistic since the multitude of terms really form independent self-existent entities. The theory of external relations is characteristic of the New Realism, while the theory of internal relations plays a notable part in the development of absolute Idealism.

In large degree, the theory of external relations is intimately related to the analysis of the logic of pure mathematics, and in this field it does appear to have at least a large degree of validity. Whether or not from the standpoint of the profoundest understanding of the nature of pure mathematics this theory will remain as the final true truth, still it has some measure of truth. Thus a numerical entity, such as the number 2, for instance, may well seem to be identically itself and unaltered whether it stands as an element in relational complexes which define various infinite series, either cardinal or ordinal, or is the designation of the class of classes in which all members possess the characteristic of consisting of two terms. It would seem that in all the relational complexes of which 2 is an element, 2 remains unalteredly 2, i.e., unaffected in its intrinsic character by differences in the complexes. But is not this, perhaps, only a surface appearance? Let us see. Of the class of classes whose number is 2 let us take two members, one of which consists of two atoms of a non-atomic gas, such as helium, and the other of two animals of the same species but of opposite sex. Can we say that the total significance of 2 is precisely the same in the two cases? In the one case 2 remains 2 indefinitely but in the other 2 is a dynamic potential tending toward numerical increase. Again, consider 2 as the limiting value of the geometrical series $1 + 1/2 + 1/4 + \dots + 1/2^n + \dots$, and as the second member of the series of natural numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, ..., n, ..., ∞ , and in each case 2 gives or reveals a meaning which is not identical with that of the other instances. Now, in addition, in all these cases 2 and the relational complexes in which it is a member stand in relation to consciousness, at least in the sense of the consciousness of the writer and the reader. It does not appear that the Neo-Realistic theory would deny that there are differences in the above complexes, but would assert that the meaning in each case would reduce to a combination of 2 and a relation, with 2 remaining intrinsically the same — as is also true of any other term to which it is related — and with nothing being added over and above the unchanging meaning of the relation.

Criticism of a theory like this is difficult since there appears to be a reference to immediate experience which is not explicit. If the theory were in the nature of a formal mathematical exercise the critique would consist merely of an examination of the logical development with respect to terms that are explicitly defined and without

immediate experiential content. But Neo-Realism is supposed to be a philosophy dealing with empiric actuality, and thus the terms and relations are supposed to be real and not solely ideal. It is difficult, if not impossible, to avoid the feeling here that there is something in the thinking that is arbitrary and artificial. Something in the immediately given, before analysis, is lost — something which is like vision that is not completely reducible to analysis and formulation. Can we say, for instance, that the total meaning of water is reducible to the chemical addition of oxygen and hydrogen? No doubt the theory has a partial validity and utility, but only as an abstraction from the concrete actual for certain purposes; hence when the Neo-Realist goes further and claims comprehensive validity, it is not easy to avoid the feeling that the theorist suffers from a partial blindness.

As a correlate of the theory of external relations, the new Realism affirms the complete validity of analysis. Analysis serves the office of breaking down given complexes of experience into their ultimate elements or terms, which are conceived as forming the wholes of experience by entering into various relationships. But, since relationships are external, the wholes of experience consist of the sum of the terms and relations and no more than that. Thus, the whole is not more than the sum of its parts. Sheer wholeness does not add any new qualitative character which vanishes in the process of analysis. Therefore, analysis is competent to find all that reality is, and, consequently, there is no need for a mystical immediacy to know the final reality.

The ultimate nature of terms and relations is conceived as essentially logical. In their intrinsic nature they belong to a neutral region which is neither mind nor body, neither consciousness nor matter. But the terms may enter into relation with consciousness or with the world of physical things, in either case remaining unaltered in their essential nature. A conscious being must come into adjustment with the terms and relations since they are real and not merely the creative projections of a consciousness.

This theory of the New Realists is largely true with respect to a fundamental experience of any mathematician, i.e., that the material with which he works is, in some sense, highly compulsive. Although the fundamental assumptions of a mathematician may be free creations — even fantasy constructions — yet, as soon as he begins to deduce consequences he is not at all free to think as he pleases. The consequences have the inevitability of an absolute necessity. The thinker must conform to this necessity; he cannot make it other than what it is. So while some element of invention no doubt enters into a mathematical system, such as the conventions of mathematical language and the formulations of the fundamental assumptions, yet the effect of constraint by an absolute necessity is a most significant part of mathematical experience. Perhaps more than in any other field of human effort mathematics carries the thinker on a voyage of discovery, with the creative element occupying a

subordinate position. The resistance of the rocks of the earth or of the unconscious factors of the collective psyche are less ineluctable, or, at least, are not more insistently conditioning. It is not the will that determines what mathematics shall be, once the fundamental postulates are given, but it is mathematics that sets limits to the path which the will must follow if it is to orient itself to something more than a fantastic illusion. But while it is no doubt true that the determinations of mathematics are objective with respect to the private wishful consciousness of the individual, it does not follow that these determinations are existences outside consciousness in every sense. We can conceive — and there are realizations very strongly confirming the conception — of a primary and universal consciousness which conditions the merely private personal consciousness, and so we may view the essence of mathematics as being of the nature of this primary consciousness without the mathematical determination losing one whit of its authority and objective power.

As one studies the philosophy of the New Realism he is impressed with a certain congruence with Naturalism. As was noted in the preceding chapter, Naturalism grew out of an orientation to natural science, and particularly that part of science which we commonly think of as physical. Neo-Realism has a similar orientation to mathematics and logic, and so we may say that what Naturalism is with respect to physical — as distinct from biological — science, this Realism is with respect to the normative sciences. Thus we may say that the Neo-Realists are oriented to a much more profound necessity than that envisaged by the Naturalists. Both these schools recognize a valid fact of experience, i.e., the experience of dealing with a compulsive necessity, a somewhat which is more determining than any wishfulness. It is precisely with respect to this experience that the Vitalists give the least satisfactory answers in their philosophies. Whether it is Vitalism or Realism which has in this respect the more fundamental vision may be a question that cannot be answered in terms which transcend the relativity of individual temperament. For my own part, I find myself in closer agreement with the realistic view with respect to this issue. In any case, the strength of the New Realism appears to consist mainly in its treatment of logical necessitarianism, while its principal weakness is to be found in its depreciation of another fundamental of no less importance, i.e., the fundamental of consciousness.

For the New Realist, consciousness is only a relation, and, like other relations, it is external in the sense that the terms which enter into consciousness do not acquire their intrinsic character or being by that relation. Consonant with a conception developed by David Hume, the Realists maintain that the actual entities themselves enter consciousness and leave consciousness remaining essentially the same. When in consciousness we may call them "ideas", and when outside, "things", but these words are merely different names for the same

persistent and unaltered realities. A fundamental implication is that consciousness does not creatively determine its contents; it has only a selective relationship to them. Some entities may be selected and others neglected, but they always remain just what they were in either case. The selection of consciousness may build compounds of elements through the selection of various relations, but the compounds are conceived as completely reducible to the various terms and relations, with nothing left over as characteristic of the compound, which is lost as a result of the analysis. Thus the experience of an immediate affective or noetic value in the compound — which is lost in the analysis — is simply denied by this theory. — But does this denial have greater significance than that of a psychological confession? The question as to whether the compound or complex of experience has what we may call an "over-value" which is lost in the analysis is really extra-logical. Our judgment must rest upon the testimony of immediate experience. If there are those who do not find this over-value in their experience, then they are justified in reporting that so far as their personal consciousness goes it does not exist. But this could be a fact of importance mainly for psychology. The testimony of others who said that they found the over-value lost in the analysis would have no less validity. The issue between these two testimonies cannot possibly be resolved by a logical theory.

Since consciousness is conceived as a non-substantial and non-determinative relation, it is quite natural for the New Realist to develop a psychological and philosophical view in which consciousness is quite irrelevant. Thus we get the behavioristic psychology in which the determination of psychical fact is conceived as fully available for objective research without the use of introspective methods. The mind is conceived to be simply what it appears to be in objective behavior. Although it may be possible to proceed by this method and build a schema which is logically self-consistent, yet that is not enough to render it comprehensively true. The immediacy of inner consciousness does not cease being a fact simply because some methodological theory has no place for it. Again we have an issue which cannot be resolved without reference to testimony grounded upon immediate experience.

A particularly fundamental feature of the Neo-Realist's polemic against the Idealist is the contention that the latter has not proved that there can be no being wholly outside and independent of consciousness. No doubt the Idealist cannot prove this, for it is essential to the very nature of proof that in the act of proving it carries its material into the field of consciousness. But the Idealist may very properly reverse the charge and challenge the Realist to prove the independent being of a supposed that which is not knowable in any sense, or of a supposed thatness existing at any time outside consciousness in every sense. He may also quite reasonably contend that the burden of the proof rests with the Realist since the latter is affirming a thatness beyond the range of direct epistemological determination and thus

involving hypostatization beyond all possible experience. In the attempt to show that it is possible to know beyond the range of consciousness, the Neo-Realist has given an illustration which at first seems quite impressive. We know, for instance, the general solution of the algebraic equation of the second degree because we have proved its correctness by rigorous logic. Therefore, we know that this solution provides a formula which will give a correct solution of every specific equation of the second degree by making the appropriate numerical substitutions for the letters representing constants in the general formula, and we know this even in the case of those equations of which no man has ever thought. Hence we know the actuality of an existence which has never been thought or experienced. But here two lines of possible criticism arise. First, a radical empiricism might well question whether such supposed knowledge is authentic knowledge at all. He might say that though the formula was found invariably valid in all the thousands of specific instances to which it has been applied, this gives no real knowledge concerning the infinity of cases to which the formula has not been applied, but in these cases our conviction of the validity of the formula is only grounded upon belief. Second, granting that the assurance of validity given by the general proof for the infinity of equations not actually solved is authentic and justified, yet this does not imply knowledge of an actuality lying outside consciousness, but only of one lying beyond consciousness in the form of specific thought and experience. In a word, the whole meaning of consciousness as such is not restricted to consciousness in the form of thought and experience.

The discussion of the preceding paragraph leads to a question of general epistemological interest which extends beyond the field of Neo-Realistic theory, and is one of considerable importance. It is a fundamental characteristic of the mathematical use of logic to develop proofs in general terms, which are completed within the limits of a finite apprehension, but which, nevertheless, are conceived as giving an infinitely extended knowledge since the specific cases included in the general proofs are, more often than not, infinite in number. It is unquestionably true that the typical mathematician feels an assurance of validity extending over the whole infinity of special cases, and it would appear that the Neo-Realistic philosophers as a class also share this assurance. Is this assurance justified? It is clear that this question is not one which can be resolved by logical proof since it is essentially a query relative to the validity of proof itself. It introduces a problem which requires for its resolution an examination of the very roots of cognition and an evaluation of conceptual cognition. This leads us into the sea of epistemological theory with all the variants characteristic of different philosophical schools, not to mention the vaster variations introduced by individual philosophies. This task will not be attempted here, but a little will be offered by way of suggestion.

There are at least three possible forms which proposed answers to the question may have. These we may call the empiric; the formalistic and the gnostic. None of these forms of the answer can be dialectically justified in the complete sense, which would finally dispose of the question, since the differences in the forms are grounded in differences of point of view or perspective, which in turn are reducible to a matter of individual psychology or of insight. In the end, it appears that we are faced with the fact of philosophically significant psychological differences which are irreducible within the limits of present understanding. But we may with profit make a brief survey of the three views suggested.

(a) The thoroughgoing empiricist typically denies that the authority of logic extends beyond the possibility of experiential verification. Logic may well be a valuable aid in a process of thought which leads on to a fuller experience, but its value is essentially conditional or heuristic. It does not wield an original or primary authority in its own right, but only one derived from experience ultimately. Hence, a finite logical process cannot give an infinitely extended knowledge, and, consequently, the real justification and proof of a general mathematical formula is the fact that it is effective in the specific instance. In a word, mathematics does not give us true knowledge of the infinite. The great difficulty with this point of view is that it fails to give us any adequate explanation of the success of mathematical thought in even the empiric field. The vast bulk of mathematical creation has been quite unrelated to empiric application; it has been a pure development for its own sake. But again and again, these pure constructions have supplied subsequently — sometimes after the lapse of considerable time — the theoretical framework which organizes the data from experience. This fact has led no less a person than Albert Einstein to ask the question: "How can it be that mathematics, being after all a product of human thought independent of experience, is so admirably adapted to the objects of reality?" It is certainly difficult, if not impossible, to see how such a pure thought could reach ahead of experience if it is no more than a derivative from experience.

(b) The formalistic view maintains that mathematical entities, processes and conceptions are essentially meaningless, and thus the whole mathematical development is merely a formal structure. Of course, this would imply that mathematical thought does not really give knowledge at all, not even as much as the empiricist would grant. This view is not in conformity with the realistic conception since the mathematical entities would not be real. It does not cast any light upon the question asked by Einstein. On the whole, this theory does not appear to be fruitful, but it is worthy of note since no less a mathematician than David Hilbert subscribed to it.

(c) The third view, which is here called the "gnostic", maintains that mathematical, and therefore logical, knowledge is

essentially a priori, by which is meant that it exists independent of experience. However true it may be that this knowledge does not arise in the relative consciousness, in point of time, before experience, yet it is not derived from experience, however much it may employ a language which is derived from experience. It is thus in its essential nature akin to mystical cognition — and hence gnostic in character — rather than similar to empiric knowledge. This view would explain how it is possible for the pure mathematical thinker to have pre-vision of the future in formal terms which subsequently become empirically concrete as experience gradually advances with its slower trend. It also explains the strong feeling of assurance extending over infinite implication which follows upon the recognition of mathematical proof. Finally, it implies that mathematical knowledge is authentic knowledge, grounded upon an original authority. The full conception maintains that the root of mathematical knowledge is identical with the root of empiric knowledge but that neither is derived from the other. It thus is the identity at the root source that explains how pure mathematical thought can be relevant to the material given by experience.

These three views are barely sketched here, and therefore are given primarily as suggestions. However, the third view is the one held by the writer, and its justification will be more fully developed in general terms in what follows. Inasmuch as the Neo-Realistic philosophers seem typically to accept the assurance of logical demonstration, the writer stands in agreement with them in this respect, but he does not find that the Neo-Realistic theory supplies adequate justification for the acceptance of the assurance.

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The outstanding peculiarity of the New Realism does not lie in its affirmation of the independence of things with respect to consciousness, for this doctrine is a characteristic part of all realism in the modern sense. The differentiating contribution of the New Realism is to be found in the doctrine of immanence. This is the theory that the actual things or terms enter into consciousness without being made over by consciousness. Thus the idea of a thing is the thing itself, when in the relationship of consciousness, and, consequently, the idea and the thing are not two entities but one. In this way, it is believed, the duality between mind and body is overcome, and, likewise, the duality between knowledge and things. But all the while the thing remains independent. Thus we may isolate as the cardinal principle of the New Realism the idea of the independence of the immanent.

Part of this conception suggests a similarity to the identity of the knowledge and the known, which is a characteristic part of mystical

states of consciousness, but the theory of the independence of the immanent marks a radical divergence. The mystical state leads to a doctrine of inter-dependence, not only of the knowledge and the known, but of the knower as well.

In order to bring the more fundamental teachings of the New Realism into clear relief, they are listed in brief form below:

1. The subject to consciousness can become in other connections the object of consciousness.
2. Mental action is a property of the nervous organism.
3. Mental contents consist of portions of the surrounding environment, illumined by the action of the organism.
4. The content of the mind is that portion of the environment taken account of by the organism in the serving of its interests.
5. Ideas are only things in a certain relation.
6. In the case of immediate knowledge, the thing and the knowledge are identical.
7. In other connections than those of immediate knowledge, the thing is the thing in itself.
8. In mediate knowledge the thing thought about and the thought are both experienced, but the thing transcends the thought.
9. The thing is independent of experiencing as well as of thought.

The last thesis marks an important point of departure between Neo-Realism and the more realistic wing of Pragmatism. In both these schools, the conceptions of the office of thought and of mediate knowledge do not diverge radically, but Pragmatism tends to identify the real with experiencing. It is also true that the Neo-Realistic and the Pragmatic tests of truth and error are not so far apart. The former simply attaches less importance to the subjective factor. For both, truth is a harmony between thought and things, in the one case the things being independent of experience, while in the other their nature is determined through the experiencing. Further, the test of truth is practical, i.e., is relative to a grouping of interest and circumstances for the purposes of action. In neither case is truth an internal coherence of ideas or things. Thus, in both cases, truth may be thought of as a function or relation of a thinking consciousness, or organism, with respect to something other, be it immediate experience or independent things.

The fact which stands out with especial force in connection with the New Realism is its enormous depreciation of the significance of consciousness. An examination of the numbered items above gives the impression that consciousness as a sort of by-product of the effort of organisms to attain adjustment in pre-existent unconscious environment. To be sure, consciousness is not so unimportant as to be a mere epi-phenomenon which accidentally happened in a mechanistic universe, for it serves the function of adjustment for organisms. It, therefore, makes some difference in the world of living creatures. But it is the lesser fact in the midst of an all-surrounding and compelling necessity.

Particularly notable in the New Realism, as in Naturalism, is the depreciation of the subjective component of consciousness. The subject is even viewed as potentially capable of becoming an object of consciousness in certain relations. Now, in conformity with the epistemology of Neo-Realism, the subject that has become an object is not merely a symbol representing the subject but is the actual subject itself. Here we have exemplified a very common error of the extraverted orientation in the individual psychology. For whatever it is that has become an object, its status as object implies a relation to a subject which is not the supposed subject that has become object. To be sure, something subtle associated with the true subject may become an object, but the subject proper remains the witness in a relationship of witnessing with respect to this subtle object, and thus does not itself become an object. We may project the conception of a subject-object relationship, but the subject itself has not been projected in the conception, remaining still the hidden witness of the conception. This point is of extremely vital importance and must be understood by him who would himself attain self-realization, or would seek to comprehend the philosophical developments based upon self-realization.

In contrast to its relative superiority in the interpretation of mathematics and logic, the New Realism seems somewhat less than satisfactory in its treatment of ethics and religion. Here we find much the same inadequacy which was so notable in Naturalism. The reader at times has the feeling that these subjects enter into the total philosophical picture as more or less troublesome addenda. One in whom the ethical and religious motives are strong tends to feel frustrated or belittled. The impression is produced that the real order of being is aloof and unresponsive to human purpose and aspiration. While, no doubt, there is a dimension of being which has this character, or, rather, appears to have this character, yet there is far too much immediate insight which gives the real a quite opposite character to permit the Neo-Realistic view an exclusive validity. After all, the assurance of logic and of sense-impression is not such as to deny other forms of assurance equal right to recognition. So we must conclude that the New Realism has offered an interpretation which is partly true but no more

than that. It has not succeeded in evolving a conception competent to circumscribe the whole of the real and possible. Important dimensions of awareness are not recognized at all, and at least some of these dimensions embrace that which large portions of mankind value above all else. Philosophy, if it is to fulfill its full-office, must recognize and do justice to these dimensions of being as well as those upon which the New Realism is focused.

Chapter IV

PRAGMATISM

Life, as we know it and as it appears to have always been, judged by the record of history, has consisted most largely of an effort by living creatures to survive in an environment which, while in part friendly, has yet been in large degree unfriendly, toward that survival. The life-story of man appears to be no exception to this rule, and so the preponderant thought and effort of the human kind have been devoted to the practical or mundane interests of securing food and protection from the elements and living creatures, including man himself. But from a day at least as ancient as the formulation of the Vedas there have always been a few among the human whole who have devoted a portion of their time and effort to a profounder querying of nature, with a view to the resolution of more ultimate questions, such as the meaning and purpose of life, the nature of being, etc. Out of this deeper and relatively detached questioning has finally developed the profounder part of both religion and art, and nearly the whole of what we today know as science and philosophy, in a word, all that which we class as culture and which contributes the larger part of the graces and values of living. Those who have led in the cultural side of life, either as originators or as continuers, have never constituted more than a small proportion of the human whole, but they have formed an especially significant part, and, while they have known their share of resentment and persecution by the non-understanding mass of mankind, yet, in the end and on the whole, they have received appreciation and even recognition as forming a genuine aristoi, a sort of informally recognized class-status distinct from other men.

Among the bearers of culture there have inevitably grown attitudes toward life and thought and forms of expression that tend, more or less radically, to diverge from the attitudes and forms natural to the commonality of mankind. This has led toward a separation of interest and sympathy which at times has amounted to a social bifurcation, so that the languages, as well as the attitudes, of the smaller class tended to become strange and foreign to the collective mass. This inevitably restricted the service which the former could render to the latter, and so from time to time there arises the necessity of re-establishing an integration or working relationship between the two parts.

In the field of philosophy, which most particularly concerns us here, the specialization of interest, way of thinking, of attitude

and of language is especially notable. Philosophers tend to write for other philosophers and to give exclusive attention to the conceptions evolved in the detached philosophical consciousness. This all quite understandable since these conceptions are an inevitable development for a felt need and they are adequately comprehended only by the trained philosopher. But there remains a large sector of human concern which is left out, and thus the practical office of philosophy becomes considerably narrowed. In the classical culture, the isolation of the philosophical world from the broader general human world was particularly notable. Such science as there was developed in the milieu of the philosopher, detached from practical life, with the result that, although the Greek mind was able enough and theoretical understanding was well advanced, yet there was relatively little development of a practical technology. Abstract conceptions became objects in themselves, unrelated to empiric utility. A distinction arose ultimately between two orders of consciousness, the one, the more abstract or intelligible, being viewed as a higher more divine order, and the other, the sensuous or empiric, being regarded as irrational and evil. Apparently no culture has ever attained a greater conceptual purity than that which was realized in Greece at its peak of development, but it was a conceptuality unrelated to empiric life. Also, this was achieved at a severe price. At the top of the culture we find an aristocracy of beautiful intellectuality; at the bottom, a massive slavery of bound men; a humanity bifurcated so that the mass received little benefit from the best.

The Greek dominated Western culture up until that day in the Renaissance when the immortal figure of Galileo appeared upon the scene. In the hands of the scholastics dialectical power had become refined and subtilized, but largely empty of substance, and perhaps even more divorced from the world of common experience than was true with the ancient Greeks. However, with the appearance of Galileo an old cycle was closed and a new one opened that has continued to the present time. The significant contribution of Galileo was an insight which led to a marriage of a highly developed conceptuality with sensuous experience, the aspect of consciousness so despised by the typical cultured Greek. Out of this marriage was born science, in the modern spirit, and a vast extension of philosophic subject-matter, but, most important of all from the practical standpoint, there came forth from this union technology in the modern sense, and with this vast alterations in social organization and in ways of life.

Although it is inevitable that in the modern world, as in the classical, the conceptions and language of technology, science and philosophy should be developed with due regard to the peculiar necessities of each discipline, yet the attitude toward sensuous cognition was inevitably radically altered, when contrasted to the attitude of the classical thinker. The sensuous or empiric could no

longer remain the despised half of human cognition. Indeed, it has often become the most valued half, with conceptual theory falling heir to the old depreciation. Important as experience no doubt is, yet even experience has taught us that without adequate theory there can be no true science, not even technology, so that today we know that we advance in knowledge, as someone has said, by two legs, one of observation and one of theory. Therefore, we have not repudiated the sound features of our inheritance from Greek culture, but by adding to it that which the cultured Greek scorned we have transcended him both in theory and in practice.

The rapprochement between conceptuality and sensuous knowledge has naturally involved more than a technical advance. A parallel increased regard for the ways of cognition, interests, and attitudes of the common man was probably inevitable. This, though particularly marked in the zone of sociology and politics, has yet had its effect in the more aloof field of philosophical speculation. In our own day there has arisen a whole school of philosophy which, questioning the soundness and reliability of lofty conceptuality, has turned to the field of popular cognition and interest for its principal subject-matter and basis of evaluation of the higher conceptuality. This school is the one popularly known as Pragmatism.

In the hands of the Pragmatist the kind of thinking, which is the only kind known to most men and the kind which all men use most of the time in the field of day-to-day life-relations, is here given the dignity of philosophic recognition. In this sense, Pragmatism is more popular than any other philosophic school, and, indeed, has been peculiarly associated with the democratic spirit. But though Pragmatism renders to the ordinary variety of thinking a dignifying recognition, it would be a vast mistake to imagine that the Pragmatist is merely an ordinary thinker or that this school is popular in its technical methods. Popular thinking is an object for serious study and evaluation, as viewed by this school, but the problems considered are treated with all the technical acuity of trained philosophers. Pragmatism deals in large measure with popular thinking as a type, but is not itself a form of popular thinking. Pragmatic philosophers in the technical development of their thought can and do become just as involved and obscure as any other kind of philosopher. They are by no means always easy to understand, and so, despite the democratic orientation of their thought, they themselves belong to the intellectual elite like all others who think beneath the surface.

The popularity of Pragmatism is quite different from the popularity of Naturalism. The latter accepts, on the whole, an attitude toward the world-about which is quite consonant with the general naive view that commonly holds before the development of reflective analysis. But the philosophical Pragmatist, like most other professional philosophers, is intelligently critical of this view. He is well aware

that thinking and the other psychological functions do make a difference in the content of human consciousness, or, at least, if they do not, this fact must be established by careful study. Whereas the Naturalist typically thinks in terms analogous to those which have achieved success in the sciences of the inorganic, and, as a thinker, very largely forgets that he is a living being, the Pragmatist views life and the sciences of the organic as nearer to the true nature of man and as supplying a better key to the understanding of the contents of his consciousness. Further, this life on which the Pragmatist centers his focus is not an abstract or Eternal Life, but the natural or empiric life seen all about us. It is the life of plants, of animals, and of men — just that which the biologist and the psychologist study in its physical and somatic manifestations, respectively. Indeed, this fact implies that the Pragmatist is also a Naturalist in his way, but instead of being a physical Naturalist he might be called a biological Naturalist. He views biology, and, along with this science, psychology, sociology, anthropology, politics, etc., as being essentially more fundamental than mathematics, physics and the more mathematical sciences generally. In the implied relative depreciation of logic and mathematics we find the primary point at which Pragmatism departs from the New Realism, though in other respects these two schools have many sympathies in common.

The central core of Pragmatic interest is the human world, and not a supermundane Ideal or transcendent Realization. No doubt empiric life involves more than the exclusively human, since we have constant evidence of other forms of life before our eyes, but Pragmatism does not pretend to speak for the possible standpoint of plants and animals any more than it does for a super-mundane Divinity. All these living, or supposedly living, beings may receive consideration in a Pragmatic philosophy, but, if so, they enter into the discussion as objects possessing an empiric human interest. Thus Pragmatism is not, nor does it pretend to be, a comprehensively inclusive system. Its validity, in so far as it is valid, is maintained to be such for man as we know him here and now.

Indeed, Pragmatism does not pretend to be a philosophic system, but is rather conceived to be a definition of a method of approach to vital problems. Here philosophy is viewed as an aid or guide to an empiric life so that it may be lived more wisely, and on the whole more happily. Thus it is more largely a philosophy of and for life than a system of ideas. It may be said that its metaphysic is the least systematic of the four schools.

Pragmatism has many roots which reach back into what is known as the English school of Empiricism. Like Empiricism it gets its stuff, in the largest degree, from the raw material derived or given by the senses. But it departs from the earlier Empiricism in that it is much more activistic, that is, more concerned with purposive action than with simple reception of impressions. The Pragmatic world is much more alive

than the older Empiricist world. Man's consciousness is certainly considerably richer than a mere blank tablet which is passively receptive to the impact of the environment. Men do have interests and purposes which lead to the selections of certain possibilities presented by the total environment. It is to his interest to survive as an organism, and, beyond this, it is manifest that he seeks all sorts of objects and relationships from the most banal up to the loftiest possibilities. It has remained for the Pragmatist to isolate and accentuate this aspect of human nature as a significant feature for the understanding of him and as an important factor for the facilitating of his growth in understanding. The Pragmatist says that philosophy, even in its most abstract and other-worldly aspect, is, after all, but an instance of human interest and purpose. It is not here suggested that the older philosophers or the representatives of the opposed schools of the present day were or are unconscious of the fact of interest and of selections guided by interest, but it is simply true that generally this fact was neglected as a determinant factor in evaluating philosophic content. At this point the Pragmatist departs from the non-pragmatic thinker, since he maintains that meaning cannot be isolated from the influence of interest.

At this point the Pragmatist's characteristic attitude toward the psychological status of ideas becomes evident. Ideas enter into at least two systems. In one aspect they are recognizable as psychological facts, that is, as something having a history and standing in correlation with a group of more or less observable relations in some living mind, while in another aspect they carry a logically significant content. For the greater part, philosophy has been exclusively concerned with the logically significant content and defined meaning in terms that are mainly logical. Pragmatism says that this is a mistake. Even a perfect and logically complete content would only be, at best, but partly competent in the determination of ultimate meaning, for the psychological factors of interest and purpose are also determinant. In fact, one gains the impression that the Pragmatists characteristically as a class attach the greater importance to the psychological factors, with logic admitted only in a subordinate office.

One practical consequence of the foregoing theoretical evaluation of the psychological status of ideas is that proposed conceptions may be valued as much or even more by consideration of the purpose or motive of the thinker than by a regard for the logical acuity of factual accuracy of the content. Thus psychological facts true of the thinker become important in the philosophical evaluations of the thought. There are connections wherein, no doubt, the psychological conditioning of the thinker is determinant in such a way that the value of the content of the thought is involved. This is clearly true in all cases involving statement of fact, particularly where the fact is not easily verified by other means, and no less so in instances where

subjective determinants form an important component part of the content. In general, we may well recognize the psychological factors as possessing a constitutive importance in the zone of reflection where the perceptual referent is correlated with a conceptual statement. But there is a large range of thought wherein the content is purely conceptual and objective. Particularly is this true in the case of the discovery and proof of a mathematical theorem, and only somewhat less so in the theoretical development of any science. In these latter instances the evaluation of the thought content can be made in complete disregard of the thinker as a person. His character may be noble or vile, his personal psychology may be normal or abnormal and his attitude social or anti-social, but, in any case, his thought is a presentation which can be judged as to its soundness quite independently and objectively. Thus it appears to be clear that the psychological evaluation of thought has only a partial validity with respect to the soundness or unsoundness of the content. The Pragmatist has, no doubt, brought into focus a part truth which is philosophically significant, but appears to generalize too far.

It is undoubtedly true that the philosopher, being a man as well as a thinker, is, in his own person, conditioned by psychological determinants which vary more or less radically from individual to individual, and, equally, there can be no doubt but that these factors play their part in providing the basic orientation of the thinker and in giving form and direction to the thought. Unquestionably, criticism which is at all complete must have a due regard for these factors as well as for the more impersonal and rational elements, such as the factuality of references and the soundness of the logic. But if too much stress is given to the psychological determinants, criticism can all too easily degenerate into the error of the argumentum ad hominem, and thus we may see philosophy fall from its lofty state of impersonal and detached aloofness. Issues which otherwise would be worked out to agreement, or agreement to disagree, on the high level of the forum may well be carried to the arena for final resolution. Logical issues are resolved in the forum; differences on the level of transcendental vision are resolved by the greater Light manifested by the more comprehensive Realization; but differences based upon psychological factors such as the purpose, interest and taste of the empiric man, when resolution becomes desirable or necessary, cannot be integrated by either the forum or the Light. In the latter case resolution at least tends to be one worked out by force, either physical or psychological.

An instance of the resolution of philosophic difference by force, and one which today is deeply stenciled on the world memory, is to be found in the incident of German National Socialism. Despite all the crudities of this movement, it was grounded in a philosophy. One who has read and brooded upon both The Decline of the West and Mein Kampf can hardly help but note practical implications in the latter which find

their philosophical base in the former. The Spenglerian philosophy is one of the most consistent developments of the Vitalistic orientation, in which conceptualism is given radical subordination to the Will and to psychological factors generally. The conclusion is drawn that war is well nigh the essence of life, and there does not appear to be any ground for viewing this conclusion as something added to the ineluctable consequences of such an orientation. Logic stands as incompetent to resolve fundamental issues. The wars of creatures from the plant to man and of groups and nations are the final determinants. No doubt Spengler resented the form his thought took in the hands of the vulgar Hitler, but this was more the resentment by one with the taste of a scholar and gentleman for the crudities of a vulgarian, who was no gentleman, than it was for the essence of the Hitlerian philosophy. The fact is that if one is concerned with only purely vital issues, these are resolved by conflict, and thus the transcendence of conflict as a ultimate determinant depends upon the subordination of the vital by some higher principle, such as rationality or spirituality. In this fundamental sense, the powers which defeated National Socialism upon the field of battle did not thereby overthrow or disprove the primary thesis of Mein Kampf, but merely denied survival to a specific interpretation of that thesis. The irrationalism of a psycho-vitalistic philosophy was not transcended by a rationalistic power, acting in conformity with its own nature, but a specific manifestation of this irrationalism was overcome by a greater irrational power. The total effect is in the form of a confirmation of the primary thesis of Spengler.

The foregoing illustration is pertinent to a discussion of Pragmatism, since "Pragmatism" is, in one of its aspects, but another name for "Vitalism". In this connection, "Vitalism" must be understood with a broader connotation than is given the same term in more specialized biological theory. Vitalism, here, means a philosophical orientation, such that the categories of life are given priority over the categories of the mind or intellect. Now, while it is true that in some system of thought Life — spelled with a capital L — is viewed as the ontological or transcendental principle, this is not the sense which is meant by the Pragmatist. The life of the Pragmatist is the natural or mundane life which we experience and know with our ordinary faculties — the life which is studied by the biologist. In this respect the attitude of the Pragmatist parallels that of the Naturalist, with the important difference that biological categories are viewed as more fundamental than physical categories, such as those which are fundamental in physics, astronomy, chemistry, etc.

It is quite relevant to the attainment of an understanding of Pragmatism to ask ourselves the question: What do we mean when we speak of "Life"? We find that besides the conception of Life as a transcendental principle there are at least two contrasted possible meanings. The word may be conceived as meaning a privative concept,

defined to comprehend a certain kind of phenomena. In this sense "life" is an object of scientific study of which the end of the program would be an integration of the facts of life within the limits of intellectually comprehensible law. When biology is viewed as essentially a special kind of manifestation of physics and chemistry, this is the standpoint that is taken. The underlying assumption implied by this attitude, either implicit or explicit, is that life is no more than it is conceived to be. It is just another case of knowledge which, while it may not be complete knowledge today, is nonetheless regarded as capable of completion in principle. This implies that conceptual thought has the power to comprehend life and thus is a larger power and not merely one which exists as an effect or by-product of life. But we may think of "life" in quite a different sense. The word may be viewed as no more than a sort of pointer to a reality which, in peculiar degree, can never be known in the conceptual sense. Thus, while we may know mathematical and other logical entities with conceptual rigor, life forever escapes this kind of knowing. What we really do know of life itself, as distinct from a conceptual symbol meaning life, is through an extra-conceptual acquaintance, i.e., through a way of consciousness that can never be fully thought. Thus, around every conceptual thought of life it is believed there lies a sort of penumbral field which is not part of the central thought and which may escape clear analysis entirely, but may be glimpsed, however dimly, in those moments when consciousness turns upon itself, as it were, and glimpses a sort of fleeting shadow. This shadow is a fringe about the nuclear core of the concept, known darkly like an intuition which defeats all definition. It may seem that this fringe, rather than the central conceptual core, carries the real secret of the meaning of life. There are many who say that this is indeed so, and that the nature of the fringe is such that no intellectual analysis, however refined, can ever grasp its real nature, and this is the case because it is an essentially inconceivable life which so supports and envelops thought that the latter can never by itself comprehend its living roots. Thus life is viewed as master and thought the servant. This appears to be the general view held by Pragmatism, and particularly by Henri Bergson.

Doubtless, within non-philosophic and non-scientific circles, the second view given above would generally seem the more acceptable, since to view life as an object implies a relatively exceptional detachment where thought itself, or something greater than thought and empiric life, supplies its own base, or some foundation other than life. Far more commonly, life seems to the consciousness to be a mystical somewhat which conditions all else, but which is not itself conditioned, or, if it is, that higher conditioning is unknowable to the conceptual mind. For the greater part, Western philosophy has not assumed this point of view, but there are philosophic thinkers who have

maintained it, such as Spengler and Bergson. These thinkers are classed today as Vitalists.

While it is true that Pragmatism is a form of Vitalism, it by no means follows that Vitalism is always a form of Pragmatism. Thus in the case of Spengler, while in this philosophy we find many features which remind us of Pragmatism, yet the "Life" of Spengler is a notion embracing a good deal more than the "life" of the biologist. With him it is an ontological notion which can be really apprehended only by a mystical intuition. The Spenglerian philosophy is not restricted to the empirically given, in the same sense or in the same degree as is true of Pragmatism. To differentiate the latter more completely we must consider its development out of epistemological considerations.

The epistemological definition of Pragmatism is given very concisely by C.S. Peirce in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology in the following words: "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object." (Underlining mine)

From the same source we derive a further elaboration of the definition in the following words: Pragmatism is "the doctrine that the whole 'meaning' of a conception expresses itself in practical consequences, consequences either in the shape of conduct to be recommended, or in that of experiences to be expected, if the conception be true; which consequences would be different if it were untrue, and must be different from the consequences by which the meaning of other conceptions is its turn expressed." (Underlining mine)

The second quotation above was contributed by William James, and, inasmuch as C.S. Peirce and William James were among the half dozen or so thinkers who were most prominent in the early development of Pragmatism as a philosophic school, we may, with substantial reason, regard the foregoing definition as authoritative. A close study of this definition reveals that four words are crucial in the determination of its meaning. These are: "practical", "conduct", "experience" and "whole". In order to arrive at reasonable precision, we will consider their definitions as given in the same source.

(a) The practical "covers all that is not theoretically or cognitively determined, but which involves purpose, teleology, striving, achievement, appreciation, ideals." This meaning is akin to that of practice which in turn is defined as "conduct or moral activity, as distinguished from the strictly intellectual life."

(b) Conduct is "the sum of an individual's ethical actions, either generally or in relation to some special circumstance." By this definition conduct is differentiated from any arbitrary kind of action as in the popular understanding of the term.

(c) Experience is defined in two senses, psychological and psychic or mental. (1) "Psychological: consciousness considered as a

process taking place in time." (2) "Psychic or mental: the entire process of phenomena, of present data considered in their raw immediacy, before reflective thought has analysed them into subjective and objective aspects or ingredients." The last part of this definition is contributed by William James himself, who goes on to say that it is "exactly correlative to the word Phenomenon" as "it is used in a colourless philosophic sense, as equivalent to 'fact' or event — to any particular which requires explanation." The last portion of the quotation is from John Dewey's contribution to the definition of the word Phenomenon.

(d) Whole is to be understood in the sense of entire or complete. Thus "whole of our conception" and "whole meaning" imply that there is no additional meaning attaching to the conception over and above that given in the definition.

From the above definitions we derive a very clearly delimited meaning of Pragmatism. We can still further clarify the conception by considering what is excluded by Pragmatism in its use of meaning and truth. Meaning and truth are denied to that which is exclusively determined by theory and cognition. This means, for instance, that a self-contained and self-consistent mathematical system which did not lead to anything beyond itself would not be true or have meaning. Sheer self-consistency is thus not a criterion of truth. To be sure, such a system might have an aesthetic value, in which case it would have a degree of truth and meaning, but it would derive this from the value it had for the aesthetic feeling, and not from the purely theoretical or cognitive relations or content. Thus, truth and meaning clearly depend upon a relation of the cognitive factor to something other than the cognitive thought itself. The word whole reveals the privative or absolute character of the Pragmatic thesis. Truth and meaning, as understood by the Pragmatist, do not have the signification given above in addition to other applications, but the practical or empiric significance is the whole of their signification. Thus, one who accepted the above definitions as substantially valid as a part truth, provided the word whole were expunged, would not be a Pragmatist.

Quite clearly, Pragmatism is anti-intellectualistic as has been so frequently affirmed by its protagonists. It is anti-intellectualistic both in the psychological and philosophical senses; that is, it denies the theory that the intellectual or cognitive functions are more fundamental than the affective and conative, and, as well, the view that the ultimate principle of the universe is some form of thought or reason or the more modified view that reality is completely intelligible to thought. Pragmatism is also anti-conceptualistic in the classic sense that universals are real ante res, in rebus, and post res. Further, it is anti-rationalistic in both the sense of reason being an independent source of knowledge, distinct from sense-perception and having a higher authority, and in the sense of a philosophic method which, starting from elementary concepts, seeks

to derive all the rest by deductive method, as is the process in mathematics.

So far as these determinations of what Pragmatism is not are concerned, this school does not by any means stand alone, since the older Empiricists maintained the same attitude, and most of oriental philosophy would be in agreement. Clearly, Pragmatism is empiric or aesthetic and essentially nominalistic, but in taking its orientation upon the base of experience defined as a process in time and restricted to the raw immediacy of the sense it departs from the Oriental Aestheticism which embraces non-temporal and non-sensuous aesthetic elements. Further, in its assertion of anti-intellectualism and anti-rationalism, Pragmatism has much in common with the voluntaristic wing of Idealism and finds considerable support in the final position of Immanuel Kant. But Pragmatism departs from the general thesis of the older Empiricism in the emphasis it places upon conduct and the practical. The former held a relatively static view of Being, whereas for Pragmatism real being approaches the meaning of activity or becoming, in this respect having a large agreement with the philosophy of Spengler. With respect to voluntaristic Idealism, Pragmatism stands in contrast both in that it is much more realistic and because it is anti-transcendentalistic, in the sense that the whole meaningful content of conceptions consists in a reference to experience and conduct. The antithesis of Pragmatism is to be found in the Rational Idealism of Hegel, and even more so in the highly pure conceptualism of Spinoza.

The relative human consciousness manifests through three fundamental modes which we may designate thinking, feeling and doing, or, more technically, cognition, affection and conation. In the history of human philosophic thought each of these modes has, at one time or another, been given the primary valuation, and not only in the sense of a peculiarity of individual psychology, but even in the ontological sense. Thus, with the main body of Greek thinkers, the Western Rationalists, and the rationalistic wing of Idealism, cognition has been given a prime and even ontological status, with respect to which the other modes stand in either derivative relationship or are at least subordinate. Likewise, with the voluntaristic Idealists and the Vitalists conation generally occupies the position of primacy, and even, as is the case of Schopenhauer, is viewed as ontologically identical with original Being. It would appear that there should be room for a school of thought which we might call Affectionism, where the primacy in importance would be assigned to the affections. Such a school does not appear in the main stream of Western philosophic thought, but it is to be found in India. Wherever the hedonic tone of a state of consciousness is given prime valuation, the philosophic formulation proper to such a valuation would be some form of Affectionism. In the exceptionally comprehensive and able philosophy of Sri Aurobindo Ghose we find precisely this kind of evaluation. To bring out in clear

relief this orientation, which is unknown or virtually unknown in Western philosophy, the following lengthy quotation is taken from Sri Aurobindo's essay on Heraclitus:

But there is one great gap and defect whether in his (Heraclitus') knowledge of things or his knowledge of the self of man. We see in how many directions the deep divining eye of Heraclitus anticipated the largest and profoundest generalizations of Science and Philosophy and how even his more superficial thoughts indicate later powerful tendencies of the occidental mind, how too some of his ideas influenced such profound and fruitful thinkers as Plato, the Stoics, the Neo-platonists. But in his defect also he is a fore-runner; it illustrates the great deficiency of later European thought, such of it at least as has not been profoundly influenced by Asiatic religions or Asiatic mysticism. I have tried to show how often his thought touches and is almost identical with the Vedic and Vedantic. But his knowledge of the truth of things stopped with the vision of the universal reason and the universal force; he seems to have summed up the principle of things in these two first terms, the aspect of consciousness, the aspect of power, a supreme intelligence and a supreme energy. The eye of Indian thought saw a third aspect of the Self and of the Brahman; besides the universal consciousness active in divine knowledge, besides the universal force active in the divine will, it saw the universal delight active in divine love and joy. European thought, following the line of Heraclitus' thinking, has fixed itself on reason and on force and made them the principles toward whose perfection our being has to aspire. Force is the first aspect of the world, war, the clash of energies; the second aspect, reason, emerges out of the appearance of force in which it is at first hidden and reveals itself as a certain justice, a certain harmony, a certain determining intelligence and reason in things; the third aspect is a deeper secret behind these two, a universal delight, love, beauty which taking up the other two can establish something higher than justice, better than harmony, truer than reason, — unity and bliss, the ecstasy of our fulfilled existence. Of this last secret power Western thought has only seen two lower aspects, pleasure and aesthetic beauty; it has missed the spiritual beauty and the spiritual delight. For that reason Europe has never been able to develop a powerful religion of its own; it has been obliged to turn to Asia. Science takes possession of the measures and utilities of Force; rational philosophy

pursues reason to its last subtleties; but inspired philosophy and religion can seize hold of the highest secret, uttamam rahasyam.¹

It is thus a fact that corresponding to the three primary modes of relative human consciousness there have been systems of philosophy which have given primacy of accentuation to one or another of these modes. The two schools heretofore discussed; i.e., Naturalism and the New Realism, quite clearly give the primacy to cognition, either perceptual or conceptual. But Pragmatism clearly subordinates conceptual cognition to empiric or perceptual cognition, and, by accentuating practice and conduct, gives the primacy to the conative mode of consciousness. Perhaps affection is here valued above cognition, but on this point I am unable to arrive at a definite decision. At any rate, conation receives the ascendent evaluation.

Pragmatism, then, may be classed as an empiric Voluntarism, in contrast to transcendental Voluntarism, such as that of Schopenhauer. But, being a form of Voluntarism, the general implications of a voluntaristic attitude, both positive and negative, follow. There is a definite support and strengthening of those tendencies in man which express themselves in performance, such as conquest of nature, missionary zeal, melioration activities and movements, progressive education, promulgation of propaganda of all sorts, selling, promotion, building, etc., etc. We may well agree that much of this is all to the good, but there is another side to a Voluntarism which is its own ultimate law. The will may and has successfully sought to impose its idea upon the other fellow, group or nation, either for, or not for, his own good. It is of the very nature of Voluntarism to deny that there is any moral maxim, conceptual law, or transcendental order which can serve as a supreme court for the review of its volitions. Whatever willed objective is successfully effectuated is, by reason of that success, morally and otherwise justified. Thus, a successful National Socialism would be righteous simply because it was successful. It stands today repudiated, but on pure voluntaristic grounds; that repudiation does not rest upon moral, religious, or intellectual considerations; it rests simply upon the fact that in the trial by willed force National Socialism was overthrown. Had the Nazis been strong enough to succeed, they would have been justified.

It is quite understandable and in conformity with expectation that, given the premises of Pragmatism, there should follow the doctrine of the Will to Believe as a justified form of cognition. But the will to believe, which, in the hands of a William James, a cultured gentleman of superior tastes and ethical values, could eventuate in a statement

¹ Ghose, Sri Aurobindo, Heraclitus, Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry, India (1941) p.70. (Underlining mine.)

with which we can feel much sympathy, is subject to no guiding modulus and both could and would mean something very different when developed by a man of quite different character and tastes, such as Joseph Stalin. Here the successfully effectuated will becomes the final authority. The good is that which the will actually accomplishes, and only that. This is the great dilemma of the Voluntarist. On one side, a completely free will, not subject to the review of any higher authority — at the price of chaos; on the other, a moral and rational governing modulus — at the price of a curtailed freedom. Howard H. Brinton, in his The Mystic Will, has shown how that greatest of voluntaristic mystics, Jacob Boehme, becoming conscious of the dilemma, was troubled, and therefore at times wrote like a rationalist. Jacob Boehme, who although in his soul incarnating the spirit of non-violence in such degree as to be the very fountainhead of the non-violent tendency in the West, nonetheless was likewise the fountainhead of that voluntarism which is the ultimate base and justification of all violence!

The difficulties involved when Pragmatism is understood as an orientation to pure activism has not escaped the attention of one of the leading Pragmatists and has caused him to feel some doubts. This self-criticism comes from C. S. Peirce, who, at least in the temporal sense, was the first of the modern Pragmatists, and since his statement is trenchant and comes from the ranks of the Pragmatists, it will be quoted at length.

This maxim was first proposed by C. S. Peirce in the Popular Science Monthly for January, 1878; and he explained how it was to be applied to the doctrine of reality. The writer was led the maxim by reflection upon Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Substantially the same way of dealing with ontology seems to have been practiced by the Stoics. The writer subsequently saw that the principle might easily be misapplied, so as to sweep away the whole doctrine of incommensurables, and, in fact, the whole Weierstrassian way of regarding the calculus. In 1896 William James published his Will to Believe, and later his Philos. Conceptions and Pract. Results, which pushed this method to such extremes as must tend to give us pause. The doctrine appears to assume that the end of man is action — a stoical axiom which, to the present writer at the age of sixty, does not recommend itself so forcibly as it did at thirty. If it be admitted, on the contrary, that action wants an end, and that that end must be something of a general description, then the spirit of the maxim itself, which is that we must look to the upshot of our concepts in order rightly to apprehend them, would direct us toward something different from practical facts, namely, to general ideas, as the true interpreters of our

thought. Nevertheless, the maxim has approved itself to the writer, after many years of trial, as of great utility in leading to a relatively high grade of clearness of thought. He would venture to suggest that it should always be put into practice with conscientious thoroughness, but that, when that has been done, and not before, a still higher grade of clearness of thought can be attained by remembering that the only ultimate good which the practical facts to which it directs attention can subserve is to further the development of concrete reasonableness; so that the meaning of the concept does not lie in any individual reactions at all, but in the manner in which those reactions contribute to that development. Indeed, in the article of 1878, above referred to, the writer practiced better than he preached; for he applied the stoical maxim most unstoically, in such a sense as to insist upon the reality of the objects of general ideas in their generality.¹

Certain striking modifications of the original conception of Pragmatism are revealed in the underlined portion of the above quotation. First, since activism appeals more to the man of thirty than to the man of sixty, it appears that the activist emphasis is no more than a matter of individual psychology and thus may not be validly extrapolated into an ontological principle. Second, it appears that the essential meaning of the maxim is not necessarily activist but consists in the evaluation of the given conception by its upshot — a view which contrasts with the evaluation by the source. (This would appear to be the most fundamental feature of Pragmatist method which remains.) Third, it appears that the maxim is merely useful in guiding empiric thought, but not, therefore, necessarily an absolute criterion of truth. It is thus reduced to a mundane heuristic principle. Fourth, it appears that there is insistence upon the reality of general ideas in their generality. This would seem to bring us back to the standpoint of the Conceptualists, and with that the distinctive quale of Pragmatism qua Pragmatism very largely vanishes.

With Pragmatism modified as above, it would seem that we have left merely a useful method of heuristic or pragmatic value only, and in that case the idea that the whole meaning or truth of a conception is necessarily found in consequences in terms of conduct, the practical and the empiric, would have to be abandoned. But in that case Pragmatism would hardly have any reason for existence as a philosophic school. With Pragmatism reduced to the status of a useful modulus of procedure in the movements of mundane consciousness, there does not

¹ Quoted from article on Pragmatism in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. II p.322. (Underlining mine.)

appear any reason why a protagonist of any school of philosophic thought could not and should not also be a Pragmatist in some phases of his thinking. Standard Pragmatism, by reason of the privacy implied by the word "whole" in the maxim, narrows the office of conception not only in the sense already discussed but, even more seriously, excludes the use of the conception in relation to a transcendental meaning, and this is a matter of particular importance to us here.

In conformity with Pragmatic epistemology, if there is a consciousness which is not conceptual or merely conceptual, which is not in time, which is not an immediate presentation of phenomena and is not related to conduct as action, then the relationship of conception to such a consciousness cannot be classed as truth or meaning. Since the immediate content of at least some mystical or Gnostic states of consciousness has such an immediate non-temporal and non-sensuous character, or at least purports to have such, it follows that the Pragmatist's epistemological theory either (1) implies denial of the actuality of such a mystical content, or (2) granting that such a content exists, then affirms that the relationship of a conception to it may not be classed as 'meaning' or 'truth'. This constitutes the second zone in which truth and meaning are denied to a conceptual relationship — the first, it will be recalled, being the zone of the relationship of concept to concept in an exclusively conceptual system, such as that of pure mathematics. Now it is true, as a matter of fact, that historically, as well as currently, the notion of 'truth' has been important, and even very important, in both zones. The Pragmatist theory, therefore, must imply that both of these uses of the notion of 'truth' are without validity, and, therefore, that both of these types of conceptuality are without meaning — a conclusion which is not very likely to be acceptable to either the philosophic mathematician or the philosophic mystic.

It is not here suggested that Pragmatism, as such, or that all pragmatistic thinkers, necessarily deny the actuality of mystical experience. Indeed, William James has treated the subject very sympathetically in his Varieties of Religious Experience, and has affirmed that it deserves much more serious study. But the mystical consciousness appears under two aspects, in that, in one sense it is an experience, and, in another, it is an immediate content. As an experience, it is an event happening to some subject or self in time, and, as such, falls within the range of psychological, physiological and even physical observation. Further, the event may produce changes in the conduct of the individual involved, and this may be noted and in some measure evaluated objectively. In this sense, the mystical consciousness is a somewhat which may fall within the range of evaluation in the pragmatic sense. But the matter is quite different when we come to consider the inward or immediate content — the psychical as distinguished from the psychological — of the mystical state. This

lies beyond the range of external observation, as is also true of the immediate psychical value of any experience, such as the immediate quale of the experience blue, for instance, and can be known only by those who have realized the state. It is certainly true that historically such inward or psychical content has constituted the meaningful reference of philosophies, especially in the case of oriental philosophies. But this sort of truth-reference is ruled out by the Pragmatist epistemological theory.

Anyone who granted the validity of the mystical or Gnostic content and of a truth-relation or of a meaning-relation on the part of a conception to such a content, but who at the same time accepted as valid the Pragmatist definitions of truth and meaning in other relations, would not be a Pragmatist in the sense of the definitions quoted above. For then the whole meaning of a conception, or of conception as such, would not be manifested in practical consequences in terms of conduct and experience. At least some of the meaning would be of a different sort. Superficially, one might imagine that the removal of the word 'whole' from the definitions would resolve the difficulty, but this is not so, since the independence and existence of Pragmatism as a school actually hangs upon that word. As an example, we can easily conceive of an Absolute Idealist who would say, provided the word 'whole' were removed from the definition: I also accept the Pragmatist epistemology as an adequate description of conceptual cognition in its relation to the relative realities of appearance, but not in its relation to Ultimate Reality. In such a way Absolute Idealism could assimilate the Pragmatist epistemological theory as a part truth, and there would be no room left for Pragmatism as an independent school. However, the historic fact is that epistemological Pragmatism came to birth as the result of a polemic directed against Absolutism. Thus its possibility as an independent existence lies in its emphasis of the word 'whole' in the definitions. It appears somewhat ironical that Pragmatism, in order to establish a place opposed to Absolute Idealism, had to invoke a sort of left-handed absolutism of its own!

The argument in support of Absolute Idealism, as against that of Pragmatism, has opened a door within the defenses of the latter whereby the former may possibly once again establish itself, if it can show in any degree, however small, that the use of the word 'whole' in the Pragmatist definitions is not valid. This is the analogue of William James' own thesis that Pluralism is established if it can be shown, in even the smallest degree, that there is something not contained in the Absolute One. Thus, if a conception can mean a mystical content — as is indeed implied throughout the philosophical Buddhist Sutras, to name one instance — and this content is neither a time-conditioned consciousness nor a perceptual experience, in the sense of the raw immediacy of sensual presentation, then a breach is established in the

walls of Pragmatist epistemological theory. To be sure, this does not necessarily imply the negation of the instrumental theory with respect to the office of the concept. But if the instrumental theory is retained, or insofar as it is retained, the concept would have at least a two-fold instrumental office. One would be that so well developed by Pragmatism, wherein the conceptual idea is instrumental to an experience, or practice, that always includes some degree of the perceptual quale, and the second instrumentality would be oriented to an immediate content which is non-experiential — in the sense of the definition given above — and non-conceptual. This latter content we may call the Transcendental or Spiritual, in the Indian sense of the term. The polemic of Pragmatism as against Absolutism would have proved effective to the extent that it has established that the thesis of the latter cannot be maintained on the ground of pure conception alone. Conception would have to be differentiated from the transcendental content as well as from the perceptual. The intellectualistic thesis that the fundamental and ultimate principle of the universe is some form of thought might well have to be abandoned, and, whether or not the intellectualistic psychology, which places cognition above affection and conation, would be retained, still the intellectual and conceptual would stand below the Transcendental. In any case, the Pragmatist thesis that conception is derived from perception could be maintained no longer as exclusively valid. For, it is at least possible that the concept has a hidden Father in the Transcendental, as well as a revealed Mother in the perceptual on experiential, and, on a priori grounds, it cannot be maintained that the nature of the concept is necessarily in closer affinity to the Mother than to the Father. Recognition of the actuality of the Father, and, further, the realization that his nature is not less native to the Son-concept than is the Mother-percept, is all that the Transcendental Idealist needs.

The instrumental interpretation of intellectual thought or conception, as developed by Pragmatism, is based, in considerable measure, upon the thesis that the concept is derived from the percept and serves as an office for the latter. In this connection the percept is not to be construed as derived exclusively from sensation, but, rather, something sufficiently comprehensive to include a complex of feeling and intuition as well as sensation.¹ Perception thus comprehends the material given by all the psychological functions except conceptual thinking, as these functions are listed by C. G. Jung. This perception is conceived as prior to conception, both in the sense of time and of epistemological value. With respect to the notion of priority in time, the study of biology, under the assumption of organic evolution,

¹ See William James' Some Problems of Philosophy, Longman Green Co., N.Y. (1911) p.48 footnote.

does build a very strong presumption in support of the thesis. Investigation of the psychical life of animals, particularly in the case of the higher animals, gives convincing evidence that they do have a perceptual consciousness in which there is some form of sensation, feeling and intuition. But there is little or no reason to suppose that animals think in the conceptual sense. Thus, in bio-psychology, the qualitative differentiation of man from all other animals inheres in the development or presence of the function or faculty of conceptual thinking. Man is distinctively man because, and to the extent, he thinks conceptually. From the standpoint which regards the theory of organic evolution as an all-sufficient basis of interpretation, man and conceptual thinking are simply the latest terms in the natural evolutionary series. If, then, we view man as solely a biological entity, it is clear that on the whole he has achieved the most comprehensive adjustment to environment, when compared to that of any other animal. He commands the stage of life as does no other creature. He can survive under far greater diversity of conditions, and, notwithstanding the relative atrophy in man of functional capacities that are strong in the animals, he is lord over the whole animal world, and has advanced far in the conquest of the inorganic. Despite his many remaining and new problems, man constitutes an advance over the purely animal kingdom in the art of adjusting life to environment. But the key to this unique achievement of man clearly lies in the possession of the faculty of conceptual thinking. Therefore, there can be no doubt but that the concept does serve an office for life.

Does it therefore follow that the total significance of the concept is that of an office for life? Even though we grant that the given outline of the bio-historic genesis of the concept is substantially correct, we may still ask this question. Here it is quite germane to point out that the bio-history we refer to is itself a conceptual construct, and not a pure perceptual fact. The history known is a history for thought, whatever else it may be. As a consequence, the reference to biologic evolution does not supply us with a pure pre-conceptual root from which the concept is supposed to be derived. The material with which we are working is so compounded that the concept is inextricably a part of it, and the problem of the inherent nature of the concept simply reappears in a new form.

The thesis that historic genesis supplies the key to significance is, itself, no more than a conceptual hypothesis, a theory of interpretation. History can be interpreted in such a way that it loses all ontological value. Thus it is possible to view all events as merely supplying occasions which arouse recognition of truth without being their source. In such a case the bio-historic process would have only the value of a sort of phantasmagoria having only catalytic significance. A consistent interpretation of history along this line is only a question of skill. As a result, we could quite easily

conclude that the primacy of perception in time casts no effective light upon the fundamental nature of conception. So, the facts of biology do not prove that the total significance of conception is that of an instrumental aid to life or experience, nor that its principal significance is such. All that we can positively say here is that conception does facilitate the adjustment of a living organism, though it may have quite other and even much more important relations.

As far as I can see, the Vitalists have not established their thesis for the derivation of the concept, though, if they had, the conception of the exclusively instrumental value of the concept with respect to life might well follow. But although the vitalistic attempt at proof may have failed, this does not imply that the instrumentalistic theory may not otherwise be established. There is another line of approach to substantially the same conclusion, which, in my opinion, carries much more weight. This we may call the psychological approach and shall proceed to its consideration.

The introspective observation and analysis of the actual quale and functioning within consciousness can lead to a philosophic statement, and this seems to be the most distinctive approach to Pragmatism as exemplified by William James. While one is immersed in a state of consciousness or engaged in a psychical process, it is possible to shift one's attention from the immediate enjoyment or content to the observation of the state or process itself. This step is sometimes quite difficult as the shift of attention may, very easily, destroy the state or erase the content, but with care it can be done. In this kind of effort William James was undoubtedly endowed with exceptional skill, and has unquestionably made highly valuable discoveries. But not only did this sort of research contribute an important part of his psychological theory, it also formed a significant part of his philosophical base. His theory concerning the nature and functioning of perception and conception appears to be very largely grounded on such research, and that is the phase which concerns us most particularly here.

James' root finding is probably best given by a direct quotation of his own words. In his Some Problems of Philosophy he has said:

If my reader can succeed in abstracting from all conceptual interpretation and lapse back into his immediate sensible life at his very moment, he will find it to be what someone has called a big blooming buzzing confusion, as free from contradiction in its 'much-at-onceness' as it is all alive and evidently there.

Out of this aboriginal sensible muchness attention carves out objects, which conception then names and identifies forever — in the sky 'constellations', on the

earth 'beach', 'sea', 'cliff', 'bushes', 'grass'. Out of time we cut 'days' and 'nights', 'summers' and 'winters'. We say what each part of the sensible continuum is, and all these abstracted whats are concepts.

The intellectual life of man consists almost wholly in his substitution of a conceptual order for the perceptual order in which his experience originally comes.

In a footnote James acknowledges the obvious fact that this account of the 'aboriginal sensible flux' directly contradicts that which Kant gave. As this contrast is historically of prime philosophic importance and implies quite diverse interpretations of the function of conceptuality or understanding, I quote the relevant statement from the Critique of Pure Reason:

But, the conjunction (conjunction) of a manifold in the intuition never can be given us by the senses; it cannot therefore be contained in the pure form of sensuous intuition, for it is a spontaneous act of the faculty of representation. And as we must, to distinguish it from sensibility, entitle this faculty understanding; so all conjunction — whether conscious or unconscious, be it of the manifold in intuition, sensuous or non-sensuous, or of several conceptions — is an act of understanding. To this act we shall give the general appellation of synthesis, thereby to indicate, at the same time, that we cannot represent anything as conjoined in the object without having previously conjoined it ourselves.²

James goes on to say, not quite consistently but I think correctly: "The reader must decide which account agrees best with his own actual experience."

But despite James' virtual acknowledgment in the last quotation that there may be a relativity of individual psychology involved in the differences in the formulations of the sensibly given, as between himself and Immanuel Kant, he proceeds in his subsequent philosophic development as though his own finding were a universally established fact and thus would seem to be guilty of the psychologist's fallacy — his own designation — which he, himself, has defined as "the confusion of his own — the psychologist's — standpoint with that of the mental fact about which he is making his report." It may, quite possibly, be admitted that, given the perceptual base which James found through the examination of his own psychical processes, much, if not all, of his epistemological theory concerning

¹ *ibid.* p.50-1.

² Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, translation by J.M.D. Meiklejohn, J.M. Dent and Sons, Ltd London (1934) p.93.

the office of percepts and concepts follows reasonably enough. But can an epistemology of universal validity be established in this way? Have we perhaps a statement which is valid for an individual or a psychological type but not valid as a general truth? Both Hume and Kant most certainly found the given of sensibility in quite other form, and this fact cannot be casually swept aside. The contrast is radical; for James a continuum of 'much-at-onceness' in which manyness is given, fused in an original unity of a perceptual flux into which the conceptual power casts 'cuts' which are extracted as discreet entities, both static and timeless; for Hume and Kant, a manifold of atomic elements which, for Kant, are conjoined into unified wholes by the conceptual understanding and the transcendental unity of apperception of the Self. For James, the conceptual function introduces separation into discrete elements by abstraction from an original unified totality, while, for Kant, the conceptual understanding conjoins into the object from an originally given discrete manifold, and thus is a synthesizing function. From such contrasted bases quite different epistemologies must follow and correspondingly different metaphysical conceptions.

Neither the descriptive picture of Immanuel Kant nor that of William James stands unsupported by other testimony. It is a historical fact that Kant's view was largely accepted by Western philosophy since his day, but the experience of the pure perceptual as given by William James appears highly consonant with the view which holds the predominant place in the Orient. We are indebted to Dr. F.S.C. Northrop for bringing this characteristic of oriental thought and valuation into clear relief in his The Meeting of East and West. Indeed, Dr. Northrop builds a convincing case for the thesis that just in this valuation of the pure perceptually given we find the prime differentiation in the psychical outlook of oriental and occidental man. Therefore, we cannot in a quick or off-hand manner decide that either view is exclusively true, for here we do not have a conceptually deduced conclusion available for objective logical analysis nor an objective datum checkable by scientific method, since the given datum is psychic in the sense of a conscious process apprehended by itself, rather than psychological in the sense of being apprehended by another. The self-observing consciousness gives a material which is mostly beyond the reach of criticism because it is subjective, and so, at least provisionally, we must accept it as valid for the individual reporting what he finds. Unquestionably, we must recognize a difference in competency in the self-examination, yet, regardless of whether the competency is limited or large, the finding must be determinant for the individual himself. As a consequence, the epistemology and general philosophy founded upon the psychic material may possess a substantial validity for the individual and for those of similar psychical type, and yet fail to authenticate an extrapolated general epistemology. We must assume that other self-determination of the psychic character of the pure

perceptual supplies an equally valid ground for a quite different theory of knowledge and philosophical development.

In my own finding with respect to the perceptually given, prior to the experience of the transformation process reported in Chapter II of Part I, Volume I, the material seemed of identical nature with that described by Kant. Subsequently, when reading James' report, I made a re-examination and found the perceptual material to be consonant with his statement. But repeated examinations since then have given me either the continuum or the manifold, and I do not find myself able to determine that the one view is more profound or truer than the other. This fact has forced the provisional view that the finding is conditioned by individual psychology and that the ultimate or objective nature of the pure perceptual is such that it possesses both characters at the same time. This seems like a contradiction and probably is a paradox, but it is scarcely more difficult to accept than the physicist's experience of the phenomena of light which requires a description in terms of both corpuscles and undulating waves.

We derive from Kant and James two radically contrasting theories of the origin, office and nature of the conceptual understanding. For James, the concept is derived from the percept, is at all times dependent upon the percept for its ultimate meaning, and, in the end, fulfills itself by eventuating in a perceptual state of consciousness or experience; but for Kant the conceptual order is a priori, that is, not derived from perceptual experience, and though not known by the relative consciousness prior to experience in time, is, nonetheless, transcendental in its nature and thus prior in its essence; it integrates the raw perceptual material, depends upon the latter for the predication of actuality, but not for the determination of the form of understanding. There is a considerable area of agreement between Kant and the Pragmatists in that they both view the office of the concept as related to the perceptual material. Indeed, it will be remembered that the first statement of the Pragmatic theory grew out of Peirce's meditation upon the implications of certain portions of the Kantian thesis. But we can hardly conclude that this interpretation is true to the whole meaning of the Kantian philosophy, since modern Idealism is derived from this source, both in its Rationalistic and Voluntaristic forms. Truly, Kant conceived a puissant and pregnant philosophy! It is true that the Kantian treatment of the concept is moderately pejorative when compared to the view of the older Rationalists, but is much less pejorative than James' treatment, since the latter views the concept as no more than a dependent attachment to the perceptual order. For Kant, the concept had a transcendental genesis, and, therefore, a degree of authority which was independent of the perceptual order. James does concede that the concept possesses great practical utility in its operation in connection with percept, since it possesses powers lacking to the latter but which are valuable

for the empiric consciousness and life. He acknowledges that the concept may operate for considerable stretches in conceptual terms exclusively, as is particularly demonstrated in mathematics, but he insists that the ultimate reference be to the perceptual. Otherwise many unsolvable conceptual problems arise, such as those that have become famous and perennial in technical philosophy. James even recognizes that concepts have a substantive as well as a functional value, though he seems to view the substantive value as definitely more important. But the concept has a character so different from the percept that when it builds a portrait of the world it produces a falsification of the reality which is supposed to be of the nature of the perceptual. It serves a valid office as a pointer to the latter, but is not a representation of truth when developed in conformity with its own law in abstraction from the perceptual order. James does concede that the concept possesses great practical utility in its operation in connection with percept, since it possesses powers lacking to the latter but which are valuable for the empiric consciousness and life. He acknowledges that the concept may operate for considerable stretches in conceptual terms exclusively, as is particularly demonstrated in mathematics, but unsolvable conceptual problems arise, such as those that have become famous and perennial in technical philosophy. James even recognizes that concepts have a substantive as well as a functional value, though he seems to view the substantive value in essentially perceptual terms, and regards the functional value as definitely more important. But the concept has a character so different from the percept that when it builds a portrait of the world it produces a falsification of the reality which is supposed to be of the nature of the perceptual. It serves a valid office as a pointer to the latter, but is not a representation of truth when developed in conformity with its own law in abstraction from the perceptual order.

Conceptual thought can develop a system in its own terms, employing concepts liberated from all perceptual reference, as is done in the most formal and most pure form of mathematics. In this case, the terms have been viewed as 'meaningless', and certainly appear as meaningless if 'meaning' is restricted to a perceptual referent. In terms of James' view, the pure perceptual continuum forms an order in itself which has no need of the intramission of any conceptual element in order that it may have existence. This order, according to James, has no meaning but is simply itself, or its own meaning, if we may so speak. 'Meaning', in James' sense of the word, is an attribute or quality of the concept when it serves the office of pointing to the perceptual order, or some portion of it, and the terminal value of the concept lies in the perceptual experience to which it points. Now, in James' view, there are two interconnections between the conceptual and the perceptual, (1) the birth of the concept out of the perceptual matrix, and (2) the relationship of pointer on the part of the concept to

the perceptual in relatively or ultimately terminal phases. That the concept can and does serve the office of pointer to a perceptual experience is not questioned here, so long as this 'meaning' of the concept is not taken in the privative sense. But can we truly say that the concept is born out of the perceptual matrix? If it is in some sense born out of that matrix, can we derive its complete character and nature from the perceptual source? These questions we shall proceed to examine.

If the conceptual were something exclusively derived from the perceptual and dependent upon the latter for its possibility, as the tail of a dog is dependent upon the dog, then self-contained conceptual systems would not be possible. But we do have such conceptual systems. Further, when we consider the inner form or organization of the conceptual systems and of the perceptual order, we find radical discrepancies. One is not the duplication of the other, as James himself has shown at some length. Attempts to build a conceptualistic philosophy which shall embrace the totality of the perceptual have failed, broken by the dilemmas of many apparently unsolvable problems. This we shall illustrate by one instance, i.e., that of the characters of the conceptual and the perceptual continua. The conceptual continuum consists of an infinity of terms, no two of which may be selected in such a way that there will not be an infinity of other terms between them, yet each term is static and completely determinate. There are no gaps in the continuum but also no flow or flux and no becoming. In contrast, the perceptual continuum consists of no completely determinate terms, but only of parts which stand out in the sense of more or less, and all inter-connected by a stream of becoming, such that no term is identical to any other, and none stands in a fixed unchanging relationship to any other. Clearly, these two continua are radically different. We cannot set up a two-term relationship between the elements or parts of one and those of the other. We cannot do this, as suggested by Dr. Northrop, even though the two-term relationship is conceived of freely in the form of one-one, one-many, and many-one. If the perceptually given were in the form of a discrete manifold, as Kant found it to be, such a two-term relationship might be quite conceivable, but we are at present viewing the perceptually given in the form which James gave it. In this form it is a flow or flux, and thus not consisting of determinate terms with which a two-term correlation is possible. So we must conclude that the inner form or organization of the conceptual systems and perceptual order are qualitatively different, and not merely different in degree but diverse in the sense of being incommensurable.

But while the conceptual and the perceptual are orders or systems incommensurable to each other, so that the one is ineffable with respect to the other, they unquestionably do interact. Something in the conceptual system is derived from the perceptual order. Of

this there can be no doubt. However, this fact of something contained in the conceptual, which is derived from the perceptual, does not imply that the conceptual in its total or its essential nature is derived from the perceptual. What we have, rather, is the meeting of two powers or modes of the total consciousness that are in their surface manifestation alien to each other, however much they may be fused in their root source. What is being suggested here is a fusion or identity in a common root combined with parallelity in manifestation, rather than a causal connection on the surface. Because of the commonality of the root, interaction is possible, but because of independence in essential development, each according to its own law — or swadharma — there is an ineluctable incommensurability in the inherent character of conception and perception. We can illustrate the interaction combined with essential incommensurability by the figure of conceiving of the perceptual flux as stream or a sea of flowing currents into which the conceptual enters as a determinate vessel and brings forth a portion of the perceptual water. The concept in its impure or mixed form consists of both the water and the vessel. The water is derived from the perceptual, while the vessel is not. Pure conceptuality is a development in terms of the vessel alone, without the water.

When Kant said, "but, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience", he made one of the most profound observations in the whole history of philosophy. ("Knowledge" here is to be understood in the sense of conceptual knowledge.) The implication is that in the conceptual and perceptual we have two orders, neither of which is derived from the other. As a result, each is capable of independent or autonomous development in accordance with its own nature. The perceptual does not need the conceptual in order that empiric life may survive, as is abundantly demonstrated by the lower forms of organism. Likewise, however much it may be true that within our ordinary experience the conceptual order does not manifest until brought into contact with experience, yet the conceptual is capable of operating in its own terms and in accordance with its own law, in high disregard for all perceptual elements. It does not even need the Kantian transcendental forms of perception, i.e., space and time, as is demonstrated in the development of formal mathematical systems. We do not need to decide that one order gives truth while the other does not, or that truth attaches exclusively to a relationship between the two; nor do we face the necessity of concluding that one is real while the other is unreal. Perhaps we are not yet able to answer questions of this sort in the ontological sense, but we can recognize that, relative to individual psychology, the one or the other order carries the greater, or even exclusive, reality-value and truth-value, and thus opens the door to a larger mutuality of understanding and consideration.

Conceding that the perceptual and conceptual orders are, as they stand manifested to our relative consciousness, of distinct nature, neither, in its essential character, being derived from the other, then we may well inquire as to the innate character of each. Is one substantive while the other is only functional, or is each both functional and substantive, etc.? For James, it is clear that primary substantiality attached to the perceptual, as being both the source and terminal of the conceptual, while the conceptual entered into the picture preponderantly as a function or active agent which is valuable mainly as it leads to something beyond itself — a something which is always perceptual. Nonetheless, the conceptual is granted a degree of substantive value, apparently in the form of vague images which are associated with some — but not all — concepts, and can be objects of contemplation. But clearly a 'vague image' is not itself of conceptual character, but a form of percept, and so we are forced to conclude that James did not grant to the conceptual order a conceptual substantiality qua conceptual. Thus the conceptual qua conceptual appears as functional only. But it is quite otherwise with the perceptual. It would appear that James viewed the perceptual as primarily, if not wholly, substantive, as is indicated by the following quotation: "The perceptual flux as such . . . means nothing, and is what it immediately is."¹ Yet there are interpretations of the perceptual that vary radically from this view, as in the case of all those views wherein the percept is regarded as merely the occasion which arouses the conceptual understanding into waking consciousness. Clearly, on such a view the perceptual serves a functional office, either as a part or the whole of its significance. Likewise, there are interpretations of the conceptual which give it substantive value, even in the sense of prime or exclusive substantive value, as for example is the case in the philosophy of Spinoza. Clearly there are important differences here, of interpretation or of insight, which require our further consideration.

What do we mean by function and substance? Of these two, the meaning of function is reasonably clear. As used in this discussion, we may understand function as an activity, process or constituent, which is dependent for its value, significance etc., upon something else. Substance or the substantive is that which is to be understood as in some measure the self-existent and the substrate of properties or processes, thus terminal or relatively terminal with respect to values, significance, etc. There are philosophies which abandon the notion of substance entirely, as in the case of David Hume, much of Positivism, and a large part, if not the whole, of Buddhist philosophy, but we shall not discuss this actualistic theory at this time as it does not

¹ Some Problems of Philosophy, Op. cit. p. 49.

appear to be the meaning affirmed by William James. Practically, from the psychological or psychic standpoint, we may view the distinction between the substantive and the functional as being such that the substantive may be an object of contemplation for its own sake, more or less completely, and thus relatively or absolutely terminal, whereas the functional is not such a contemplative or terminal object, but is only a means for reaching such.

In the history of thought it is Rationalism or Intellectualism that has affirmed Substantialism and the state of contemplation as the final state of blessedness, as is notable in the philosophies of Spinoza and of Leibnitz. Or, again, as brought out by Sri Aurobindo in the following quotation: "For it is asserted to us by the pure reason and it seems to be asserted to us by Vedanta that as we are subordinate and an aspect of this Movement, so the movement is subordinate and an aspect of something other than itself, of a great timeless, spaceless Stability, sthānu, which is immutable, inexhaustible and unexpended, not acting though containing all this action, not energy, but pure existence."⁸ In contrast, it is empiric insight which has led to the non-substantialistic or nihilistic view that there is nothing but the movement, inhering in nothing else, as exemplified by David Hume and the Buddhists.

But though the vast rationalistic tradition affirms a substantive Existent, which is not revealed by sensuous experience, however profoundly empiric insight may be developed, the question arises as to whether this existent is real, something more than a speculative construct, and, if it is real, is its nature conceptual? That there is a real Existent, which is not given to the sensuous consciousness, however acutely developed, is affirmed by more than the pure reason. Thus, quoting again from Aurobindo:

But there is a supreme experience¹ and supreme intuition by which we go back behind our surface self and find that his becoming, change succession are only a mode of our being and that there is that in us which is not involved at all in the becoming. Not only can we have the intuition of this that is stable and eternal in us, not only can we have a glimpse of it in experience behind the veil of continually fleeting becomings, but we can draw back into it and live in it entirely, and in our attitude, and in our action upon the movement of the world. And this stability in which we can so live is precisely that which the pure Reason has already given us, although it can be arrived at without

¹ 'Experience' as used by Aurobindo is not restricted to the raw immediacy of the sense or a time conditioned process, but embraces the ways of consciousness which I have called 'Realization', 'Recognition', 'Enlightenment', etc.

reasoning at all, without knowing previously what it is — it is pure existence, eternal, infinite, indefinable, not affected by the succession of Time, not involved in the extension of Space, beyond form, quantity, quality — Self only and absolute.

Here we have affirmed a substantial Base, affirmed by the pure reason, intuition and mystical realization, but it is clearly not a Substance composed of conceptual stuff any more than it is of a sensuous perceptual nature. So, while on the whole the Western rationalistic thinkers, who have affirmed the reality of the non-sensuous substantial, have given the impression of meaning a conceptual sort of substance, this may well be an error of interpretation and even of understanding on their own part. In other words, the intelligibly or rationally given of which they spoke may well have been Reason plus something more. This I am convinced was the case. What they saw clearly was that here was a somewhat which had no part in sensuous experience, in fact was quite other than that, but which was certainly given to profound insight. Then, if there is only perceptual and conceptual knowledge, it belonged to the conceptual order. But it may belong to another more transcendental order of consciousness which is only isolated with difficulty. Provisionally, then we may say that the pure Existent is neither conceptual nor perceptual.

Whether or not there is a conceptual substantiality, of a nature not reducible to percepts or a transcendental order, is a question we shall leave open here. The essential point of the present critique of the Pragmatist epistemology in general, and that of William James in particular, is the thesis that the conceptual order is not completely derivable from the perceptual, and that its meaningful reference is not exclusively to an ultimately perceptual referent. And then there remains at least a possible a priori referent, which the concept may mean, even though the whole office of the conceptual order may be that of instrumentalism, one way or the other.

* * * *

There can be no doubt but that the fundamental maxim of Pragmatism is of authentic utility in many applications. This is particularly true in the case of natural science, but 'science' in this sense means a particular way or form of knowledge, and not knowledge in every possible sense. Natural science is a body of knowledge delimited by its own methodology. This science is governed by three heuristic principles, as follows: (1) The data or material of scientific

¹ The Life Divine, Op. cit., p.77.

knowledge is grounded in sensual observation, and restricted to the generally possessed sensory equipment. (2) The organizational concepts or theories introduced to form the mass of selected observation into a conceptually thinkable system are invented or intuited postulations. (3) The interpretative postulates must be of such a character that consequences may be inferred of such a nature that they are verifiable or disprovable by an indicated observation either with or without a devised experiment. But such a methodology uses concepts in a way that satisfies the Pragmatic prescription. Clearly, science in this sense is for a program or purpose and not a detached presentment of the real as an object for pure contemplation. Theory is an instrument toward a practical end, in the philosophical sense of the term, although, of course, this practicality is not necessarily to be limited to the sense of a narrow utilitarianism.

Yet, although natural science is unavoidably a source of truth only in the pragmatic sense, owing to the limitations imposed by the methodology, nonetheless, an analysis of the attitudes revealed by at least some scientists suggests a feeling for knowledge in a more ultimate sense, such as that of the Gnosis. Why else the predominant preference for 'pure science', as contrasted to applied science, on the part of the greater scientific thinkers? Here we have revealed an orientation to truth, not as a means to some practical accomplishment, but rather as an end or value in itself. Of course, a conceptual formulation of truth is less than Gnostic Truth, and the Gnosis is not grounded in a sensuous base, as natural science is, yet the feeling for truth as a value in itself, however inadequately it may be conceived, is the sign of an interest which is more than pragmatic. In fact, it is a well recognized principle among the pure research thinkers that a motivation guided by a consideration of possible practical utility acts as a barrier to successful research. The pure search for truth, whatever it may be, is the royal road to fruitful results, not alone in the development of detached theory, but even in the laying of the bases for future utilitarian applications. We may even say that the pure scientist, however much he may be restricted to the employment of a pragmatic methodology, is, nonetheless, motivated by a love of truth as a terminal value. Thus the Pragmatist theory of cognition is not sufficient to explain the whole of the scientific process, just as the logistic interpretation of mathematics is inadequate to achieve an understanding of mathematical creativeness.

The degree to which our scientific disciplines confirm the Pragmatist theory of knowledge varies with the sciences. The sciences most closely related to empiric life, i.e., the biological sciences and psychology, most largely confirm the Pragmatist theory, as might well be anticipated, since this school is most closely oriented to this division of science. But this theory is progressively less adequate in the other sciences as they become more and more mathematical, and

it fails most notably in the interpretation of pure mathematics — the field in which the New Realism has its greatest strength. Whether or not pure mathematics consists only of conceptual elements, it certainly is freed from admixture with the perceptual and thus is not subject to the methodology of the empiric sciences. So the Pragmatist theory has only a restricted validity even in the field of science itself.

The general thesis of Pragmatism, that there is a non-intellecutal form of knowledge or awareness, is one which can hardly be questioned, but the further thesis that this non-intellectual form is more fundamental and comprehensive does not necessarily follow, or it may be true in some respects and not in others. Further, the Pragmatists class this other form as perceptive in the sense of being experiential, with experience defined as "the entire process of phenomena, of present data considered in their raw immediacy." If then we take a concept from out of a part of the perceptual flow, it is clear that the total flux is more than the concept, but the latter in its universality has an extension reaching far beyond any particular concrete experience. Thus, in one sense the perceptual is more comprehensive than the conceptual, but in another sense the reverse is the case. Which kind of comprehension is the vaster is a question on which we may never find agreement, since the relativity of individual psychology and insight is determinant here. Again, with respect to the question as to which is the more fundamental, much depends upon the theory of the origin of the concept and percept which the thinker entertains. If the conceptual is viewed as wholly derived from the perceptual matrix, then clearly the latter is more fundamental, but if both are viewed as derived from a common source, but not the one derived from the other, then there does not appear any simple way in which we could determine that either is more fundamental in the ontological sense.

Pragmatism is not only anti-intellectualistic, it is also pro-sensationalistic, or pro-vitalistic, or pro-experientialistic, meaning by this that sensational experience and life are more fundamental and more bedded in the Real than the concepts of the intellect, or the intellectual order as such. One may agree with Pragmatism with respect to its anti-intellectualism in the sense that intellectualism means the identification of things with what we know of them in reflective thought — with nothing left over — and yet diverge with respect to the Pragmatist view relative to vitalism and sensationalism. There is Gnostic or supramental Knowledge which is quite other than sensational cognition, or vital intuition or perceptual intuition, yet this Knowledge is truly more fundamental and comprehensive than the conceptual order. Pragmatism is not only anti-intellectualistic but it is also anti-transcendentalistic, and the primary focus of the present critique is aimed at the latter feature.

Transcendentalism may be no more than a postulate of the reason, in which case it is a speculative construct not grounded in experience or any other form of immediacy, but it may also be a conceptual construction based upon direct Realization, such as may be known as Gnostic or Mystical Enlightenment. For a consciousness that has no acquaintance with direct Realization the notion of a transcendental Reality tends to appear fantastic, since it does not seem to be a content of common experience, and does not seem to be a necessity for the reasoning process, except, perhaps, in the restricted Kantian usage of the notion. From this latter point of view, the hypothesis of a transcendental Existent, however much it may facilitate a philosophic formulation, suffers by the defect that it can never be authenticated by common experience, and thus it appears more in the spirit of natural science to abandon the notion entirely and proceed to the construction of philosophic interpretation exclusively in terms of concepts which mean elements, complexes, relationships or processes lying within the limits of experience. But for a consciousness which has had or possesses direct acquaintance with direct Gnostic Realization, such procedure inevitably appears to be arbitrary and inadequate. The latter may grant that, if we cut off that section of total consciousness which we may call the human empiric and conceptual consciousness, then the Pragmatist epistemology and general philosophy forms as substantially accurate interpretation, but it would be only partial and could not satisfy more than a part of human need, since a portion of the total human need requires the Transcendental for its fulfillment. From this standpoint, Pragmatism is inadequate, and even in a measure malicious, since its orientation to the empiric is exclusive or privative.

It may be contended that mystical or Gnostic Realization is a form of experience and may therefore be embraced within the Pragmatism meaning of the term, and therefore be a possible referent in the forms of Pragmatic epistemology. The expression "mystical experience" does occur in literature, as in the cases of both William James and Sri Aurobindo, but to validate such usage the meaning of the term "experience" must be widened substantially beyond that given in Baldwin's Dictionary and which appears as the sense directly affirmed or implied in Pragmatist philosophy. No doubt, mystical states of consciousness do occur as events in the life of the individual, and to this extent we are dealing with a process in time, and the event itself is a phenomenon. To this degree we may validly speak of a mystical or Gnostic experience. But it is quite otherwise when we consider the meaningful content of the states. At least some of these — and all that are authentically Gnostic — have a content which is timeless and Noumenal, and thus fall outside the definition. I believe the definition of "experience" as given is perfectly sound and is in conformity with the general understanding of the term, but if we take "experience" in

this restricted sense, then it becomes necessary to recognize other forms of immediacy, such as Gnostic immediacy.

A Gnostic immediacy may be the referent of a body of conceptual thought, in which case we may regard the conceptual or reflective thought as significant only in the instrumental sense, but it would not be instrumental to an empiric immediacy, and, therefore, not identical with the instrumentalism of Pragmatic epistemology. But while this is clear where the Gnostic Realization is sharply defined as neither thought nor experience, as in the case of preparatory meditation in which intellectual and sensuous process is silenced, there remains the case of Gnostic insight which is not pure but mixed with conceptual or empiric elements, or both, and in this case there can be confusion in interpretation. The actual state of consciousness of an individual may seem to be pure or simple, whereas, in point of fact, sufficiently profound criticism will reveal that it is a complex of functions or faculties. The Gnostic and the empiric may be so fused as to seem to be of one sameness with sense-experience, but this fusing may occur between the Gnostic and intellectual thought with the result that the whole complex appears to be simply the pure Reason. Here lies the source of the self-evident truths and innate ideas which formed so important a part of Rationalistic thought before the time of Kant. But while Kant made it clear what the pure reason qua reason is and took a pejorative attitude toward the Transcendent in the Gnostic sense, thus tying reason to experience in the narrow sense, the Reality for Gnostic Realization does not therefore cease to be, nor does the fusion of a partial Gnostic insight and reason cease to carry authority. What he did, in this respect, was the isolation of reason qua reason, and did not thereby invalidate the insight of the Rationalists and the Platonists.

But whether or not the Platonic ideas or self-evident truths or innate ideas are grounded in pure reason or a combination of the Gnosis and reason, the rationalistic method remains valid as a philosophic process, once the insight is given. Philosophy can be, in some range of its activity at least, a deductive development on the analogue of mathematics. And it would be no more necessary for this kind of philosophy to justify its conclusions by reference to a narrow empiricism than it is for pure mathematics. We are by no means justified in assuming that all Truth is correlated with the empiric in the narrow sense of the definition.

What I am here suggesting is that the alternative of Empiricism is not necessarily Intellectualism nor Rationalism in the sense of a pure reason, in the Kantian meaning of the term, is a source of knowledge independent of sense-perception. The alternative may be a philosophy grounded upon a third form of cognition which is more fundamental, more primitive, and more authoritative than either sense-perception — and likewise perceptive intuition and vitalistic intuition — or conceptual cognition. The present work is by no means unique in that it is a

formulation of a philosophy of that sort, as can be verified by reference to the main streams of Indian philosophy and at least the philosophy of Plotinus among the Greeks. The standpoint is presented very clearly in the following quotation from Plotinus.

External objects present us only with appearances. Concerning them, therefore, we may be said to possess opinion rather than knowledge. The distinctions in the actual world of appearance are of import only to ordinary and practical men. Our question lies with the ideal reality that exists behind appearance. How does the mind perceive these ideas? Are they without us, and is the reason, like sensation, occupied with objects external to itself? What certainty could we then have, what assurance that our perception was infallible? The object perceived would be something different from the mind perceiving it. We should have then an image instead of reality. It would be monstrous to believe for a moment that the mind was unable to perceive ideal truth exactly as it is, and that we had not certainty and real knowledge concerning the world of intelligence. It follows, therefore, that this region of truth is not to be investigated as a thing external to us, and so only imperfectly known. It is within us. Here the objects we contemplate and that which contemplates are identical — both are thought. The subject cannot surely know an object different from itself. The world of ideas lies within our intelligence. Truth, therefore, is not the agreement of our apprehension of an external object with the object itself. It is the agreement of the mind with itself. Consciousness, therefore, is the sole basis of certainty. The mind is its own witness. Reason sees in itself that which is above itself as its source; and again, that which is below itself as still itself once more.

Knowledge has three degrees — Opinion, Science, Illumination. The means or instrument of the first is sense; of the second, dialectic; of the third, intuition. To the last I subordinate reason. It is absolute knowledge founded on the identity of the mind knowing with the object known.¹

Here we have recognized three forms of knowledge, i.e., Opinion, or Perception in modern terms; Science, or Conceptual Cognition; and Illumination, or Transcendental Cognition, or Introception in the terminology of the present work. Reason, Science, or Conceptual

¹ Quoted from the letter to Flaccus as given in Hours With The Mystics, by R. A. Vaughan, Gibbings and Co., Ltd., London (1895) p.79-80. (Underlining mine except the underlined 'within' and 'known'.)

Cognition occupies an intermediate position between the other two, but is seen as having its source in that which is above, or Illumination, and stands in a relationship of hierarchical superiority to the sense-perception which lies below. Plotinus' philosophy is grounded upon Realization, and not upon mere inventive speculation, and, therefore, what we have is a relationship in the hierarchy of knowledge which is found by self-examination. Thus it is grounded in a self-searching similar to that on which William James grounded his theory of the relationship between the concept and the percept, though the found relationship was radically antithetical. What are we to conclude about such disagreement? Is one competent and correct and the other incompetent and in error? Or, shall we assume equal competency, but with difference of results growing out of difference of perspective? I think that an affirmative answer to the last question will afford the juster view. At any rate, assuming that it is the most just view, then it would follow that James' view that concepts are born exclusively out of percepts is a part truth, valid only if the word "exclusively" is expunged. The authority of Illumination is too great to be disregarded.

If reason, or the intelligible order, or the conceptual order, is derived from a source above it, and is in hierarchical transcendence with respect to the perceptual order standing below it, then it will most naturally have affinity to the Illuminative order of cognition, greater and more immediate than the affinity between the latter and perceptual cognition, though there is abundant ground for recognizing that a correlation of the latter sort, which proceeds around or short-circuits the reason, does exist. But the difference suggested as between these two types of correlation is analogous to the difference in military communications, known as communication through channels and around channels.

A certain important consequence follows from the inter-relationship of the three types of cognition as given by Plotinus, and that is that the universal of the conceptual order is in closer affinity to the Illuminative Cognition than is the particular. In other words, that which appears from the standpoint of concrete sense-perception as abstraction away from the immediately given, i.e., the general concept, when viewed from the perspective of Illuminative Cognition, is closer to the immediately given, and is closest when the concept is most general and therefore most universal. Since it is from general or universal concepts that the largest deductive development is possible, it follows that a philosophy grounded on the Illuminative Cognition would elaborate itself mainly as a deductive system, which does not derive its authority, however much it may derive illustration, from sense-perception, or from perceptual intuition or vitalistic intuition. Here we can see the possibility of a mathematic which is

not mere logicism or formalism, but, rather, a revelation of truth as it is behind appearance or phenomena.

These considerations should throw light upon the philosophy of Spinoza, both with respect to its substance and form. This philosophy purports to be a necessary development, in mathematical form, of certain fundamental conceptions, so that the truth of the consequences depends upon the truth of the antecedents, with no need of any other kind of dependence. Truth in this sense may be viewed as a legislative authority with respect to experience. Of course, for a consciousness which is grounded solely in perceptual immediacy a development of this kind seems peculiarly irrelevant, but to a consciousness that commences with a mystical or Gnostic immediacy, of the type reported by Plotinus, the case is quite different. In the latter instance, the knowledge with which the system begins is known originally and immediately and with far stronger assurance and authority than anything given through perception. From this standpoint a critique of Spinoza would consist of the following three phases: (1) Is the initial insight based upon the Reason alone, or is it grounded on some other power of consciousness? (2) Are the initial conceptions correct formulations of an adequate insight? (3) Is the logical development correct? The question would not arise as to whether the conclusions were authenticated by experience. They might or might not conform to conclusions drawn from experience, or, what is more likely, they might in part conform, in part contradict and in part have no relation to, common experience. The only important practical or ethical question would be: Do they serve to orient consciousness in such a way that it tends to develop toward, or awaken to, the initial Realization? There is something in this that reminds us of the Pragmatist maxim, in that the practical test of truth is by a leading of consciousness to a somewhat that is other than a concept, but this would be an inverted Pragmatism.

Even though we assume that the Pragmatist has been successful, or at least may be successful, in showing that there is no knowledge which has its original source in the concept, or pure conceptual order, and that no ultimate terminal lies in the order, yet this achievement, by itself, is not enough to prove that the sole origin and the sole terminal lies in experience, in the sense defined. To justify completely the maxim, the Pragmatist must prove at the very least, that there is no such thing as Illuminative Cognition in the sense Plotinus has formulated. It is hard to see how this possibly could be done, any more than could a supposed non-sensuous being prove to our satisfaction that there is no such thing as sensation. The intellectual power is simply not competent to disprove the actuality of any immediacy, and the fact that a given individual or a large class of individuals has not known a certain type of immediacy is irrelevant so far as its factuality is concerned. This constitutes the essence of the present critique of Pragmatic epistemology.

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Our discussion of Pragmatism would be incomplete if we failed to consider the idealistic wing of Pragmatism represented by F. C. S. Schiller. The view developed by this philosopher, while in fundamental methodological agreement with the conception of Dewey and James, differs from that of the latter philosophers in that it abandons their naturalistic Realism, a characteristic which is quite explicit in John Dewey's Logic. Schiller starts with a fact which has been of prime importance for all Idealism since Bishop Berkeley. This fact is expressed explicitly in the following words of Schiller: "The simple fact is that we know the Real as it is when we know it; we know nothing whatever about what it is apart from that process."¹ This fact of cognition is with Schiller, as with the Idealists generally, the foundation stone of ontology, or the theory of the nature of Being. Here we have a principle of philosophic procedure of primary importance with a large philosophic class, and we may profitably devote to it some consideration in its general form before proceeding to the discussion of the special form of Schiller's treatment.

It is a fact, recognized by the more thoughtful Realists, as well as insisted upon by all Idealists, that all that we ever cognize is an existent in consciousness. Whether this existent is viewed as primarily a conception, a perception or a volition — differences of view that have led to the classification of Idealists into sub-schools — in every case we meet this existent as a fact in consciousness. Now, while the Realist who acknowledges all this would say that this fact is merely an incident characteristic of the cognitive process, which leaves the real Existent, as it is, unaffected, the Idealist insists that the characteristic of Existence, as it is in consciousness, is the characteristic of Existence as it is in itself, or per se. Certain Idealists have attempted to prove logically this thesis, but with respect to this effort at proof the Realistic criticism under the headings of the so-called fallacies of the "fallacy of definition by initial predication" and the "fallacy of the ego-centric predicament" does seem to be well taken. It will profit us to consider these critiques.

"Definition by initial predication" means the defining of any idea, fact, or thing by the circumstances of its first manifestation to our cognition. Thus my first cognition of gravity might be the experience of seeing an organic object, such as an apple, fall from a tree. If then I defined gravitation in such terms that being an organic object was essential to the notion, I would have defined by initial

¹ Quoted from the quotation in R.B. Perrey's Present Philosophical Tendencies, Longmans, Green and Co., N.Y., (1912) p.217.

predication. There is an obvious error in such a definition, since other than organic objects are clearly subject to gravitation, and the valid statement of the law must be such as will account for all instances and exclude all that is not essential to the conception. In the case of Idealism this criticism is applied in the sense that the appearance of the existent in consciousness is only the accident of the first appearance, and may not validly be made a determinant of the Existent as such. Therefore, it is not proved that the Existent is an Existent for consciousness and only for consciousness. The force of this argument may well be granted, but all it has achieved is disproof of proof in the logical sense; it has not disproved the fact that the Idealist maintains it. Further, there is no second or other subsequent appearance or experience of the Existent which contrasts with the initial experience in this respect. In the illustration of the falling organic object the case is different, since we do have subsequent experiences of falling inorganic objects. This fact makes a very important difference. The error made by the Idealist in this case was the attempting of logical proof where his real ground lies in immediacy, just as the greenness of a green object subsists in immediacy and cannot be proved.

The so-called "fallacy of the Ego-centric predicament" is akin to that of initial predication. It is a fact that it is impossible to conceive of anything apart from consciousness, and, in particular, in terms of relative consciousness, it is impossible to cognize anything that does not stand in a conscious relationship to a knower, witness or subject. As ordinarily conceived, this knower or witness is viewed as the ego, and so we have the primary fact of relative consciousness that all cognition stands in relation to a conscious ego. By ordinary, non-mystical means we cannot escape this. Thus, if we try to compare the object of consciousness with what it may be supposed to be outside all relation with an apperceiving ego, we are stymied at the very beginning of our effort. We may compare an object as it is for pure perception with what it becomes for conception, but in neither case do we get something outside consciousness in every sense, nor do we find anything that is not in relationship to a cognizing subject. The critical Realist acknowledges the factuality of the predicament but denies that this fact is sufficient to justify that only ideas exist or that only objects for consciousness exist. Again, we may grant the validity of the criticism so far as the question of logical deduction or induction is concerned. We may quite well grant that in formal logical terms the Idealist does beg the question, but this criticism carries force only if the Realist can produce a conceptual system which does not involve an analogous error of equal or greater importance.

But the Realist does beg the question much more egregiously than does the Idealist. For if we do predicate that there is an Existent outside consciousness in every sense, then we are making a statement

concerning that of which we can never know anything whatsoever. As a matter of knowledge, we cannot validly affirm even bare existence of such an Existent. If we believe in it, then that is an act of violent will to believe that can hardly be surpassed by the most superstitious religious belief. Further, what possible meaning attaches to the notion of a forever unknowable unknown for every possible form of cognition there may be? How can we possibly distinguish between such a supposed existence and absolute nothingness?

The Idealist is on quite unassailable ground if he affirms only that which he knows, and which therefore is an existent for consciousness, and makes no affirmation or denial with respect to the supposed unknowable unknown so far as its existence is concerned, but points out that the notions of existence and non-existence are quite meaningless with respect to such an eternally unknowable unknown. The predication of this eternally unknowable unknown may have, as Schiller quite rightly notes, a pragmatic value as a convenient fiction, but it is the predication, not the supposed unknown, that has the pragmatic value, and predication is an act within and of consciousness. Still, if we can dispense with this predication and replace it with another conception of such a sort that it is in principle verifiable, and which has an equal or greater pragmatic value, then we shall have established our philosophy upon a sounder base than that known to any form of Realism. Such a conception will be offered later in this work.

So far, I believe the position taken by Schiller is the soundest of all the Pragmatists, but as we follow further his thought serious difficulties arise. In basic conformity with the other Pragmatists, Schiller restricts, or seems to restrict, consciousness to the notion of experience. Now in addition to the general criticism of this aspect of Pragmatism, given above, in the case of idealistic Pragmatism there are further difficulties. The 'experience' of Schiller, as of other Pragmatists, is the experience of empiric human beings, and not a total experience of an Absolute. How does this kind of experience become organized into a unity, social or otherwise? With the realistic Pragmatist there is a possible unity provided by the commonality of the supposed real order outside experience, but this order does not exist for the idealistic Pragmatist. Absolute Idealism provides the organizing modulus of either a Transcendental or of an Absolute Consciousness, but such a modulus does not exist for Schiller. As a result we are faced with a relativism of specific experiencings, not unified by any rational or Transcendental Principle. Schiller drives an ethical metaphysic, but hardly provides any way of choosing between the empiric ethical orientations for the social body, save that of successful imposition. If the ethics of a Hitler were successfully imposed by the sword, then Hitler would have won the empiric argument, and there would be no higher ground for an adverse moral judgment. The

strength of Schiller is his Idealism; his weakness lies in restricting consciousness to the experience of empiric man.

* * * *

It is not part of the present purpose of the writer to develop either a comprehensive exposition or critique of Pragmatism, nor, for that matter, to achieve completeness in this respect relative to any of the current schools of philosophy. The purpose is rather to clear the ground for his own formulation which involves certain incompatibilities with many current views. Beyond this restricted purpose there is no intention of trying to prove that any extant system or philosophic orientation is completely false or unsound. It seems to the writer that all philosophies, or at least most, constitute a valid formulation, in at least some measure, of genuine insight into Being or knowledge, or of acquaintance with fact or experience. For the most part, error arises through giving a too sweeping, or even exclusive, extension to views that are only partial. Full recognition of the partial validities is freely offered, along with the critique of important defects.

The writer feels that Pragmatism has made a durable contribution to philosophic thought, a contribution which may not be disregarded in any future philosophy, if the latter is to establish itself upon a sound basis. Thus the Pragmatist analysis of the percept and the concept, with their inter-relations, is a valuable continuation and advance upon the criticism of Immanuel Kant, and, like the production of the latter, must be taken into account in any future metaphysic. But by an exclusive orientation to experience, so conceived as to close the door to the Transcendental and the type of cognition which renders the Transcendental available to human consciousness, Pragmatism so far restricts the field of human consciousness as to close the gate to those values which form the most essential part of the higher religion and religious philosophy. As a philosophy which is oriented exclusively to mundane interest, Pragmatism has a great deal to offer as a modulus in the field of action, but action is not the whole of man. There are rich values to be known only in a state of contemplation, and there comes at some time, at least to some men, a felt need for these values that transcends the desire for action. Here the orientation is to the substantive rather than to the activistic or functional. It may well be, as C. S. Peirce indicated in the quotation given earlier, that Pragmatism is a philosophy more adapted to the needs of youth than to the spirit of age and maturity. Sooner or later we must all face the

mystery of death and the dissolution of at least a phase of organized consciousness. The philosophy which provides the greater preparation for this transition, so that it may be faced with confidence, trust and even assurance, would seem to have met the greater need, since after all the cycle of material activity plays but a small part in the vast reaches of Eternity.

No doubt the supreme criterion of Pragmatist philosophy is the principle of test by consequences, which stands in contrast to test by source. Equally, there can be no doubt that in many situations the test by consequences is the only available method by which empiric man can evaluate offered conceptions. This is an application of the old maxim, "by their fruits you shall know them", but raised to a status of a universal and exclusively valid principle. However, with all its unquestionable utility, this criterion has serious limitations. A given empiric consciousness, and indeed the whole of empiric consciousness as a type, may fail to apprehend the full range and bearing of the consequences, with the result that a judgment of soundness, desirability, or "warranted assertibility", or the opposite, may be made, while a full knowledge would reverse the judgment. We may illustrate the difficulty by a reference to Plato's figure of the cave. The man who escaped from the cave and found the light-world and then returned to the dwellers in the cave with conceptions having their base in the light-world would most likely find that his conceptions were not acceptable to those whose cognitions were confined to the shadow-world. Conceivably, some of these conceptions might be verified by the test of consequences within the terms of the shadow-world in some degree, but to the largest extent they would fail of such verification. Undoubtedly, for the greater part they would seem like rank heresy, with all the implications that follow from that. Tested by consequences exclusively, such conceptions would have little or no positive value for those who chose to remain bound in the cave consciousness. Suppose, though, that among the cave dwellers there was one or more who accepted the man who returned as an avatar, or a divine descent from a transcendent order, and then accepted in faith the conceptions offered because of their source, and then proceeded to think and act in conformity with the implications of the new and strange conceptions. The probable outcome would be ultimate escape from the cave, with the subsequent verification of the conceptions.

The great limitation of verification by consequence lies in the fact that it assumes the understanding and insight of the present, existing empiric man as the power or standard for the evaluation of the consequence. It is not hard to see how the greatest ultimate good and truth could appear to the perspective of the present empiric consciousness as something unattractive, unsound, and even malign. There may well be conjunctures in the history of empiric man when disaster can be avoided only by the hieratic imposition of certain truths

with their implications. Changes wrought in the human consciousness by this means can have the effect of rendering the given consequences attractive, sound and benign. In the two situations the test by consequences leads to quite divergent evaluations.

To be sure, the Pragmatic thinkers do quite generally accept the notion of evolution as an active operating principle resulting in the development of human consciousness. Indeed, with John Dewey, development is a fundamental conception. This implies that the valuation based upon consequences is subject to progressive modification, but this development is, quite naturally, viewed as a continuum in the evolving empiric consciousness. Yet, while one may recognize a degree of validity in this conception, the difficulty remains that it can be finally valid only on the assumption that the sole process in the transformation of human consciousness is in the form of a continuous evolutionary development in the empiric field. If it is true that the total process in the transformation of human consciousness is in the nature of multiple continua in discrete relationships of transcendence with respect to each other—as may be illustrated by the notion of multiple dimensions—then the conception of development exclusively within the terms of one evolutionary continuum fails of being adequate. It is reduced to a part truth, which, by being insisted upon too exclusively, can retard the realization of the higher possibilities of man.

A study of the history of Gnostic transformations renders quite clear the fact that here we are dealing with alterations of states of consciousness and of self-identification that involve relationships of discrete transcendence, often, if not generally, manifesting incommensurability as between state and state. Here, then, we have at least one field in which the test by consequences fails.

The test by consequences, when viewed as the sole criterion of truth and soundness, tends to the enthronement of the consensus gentium as supreme authority, and, in the absence of universal consent, to the general exaltation of majority opinion and evaluation. This tends to drag culture down to the dead level of mediocrity, since the valuation of the majority tends to be that of the medial intelligence, character, and taste. Superiority of truth-insight, moral standard, level of taste, etc., are not initially or naturally part of the medial level of human consciousness, but are the contribution of the few who stand or march in the van of human progression. The valuations of the latter tend to fare ill before the consensus gentium at the time of their presentation, however much they may slowly percolate into the common consciousness in the passage of time. The result is that the test by consequences, when too greatly exalted as a truth and value criterion, tends to retard the development of the higher possibilities in human consciousness. If the goal of man is to exceed himself, if this goal is such that he must leave behind what he now is in order that he may become a something more, which, as yet, he cannot understand and properly

value, then the test by consequences is not enough when applied by the consensus gentium of the majority. It is here that Pragmatism fails.

Chapter V

IDEALISM

Does consciousness exist? No question is more fundamental than this since conformity with the form and substance in which the thinker answers it, so will his philosophy be developed and so will his life be oriented. To many, the writer among them, the question seems redundant since no fact appears more self-evident and certain than that consciousness does exist. But serious and able thinkers, William James among them, have questioned the existence of consciousness and ultimately arrived at a negative conclusion. This fact causes one to pause and to question just what is meant when the existence of consciousness is doubted and even denied. That some men should deny, while others affirm, the existence of the world, is easy to understand, but that the existence of consciousness should be in all seriousness denied seems to be the ultimate in fantasy. Surely, for certain states of consciousness the world, and the whole universe for that matter, appears to be no more than an essentially meaningless phantasmagoria, yet consciousness remains as an indubitable and ineluctable fact. A very highly important sector of Oriental thought takes its stand upon this view, and not on the basis of mere speculation, as is often the case with Occidental philosophers, but upon the ground of direct Realization. Thus the fact that serious negative answers to the question exist, compels us to a careful consideration of the question.

What do we mean by consciousness? A profound study of the subject reveals the fact that here we are dealing with a somewhat which is essentially indefinable. It is that which is presupposed in even the possibility of definition, but is never itself the object defined. Nevertheless, it is possible to indicate or point to what we mean by consciousness by bringing this state into contrast to a state of another sort. For a first approximation, this has been done rather well in the following words: "Whatever we are when we are awake, as contrasted with what we are when we sink into a profound and dreamless sleep, that it is to be conscious. What we are less and less, as we sink gradually down into dreamless sleep, or as we swoon slowly away; and what we are more and more, as the noise of the crowd outside tardily arouses us from our after-dinner nap, or as we come out of the midnight of the typhoid fever crisis, that is consciousness."¹ The experience described is, no doubt, quite common — though we do not know enough to say that it is universal — and, therefore, we generally know, with greater or lesser adequacy, the distinctive

¹ Quoted from Ladd's Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory as given in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. I p.216.

reference of the notion of "consciousness". But a careful study of this experience as we actually pass through it raises considerable doubt as to whether we have secured an essential contrast between a real and complete unconsciousness and consciousness. Thus the awaking may be from out of a dream experience, and while a shifting in the mode of consciousness, with a possible fading of the dream into irrelevance and even a complete disappearance from memory, is sharp and clear with the apperceptive mass of the waking state suddenly replacing the dream, yet both states with all their divergences of content, affective quala and conative attitude are, nonetheless, united in the common feature of being conscious. Again, if one wakes from dreamless sleep, the moment of transition, plus a usually brief interval while waking consciousness assumes dominance progressively, may be marked by a residual hedonic tone of delight, which may well lead one to regret the awakening. There can be a more or less clear feeling of movement from delight to relative pain, even though the relative hedonic tone of the waking consciousness at the time is of a superior and positive sort. Thus the contrast, even in the awakening from dreamless sleep, is not between an absolute unconsciousness and consciousness. It appears, rather, as a contrast, within a whole or common denominator of consciousness, of one conscious state with another. Therefore, the descriptive definition of Ladd more correctly isolates a state of consciousness, rather than pure consciousness, as such. However, there is a wide, if not universal, custom in Western philosophy and psychology of giving to the word "consciousness" the meaning suggested by Ladd, but, however much this may be justified from the standpoint of a superficial psychology, it tends to produce a restriction in understanding which renders incomprehensible the very foundation of Idealistic philosophy. We must, therefore, examine into the sense in which the judgment has been made that consciousness does not exist.

In the following quotation, taken from Ralph Barton Perry's essay on "The Philosophy of William James", reprinted in the Appendix of Present Philosophical Tendencies, the sense in which consciousness is denied existence is brought out fairly clearly:

If by a thing's existence you mean its separate existence, its existence as wholly other than, or outside of, other things, as one planet exists outside another, then consciousness does not exist. For consciousness differs from other things as one grouping differs from another grouping of the same terms; as, for example, the Republican party differs from the American people. But this is its true character, and in this sense it exists. One is led to this conclusion if one resolutely refuses to yield to the spell of words. What do we find when we explore that quarter to which the word 'consciousness' directs us? We find at first glance some particular character such as blue; and at second glance another particular character, such as roundness. Which of these is consciousness? Evidently neither.

For there is no discoverable difference between these characters, thus severally regarded, and certain parts of nature. Furthermore, there is no discoverable community of nature among these characters themselves. But continue the investigation as long as you please, and you simply add content to content, without finding any class of elements that belong exclusively to consciousness, or any conscious 'menstruum' in which the elements of content are suspended.¹

The idea presented in this quotation seems to be that consciousness exists in the nature of a selection of one or more things, which then form the content of consciousness, out of the totality of all things that exist. These things are what they are and unaltered by reason of existing inside consciousness or outside it. Among all the things that one can select he cannot find one thing or group of things which may be designated consciousness, in contradistinction to other things. In addition, it is affirmed that one cannot find "any conscious 'menstruum' in which the elements of consciousness are suspended." Thus, if we sum up in one sentence, consciousness exists only in the sense of a selection or relationship, within the existent, but does not exist as a constitutive substance supporting things or as a menstruum or field in which contained things or objects are suspended.

The conclusion attained is reached through a critical examination of experience in the form of a searching of the mental or psychic status or activity which the thinker actually finds within himself. Thus it is grounded upon something more fundamental than dialectic, i.e., an immediate finding. But such immediate finding is relative to the cognizing individual, and may not be safely universalized into a general judgment. It certainly is a psychological confession and may have validity only for a psychological type. In any case, it cannot rule out the possibility that a self-searching by an individual of a different type or of a different kind of power may lead to quite different discoveries. As a matter of fact, other searchings in this zone have led to quite diverse conclusions. Testimony in support of this fact is to be found in the following quotations from Oriental sources.

In the general exposition of the philosophy underlying the Tantric works, Shatchakranirupana and Paduka Panchaka, as given by Arthur Avalon in The Serpent Power, we find the following statement: "The ultimate reality is Pure Consciousness (Chit, Samvit) from out of which by its Power (Shakti) Mind and Matter proceed."² Again, from the great work of the present-day leading exponent of the Indian Vedanta — a different

¹ Perry Ralph Barton, Present Philosophical Tendencies, Longmans Green and Co., N.Y. (1912) p. 352-3

² Widdroffe, Sir John, The Serpent Power, Ganesh and Co., Madras, India, (1972) (Eighth Edition) p.30.

philosophic system from the Tantra — the following quotations are extracted from out of a large number of statements of similar import. "It then becomes apparent that what we see as consciousness must be a Being or an Existence out of whose substance of consciousness all is created."¹ "It is true that there is no such thing as an objective reality independent of consciousness; but at the same time there is a truth in objectivity and it is this, that the reality of things resides in something that is within them and is independent of the interpretation our mind gives to them and of the structures it builds upon its observation. These structures constitute the mind's subjective image or figure of the universe, but the universe and its objects are not a mere image or figure. They are in essence creations of consciousness, but of a consciousness that is one with being, whose substance is the substance of Being and whose creations too are of that substance, therefore real. In this view the world cannot be a purely subjective creation of Consciousness; the subjective and the objective truth of things are both real, they are two sides of the same reality."²

These quotations from Indian sources are of particular importance for the reason that typical Indian philosophy is not of the nature of mere speculative constructs, but are formulations based upon Realizations or immediate insights. But the results are so different from that given in the above quotation from Ralph Barton Perry as to lead to incompatible interpretations. Here is an issue based upon immediate findings and which, therefore, cannot be resolved dialectically. Mutual recriminations between the two parties would be even less fruitful. If, then, we are to assume, as I think we must, that the findings of both parties were authentic, as far as the searching extended, the remaining possibility of a resolution of the difference lies in determining whether one insight is more comprehensive than the other and provides a zone in which the latter has a partial validity. These specifications are in fact met by the second quotation from Aurobindo. Here the essential statement is that though there is no objective reality independent of consciousness, yet from the perspective of the surface human mind, and therefore of the relative consciousness, there is an independent objectivity. Truly, consciousness restricted to the latter sense is not a "'menstruum' in which the elements of content are suspended." If the "consciousness" of the Idealist is to be understood exclusively in this restricted sense, then the critique of William James carries substantial force. But for him who knows consciousness in the deeper sense, the figure of the 'menstruum' carries considerable validity, for there are levels of direct Realization in which one finds a field of consciousness

¹ The Life Divine by Sri Aurobindo, Tenth Edition (1972) p.643.

² Ibid. p. 645.

quite capable of dissolving the objects or contents suspended within it. Thus, we may conclude that there are fractions or forms of consciousness which do not have existence in the sense that James denied existence for them, yet in a deeper sense there may be a Consciousness which is the substance and support of all things. At any rate, the thesis that such a Root Consciousness is the ultimate Reality is the cardinal principle of Idealism.

* * *

The word "Idealism" is not in all respects the best term for the designation of our present school, since the ultimate reference of "idealism", in the etymological sense, is to the "idea", while not all systems of thought which are classed as Idealism are primarily oriented to the idea, e.g., the philosophy of Schopenhauer. The common feature in this school of philosophy is an orientation to consciousness, in some sense, or to some element or elements or complexes whose nature is part and parcel of consciousness. Therefore, all these philosophies are, in the technical sense, to be classed as spiritual since the common meaning of "spirit" is "the conception of that which is conscious". Thus it would appear to be better practice to class the school, when considered as a whole, under the designation "Spiritualism", care being taken not to confuse this meaning with the popular conception of supposed or real communication by means of a medium with discarnate entities. But even this term, as commonly employed in Western philosophic thought, is hardly broad enough to embrace all philosophic orientations which find ontological primacy in consciousness in some sense, for, in general, "spirit" is viewed as that of which consciousness is an attribute, rather than consciousness itself being spirit. It is for this reason that I have been unable to class my own system simply as Idealism, and coined the term "Introceptionalism".

It is suggested here to use the term "Spiritualism" for the whole school of thought which has oriented itself to conscious being, regardless of phase of consciousness which is given primacy, meanwhile reserving "Idealism" for the sub-class where primacy is given to the idea in some sense. Spiritualism is negatively defined as the orientation which stands in strongest contrast to the views classed as Materialism, Naturalism and Realism, the last term being understood in the modern and not the medieval sense, which latter is really but one of the forms of Spiritualism. Common to Materialism, Naturalism and Realism is the conception that the ultimate reality is a non-conscious existence — not in the sense of Von Hartmann's Unconscious — and that consciousness arises as something derivative that may be quite irrelevant or may be selective but is not either creative or constitutive. We shall give our attention first to the form of Spiritualism which most strictly may be called "Idealism".

The roots of Idealism, so far as traceable in the history of

Western thought, are to be found in the early or pre-Socratic philosophy of the Greeks, but at this stage of reflective thinking the Idealistic and Realistic tendencies are so far intermingled that the sharp cleavage is lacking that is so notable today. The first clear statement we have of philosophic materialism was given by Leucippus and developed by his better known pupil Democritus, but paralleling this development we have the first sharp delineation of the Idealistic tendency in their younger contemporary, the justly famous Plato. For the one, the prime fact was found in the notion of body, for the other the prime reality was seen to be in eternal Ideas. Although these two orientations are traceable as the expressions of complementary attitudes down to our own day, the predominant influence, so far as religion and philosophy are concerned, is unquestionably that of Plato.

With Plato we have the clear emergence of the conception of ideal elements as ontologically significant and determinant. As a matter of fact, we have conceptions such as, 'tree', 'table', 'goodness', 'truth', 'beauty', 'justice', etc., but in the history of philosophy there has been extended discussion, without final resolution to this day, as to the real status of these conceptions. Are they notions corresponding to real existences or are they merely abstractions of common features from concrete and particular experiences? It is unquestionably true that so far as sensuous experience is concerned we do not deal with treeness, as such, or goodness, as such, etc., but with particular trees, good acts or persons, etc., and, if one's feelings of reality is exclusively associated with these particular experiences, then he is disposed to view the general conceptions as only nominalistic abstractions, valuable perhaps for communication or manipulation, but not realities in themselves or corresponding to such self-existent realities. But with some individuals, the feeling of reality is associated, predominantly or exclusively, with the general or, rather, universal qualities, and, in this case, the universals seem self-existent and substantial, whereas the concrete presentments of experience seem like shadows or mere phenomenal appearances of the pre-existent universals. Now, each type of individual may develop a philosophic world-view, in conformity with this reality-feeling, and while argumentative conflict growing out of this divergence of view may and has resulted in the mutual perfecting of the respective systems, it has generally failed in the conversion of the individual of one type over to the view of the other. The significance of this is that, although the representatives of both types employ the same logic, they, nonetheless, diverge in their primary insight and reality-feeling, which is essentially extra-logical and of the nature of aesthetic immediacy. If, then, we are to come to an understanding of the truth contained in these conflicting views and achieve a just appreciation of their significance, we must find some other approach than that of dialectic. In modern analytic psychology we have a means to this end which goes far toward the

resolution of the problem.

But before we can properly appreciate the contribution of modern analytic psychology we must step across the centuries from Plato to Immanuel Kant, who gave to the essential Platonic conception its most important modern formulation. And, again, to understand the significance of Kant's contribution it is necessary to realize something of its office in the stream of philosophic development. At the time Kant had appeared upon the scene, the stream of philosophy had divided into two divergent, though fundamentally complementary, branches commonly known today as Rationalism and Empiricism. Rationalism had culminated in the dogmatism of Christian Wolff in which the endeavor was to derive everything by a method of deduction paralleling the processes of mathematics, but the result was a system which was very largely unrelated to the material of actual experience. The other, or empiric, branch of the stream had flowed from Descartes through John Locke and Bishop Berkeley to David Hume where we arrive at the conclusion that the sole reality consists of a sequence of sense-impressions and inner introspective states, without any material or mental substrate and without any basis for supposing the sequence to be governed by either natural or logical law. On one side, a dogmatism from which, while there is an abundant emphasis of a principle of organization and order, there yet is no relatedness to actual experience, on the other, a scepticism, which while it was closely bound to sensuous immediacy and thus fully recognized the force of brute fact, yet afforded no security or certainty with respect to those values most vital in the consciousness of man, such as uniformity and calculability of nature, the reality and persistence of the Self or the actuality of the Divine. Thus philosophy had come to a dead-end which could satisfy neither the needs of a theoretical or systematic science nor of the religious consciousness.

The high valuation which Immanuel Kant has generally been given by the philosophers who followed him is no more than just, if for no other reason than that it was he who found the way out of the impasse which philosophy had reached. And this remains true, even though all his specific conceptions may have to be modified in the light of a later and fuller understanding, for he was the force which drew together the divided, but essentially complementary, streams of thought, and gave new direction and vitality to future thought. But Kant is significant in a considerably larger sense than that of being the synthesizing point in the Western philosophic stream, for, in the end, it was he who opened the way to the bridging of understanding between the Western and oriental mind. This latter service was not so much contributed directly by Kant, who was not and never claimed to be a metaphysician, as by the main stream of philosophy which was founded upon and received impetus from his most fundamental conceptions, i. e., German Idealism or, rather, Spiritualism. One who is familiar with the thought of Kant and with the Rational and Voluntaristic Spiritualism which grew out of him, can turn to Buddhistic

and Vedantist philosophy and not find it wholly strange and meaningless. To be sure, important differences remain, growing out of the fact that the matter of the oriental philosophy is grounded in Gnostic Realization at every step, while Western philosophy is more largely, though not wholly — as indicated by the influence of Meister Eckhart and Jacob Boehme upon Hegel — guided by a logical modulus. But the parallelism of the ultimate conceptions in these oriental and Western developments is sufficiently close, so that a conceptual crossing without undue intellectual strain is possible. And this we owe in a profound sense to the labors of Immanuel Kant, who thus may well be the greatest synthesizing or integrating force in the whole history of thought.

Kant developed his synthesis of the two philosophic currents by the acceptance of the determination as to fact which had been formulated by David Hume, along with an equal acceptance of the recognition of principle or law that was the primary vision of the Rationalists. Kant as a physical scientist, concerned primarily with theoretical development, was well aware that neither factor or component could be disregarded without destroying the possibility of any such science. But Hume's analysis had shown that on the basis of experience through the senses alone can we have no knowledge of law or assurance of an order in the universe, yet despite all this, science, especially in the form of the Newtonian development, had built theoretical constructions which fitted with remarkable reliability the matter subsequently given through the senses. Clearly, there is some law or order, conforming in high degree with our logical thinking, that governs somehow the material supplied through the senses or by sensuous intuition, to use Kant's own term. Now, if law or principle is not given by pure experience, and, yet, is known with an assurance not inferior to that of experience and, in addition, is even empirically vindicated by the power of theoretical science to prognosticate future experience, from whence do we derive this knowledge of law and principle? Kant's answer to this is, that our knowledge of law, principle or order and, in a word, of all truth as distinguished from knowledge of fact, is innate or a priori. That is, we carry in the subjective dimension of our consciousness predetermining forms which, while they may not condition nature as it may be supposed to be apart from consciousness, nonetheless determine the form of our possible experience of that nature. We are not born with minds in the state of blank tablets, as John Locke imagined, upon which the realities of the objective are written just as they are, but we carry a framework in our minds which predetermine the limits of possible experience. In so far as there may be supposed to be a nature or phase of nature which could leave no impress within the terms of these forms, we could never know of its existence. But we can know the conditioning forms of our experience (transcendental aesthetic) and of our thinking (the logical forms of the understanding), because they are already present in the mind, even when new-born. Thus it is possible to build a theoretical science, which is

reliable with respect to the phenomena given in experience, but we can predicate nothing with respect to nature or the thing as it is in itself. In a sense, which is not individually voluntary, we legislate the law and order governing possible experience, and can, therefore, know it. It is of little moment, as Kant pointed out, that we do not actually cognize these forms and law, in point of time, before experience, but the essential point is that, instead of deriving them from experience, experience is the occasion on which the knowledge of them is born. In a word, they are logically prior to all experience, however much actual cognition of them may be temporarily subsequent to experience.

Without entering into the detailed development of the idea, which is very complex and often difficult to follow, we now find ourselves with a conception which enables us to see how it could be possible for a human individual to have an ordered experience and could know necessary governing laws, so far as he individually is concerned. But so far we are provided with only a private or solipsistic field of ordered phenomena and, if we are to conceive of mankind as a community of actual individuals, and not merely phenomenal appearances within my unique and private consciousness, then more is required. To meet this difficulty Kant contributed what may well be his most important conception, i.e., the idea of a transcendental Self or Ego, which may be called objective with respect to the empiric or psychological ego of the individual since It conditions the latter. Here 'objective' is not to be understood as objective in the sense we apply this notion to the not-self or non-ego or content of a consciousness apperceived by a self or ego, but is rather to be understood as an impersonal and universal Subject, such as an Absolute Self or Subject. In some way the Transcendental Self lays down the forms of possible experience and thought, and the private or individual subject is as much conditioned inwardly by this as it is by the matter of external experience. Thus we have a basis for cognizing forms and laws that are not merely private, but which are generally valid for all individuals and, indeed, we now see the possibility of communication with mutuality of understanding, and which is not wholly dependent upon a commonality of the aesthetic component of experience. In contrast, on the basis of the Humian conception, intellectual communication would be impossible, and the only possibility of conveying anything would be by evoking, as by appropriate use of art, of similar aesthetic states of consciousness. But as a matter of fact, we can communicate intellectually and, in the purest forms of this communication, as in mathematics and logic, there may be a complete absence of all aesthetic evocation. With the full Kantian conception, an explanation of how all this is possible is provided, and thus Kant left us with a conceptual framework which effected a vaster integration for understanding than had ever been provided before him.

That Kant's philosophy was not complete and, in the sequel, proved in certain respects unsound, detracts little, if at all, from its importance. It opened the way to the most fruitful speculative thought

that has ever been known and, whether the subsequent thought was built upon the foundation of this philosophy or by an adverse criticism of it, Kant has been, in either case, a philosophical stimulus of the highest power. There is some reason for believing that no conception has ever been produced or ever will be produced which will be eternally and immutably valid. But whether this is true or not, conceptions which widen and broaden the stream of thought and understanding are to be regarded as among man's most precious possessions. In this sense, at least, Kant's contribution is an enduring and lofty value, to be classed with the earlier achievement of Plato, and permanent in its effect, even though every particular Kantian conception is ultimately over-passed and even forgotten in the foreground of consciousness. Even though the steps, by which we climb the cliff of consciousness, in time erode or break away below us, yet, but for those steps we would not be where we now are. So, the steps that are gone are, nonetheless, in a profound and occult sense, permanent and enduring.

The two most primary conceptions of Kant, i. e., the forms or ideas which underlie experience and the Transcendental Self, are crucial determinants in the development of the Spiritualistic philosophy which grew out of him. Of these, we shall give first consideration to the Idea.

Kant and Plato agree in attaching an a priori primacy to certain Ideas which are of an extraordinary universality, but there is a characteristic difference in the way these Ideas are viewed. For Plato they appear as metaphysical self-existences, while for Kant they appear as epistemological pre-determinants. For Plato the judgments of knowledge and Being have not become clearly distinguished, but with Kant we have the fruit of two thousand years of thought in the sharp recognition that metaphysical actuality, as it is in itself, is something other than our knowledge of it, at least in so far as our common non-mystical forms of cognition are concerned. But despite these important differences, the basic agreement that there are fundamental pre-existent Ideas establishes a far more important ground of agreement. Consequently, the primary question that must be met in the valuation of the authenticity of Idealism is that as to whether such Ideas really exist, and as to how we determine that they are.

One could easily imagine that these supposed or real pre-existent Ideas existed only in the sense of a speculative construct or postulate, introduced for the theoretical handling of a problem in the sense that is common in modern science. In that case, the only test of their validity would be the pragmatic trial by consequences. But they may be knowable directly through insight, in which case they are much more than speculative constructs and have a more or less ineluctable character, analogous to that of well-attested facts of experience. It is upon the question of the status of these Ideas that light is now shed by analytic psychology.

As man is born with a characteristic anatomical structure, which differentiates him from other animal creatures, so also does he enter embodied life with a psychical organization, which predetermines the general form in which his consciousness may develop, however much the specific form of that consciousness may be conditioned by environmental factors. Modern analytic psychology, through the development of methods adapted to the study of this kind of subject-matter, has afforded us a means for an empiric investigation of psychic material so that we are not now entirely dependent upon the insight of Platonic or Kantian genius.¹ These conditioning psychical forms, as reported in the works of Dr. C. G. Jung, differ from the Abstract Ideas of Plato and the Categories of Immanuel Kant in that they appear as concrete and collective images which, because of the latter characteristic, Jung designates as 'primordial' or 'archetypal'. They are images which are not mere reproductions of objects, as given through the external senses, but are of a sort which arise spontaneously from an untraceable source — and that is therefore called the Unconscious — and find their analogue in the mythologies of the various peoples, in alchemistic symbols and in the Mandalas which play so important a part in the oriental psychology of the transformation process. Their original character is similar to perceptual images, rather than to the form of conceptual ideas, but they differ from the external perceptions in that they predetermine ways of viewing experience, while the latter present us with facts. As one becomes conscious of external fact by an extraverted movement in consciousness, so one may animate and bring above the threshold of consciousness the primordial images or archetypes by a process of more than usually profound introversion: We have, thus, a means of research in this subjective dimension that, in some measure at least, frees us from a more or less blind acceptance or rejection of the general conception that there are predetermining Ideas, as enunciated by Plato and Kant.

The primordial images of Jung differ from the Platonic Ideas, not alone in the sense that they are in their initial form quite non-conceptual, but in the further respect that they are not truly eternal. They are indeed very ancient, representing, as it were, the view of a million-year-old consciousness for which the phenomenon of the passing moment would be rather improbable, but they are conceived to be a deposit in time. With respect to the fleeting elements or complexes of experience they are truly hoary, but since they are deposits in time, although a vast time, they are less than eternal. Thus they enter into the total picture of the empiric consciousness in a sense that is analogous to the parameter in mathematics; they are relatively permanent with respect to the current experience of any embodied man, but are not

¹ See Jung's Psychology of the Unconscious and Psychological Types, particularly the definitions of "Image" and "Idea" in the latter.

ultimately permanent. Clearly Jung does not give, nor does he pretend to give, a description of the ultimate derivation of the relative consciousness of man since he restricts himself to statements that can be empirically verified. But he has isolated by empiric means imagerial factors which serve the office of pre-determinants, or a priori components, in the present concrete consciousness, and, in so doing, has gone far in confirming the primary thesis of Plato and Kant.

The fact that Jung speaks of 'primordial images', while Plato and Schopenhauer speak of them as 'ideas' and Kant calls them 'transcendental forms of aesthetic intuition' or 'categories of the understanding', does not constitute a distinction of fundamental importance. The fact of first importance is that, in any case, they are a priori or preconditioning factors. Thus the psychically received and accepted world is not the world as it might be known to an absolutely pure consciousness — a consciousness not subject to the condition of being an object for a subject — but is a world which is mirrored in the relative consciousness, and the mirror has a shape or character largely defined by the a priori components.

The autochthonic primordial images are viewed by Jung as the maternal soil from whence arise the general conceptual ideas that have the abstract, definitive and rational character, which is the typical mark of conceptual systems. Hence, the Idea, thus conceived, possesses only a secondary or derivative character. Here Jung stands in essential agreement with the thesis of Schopenhauer. We are also reminded of the view advanced by William James, with the difference that while James appears to be speaking exclusively of externally derived perceptions, or images derived from the concrete and particular object. Jung on the other hand, in so far as he is speaking of the Idea derived from primordial image, means a perceptual matrix which is subjective and, while this matrix is also concrete, it is nonetheless universal. The primordial image, like the fundamental and essentially Platonic Ideas of Schopenhauer, is a concrete universal, which stands in the relation of source with respect to the abstract conceptual universal. Now, while one may agree with both Jung and James that in some sense the primordial image and the particular percept, with objective reference, both constitute material soils underlying the concept — in the one case the more general ideas, in the other the ideas with more particular and objective reference — yet it remains true that the concept, whether more general or more particular, has, in its total character, features which are not reducible to either matrix, such as being more or less completely definitive. In both cases, as between the concept and the primordial or the particular percept, there is a relationship of incommensurability as well as of meaningful reference. The matrix, in either case, is aesthetic or irrational, yet the most notable characteristic of the child-concept is rationality. In a word, something is added in the concept which is not reducible to the matrix.

It becomes evident that we must look further if we are to complete the derivation of the abstract and rational or conceptual ideas, whether in the sense of the a priori universal concept or the a posteriori concept having objective perceptual referents. Though the primordial image and the external percept together are, no doubt, sufficient to maintain an embodied consciousness, that consciousness would be something less than that which we actually find manifested in the human being. It would be an exclusively perceptual consciousness. It would have a sense mind, but not an intellectual mind. In a word, the being would not be capable of reasoning, though a perceptual, and probably autonomous, thought would be possible for it. The surface consciousness would be engaged in external perceptions, but the subliminal mind, bearing the primordial images, would remain hidden in impenetrable unconsciousness. We can see how this equipment could be enough for meeting the task of adjustment between a living organism and its environment, for clearly the animals are endowed with a consciousness-organization of this sort, and the animals have abundantly proven their ability to survive. It is quite conceivable that an evolutionary development of this type of organization could lead to the establishment of entities much in advance of the animals as we know them, and with a capacity for quite superior states of consciousness — even states of consciousness which in the purely spiritual sense could far transcend those attained by most men. But despite all this, we would not have human beings anywhere in the evolutionary series since the power of rational thought and of conceptual communication would not have arisen. And, likewise, there would be lacking the power to turn upon the states of consciousness for their analysis and ultimate mastery.

Before proceeding to the derivation of the rational component, which is the distinctive sign of man qua man, it may profit us to reflect further upon what is achieved by the addition of the primordial image to the external perceptual equipment to which David Hume reduced human cognition. It will be remembered that Hume left us with a wholly unpredictable and anarchic play of insubstantial images without any possibility of integration in terms of form or law. This feature is corrected, by the introduction of the primordial image, to the extent that it now becomes possible to see how a perceptual order or dependability is possible. Part of the task which Kant performed is effected. The conscious entity functions within a framework of order and a kind of dependability within its world of experience, though it would be lacking the powers of understanding, discrimination and judgment and could never construct a science, nor even produce a Humian philosophy. But with all this limitation, which would eliminate the whole rational dimension of our consciousness so that there would be no science, no mathematics, no philosophy and no art of the characteristic Western sort — though a purely aesthetic art of the type of the Zen Buddhist's constructions might conceivably remain — yet a kind of enlightenment would remain a

possibility, and so the possibility of a religious motif would not be excluded. In fact, a careful study of the Chinese Taoism and Buddhism, particularly in the cha'n or Zen form, suggests that an important aim of that discipline is the elimination of the rational component from consciousness so that we have left a consciousness composed exclusively of the outer and inner perceptual factors. In terms of these, the religious objective is the shifting of identification from the external perceptual factor to the inner, or primordial, and then transcending the latter as image. Becoming conscious in this final stage is Enlightenment. From the study of these Chinese Sutras, the Western reader may well derive the impression that the writers viewed the development of a rational power in man as unnecessary and even a mistake. But whether or not the possession of a rational power, either as a faculty or function, is necessary and desirable in the total constitution of man, there can be no question but that man in one side of his nature is a rational being and that this characteristic is, at least, of considerable importance and accordingly, the determination of the status of this function or faculty is of prime concern for him who would know the nature and significance of human knowledge.

In the history of Greek thought the principle of Reason, in the profoundest sense, is represented most commonly under the notions of Logos and Nous. While the sense in which these terms are employed varies from thinker to thinker, it is probably in accord with the most mature usage to regard 'Nous' as an ontological or Divine Reason, while 'Logos' enters into the picture in the sense of the 'Word', or the Reason become articulate, organized and manifested. Although in the Greek thought the metaphysical and the epistemological were not yet clearly differentiated, so that 'Logos' can mean 'Word' as well as 'Idea', and is even personalized in some developments, yet it is easy to see in 'Logos' the original of the modern concept, and all that is now understood under the designation of 'logic'. This would naturally lead to the identification of 'reason', in the more common sense of modern usage, with the notion of 'Logos'. This is 'reason' conceived as a ratiocinative process, i. e., reasoning. But the Greeks also conceived of 'Reason' in a more ontological sense — as is also manifest in a modern thinker like Hegel — and in this profounder sense it is identical with the notions of 'Law' or 'Order' conceived as governing, both teleologically and structurally, the whole Cosmos. Reason, in this sense, is identical with 'Nous' and, apparently, also identical with the Indian conception of Buddha, taken in the sense of a Cosmic principle. Within the limits of human cognition, the distinction between 'Nous' and 'Logos' seems well represented by the differentiation indicated by 'apprehension' and 'comprehension', understood in the more rigorous sense. Apprehension carries the meaning of simple cognition, or what James called "knowledge through acquaintance", whereas 'comprehension' is the definitive "knowledge-about".

In conformity with the foregoing discussion, Reason, in the sense of Nous, is not identical with the subjective ratiocinative process of human thinking, but is rather a part or phase of higher Nature and, therefore, objective. Ratiocination would be a stepped-down correlate or reflection in the relative consciousness where the relationship to knowledge would be one of seeking. Reason, as Nous, is pre-existent with respect to the relative consciousness. In this sense, Reason does not stand in contrast with intuition — as is the case with ratiocination — nor with other forms of higher cognition, such as Vision, Direct Cognition and Knowledge by Identity, as differentiated by Sri Aurobindo. A perfect Rational Intelligence would, for instance, embrace the whole of extant and future mathematics as a unified totality without passing through reasoned steps as a process in time.

Reason, as Nous, must be conceived as pre-existent with respect to all experience, however much the ratiocinative reason, or Logos, must wait upon experience before it can be manifested. Thus, however much the concepts of the latter are dependent upon experience, either in the sense of the primordial images or of the particular images with the external reference for their substantive content, yet the concept is not exclusively derived from the percept but has, as well, a source in the primordial Reason. This provides for a dimension in knowledge which is other than experience in its Root, although actual knowledge as we know it in the relative field is so far an intermixed mass of empiric and pure rational components that their separation is a task of great difficulty.

Assuming the picture, as thus far delineated, at least provisionally, we are in a position to deal with a defect in the primordial image as given by Jung. This image does not appear as an eternal or timeless archetype and thus absolutely a priori. It is rather a deposit over a vast temporal range of experience, or the way a million-year-old consciousness would perceive. It is relatively a priori, but only relatively so. It may be viewed as the conditioning factor in current particularized experience, that is itself a deposit from all past experience, but does not provide the form whereby the initial experience was possible. The root-form, making possible the initial experience, cannot be itself a deposit of experience. This form we here find in the notion of Reason as Nous.

For the consciousness of the extraverted empiricist, and even for the introverted sensationalist, the question quite naturally arises as to how a pure Reason can be cognized, since it is not given by experience in the restricted meaning of the term. To answer this query we must at least assume the actuality of ways of cognition other than the empiric. For the purposes of formal discourse, once we assume or postulate the appropriate cognitive means then the possibility of direct apperception of a pure Reason, or of a Reason which is pre-existent with respect to experience, can be accepted in principle. But if we can go no

further than this then the discussion is only of academic interest. To advance beyond that necessitates the immediate actuality of the required cognitive power. There are those who have, or at least claim to have, immediate acquaintance with cognitive powers which are not active in all men and, therefore, when such formulate philosophies, grounded more or less upon these powers, verification by strictly empiric means is impossible. Thus the effective critique of these philosophies is impossible by those who are strangers to the necessary cognitive resources. The ultimate and vital question, therefore, is whether or not these cognitive powers exist. It is the same problem that arises in connection with the evaluation of the states of consciousness of the mystic, only, in this case, it occurs in connection with the cognition of Reason itself. But here no attempt will be made to prove the actuality of means of cognition which are not generally active since such proof is quite unnecessary with respect to those who have these powers, and it is impossible in the case of those who lack them. It is merely pointed out that the existence of such powers must be assumed if a primary understanding of Idealism is ever to be attained.

We now possess at least a schema whereby the development of universal conceptual ideas may be seen as possible. These ideas are the product of the combination of the primordial images and the pure Reason, whereby we derive concepts which unite a perceptual context with a logical order. Both components are necessary since without the substantive content supplied by the primordial image, the logical form would lack all relation to experience, while, on the other hand, without the rational component, the primordial image could never supply the notion of law and organization. Because of these two factors we are enabled to cognize the externally given as a Cosmos, and not merely as an indeterminate Chaos.

Having reached this point, the question arises as to whether we have determined a truth concerning the nature of the world or universe, as such, or only determined conditions of human knowledge. It is clear that Kant viewed his analysis as valid only in the latter sense, since he explicitly said that it never occurred to him to question the existence of a real world, in the sense of an existent beyond all consciousness. He even called himself an "empiric realist", though he acknowledged that he was also a "transcendental idealist". By this it is to be understood that he viewed the intuitions of the senses, in their concrete filling as determined by an external somewhat, or the thing-in-itself, which in its nature as it is in itself is unknowable to human cognition. In this sense he remained realistic, in his own opinion at least. But the actual form of our experience he conceived as determined by transcendental forms which are pre-existent in the knower. In this sense he was frankly idealistic.

Chapter VI

IDEALISM CONTINUED

The Idealist affirms the primacy of consciousness along with its subject. This is not to be regarded as merely an arbitrary affirmation nor as a working hypothesis but as a direct or immediate recognition, something which is beyond all doubt for the thinker himself. This is so fundamental that the Idealist finds it confirmed in the very denial of the denier, since the denial itself is an act of consciousness. That which is wholly unconscious simply could not deny anything. So when the Realist opposes the thesis of the Idealist, he has to invoke, however unwillingly, the very quality which the Idealist affirms is. It never occurs to the Idealist to charge the Realist with being unconscious, so he is perhaps temperamentally incapable of getting the Realist's point of view. To get his argument across effectively the Realist should insist more explicitly on his own unconsciousness. In this way he might succeed in not adding fuel to the Idealist's fire.

Now, once one has the initial certainty of the subject or self and its consciousness the basic problem of philosophy takes a characteristic form. So long as one focuses his attention inwardly he has an immediate realization of perfect freedom. His will and thought are under no external constraint. Their activity is perfectly free. But when the focus of consciousness is turned outward, the freely willed act becomes an objective deed, which is confronted by all sorts of constraints. The deed is an action of what we commonly call an organism which simply cannot do as it pleases since it moves in a seeming environment which in innumerable ways restricts the action of the organism. In this way the freely willed act of the pure self is confronted with resistance. Ultimately practical paths for the will can

* From the standpoint of one who appreciates systematic organization the material in the present and subsequent chapters will prove less than satisfactory. Here there will be from an interplay between the intellectual and introceptual functions that, at times, may seem somewhat like a contest. The one emphasizes organization, the other, flow of consciousness; the former serves best as communication to the trained mind, while the latter provides the fertile ground for pregnant ideas; the first exemplifies discipline, the second freedom. Even for the writer himself criticism and reorganization of such material is difficult and involves the danger of sacrificing substance to form. Accordingly, it was decided to leave the composition unaltered, save in very minor detail. By far the most valuable material in this book is to be found in the present and succeeding chapters.

be found, it is true, but these paths are, in part, determined by necessity so that in the final form they are only in part the expression of pure freedom. This necessity appears as the objective world of mountains, trees, oceans, buildings, etc., just precisely that which the Realist takes as in some sense, the ultimate and basic Reality itself. But the Idealist knows immediately the conscious self and its freedom, so the necessitarian character revealed in the object raises a problem.

Details in the offered solutions of the problem of necessity vary with the different idealistic thinkers, but one feature is held in common by all representatives of this school. It is this, i.e., that the solution must be found in the nature of consciousness itself. Manifestly the only objective world we have is a world which exists in and for consciousness. If we say that it inheres in something independent and quite outside consciousness as such, then we beg the whole question by a speculative answer which can never be checked. For all checking is a conscious act dealing with material which is already inside consciousness and thus nothing is proved as to the existence of a somewhat absolutely outside consciousness. To be sure, one can affirm this somewhat and thus take a purely arbitrary and dogmatic position, but this, the Idealist will say, is no true philosophic solution. The only being we know is necessarily known and that is the important fact. Therefore being is defined as identical with being-known or as being for or in or of consciousness.

At this point the Idealist is vulnerable before logical criticism since he cannot prove that it is essential to being that it should be known or exist in consciousness. As a matter of strict logic he begs the question. Of course, the Realist is not slow to pick out this weakness and accuses the Idealist of failing to prove his thesis. It is perfectly true that the primary thesis of Idealism is not proven logically and so there is no logical compulsion to constrain all men to accept some form of Idealism as the only possible true philosophy. But the opposed philosophies face the same essential difficulty in a different form. Always one can find root assumptions which are not and cannot be proven logically. The Realist, for instance, cannot prove the existence of his independent reality and, so, also begs the question.

It is a fact that man has not and cannot build a rigorously self-contained system wherein every element is itself logically derived. The closest realization that we have of this is to be found in some purely formal mathematical systems in which the elements are wholly meaningless terms. But here logic is always assumed since its first principles are not proven. Proof depends upon those principles, but they are themselves outside proof. It may be impossible to doubt them, but the ground of confidence in them is immediate and original. But accepting anything in this way is actually a begging of

the question when we assert that it carries the quality of truth. So we must be content to start with something immediate, be it experience or insight, and then, after that, rigorous logical demonstration is effective, yet always relative to the original immediate ground.

We must accept the fact that different philosophies, starting from different grounds given in some way immediately, will develop in different directions and exist side by side. Each one has at its roots a basic logical weakness, with the result that mutual vulnerability gives to all a right to existence relative to each other. So, while logical soundness is indeed an important part of every genuine philosophy, yet this is not the whole of the story. It is even more important that every philosophy is the expression of an orientation that is extra logical. A philosophy is the expression of a View which is more primary than the philosophy itself.

Now, although the Idealist cannot prove his primary thesis and must counter the Realist by bringing the same charge against the latter, yet the Idealist can make a point favorable to his position that is particularly strong. He can point out that when being is conceived as identical with being known or with existing in and for consciousness he has given a definition that has some meaning. On the other hand, the notions of being and existence have no intelligible meaning when they are predicated of that which is outside of consciousness in every sense. What in that case does it mean to be or to exist? If anyone tries to give an answer to this question he will only invoke a meaning which exists for consciousness. His very answering and the content of the answer is something in consciousness. So the Idealist may very well say that the only being and existence which can possibly have any significance is a being and existence which is for consciousness of some sort. That which is completely outside all consciousness is simply indistinguishable from that which is not. So we may just as well disregard the whole matter.

But there is a difficulty which still remains. The inward realization of freedom is offset by an outward experience of necessity. The notion of an independent and real world does have value in explaining the necessity, for if living and conscious beings are actually in a pre-existent and independent environment, then it is quite easy to see how they will be constrained by it. But this, in its turn, makes it difficult to see how consciousness can have any real freedom. The direct realization of freedom ultimately has to be reduced largely to an illusion. But those individuals who have the greater immediate certainty of the freedom and have only a secondary or derived experience of the necessity will not accept this view. They certainly will not sacrifice the more certainly known for that which is less certainly known. So they ask, Is there not some other way of explaining the necessity which will meet this difficulty?

Idealism does offer its answers and this leads us into a veritable sea of philosophic theory and discourse which many find quite difficult to follow. In the end the Idealist believes that he has met the problem in such a way as to save the freedom so that it remains as something absolutely real, and yet supplies a conceivable explanation of the necessity. In this process a good deal of conceptual simplicity is lost, as compared to the statements of the Realists, but at least the baby is not thrown away with the bath. And the Idealist considers the baby, freedom, to be so valuable as to be worth any effort to save it.

In contrast, the Realist, whether oriented to a mechanistic nature, to a logic of relations or to an empiric life, seems to be lost when he has too much freedom. He seems to secure his comfort by anchoring himself to something outside of consciousness. He may call this something "matter", "terms in relation" or "empiric life", but consciousness is an incident embraced by an enveloping necessity whose nature is other than consciousness. Of course, he too has the direct feeling of freedom, though it can hardly be as decisive as in the case of the Idealist, and he generally strives to find some room for it. But it never rises to a commanding position. He has, however, a very clear idea as to why we cannot always do as we please.

Now an Idealist can never hope to be taken seriously if he merely affirms his unconditional freedom and lets it go at that. If he did that he would be very subject to the charge of uncritical subjectivism. There is far too much evidence of a compulsive necessity which affects all creatures, be they Idealists or not. So the Idealist must take up the problem of necessity and the great Idealists have given so much thought to this problem and have so largely written concerning it that they often give the impression of being necessitarians. But this is only the outside view of the Idealistic systems. The real heart is a profound feeling for freedom. Perhaps one would have to be something of an Idealist to be aware of this fact, but it is possible for anyone to find the evidence if he will but look far enough. I need but suggest the thought of the greatest of all the Idealists, i. e., Shankara, with whom the summum bonum is explicitly given as Liberation, spelled with a capital "L".

To the philosophically naive consciousness of most men it doubtless will seem harder to follow the more rigorous form of Idealistic philosophy than any other form of thought. He is finally led into the regions where the familiar, so-called, real world is left far behind and most of the judgments of his highly vaunted common sense cease to supply any genuine help. He may be excused if he is disposed to feel like a man out in space with no planet to place his feet upon nor solar system to give him bearings. And then the content of the thought may often seem as though it dealt with nothing that meant anything whatsoever and, least of all, have any bearing upon practical human

affairs. But deeper reflection will show him that the Idealist does have genuine anchorage, does employ an objective modulus and is deeply concerned with that which in the end is of the profoundest and most vital interest with all men. The anchorage of the Idealist is, as already noted, the immediate fact of consciousness and its subject; the objective modulus is the logical structure of thought; and the practical interest has the deepest concern with the problem of death and immortality. On the whole, it is true, the Idealist as a philosopher is not greatly concerned with the practical problems of finite life in this world. He finds plenty of able men who are engaged with these problems and so rarely finds the call of duty in this direction. But he sees beyond the cycle of finite life a great problem which, if it is not solved, renders the solutions of all other problems unimportant. So, I submit, there is abundant reason to bear with the intellectual processes of the Idealist if he can offer any evidence of certainty where most men only believe darkly within a cloud of doubt.

Let us now examine the main features of the Idealistic treatment of the problem of necessity. If there is no world outside of consciousness and the essence of the self is freedom, how, then, are we to account for the experience of necessity? The Idealist's answer to this question invariably takes us away from the material of objective experience. With the exception of the pragmatic idealist, the resolution of the problem either invokes the Divinity or a transcendental SELF, which stands in such a relation to the empiric self that it may be called objective. But it is not objective in the sense in which sensible objects or even ideas are called objective. Here we have a notion that is quite subtle and which I think is quite generally misunderstood by the critics of Idealism. But first, let us see how the notion of the Divinity or the transcendental SELF can help us with the problem of necessity, leaving the problem of the reasonableness of the notion until later.

In the case of Berkeley, the notion of the Divinity was invoked quite simply to account for the ideas experienced. Berkeley's ideas, it must be recalled, included all experiences, such as sensations, as well as ideas in the conceptual sense. These ideas, he affirmed, were not produced by something outside consciousness, such as independent and real things, but many of them, at least, had a character of being given quite independently of individual volition. How were they placed in the consciousness of the individual? The answer is that God placed them there. The actuality of god is not questioned by Berkeley nor is the Divinity a real philosophical conception with him. He seems simply to have accepted the God of Christian faith, with the result that he left many logical problems unresolved. So this earlier form of Occidental Idealism is mainly valuable for introducing the idealistic approach to the problem of philosophy but does not leave us with a system that is highly satisfactory.

Before leaving this passing reference to Berkeley, it seems important to note the fact that this thinker, like Schiller and Bergson of the pragmatist school, is not classed as a member of the school of Idealism. Like the two pragmatists named, he accepts the cardinal principle of Idealism but does not accept another principle which is of almost equal importance for the latter. Basically the ideas of Berkeley are not concepts but percepts. Thus his idealism may be classed as an empiric idealism, whereas the great school of Idealism gives ascendancy to the concept relative to the percept. Berkeley's thought is anti-rationalistic as well as anti-realistic whereas the main school of Idealism is anti-realistic but highly rationalistic, even in its volutaristic form. For Berkeley the concrete idea or perception has a reality-value which the abstract conception does not possess. He continues the psychological orientation of the Nominalists of the Middle Ages. But since the cleavage between Idealism and Realism is more fundamental than that between Sensationalism and Rationalism, there is a significant reason for classing Berkeley with idealism in the generic sense, though not with the specific school of Idealism.

There is something naive about Berkeley's invocation of the Divinity in order to explain the necessitarian and orderly character of the perceived ideas. For this is the inherited Divinity of Christian faith. It is not the Divinity of direct realization nor as a necessity for reason. It is thus not the kind of God which can properly enter into any philosophical system as a true agent of integration. It is rather a general appeal to Providence for help when one's own individual resources prove inadequate. Now, it does appear that no man ever quite succeeds in building a system of thought which completely avoids the appeal to something which is the logical equivalent to Providence, though he may call it by quite different names such as "Chance" or "Nirvana". This means that something extra-rational has to be invoked sooner or later, but some thinkers have been able to extend the limits of rational thought much further than others. This, indeed, has a great deal to do with the relative valuation of the hierarchy of thinkers. The greatest thinker is he who has been able to think furthest into the unknown. Among philosophic thinkers Berkeley did not go very far before he found his limits. The great Idealists went much further and gained profundity at the price of increasing incomprehensibility. As a result they have given us the most intellectually sound interpretation of necessity which avoids the pitfalls of Realism.

Now, by a sufficient degree of inward penetration in consciousness one can find the self as an immediately known reality. This is not a process of simple introspection as is commonly used in experimental psychology. In fact, this introspection remains far too objective to lead to the discovery of the self and the result is that many psychologists never do find the true self. They do find something which they call the subject but they describe it in such terms as to

show that they have actually found only a subtle object. In fact, the Neo-Realists explicitly state that this subject may enter into the relation of an object for some purposes of thought. This simply means that such psychologists are talking of a subject of quite a different nature from the self of the Idealist. This difference may be suggested by the figure of a lamp with a light within it. The subject of the more empiric psychologist is only the lamp while the self of the Idealist is the light itself. Actually introspection, in the usual sense, can go no further than the lamp, since it is the light which illumines and makes possible the subtle observation of introspection. The light is back of the act of introspection and only the lamp is in the foreground. So in introspection, consciousness has not really turned upon itself but merely established a kind of short-circuit in the psyche. To find the self of the Idealist one has to go a good deal further than this.

The turning of consciousness upon itself is a very mysterious process. To account for it I have become convinced that we have to introduce the notion of a function which is other than the four functions of analytic psychology, i.e., thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition. I hold the thesis that it is the activity of this function which constitutes the real base of Idealism in the grand sense. Further, it is the more or less complete inactivity of this function that destroys the force of the Idealist argument for so many thinkers and psychologists. Also, it would appear that even with the Idealists in whom the function was active, there was a defective knowledge of it as a distinct function, the result being that they often tried to explain by pure reason something which involves more than logic itself. It is right here that I would locate the greatest failure of the occidental Idealists. But the failure in terms of presentation does not imply unsoundness of fundamental insight.

The above point is well illustrated in the case of Fichte who may well prove to be the purest example we have in the West of an Idealist. From the standpoint of sheer insight I find Fichte very convincing, but his attempt in the Science of Knowledge to derive that insight as the necessary underlying implication of the logical laws of thought seems strained and far from convincing. Very possibly he has the substantially correct view as to the source of the laws of thought, but it is quite another matter to say that from the use of logical principles he has proved the source. I am pretty well convinced that Fichte did not discover the self or "ego", as he calls it, but the method in which he sought to prove it. I would say that he really knew the self through what we might call the fifth function, though it is entirely possible that Fichte did not differentiate this function in his analysis. In such matters the psychical analysis of the Orient has gone much further than either the philosophy or psychology of the West.

Elsewhere I have suggested the word "introception" to represent this fifth function. It is to be understood as the process whereby consciousness turns upon itself and moves toward its source. It is not the same as introspection wherein consciousness merely short-circuits itself to observe more subtle psychological objects which are generally unconscious for the extraverted attitude. Introception, when successful, leads to a state such that consciousness becomes its own content, that is, a consciousness which is divorced from its objective reference. By this means the self as source of consciousness can be realized and without being transformed into a subtle object as a me. This is identical with the Indian notion of "meditation without a seed", which is absolutely essential for the attainment of Liberation or Enlightenment. Buddhist use of the word "Dhyana" suggests very strongly that it refers to an analogous process. So it may be said that by "introception" I mean substantially the same higher psychological function as "meditation without a seed" and "Dhyana". It is this, I conceive, to be the real source of the assurance of the originating idealistic philosophers and as the ground for differentiating Idealism proper from mere Intellectualistic idealism of which the latter is more a reflection of a Light than an incarnation of the Light itself. Introception gives immediate content just as perception does but diverges at least as radically from the latter as does conceptualism. If one divides the functions of consciousness into two classes with perception on one side, including feeling, sensation and intuition, and conception on the other, then introception would appear lumped with conception. In this case a successful critique of conceptualism would undermine the foundations of Idealism, particularly in the case of the Absolutistic school. But if the true base of Idealism is the activity of a function which ordinarily is latent and inactive, then the real root of Idealism is untouched by a critique of conceptualism considered in separation from introception.

"Introception" is definitely not thinking, feeling nor sensation. It is also definitely different from "intuition" as that term is generally understood, though translators from oriental sources have often used the latter word. This, however, only helps to confuse the situation for then we think of intuition as it appears in analytic psychology or in usage such as that of Bergson. It is a content coming into consciousness out of the dark of unconsciousness, hence we have Bergson speaking of grasping indefinite fringes around the core of conscious ideas as intuition. But introception is a function operating in the intensest kind of Light wherein one is more completely conscious than ever before. Consciousness turning upon itself is a very different matter from contents rising into consciousness from out the unconscious.

I submit that "turning inward", in the sense in which Fichte speaks, must be understood in the sense of introception rather than of

simple introspection. Thus no amount of bare introspection would be competent to challenge what Fichte found. Introception is an exceedingly profound act of introversion and the evidence would indicate that it is quite rare. If introversion is carried very far without the turning of the Light of consciousness upon itself, the effect is of something inchoate feathering out into the darkness of unconsciousness. But with the turning of the Light of consciousness upon itself consciousness becomes vastly intensified with the quality and ground of assurance much better established than in the case of anything derived from experience. This is something that must be borne in mind if one is ever to understand Idealism of the grander style.

Introception renders the actuality of the self far more indubitable than any content given through perception. This is the key to idealistic assurance and explains why all the necessitarianism which inheres in the environment takes on the quality of subordination. In fact, the intensified Light of the introceptive process gives to all experience a dreamlike or unreal character. It is like the sun quenching the light of the moon, or like the waking state quenching the consciousness of the ordinary dream. This is not a speculation, it is something which actually happens. The shift from introception to perception is like the sun going under while the moon takes over. The memory of the light of the sun, when the moon is shining, is stronger than the memory of the light of the moon, when the sun is shining. This alone gives a determinate meaning as to which is relatively most real.

The first immediate content of successful introception is the realization expressed by the words "I am". This is not an inference from conscious activity such as that of Descartes when he inferred the being of the self from the fact of thinking. The being of the self is an absolutely immediate datum requiring no further support. I repeat, the actuality of perceptually experienced content, taken in its most complete immediacy, is much less decisively certain.

The being of the self, which for introception is more unequivocal than the being or actuality of perception, is like an unsupported Light. It is "the Flame which burns without wick or oil". But it is so pure as to be quite without the taint of personality. One may conceive of it as like a self-supporting Light within a more or less differentiated lamp. The latter carries the individual characters of personality. There is thus something about the pure self which gives it the character of real impersonality. While in the rigorous sense it is highly subjective, it is not a personal subjectivism. This is a point of the very greatest importance for philosophy since the impersonality of the self gives it a universal value. It is the ground for something a good deal more than a merely personal philosophy.

We are quite right in valuing physical science because it gives us something more than merely the private experience of the individual scientist. It gives general truths whether they are interpreted in realistic, pragmatic or other terms. It is for this reason that we call it objective. Commonly we oppose to this, subjective judgments that are so largely colored by personal feeling tones that they have only a restricted appeal. That which we call objective is believed to be in some sense true for all men, while that which is subjective is not true for all men, and may not be true at all: The self of introception, being quite pure and impersonal, is not subjective in the latter sense. It supplies a generally valid base. Thus it is conceived by those who know it, and, if the non-idealist is ever to arrive at an understanding of the inner meaning of the Idealist, he must grant this point. The only possible verification is by the path of introception itself.

The last statement implies a radical departure of the idealistic theory of verification from that of Pragmatism. The pragmatist dictum that a difference of truth must make a difference of fact here, namely in the world of perception or experience, implies an exclusive one-way reference of ideas. The idea means exclusively a terminal content having a perceptual quale. Thus there can be no verification save through experience. But the conceptual content of the Idealist qua Idealist is purely introceptive. If, incidentally, this produces a difference of fact in the field of experience, that is merely an addenda which adds nothing to the essential truth-value. Actually, the introceptive verification may have repercussions upon the empiric life of the individual with the result that the latter may, more or less widely, influence other lives. These effects may or may not be valued positively or negatively in the pragmatic sense. But all this is beside the point from the perspective of introception. Introception supplies its own authority and may very well, in some of its ramifications, move into zones quite unrelated to empiric consciousness. In such cases a difference of truth would produce no difference of fact in the perceptual field. Often, it is true, a difference that is introceptively significant does have effects that are significant for the perceptual field and may even be of momentous importance. Thus the Buddhist introceptive insight has led to empiric ways of life that are notably different from the ways of life of most men. One effect is the reduction of militancy. This is something that does have a pragmatic value. But it would be a vital mistake to regard such effects as the underlying objective of Buddhist teachings. They are, after all, only incidental. The real objective is the attainment of Nirvana. If it were true that attainment of this end implied violent militancy in the empiric field then, I submit, that Buddhism would have to accept such violence.

I think it must be clear that the fruits of the introceptive orientation, in so far as they include effects within the

empiric field, will not always be such that they will receive favorable valuation from the vitalistic pragmatist. While at times the good of the one standpoint will overlap the good as viewed from the other, there are other situations in which this is not the case. Here there arises an inescapable conflict of valuation and direction. Fundamentally, introception leads away from experience and the empiric life which define just precisely the field of focus of the Pragmatist and of the Realist. That the latter should judge such effects adversely is not only understandable but is really inevitable. But the Introceptionist counters this with a comparable attitude in the reverse sense. He views all valuation of experience and of empiric life which leads to estrangement from Divinity or Spirit as a positive evil, indeed as part and parcel of the only real evil. There is thus a limit to the possible reconciliation of the different philosophic attitudes. Between Idealism and the other three schools there is a gulf of incommensurability which implies ineluctable conflict and choice. He who has opened the door of introception cannot possibly be a Pragmatist or a Realist save only in his secondary relations as an empiric entity, that is, exclusively in those relations which he regards as of no primary importance.

I have introduced this discussion of introception into the general subject of Idealism since I conceive it as absolutely essential to an understanding of the true meaning of Idealism. I am not writing a mere history of philosophy. If I were I should have to consider the idealistic theories of knowledge as they have actually been developed by the leading Idealists. It must be admitted that such theories have followed the intellectualistic pattern. In following this course the Idealists have made themselves vulnerable to criticism and have given a false impression of what actually is their base of assurance. I believe that the great Idealists would agree, in their private hearts, substantially with what I have said above. Perhaps they have hesitated to place their systems frankly upon what I have called an introceptive base with the idea that such was an unseemly course of a philosopher. It is also possible that there was a defective differentiation between intellectual form and introceptive content. The isolation of the purely logical features of mathematics has given us today an advantage over the older writers. We are enabled to see that there is a vital difference between rigorously formal mathematics and mathematics which results from the union of logic and intuition or introception. This shows very clearly that something is stripped away when pure mathematics is reduced to an exclusively logical formalism. This something is in addition to the pure concept. Now, the bearing of this point upon Idealism is very vital. It means that rigorous logical system, by itself, does not give content. Content enters as something extra-logical or as indefinable in the logical sense. The logical demonstration renders explicit a truth implicit, initially, in the original content but does not supply the initial content. Once this is understood, all reasoning becomes

relative to a reference supplied by some other means than reason itself. If, now, it is assumed that perceptual experience is the only possible extra-logical reference, then it readily follows that all conceptual or rational thinking is instrumental to empiric content. But from perceptual content the idealistic transcendentalism cannot be derived by logical implication. As a result the Idealistic thesis falls.

The strength of the pragmatistic polemic as against Idealism lies in its criticism of intellectualism. The case which Pragmatism builds here is very strong. If the pure concept is really empty, save in so far as it has a reference beyond itself, then it is impossible to prove a substantial reality by concepts alone. Analysis seems to have established the soundness of this point. But it does not necessarily follow that perceptual meaning is the only possible reference of the concept unless it can be proven that consciousness contains no other possibility.

Indeed the anti-intellectualistic argument is a good deal older than current Pragmatism and is to be found highly developed in the thought of Immanuel Kant himself. His criticism of the ontological argument for the existence of God is a classic of this type of thought. But he was forced to leave a door open to extra-experiential possibilities. The following excerpt from his thought is of particular significance.

Our conception of the object may thus contain whatever and how much it will; nevertheless we must ourselves stand away from the conception in order to bestow existence upon it. This happens with sense-objects through the connection with any one of our perceptions in accordance with empiric laws; but for the objects of pure thought there is no sort of means for perceiving their existence because it is wholly a priori that they can be known; our consciousness of all existence, however belongs altogether to a unity of experience and an existence outside this field cannot absolutely be explained away as impossible. But it is a supposition that we have no means of justifying.¹

For our purpose the vital part of the quotation lies in the words that have been underlined. It cannot be affirmed that concepts derive their existential value from perceptual experience alone, on purely theoretical grounds. Granted that the pure concept does not give existence, yet that existence may be grounded in something other than perception. It is affirmed here that it is sometimes grounded on introception and that this is the real foundation of the idealistic systems. By this means the essence of Idealism remains untouched by

¹ Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by J.M.D. Meiklejohn. J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., London (1934)

all the anti-intellectualistic arguments. This implies that the alternative of anti-sensationalism is not necessarily intellectualism but can be a third way of consciousness which is direct and immediate in its own right.

One may agree with Pragmatism as to its general theory of the instrumental nature of concepts but radically oppose the specific theory that the instrumental reference is always to a perceptual content. There may be an introceptive reference as well. Granting the validity of introception, the central thesis of Idealism remains unaffected. Also Idealism can develop a theory of truth wholly at variance with the pragmatic test, in so far as the latter is exclusively related to programs in the stream of time and experience. There remains the test of the psychological determination of the factual actuality of the idealistic direct realization of the self. I have already argued that the pure self cannot be found by the methods of introspection. Introspection deals with objects, even though they are subtle ones. At most it finds a me having enough of determinate character to be an object in certain relations, as the Neo-realist says. This method fails to exclude the other possibilities, unless it can prove rigorously that the four functions are the only possible ways of consciousness. This it has not done, and from the very nature of the problem, cannot do. I submit that introception is a fifth function which renders available content which, otherwise, cannot be known, and, I affirm, that this supplies the base upon which the whole structure of Idealism rests.

It has long been a custom for philosophic systems to include an outline of psychology as a component part. Among the older systems it was frequently customary to introduce psychology as rational psychology. Today it is empiric psychology, that is, the kind which results from the application of scientific method. In introducing the discussion of introception as a way of consciousness within the body of a philosophical exegesis I am, therefore, proceeding in accord with well established practice. For introception, considered as a way of consciousness as differentiated from the content rendered available by it, falls under the general head of psychology. But it does not fall within the limits of the common understanding of either rational psychology nor of empiric psychology. Perhaps we may best regard it as meta-psychology. Now the material of this psychology is conceived as being, in principle, available for study, provided the right conditions exist. It is not affirmed that any subject at any time supplies the material in a form available for his own investigation. It is simply affirmed that there are instances where it has been rendered available thereby proving a possibility of consciousness as such.

Psychology is philosophically significant to the extent that the existence of a way of consciousness must be assumed before the content and inner relations of consciousness can be analyzed and evaluated. The question of the actuality of a way of consciousness is,

properly, a psychological rather than a philosophical problem. The importance of this problem hardly needs to be emphasized in a day when the positive appreciation of psychology is so strong as it is with us now. Actually, it is philosophy which has felt the force of relative depreciation. This attitude is an expression of the widespread superficiality of the age. For, manifestly, a way of consciousness is only of instrumental value to the content which it renders available. Now, the way of consciousness does not define content save in very general terms, which are always other than the distinctive quale of the content itself. The way of consciousness bears a strong analogy to a route and method of travel. In fact, this analogy is so strong that it is a general oriental practice to speak of a way of consciousness as a "path" or "road". If we analyze a route and means of travel to some destination we can say something about the possible values to be realized at the destination, but not very much. Our knowledge of content is here mainly negative. Thus we can know that if the route and means are exclusively those of land travel, then we can also know that the content of the destination will not include the values which can be reached only by sea-travel. Otherwise the actual positive content realized at the destination is not known by the route or conveyance used. Thus one could know very thoroughly the road which leads to the Grand Canyon of the Colorado and all that goes into the structure and operation of an automobile, yet this would give no knowledge of the direct experience of the Grand Canyon itself. Knowledge of the route and means of travel is psychology, but the valuation of the direct content of a realized consciousness, in so far as it is thinkable, is the concern of philosophy.

We have, now, left the problem of necessity, as it appears to the idealistic perspective, suspended in the air, as it were, for quite some time, meanwhile engaging in a somewhat extensive review of a proposed fifth function of consciousness. This seemed unavoidable for two reasons. First, the actuality of the function, which I have called introception, is not a generally recognized fact and it was necessary to build some presumption for it. Second, in the failure to establish its case upon purely intellectual grounds, Idealism must invoke some non-empiric and non-intellectual function if it is not to be cast aside as a vain speculation. If the reader does not feel that the evidence in support of the actuality of introception is adequate, then I suggest that he assume its actuality during the examination of the thesis of Idealism in order to see whether this is not enough to support that thesis in principle. If the ultimate conclusion is positive then the problem of the status of Idealism rests upon the meta-psychological problem as to whether introception is a valid way of consciousness to be added to the four generally recognized functions.

I have already defined the distinctive characteristic of introception as the "power of the light of consciousness to turn upon

itself toward its source." And this, it will be remembered, was carefully differentiated from introspection in that the latter is consciousness concerned with an objective content, although it is a content of a more subtle nature than the more outward going consciousness known as observaton. The success of introception means that sooner or later a point is reached wherein consciousness loses all content save that of itself. Such a point, if absolute, is equivalent to the complete disappearance of the world about. But the fundamental effect may be achieved by a sort of diversion of the major portion of the stream of consciousness so that it turns about toward its source, while a residual portion continues to flow toward the object, i.e., the world-about. In this case, objective consciousness continues in a kind of twilight in an inferior portion of the total psyche of the individual. The diverted portion of the stream becomes a consciousness without objective content but with an exclusive awareness of itself and its subject. Such a consciousness is clearly not a mere relation between two terms, a subject and an object, since only one term remains. This is a point of very great epistemological importance since it begins to cut under the whole conception of consciousness as exclusively a relation between terms. Here consciousness is realized in a way independent of both time and space, at least in so far as these notions are predicates of the world-about. An individual consciousness in such a state would, in particular, have no basis for time measurement and hence there would be no basis for differentiation between instantaneousness and eternity. If a portion of the stream of consciousness continued to flow toward the object, a correlation with the chronometer, which the cosmos is, would remain with the result that one would realize a conjunction of consciousness as time conditioned with consciousness as timeless. This is a curious kind of crossing of the gulf between the seeming incompatibles of time and timelessness.

As I am speaking mainly from a direct knowledge of an instance of introception, I am better able to state what is possible than to define the limits of possibility. I do know that as measured by the portion of consciousness still related to the world about, the state wherein the self and consciousness are the sole content can be instantaneous followed by an immediate unfoldment of another and very astonishing content of a character incommensurable with objective experience. As this has a very close bearing upon a very vital part of Idealistic philosophy I propose to describe its principal feature, so far as that may be.

The immediate effect of a state of consciousness with a one-way dependence or relation to the subject and no object is that of a vast Void. It is an "I" suspended in an utter Voidness. But at once

a process of enantiodromia¹ proceeds to transform the Voidness to the value of substantial Fullness. Here is a "thickness" which I am quite sure would much more than meet William James' demand. I know of no empiric content which in the faintest degree suggests this quality of Fullness. Now, this Fullness is the actual palpable Presence of Divinity itself. It is not anything so crude as a vast man in space, but a Presence which permeates the whole of space, interwoven throughout the objects of ordinary consciousness, yet more completely present where those objects are not. The effect is a radical reversal of all former values and a resolution of many of just precisely the problems to which empiricism can give no satisfactory answer.

There is very little in an introceptive realization of this sort that suggests the God-conceptions of the traditional religions. Mostly such conceptions seem to be little more than a stylized construct of the human imagination. But the introceptive realization confirms the actuality of the Supreme Value which the general faith of mankind envisages, however defectively it may conceive it. For both philosophy and psychology the various names of the Divinity have simply the significance of a symbolical representation of the Supreme Value. Proof of the actuality of this Supreme Value is possible only by direct realization. It may very well be reflected in the practical or moral reason in the sense in which Kant used those terms, but I suspect that a careful examination of the argument for God from the basis of the practical reason will prove it defective just as truly as Kant showed the ontological argument from pure reason to be defective. Immediacy alone supplies proof, though faith may very well be conceived as a sign-post.

There is excellent evidence, to be derived from the content of the formulations based upon religious mysticism, that the above stage in the introceptive process may be relatively terminal. That is, consciousness may establish an anchorage at this point. But I know that if the process is continued there are subsequent enantiodromous transformations which lead to considerably more profound orientations. A latter stage is of considerably more importance for the understanding of Idealism than the one now before us. However, before continuing with the further development, it is important to consider the effect of the present stage upon the world-view.

As was noted above, the stage of consciousness united with a self but with no object proved to be nascent like that of a chemical atom just set free from one combination but which immediately thereafter enters into another combination. The self becomes united through consciousness with a new object, but one which is no longer the secular

¹ For more information, see C. G. Jung's Collected Works, Vol. 6, Psychological Types, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1971, pp. 425-6.

world. There is no transcendence of dualism here, but the whole field defined by the self, the not-self and consciousness is manifestly psychical. At this level there is no question of a non-psychical existence for consciousness. But we cannot here say that it is a field wholly illumined by consciousness. The Divine otherness includes vastly more than that comprehended by the conscious self. But one would not interpret this as an independent, non-psychical existence in the spirit of the Realist. One would speak, rather, of the Unconscious in the sense of von Hartmann. This Unconscious is the surrogate of the Realists' independent entities which carry the necessitarian factor. In a word, we have arrived at a pattern for the interpretation of necessity which can be formulated in purely psychical terms, though we have not arrived at a complete determination by consciousness. It is thus a position of modified Idealism but not of absolute Idealism.

Necessity may now be interpreted as the inherent Law of the Divine Otherness rather than as the inherent structure of a secular nature. On the level of the introceptive realization itself there is no problem as to the reconciling of freedom with the necessity of the Divine Law. Freedom becomes simply the freedom either to surrender to the Divine Law or to affirm the autonomy of the Self. If the course of surrender is taken it is not to be conceived at all as something hard to do. It is an act most highly desired by the Self. Actually the affirmation of this autonomy requires a distinctly austere act of will. Self-surrender is sweet. The burden of problems and responsibility drops away. The universe, as it really is, is Divine and just what it should be. To move in the current of this 'should be', which is, seems as the most satisfactory course which any man might desire. Freedom is not an arbitrary doing as one pleases by a finite self, but a surrendering to something far more adequate in every sense. Actually, a certain glory is felt in the depreciation of the self with respect to the Divine Otherness. Anyone who is familiar with the literature of religious mysticism will recognize this psychical pattern. Indeed, the essential quala of this state leads to far richer expression in religious practices and poetry than it does in philosophy. No one who knows will ever depreciate this state, but as our concern here is primarily philosophical, we must focus upon the more philosophical implications.

For the reflective consciousness the problem of necessity really becomes the connection between the inherent Law of Divinity and the order of sensible nature. We are not here concerned with the concrete resolution of this problem, which can readily become a whole philosophic work in itself. We are concerned merely with the pointing to a possibility of solution other than that of the type offered by Realism with respect to the problem of necessity. The present approach will, of course, have its advantages and difficulties but let us note what is gained by the approach. In principle we have a resolution of the

problem of necessity without a stultification and depreciation of the yearning for freedom nor is the actuality of freedom denied. Freedom becomes reduced to freedom to affirm the self or to abrogate it, with the latter appearing spontaneously as the more attractive course. The union with the Divine necessity is thus an act of freedom. The religious value is not lost nor reduced to a mere addendum of a secular philosophical system. The Divine Otherness is not something alien or unfriendly, like the Realist's world, but the very best of friends. All of man's great problems are resolved an aura of profound Peace, through the expansion into the Divine Otherness which comes with the completeness of surrender.

The first stabilized stage of introceptive realization does not lead to a monistic metaphysics and, therefore, is not to be classed with absolute Idealism. The dualism of the individual self and the Divine Otherness is not yet reduced to a true unity. In the language of religious mysticism, such unity as there may be is conceived as the union of the Lover and the Beloved where, from the finite point of view, the lover is the individual self and the Beloved is the Divinity. But as the relationship is mutual, the Divine Otherness also appears as the Lover of whom the object is the individual self. An important part of the satisfaction of this state does lie in the fact that the dualism still remains, as otherwise, the relationship of love would lose its objective meaning. There is plenty of reason why this stage tends to become a point of fixation — a station on a path which actually reaches further. A study of the literature would indicate that mystical states only exceptionally pass beyond this. Indeed, there is much to be said for the view that the term "mysticism" should be applied exclusively to this stage, while deeper stages may be more properly classed as Gnosticism. It is clear that if we do so restrict the connotation of "Mysticism", then mysticism is far more significant for its feeling value than for its noetic value. But, as we shall see later, this relativity is reversed in the deeper and more Gnostic state. In the narrower sense, then, Mysticism is of relatively minor philosophic importance though of vast religious importance. However, it does clearly carry philosophic implications.

If we think through the implications of Mysticism, in the narrower sense, we find that its dualism really implies a kind of pluralism for, if the self is not conceived in the solipsistic sense, then we do have a plurality of selves in relation to a Divine Otherness, but not united in a Supreme SELF. In fact, we might say that there is both a kind of unity as well as a kind of pluralism, for there is a unity in the Divine Otherness and plurality in the multiplicity of selves. This would account for the fact that, while analysis reveals first a dualism and then a pluralism, yet the predominant testimony of the mystics favors a monistic interpretation. This is true for the reason that the real orientation of the mystic is to the Divine Otherness, whose nature

is monistic and is clearly realized as such in the mystical consciousness. But the objective character of the love relation prevents the monistic character from being complete.

One may well ask what the offering is from this state to objective scientific and world-problems generally. Frankly, it has no primary concern with such problems. They cease to be any longer vital to the individual who has attained the state, and human service is simply a matter of helping others to attain the state likewise. Success in this would solve the problems by their disappearing. And this solution is quite adequate for all those who can be induced to accept a positive orientation to the state. But beyond this limit it naturally fails. There is no logical nor moral reason why the mystic should not feel favorable to a direct approach to scientific and world-problems, and there is nothing in his philosophy to prevent him from participating in such work himself. But all this he would regard as simply of pragmatic value in the sense of being only pragmatic — a very different matter from being a philosophic Pragmatist in the privative sense. Of course, there is nothing in this attitude to provide a very deep concern with the scientific or sociological problem as they have too much the character of dream-problems. Yet, given the will to deal with such problems, there is no reason why a mystic should not achieve as much or more than the non-mystic. Indeed, some of the very best of the scientists have been a good deal more than a little mystical.

Now, what happens to the great philosophical problems of the nature of truth and of reality? The answer is really very simple. Truth and Reality mean virtually the same thing and they have a significance which renders it necessary to spell these words with capital initial letters. Truth and Reality are identical with Divinity, and the realization of Truth or Reality is not other than the realization of and union with the Divinity. Clearly, as concepts, these words do not have a truth-reference in either the Pragmatic or the Realistic sense. They have a substantial rather than a sign-pointer significance. One finds the meaning, not through a successful program of action, but by a meditative or introceptive penetration into the essence of the word or concept. And this may be said to be a general description of the meaningful reference of concepts, in so far as they have a mystical value. On the whole, I should say that this enhances the value of concepts, as contrasted to their value in either Pragmatic or Realistic usage. Some words and concepts are important in such a way that both the Realistic and Pragmatic use of them has the effect of serious depreciation. I doubt not that anyone who has the mystic flare would feel that there is a distinct cheapening of value in all three of the foregoing philosophies.

If an individual had before him a comprehensive selection of modern works on philosophy and he selected at random a few volumes for reading, the probability is that he would emerge with the impression

that philosophy is, first of all, the first effort of man to arrive at science, and secondly, a child of science, in that it is conceived quite frequently now as properly a generalization of scientific method. If, on the other hand, this same individual had before him a selection of extant Greek and Indian contributions to philosophy together with Western works produced around the eighteenth century, a similar reading would tend to give the impression that philosophy lies close to religion. The fact is, philosophy as a whole reflects and comprehends both the scientific and religious motifs. But in our present day the scientific and worldly utilitarian spirit holds the ascendant place in the reflective world with the consequence that philosophy is viewed as more like science than like religion. With Idealism the scientific side is subordinated to the religious motif, but still remains in so far valuable that the religious element is married to thought and not exclusively to feeling. Because the present age is highly secular with religion as the weak sister, if she is recognized at all, it is understandable that philosophy should be largely conceived in the sense of secular speculation. This I conceive to be the real psychological reason for the general current depreciation of Idealism as a whole. With the realization of the failure of the too secular orientation — a fact which is becoming evident in the present world-wide moral debauchery — there will be a return to a serious valuation of religion, and then once more the idealistic type of philosophy will return to the royal position it once held. For, in the broad sense, Idealism alone among all the philosophies really takes religion seriously.

An acquaintance with the lives as well as the works of the great Idealists is an illumining experience. Most generally they seem to be deeply religious natures. Berkeley, himself, was a bishop. The importance of the religious side of Immanuel Kant is very evident and seems to supply the deeper reason for his having to supplement the negative effect of the Critique of Pure Reason with a Critique of Practical Reason, so that a place for religious values might still remain. Fichte comes very near being the pure devotee, as revealed in the following quotation from The Vocation of Man:

These two orders — the purely spiritual and the sensuous, the latter consisting possibly of an innumerable series of particular lives — have existed since the first moment of the development of an active reason within me, and still proceed parallel to each other. The latter order is only a phenomenon for myself, and for those with whom I am associated in this life; the former alone gives it significance, purpose and value. I am immortal, imperishable, eternal, as soon as I form the resolution to obey the laws of reason; I do not need to become so. The super-sensual world is no future-world; it is now present; it can at no point of finite existence be more present than

at another; not more present after an existence of myriads of lives than at this moment. My sensuous existence may, in future, assume other forms, but these are just as little the true life as its present form. By that resolution I lay hold on eternity, and cast off this earthly life and all other forms of sensuous life which may yet lie before me in futurity, and place myself far above them. I become the sole source of my own being and its phenomena, and, henceforth, unconditioned by anything without me, I have life in myself. My will, which is directed by no foreign agency in the order of the super-sensual world, but by myself alone, is this source of true life and of eternity.¹

Now, if we go back in time nearly two thousand years, and far across the world, we find as an important part of the Buddhist canon, the Awakening of Faith by Ashvaghosha. From this let us select the following quotation:

First as to the unfolding of the true principle. The mind has two doors from which issue its activities. One leads to the realization of the mind's Pure Essence, the other leads to the differentiations of appearing and disappearing, of life and death. Through each door passes the mind's conceptions so inter-related that they never have been separated and never will be.²

Is it not as though one spirit were speaking far across space and time, in different worlds and different cultures?

Let us turn now to the opening words of a very famous logic, the words of one of the greatest intellects the West has produced. I quote:

Philosophy misses an advantage enjoyed by the other sciences. It cannot like them rest the existence of its objects on the natural admissions of consciousness, either for starting or for continuing, nor can it assume that its method of cognition, either for starting or for continuing, is one already accepted. The objects of philosophy, it is true, are upon the whole the same as those for religion. In both the object is Truth, in that supreme sense in which God and God only is the Truth. Both in like manner go on to treat of the finite worlds of Nature and the human

¹ Fichte, J. G. The Vocation of Man, translated by William Smith, L. L. D., reprinted edition, The Open Court Publishing Co., LaSalle, Ill. (1965) p. 141-1.

² Quoted from A Buddhist Bible, Dwight Godard, ed. Beacon Press, Boston (1970) p. 362, copyrighted 1938, E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., N.Y.

Mind, with their relation to each other and to their truth in God.... (Underling mine)¹

Who but an Idealist would start a treatise on logic in the spirit of an essentially religious subject? This quotation is from Hegel, the greatest of the idealistic thinkers.

Clearly, he who would understand Idealism must have the feeling for the religious problem as the most fundamental of all problems. And the real significance of Idealism is not to be judged by its offering to the practical advance of secular science. This contribution is, admittedly, but little if anything. It deals with that which is forever outside the reach of science so long as it is restricted to current methodology. Our science supplies us with many arts and material advantages plus a most dangerous implementation of the will to war. Perhaps the Idealist has good reason to feel proud that he is excused from responsibility for this. Perhaps the Idealist may be excused if he prefers other-worldliness to a "real" world composed largely of the irrational and insane spirit of violence. Let those who desire something better look to Idealism.

When introception is carried to the stage where the self appears as small and enveloped in a vast Divine Otherness, we do not find a basis for absolute Idealism, as has been already noted. At this point one could not say with Fichte "I become the sole source of my own being and its phenomena, and, henceforth, unconditioned by anything without me, I have life within myself."² The mystical stage of introception places the source of life and being in the Divine Otherness, and this is not in accord with Fichte's insight as implied above. So we must return to consider the further development of the introceptive process.

The self, stripped of all extraneous elements, of everything that can possibly be an object for consciousness, is very small indeed. It is a bare point of Light, the mathematical zero which forms the origin of the basis of reference. It is that upon which further possibility rests but is itself no true content of consciousness. But if at this point, the introceptive process continues, as it will if the autonomy of the self is maintained as against the surrender to the Divine Otherness, then there follows a simply tremendous enantiomorphic transformation. The self as a bare point becomes an unlimited Space whose nature is Light of Consciousness. Divinity fuses with the self thereby becoming the SELF which is at once both God and I. Again, this is not a speculation, it actually happens. This changes the whole view

¹ Quoted from The Logic of Hegel, translated by Wm. Wallace and reprinted in Modern Classical Philosophers, Benjamin Rand, Ph.D. The Riverside Press, Cambridge, Mass. (1908) p. 569.

² Fichte, J. G., op. cit., p. 142.

of the nature of being and does supply, as we shall find, the true basis of absolute Idealism.

Where the Divinity becomes co-extensive with the SELF, Light spreads everywhere. This means that the Unconscious is absorbed by Consciousness. We may conceive of this Consciousness as Thought, though that is simply to select one from among other possibilities. Consciousness is Thought, and more besides. But consciousness as Thought gives the World that peculiar coloring so that It may be, for philosophy. The Divine Thought which is MY Thought forms the only world there is. Thus the World is Thought before it becomes experience.

For the man born into the empiric world, experience comes first in time, thought afterward. To see thought in this sequence, and only in this sequence, leads naturally to the view that thought was evolved to serve experience, and that alone. Hence we have the philosophies in which thought is only the little one, the servant in the house who has no business sitting upon the royal throne. Truly, in time, experience and perception are the Mother of thought. But where there is a mother there must be a father. Mythology and the psychology of the unconscious tell us that earliest natural man worshipped only feminine divinities for the child knows first and only the mother as an immediate fact. The father is accepted later on the basis of a more or less uncertain inference. The actuality of fatherhood is an immediate realization only for mature consciousness. Much of our modern philosophy is in the state of primitive man in its acknowledgment of mother-perception and its doubt or denial of the father. Indeed, Pragmatism doubts that the father is even a valid inference, much less an immediate realization. Thus Pragmatism is the doctrine that parthenogenesis or the virgin birth is the universal and final truth!

Now, once it is realized that thought has a hidden father as well as a revealed mother, it becomes evident that the concept embodies a dual character. As derived from the mother it leads to the object whose essence is experience. But as derived from the father it leads inward toward an unseen substantiality. From this there follows two quite opposed logical theories, each of which is capable of validating itself from the ground which each assumes. A life-time devoted to the elaboration of one of these logics will never succeed in dethroning the other. The comprehensive view which finds a place for each is found only by consciousness moving within its own roots. Mere experience can never supply the final answer.

The search for the roots of thought leads us veritably into deep waters. It is easy to say that conceptual thought is generated out of perceptual life by a process of abstraction and then, having assumed such a genesis, to proceed to the development of a logic wherein the conceptual order acquires significance only in relationship to experience. But how is it possible that a living perceptual flux or manifold — view it whichever way one will — should lead to the

abstracting process? How, indeed, does it become possible to rise out of the perceptual stream or manifold to a super-perceptual order? This is by no means a simple matter, and it is no more answered by invoking the name of life, as is done by the Vitalists, than it is by invoking the name of God. Both answers are mystical in that negative sense whereby there is meant a breakdown of the intelligent will to carry through to the end. In the answers to these questions we will find just precisely the essential differentia between the animal and human kingdoms. Is the difference between the animal and the human but one of degree in an evolutionary scale without a qualitative break and addition, or does it form an incommensurable division between two orders? Is man merely a more advanced animal, or is the total human being to be conceived as an animal nature to which something transcendent has been added, a somewhat which is more lordly and divine than anything which is possible to the merely animal however highly evolved? These questions are implied, for perception in the broad sense includes the three functions of sensation, feeling and intuition taken together in contrast to conception, and all three of these functions can be found, well or poorly developed, in the animal soul, but conception is alien. The beasts are dumb just because they do not have the power bestowed by the concept. Is man merely the child of the animal or is he something added to the animal from beyond? If he is only the child then he can hardly claim the royal status in the kingdoms of living forms which would rightly be his if his fundamental nature as man is something bestowed from above. If he is only the child, indeed, a thoroughgoing democracy might be the last word in social relations, but it would have to be a democracy in which the animals — the dogs, horses, tigers, lions and hyenas — would have to be accepted as the equals of men with the same right of political representation. If, on the other hand, the quintessential meaning of the words "human" and "man" is something transcendental added to the animal-order, then the true relationship of man to the animal is royal or hierarchical, and this would be true in a progressive series from the most animalistic man up to the most human man. So, indeed, what we find with respect to the roots of thought has manifold bearings, not alone upon the form of philosophy, but even reaching down into the determination of the true social order.

How is it possible that man can receive the stream or manifold of ever-changing experience and yet not feel completely alien? To be merely presented is not enough to supply the presented with recognition by human consciousness. Something is supplied by the human subject so that the presentation can be recognized as a perception, otherwise the human consciousness would have no means of rendering an alien other into something familiar, understandable and even friendly. If one studies the psychology of the more introverted phase of human consciousness he does find, as Dr. Jung has shown, that in the deeps of man there is a perceptual matrix of a profoundly archaic nature. This appears, at

times, as a projected image, which is called primordial for the reason that it is not reducible to a construct from the objectively presented situation. This is something truly a priori, something of the nature of the Platonic Ideas which lie at the roots of the mind and which render possible, first of all, the integration of perception. As Jung conceives it, the Idea proper is derived from the primordial image by a process of abstraction by the reason, and thus the idea is not merely a construct from objective perception; but, in relation to the latter, has something of an innate or a priori character. But still the Idea is derivative from the primordial image whose nature is primarily perceptive. This view drives the problem to a deeper level, but still does not answer how the abstracting process of the reason is possible.

There is an impressive parallelism between the views of Dr. Jung and those of Schopenhauer. The latter philosopher, it will be remembered, maintained the thesis that the primary root of being is not noetic but voluntaristic. The Will is primary while the Idea, which composes the whole objective universe, is merely secondary, being essentially an objectivication of the Will. But the Idea exists in two aspects, a more objective and a more subjective. The objective Idea is subject to the principle of sufficient reason, is multiform and is the source of all science. The subjective Idea is the primary object, existing behind and prior to the principle of sufficient reason, has a unified character and is revealed most directly, not in science, but in art, in other words, the deed. The subjective Idea is fundamentally identical with the primary Ideas of Plato, and performs a function analogous to that of the primordial image of Jung. Since the subjective Idea exists prior to the principle of sufficient reason, it is useless to hope to find a reason for it in the sense that its form or actuality could be deduced from something prior to it. It, thus, exists for reason as something immediately given.

I think that Jung is quite right in finding in Schopenhauer's more subjective Idea a similarity to the perceptive quale of the primordial image. The Idea of Schopenhauer is very different from the Idea of Hegel, for whom the Idea has a more original and self-existent character. Here we have the conflict between voluntaristic and noetic Idealism sharply drawn — a conflict which even helped to embitter the life of Schopenhauer. The more subjectivistic Idea is like a transcendental object which is derived from a Will antecedent to the subject-object relationship. The Hegelian Idea is self-existent and primary. My own view is that there is a part truth in both standpoints, but that both are relative to a still more profound actuality which occupies a neutral position with respect to the Will and the Reason. This view I shall develop later.

The thought of Schopenhauer is in fundamental sympathy with the perspective of all those who find a primary orientation in

teleology or purpose, and it seems to be quite generally true that for those who take this orientation there is something more fundamental in generic perception than in conception. Perception is the root source and mother of the concept and of the idea conceived as conceptual. Jung has recognized something like a dependence upon a feminine source as instanced in the following quotation: "The primordial image is the preliminary stage of the idea (q.v.), its maternal soil."¹ But the notion of the mother always implies the notion of the father, and so, the account of the genesis of the Idea or concept is not complete until we find the father and isolate his function also. I would suggest that one significant way of viewing the difference between Schopenhauer and Hegel consists in interpreting the former's orientation as being more to the feminine factor while that of Hegel was more toward the masculine factor. The whole Pragmatic-Vitalistic school is closer to Schopenhauer than it is to Hegel.²

The present stage of our discussion leads us to the necessity of considering the relation of "idea" to "concept". In a great deal of usage the notions are used interchangeably, but we are forced to differentiate a real difference in the meaning. The more subjective Idea of Schopenhauer, and likewise the Idea of Hegel, have a creative power, though the creativeness is understood differently. Thus Schopenhauer's Idea is creative in a more artistic sense, while that of Hegel implies a creative reason operating through the dialectic process. Now the concept is often, and perhaps more correctly, understood as meaning rigorously just what it is defined to mean. Such a concept would not lead to possibilities which could not be rationally inferred. A group of defined concepts will lead to implications thereby rendering something explicitly, but will give no more than was implicitly present in the beginning. But an Idea with creative potential grows more like something that is alive. It has possibilities which cannot be known by pure inference alone. As I am acquainted with both kinds of mental contents I am thoroughly convinced of the justice of the distinction. It would follow, for one thing, that Bergson's criticism of Intellectualism has a great deal of validity with respect to the concept as outlined above, but it would not be valid for the Idea, since the latter has the power of growing beyond itself. But it would be a serious misapprehension to regard Hegel's philosophy as Conceptualism or Intellectualism in this sense, even though he gives that impression to a merely surface view. There is a creative potency in the Hegelian Idea.

¹ Quoted from Psychological Types, p. 557.

² This would even throw a light upon the feminist element that has been noted in the psychology of Adolph Hitler, with his strong development of intuition relative to reason.

Concepts which are taken as they are defined to mean, and only that, stand in a position of disassociation from the whole perceptual field. They are equally to be differentiated from introceptive content. They stand in a zone neither of the earth nor of spirit and lack that which is necessary to predicate actuality in either sense. They define forms of the possible for human consciousness in its peculiar quality as human, taken in differentiation from both that which is animal and that which is spiritual. But we are not justified in regarding this as a limiting definition imposed upon the possibilities of consciousness in its concrete totality without specific reference to a human way of knowing. We may know a necessity for man as man, but do not thereby have certainty relative to the nature of other than human kinds of consciousness, whether of a superior or inferior nature. To know the latter, the consciousness principle in man would have to be shifted to the basis of other kinds of beings. But the definition of what is possible for the distinctively human kind of consciousness is, no doubt, of great importance for a human being. The study of the nature and logic of a pure conceptual order, taken in abstraction from both perceptual reference and to introceptive content, is, unquestionably, a valuable work. I would be among the last to depreciate the value of logical investigations such as that of Bertrand Russell's Principles of Mathematics. But it would be a mistake to conceive this kind of logic as the final word in logic.

Idealism in the noetic form has been conceived far too often as the necessary implication of Reason. Beginning with the primary thesis that Reality, whatever it may be, is not self-contradictory, an examination of the specific contents of relative consciousness apparently leads to a number of contradictions or antinomies. In other words, relative consciousness is self-contradictory and, therefore, unreal. Consequently, Reality must be found by transcending the whole relative world, including all finite thought. The total process by which this conclusion is reached is very elaborate and involves an extensive literature which, at times, becomes highly recondite. We shall not here retrace steps which are well known to philosophical students but merely note the outcome. Now, since the days of the great Idealists we have come into a far better understanding of logical possibilities through the logical analysis of mathematics, and it appears that many of the supposed contradictions of the relative field can be resolved, with the result that the above argument loses its force. To be sure, the relative world may, indeed, be unreal but, if so, that fact is not established by the formal argument from essential contradictoriness of all relative consciousness. Further, the assumption that Reality is not self-contradictory may be challenged, not by affirming that it may be self-contradictory, but on the ground that contradictoriness is a conceptual category which is not relevant in an ontological sense. This form of challenge is typical of the anti-intellectualists. So, in the

light of these criticisms, the case for rational, absolute Idealism falls in so far as its case rests only on a logical thesis.

I am prepared to grant the force of the above arguments, but deny that they touch the real ground of monistic Idealism. When one reads the great Idealists, such as Fichte, Hegel and Schopenhauer, he finds that there is a good deal more present than a logical necessitarianism. Particularly is this clear in the case of Schopenhauer who is explicitly a voluntarist, but it is also true of the other two. To be sure, they attached great importance to the logical or rational factor and with a large degree of justification. But, beyond this, there is the unmistakable evidence of insight, the "temper akin to genius", to quote a phrase from Schopenhauer. These philosophers spoke of something they knew, but not from perceptual experience nor as a logical inference alone. And it is from this something known immediately that Idealism of the grand style derives its authority. Beyond perception and conception lies introception which is the path to a transcendental immediacy, and when introception is united with conception then we have the basis of the Reason which leads to Idealism.

In support of my present thesis I would call attention to the profound affinity between the Idealism of men like Fichte, Hegel and Schopenhauer and an orientation characteristic of the Upanishads. Particularly is this affinity notable in the case of the philosophy of the great Indian monist, Shankara. Here also, Reality is supersensible and radically monistic. But one who studies the philosophy and life of Shankara finds very clearly that the logical presentation of his system is incidental to a primary insight. In other words, the ontology is not exclusively nor primarily a logical deduction. Shankara went first to his Guru who did not teach him as a modern professor of philosophy teaches his students, but rather facilitated the awakening of a latent function of consciousness. The successful awakening of the function led to immediate realizations of a nature which is non-perceptual and non-conceptual in their essential nature. From this the philosophical system followed. I have employed the term "introcept" for this kind of immediacy, and "introception" for the process.

It has already been stated that when introception is carried far enough, the self and the Divine Other coalesce in a SELF having a highly transcendent character. This is a radically unitary SELF of so complete an aloofness that personality simply does not exist for It. It is equally aloof from the empiric world. It is the union of the subject to consciousness and its content. It is not contained by space, time and the world of sensible objects, but is like a Space which contained and comprehended all these. From this state of introceptive realization certain consequences follow:

1. The SELF supports the universe, yet is not conditioned

by the presence or absence of the universe.

2. The transcendent Thought of the SELF is the substratum of the universe which, later, is experienced by the empiric self, with possibilities of distortion.

3. This Thought defines necessity, whereby the freedom of the empiric self is conditioned, so that for the empiric self the inner sense for freedom attains no more than a partial realization.

4. This Thought is the noumenon of the laws of nature which receive a statement from physical science of only a pragmatic validity.

5. The world of the empiric self, being only derivative, is no more than an illusion when it is conceived as an independent self-existence.

6. Truth is a relation of congruency between empiric thought or conception and the transcendental Thought.

7. The laws of empiric thought are part of the necessity imposed by the transcendent Thought.

8. The Thought, which is both of and identical with the SELF, serves the purpose of attaining complete SELF-consciousness.

9. The Thought of the SELF is pregnant with creative potentiality so that it elaborates from within itself possibilities which are more than may be formally deduced.

10. This Thought is concrete in that it is totally comprehensive, but appears as abstract when contrasted to empiric thought derived from perceptual experience.

11. The development of this Thought, in so far as reflected to objective thought, is enantiodromous, i.e., follows the form of the triadic dialectic.

The above statements are not merely invented postulates from which one might proceed to build a hypothetical system, nor are they to be viewed as the necessary consequences of either empiric or pure objective thought. This is a very fundamental part of my whole thesis, and criticism that does not bear this point in mind misses the essence of the whole argument. They are ideas in objective form derived from the Thought of the SELF. They are not themselves the immediate form of that Thought which, in its own nature, is independent of the concepts and word-signs of objective thought. That Thought in its own essence is forever incommunicable in the forms of relative consciousness. Thus the primary postulates are rather precipitates within relative thought of a Meaning prior to the latter and which are subject to unavoidable distortion through processes whereby content identical with the SELF is made to appear as an object of consciousness for the empiric subject. The Thought of the SELF is not an objective or empiric thought and it must be conceived as such, that if realized by a non-thinking being it would not appear as Thought at all. It is a potential of many facets, of which Thought stands out as the most significant to a

predominantly thinking being. Doubtless, through another appropriate facet It could appear as primarily Willing. There is, therefore, a certain relativity here which prevents us from reaching an objective decision as to the primacy of Reason and Will. We may simply say that to a predominantly thinking being It appears as primarily Thought, and from that perspective a characteristic philosophy follows. The above postulates are, therefore, affirmed as true but not as so exclusively true as to prevent precipitation in other patterns.

But whether one realizes the SELF as inherently Will or Thought, the common implication of this stage of introception is the identification of being with conscious existence. That is, in the generic sense, the introceptive realization confirms the cardinal principle of Idealism, but does not necessarily develop in the form of Rational Idealism. However, it may take the form of Rational Idealism, and the above postulates imply that form.

Even a brief examination of the postulates will show that they confirm the major part of the Hegelian thesis, though stripping from that thesis certain features, including its privative character. To a degree, the most primary thesis of Hegel is confirmed, but not wholly. Thus there is a sense in which Being is identical with Thought, yet not identical with objective or empiric thought. The Thought of the SELF is the noumenal Reality underlying the sensible world, and the necessity inherent in that Thought is projected as the constraint which surrounds the empiric subject. But that constraint is only partly identical with the laws of empiric or objective thought. We are dealing here with the Father of the concept, but as the Father implies the Mother, so the total character of the concept is no more given completely by knowledge of the Father than it is given completely by knowledge of the Mother. We have, in fact, a dual determination, the one introceptive and the other perceptive, with the result that neither perspective alone can give a privative view. Thus the fundamental criticism of the privatism of Pragmatism applies equally, though in the reverse sense, to the privatism of Hegelian Idealism. The comprehensively synthetic philosophy requires a perspective so far neglected, at least in the Occident.

It is now evident that we must differentiate thought into three forms or aspects. In its most familiar and common form, thought is concerned with a content given through experience. In this case, the relatedness of thought is to a perceptual datum with perception, in the broad sense which includes sensation, feeling and intuition, guiding the course of the thinking. This is the only kind of thinking which is given recognition by the Empiricists — including the Pragmatists and the Nominalists — as possessing genuine validity. It is clear that thought in this sense is of only instrumental value in relation to an experienced or perceptual content. But there is a second kind of thought wherein the concepts are taken in abstraction from meaningful reference. In this case, the process starts with concepts and ends with concepts without

implying a reference to anything else. In this case the concepts do not mean anything that may be perceived or experienced nor do they refer to a spiritual essence. There is thus no material, but only a formal content. This is the thought of symbolic logic and of formalistic mathematics. In this case, the truth and existence of a system lies only in the self-consistency of the system. Such a body of thought is neither materialistic nor spiritual, but lies in a realm between the transcendental and the mundane. It really corresponds to the neutral entities of the Neo-realists which are conceived as neither body nor mind. If we call the first kind of thought empiric or perceptual, we may call this pure thought. The third kind of Thought is strictly transcendental and so I differentiate it from the other kinds by spelling the word with a capital T. Thought, in this third sense, does not stand apart from the thinking subject, but is to be viewed as identical with the SELF. Thus there is a sense in which we may say the SELF is Its own Thought, and this Thought is the SELF, and yet we may employ the two notions for the purpose of emphasis — the word "SELF" referring to a center of consciousness in its purity, and the word "Thought" to its quality as Meaning. Thought, in this highest sense, may be conceived as pure Meaning stripped from all form, whether conceptual or perceptual. Meaning, in this sense, is to be conceived as unconditioned by time, space and experiencing. It is purely transcendental and pre-existent with respect to all history of process. Neither experience nor pure thought, by themselves, can lead to the transcendental Meaning of the higher Thought. It can be attained only through another function which I have called "introception".

Manifestly, for most individuals, introception is not differentiated as a distinct conscious function. But this by no means implies that it is wholly inactive. We may conceive of it as being either wholly inactive or as in some measure active without the individual being conscious of its operation. The latter case would parallel the unconscious activity of the other four functions which is already a known fact for analytic psychology. There is, in fact, nothing strange about the notion of an unconscious activity of a function, as this is implied in all cases where there is a content given to consciousness through a function without there being consciousness of the function itself. Actually, this would seem to be more the rule than the exception. So I am not positing anything strange or even unusual in affirming an unconscious activity of introception. But when the introceptive function operates in this way the tendency would be to identify it simply with intuition, which is merely a general name for all possibilities of psychical function which have not yet been revealed to consciousness as distinct functions. I claim merely to have isolated for conscious recognition a function which has at all times operated more or less widely among men. This function is to be regarded as truly inactive, both in the conscious and unconscious sense, only in the case of those men

who have an exclusively mundane or materialistic understanding. But when introception is not consciously isolated and produces contents for consciousness, the effect is a fusing of this content with the content of the other functions with the result that there is no clear understanding of the differentiated reference of the total complex content. The result is wide-spread confusion of interpretation.

An indistinct feeling for or conviction of a spiritual reality is proof of the activity of introception in its unconscious mode. When introception itself has been rendered conscious, the indistinctness disappears and is replaced by a positive assurance resting upon a ground which is also known. In the latter case an inchoate knowing is transformed into a clear knowing, fortified by knowing of the knowing and of the how of the knowing. But the inchoate knowing which maintains a religious orientation in the face of the sharpest kind of criticism based upon scientific enlightenment is the strongest kind of indirect evidence of the existence of the fifth function. Now, when the content through introception is fused with the content of one or more of the other functions, without knowledge of the activity of this function, there is a general, and quite natural tendency, to attribute the content to the known functions. We are here particularly interested in the case when unconscious introception is united with the content of thinking.

In the fusion of unconscious introception with conceptual thinking the individual tends, quite naturally, to give to the concept a transcendental reference. This is the real ground of the ontological argument for God and for the metaphysical thinking of the scholastic and rational type generally. The fundamental failure of this way of thinking does not lie in the insight, but in the attribution of the authority of the insight to the concept itself. Kant's analysis succeeded in differentiating the purely conceptual factor, and his criticism of the rational-scholastic kind of demonstration stands as valid in so far as he showed that from the pure concept the conclusions of Rationalism and Scholasticism do not follow. And yet Kant's criticism does not touch the real ground upon which the scholastic and rationalistic insight rested. Hegel felt this when he rebuked Kant for treating the conception of God in the same way as the conception of a hundred dollars in one's pocket which possesses everything that may be thought of a real hundred dollars, but which yet lacks something which the empiric hundred dollars possesses. The point I would make is, that the idea of Divinity or any other metaphysical actuality contains this actuality if the concept is fused with the introcept, but not otherwise. Thus the error of the metaphysically oriented thought before Kant lay in a failure of epistemological analysis but not of insight, or, at least, not necessarily of insight. That is, the Rationalists, or at any rate some of the Rationalists, may have been quite correct in their metaphysical

conclusions, however much they may have been in error in the methods they employed in deriving those conclusions.

Monistic Idealism, or rather the rationalistic wing of monistic Idealism, is virtually a restatement of Spinoza's metaphysics in the form which became necessary after the criticism of Kant. Hegel, who is the great continuer of the Spirit of Spinoza, does not in the essential sense alter the metaphysical outlook of Spinozism. He mainly changed the form of the statement so as to render it less vulnerable before the Kantian form of criticism. The insight is really the same; the method of establishing the insight is different. This effort of Hegel is enormously important, for Kant's criticism left us without ground for spiritual or metaphysical assurance. Kant himself felt this and was clearly far too religious a man to like the results, and, in large measure, tried to correct the effect of his criticism in his Critique of Practical Reason, but with results that fell far short of supplying an adequate ground for genuine metaphysical assurance. Hegel, I believe, succeeded better but has, in his turn, proved vulnerable before more modern criticism.

But modern criticism, like the earlier Kantian criticism, has left us with only perceptual experience and conceptual thought which either is related to experience or produces only an abstract construction without real content. This leaves us without means for determining any metaphysical actuality since the metaphysical is no immediate part of either the purely empirical or the purely conceptual. The result is that religious conviction has, for modern enlightened consciousness, either the value of superstitious fantasy, or else only a psychological value in the sense of Jung. Under such conditions, the best that could possibly be said of such a religious conviction is that it has a value for psychological therapeutics. Under such conditions religious conviction is subjected to a simply terrible depreciation since the content of such conviction is valued, at best, as of only instrumental significance, whereas the very soul of the conviction is that its content is of terminal significance. The would-be destroyers of Hegel are, in effect, the would-be destroyers of religious insight, regardless of whether these destroyers are Marxians, Naturalists, Pragmatists or Neo-Realists.

But all of the foregoing critiques constitute a delimitation of pure conception taken in abstraction from all content. They have no bearing upon the content which may be supplied to the concept through introception. The authority of the introcept has quite a different ground from the authority of the concept. So, granting that conception qua conception can have only an instrumental value, it does not therefore follow that it is instrumental to an exclusively perceptual or experiential content. Granted that conception in its purity by itself is servant, yet that service may be related to a transcendental as well as a mundane order. Further, when conception is united to the introcept

it becomes a vice-regal power in relation to the whole mundane field of perception and experience. There is, thus, such a thing as a royal thought, as well as a servant thought. The mundane philosophies know only the servant thought, and though they may have ever so correctly understood the nature of this kind of thought, all of this is quite beside the point when we are in the presence of thought invested with the robes of true royalty.

The truly Royal Thought stands above the formalism of words and concepts, though it may ensoul these. Let it be clearly understood that I am not here speaking in terms of a speculative abstraction but of something which, under the appropriate conditions, may be known directly. There is a state wherein one may be clearly aware of a dual thought process within the mind which may even be present concurrently. One, the deeper Thought, moves or develops without words, concepts or images, and reaches into the more objective mind only through an incipient and casual contact with conceptual fragments. It is a thought of an enormous clarity and sweep. Until one has had the impression corrected by subsequent experience, it seems as though this thought would be very easy to formulate. But actually the formulation is extremely difficult. It does not precisely fit any conceptual or word forms. A pure meaning grasped almost instantaneously is only by laborious effort partially conveyed in a form which can be written or spoken. Often very strange constellations of conceptual forms are required to suggest the primary meaning. Such constellations are of an order which make little or no sense in terms of the more familiar conceptual references. Thus, for example, ordinarily the notion of "flow" implies a movement from a point here to a point there, either in space or time. This is a fixed meaning which we habitually give to the notion of flowing. It is most certainly progressive, in some sense, rather than static. But how would one convey an immediate value or realization wherein the static and flowing quality were equally emphatic? I used the notion of a life-current constantly moving but, at the same time, so turning upon itself that there was no progress from a past to a future. I thought I turned the trick in giving a clear formulation to an immediate content, until someone gently suggested to me that it did not make sense! I caught his point of view right away. Yet that did not change the fact that I knew what I knew. Actually, this difficulty is not so strange, for if one manages to abstract his purely perceptual consciousness from the ordinary complex of concepts and percepts which form the manifold of daily conscious content, and then tries to formulate the raw perceptual material in terms of concepts, then he finds that the concept and word forms do not fit either. The pure perceptual quale is more like impressionistic, futuristic or surrealist art. Anyone who tries to capture that sort of thing in terms of concepts and words so that they will really make straight-forward and understandable statement will have a real labor on his hands.

The inner Thought is spontaneous in that it happens of itself in so far as the objective or personal thinker is concerned. It is not the product of a consciously willed effort by the personal ego. Further, it is not a content which stands out as clearly differentiated from the self. Rather, the self and content are blended in identity, a state which is very difficult to conceive from the objective point of view. But, as a result of this identity between the I and the content, there is no possibility of a content which is erroneous with respect to the self. Hence there is real noetic certainty here, without all the problems and uncertainties which grow out of the trial and error method of empiric cognition. There is no question of knowing correctly, until one seeks to achieve a formulation through the objective mind. But the latter process can be more or less correct or more or less in error, and, withall is never wholly correct. And right here lies the reason why the great idealistic philosophies are, at the same time, always vulnerable before criticism and, yet, in their inward meaning, are equally invulnerable. The psychological, epistemological and logical hackers may tear to pieces the formal garments of systems like those of Spinoza and Hegel all they please, and yet never reach at any point the inner authority on which those systems rest. For men like Spinoza and Hegel know what they know, despite the defects of their own formulations and all the attacks of lesser men. He who has been There is not to be moved by a mountain of denials of those who have not been There, though he may be convinced that he should alter his garments.

The inner Thought is, whether or not it has also been thought conceptually. Also, whether or not it is important to the inner Thought to have been thought conceptually, it certainly is of the highest importance to the empiric man that It should have been brought down within the range of his conceptual reach. By having been thought conceptually, the inner Thought ensouls the concept so that thereafter such concepts are powers in themselves. They are no longer merely sign-pointers to further experience in the pragmatic sense. Doubtless many concepts and words have merely a sign-pointer value, in this sense, and perhaps all concepts may have such a significance as a phase of their total meaning. In so far, the pragmatic theory of knowledge may well be correct enough, but it becomes positively vicious when it abrogates to itself exclusive validity. The ensouled concept is a life-line from Spirit to empiric man — the wanderer in the confusing forest of experience. But when such a concept is reduced to a soulless sign-pointer in a purely mundane manifold, it ceases to be a life-line to Spirit.

With introception, conception and perception we have three primary functional forms of consciousness, if we take perception, in its turn, as consisting of the complex psychical manifold produced from the psychological functions of sensation, feeling and intuition. From the three primary functional forms of consciousness we can derive four

secondary combinations which produce corresponding fields having distinctive character. These four are outlined as follows:

1. Introception combined with conception. This already has been partly discussed in its relation to rational Idealism. This is Spirit descending to man from above and thus appearing in the transcendental relation.

2. Introception combined with perception. This is the foundation of mystical states of consciousness of the alogical type. In this case the psychological functions of feeling and intuition play a far larger part than does thinking. A study of mystical literature leads to the conclusion that by far the larger portion of the mystical states are of this type. In this case, it is reasonably correct to speak of mystical experience, whereas the more noetic quality produced by the combination of introception and conception is not properly called experience, but requires some other words, such as "recognition". Here we may speak of Spirit in the immanent relation to human consciousness.

3. Conception combined with perception. This is the familiar relationship which forms the subject-matter of the vast bulk of current philosophical and psychological literature. It is entirely possible that the Pragmatist's epistemological interpretation of this particular field is, in large measure, correct. The field determined by this combination is exclusively secular and practical in the mundane or utilitarian sense. In this connection the humanistic theory of value and ethics may be valid enough, but the field of consciousness produced by this combination, when taken in abstraction from other possibilities, is strictly non-religious. Since practically all of current sociology is conceived in terms of this combination it is easy to see why most of our social thought has an exclusively secular orientation. It is conceivable that in this combination primacy could be given either to perception or conception. This gives us the following alternatives:

a. When perception is given primacy, conception appears as only instrumental, with the pragmatic theory of knowledge following as a natural consequence.

b. When conception is given primacy, the instrumental theory of ideas does not follow or, at least, does not necessarily follow. It appears to me that Neo-realism does imply the relative primacy of conception when it affirms the independence of primacy of mathematical and logical entities.

4. Introception combined with both conception and perception. This naturally represents the most comprehensive field of all but supplies the most difficult problems for philosophic integration. I do not know of any philosophy which deals with the problem in this complex form. It does not seem to lend itself to any single and simple theory of knowledge. It is more likely that all theories of knowledge have a relative validity within this field. But barely to accept this

view can result in little more than an eclectic syncretism which is, however, something far too loose to be philosophically satisfactory. The big problem would be the integration of the apparently incompatible theories into a systematic whole, and certainly this is no simple matter.

If the three primary functional forms of consciousness are each taken in isolation from the other two, distinctive fields of consciousness are also delimited. These appear somewhat as follows:

1. Perception taken in isolation. This corresponds to sub-human consciousness, such as that of the animal kingdom. This has its superior possibilities which do seem to be evidenced in some of the behavior of the higher animals. Some animals do indeed seem to have superiorities in certain directions which would shame a good many human beings. But, clearly, out of this field of consciousness no science or philosophy could ever be evolved. Yet, at least, something of art could develop.

2. Conception taken in isolation. This is clearly the field of pure mathematics and pure logic, in the modern rigorous sense. A mathematical philosophy is quite possible here, in complete detachment from consciousness in either the perceptual or introceptual sense. When mathematics is related to perception we have applied mathematics in the familiar sense. But when mathematics is related to introception it carries a religious force which is a kind of applied mathematics, but in quite a different sense. In the latter case, Truth is not an incidental notion employed by mathematics, but so largely becomes its soul that the word must be spelled with a capital T. It is not this kind of mathematics which is discussed by Bertrand Russell in The Principles of Mathematics.

3. Introception taken in isolation. This is pure Spiritual Consciousness in the strict meaning of the words. It is absolutely Other Worldly in that complete sense wherein the whole relative universe with its multitude of forms and creatures literally vanish, as a forgotten dream has vanished. It is the Nirvanic or Super-Nirvanic State of Consciousness. This State is the objective envisaged by men such as Buddha, Shankara and Christ. It is the religious objective in the grandest sense. It transcends philosophy just as it transcends all other relative formations, even the most abstract. But it is closer to the most abstract formations than it is to any concrete particularization.

Of the seven fields of consciousness, three are manifestly non-philosophical and non-scientific in their inward content. These three are pure perception, pure introception and the combination of introception and perception. The other four fields which incorporate conception do present the possibility of a philosophical problem and orientation. Our interest here falls within the range of these four fields, to the exclusion of the other three, save to recognize them as

states in their own right. One implication which follows is, that an absolutely comprehensive system of philosophy or science is impossible, since it could not truly represent or portray states wherein conceptual cognition does not enter as a component part. In other words, a conceptual monism would not be an universal monism, since it could not incorporate the forms of consciousness wherein there is a complete absence of the concept. Yet, this does not necessarily imply pluralism, since there may be an ultimate non-conceptual unity.

Of the four current philosophical schools, three are exclusively related to the field delimited by the combination of conception and perception. These are Naturalism, Neo-realism and Pragmatism. Idealism, alone, is oriented to the combination of introception and conception and to some extent, perhaps, to the combination of introception, conception and perception. The religious motif, therefore, is to be found dominant only in Idealism, whereas with the other three philosophies it enters, at most, as only an after-thought. With all of these schools of philosophy there is a difference of accentuation in the relative importance of the functions of consciousness. The relative emphasis is as follows:

1. Naturalism. Perception under the quale of sensation is given ascendancy over thinking, while both intuition and feeling are quite ignored as philosophically significant.

2. Neo-realism. Thinking is given ascendancy with sensation subordinate, though remaining a significant constituent. Feeling is not wholly disregarded since there is a neo-realistic theory of value. But on the whole intuition seems to be rather despised.

3. Pragmatism. Sensation, feeling and intuition are all recognized as philosophically significant, with conceptual thinking playing the subordinate or servant role. The degree of importance attached to the three perceptual functions varies with the different pragmatic thinkers, though all agree in subordinating conceptual thinking. Intuition is accentuated with Bergson and Spengler. Apparently, sensation carries the prior value with Dewey. Perhaps James gives a larger recognition to the determinate part of feeling, as compared to the other leading Pragmatists, but I would not say he gives it first place. He affirms the right of a will to believe and of "over-belief" which implies a high valuation of the right of feeling to play a determinant part. Possibly Schiller gives as much emphasis to the constitutive part of feeling as any. Quite frequently, too, Pragmatists affirm the doctrine that all thinking is wishful thinking, and this implies an attribution of a predominant role to feeling, at least in so far as conceptual thinking is concerned. It does not seem to be so well recognized that there is such a thing as wishful sensation and wishful intuition as well.

4. Idealism. Idealism divides into two branches known as Rational Idealism and Voluntaristic Idealism. My study of Rational

Idealism leads me to the conclusion that here conception is united with, but ascendent over, introception. Voluntaristic Idealism, of which Schopenhauer is the greatest representative, combines, in my judgment, introception, conception and perception, with perception ascendent over both conception and introception. The "Will" of Schopenhauer is really a reference to the perceptive quale, with accentuation of its conative character. (This accentuation of conation is likewise characteristic of the Pragmatists.) In my opinion, no modern occidental philosopher has actually given primacy to introception, nor did Plato among the Greeks. This accentuation is to be found in Shankara and Plotinus and, in Buddha. In our culture, the predominantly introceptualistic philosophy remains to be written.

The great philosophical achievement of Kant consisted of two parts: — one positive and the other negative. He supplied a basis whereby we could have confidence in the orderliness of experience, which is the necessary condition of any possibility of science. But on the negative side, he showed that pure reason or pure conception could never lead to a knowledge of metaphysical reality. Yet the yearning for metaphysical certainty is not only the greatest driving motivation of the philosopher, it equally underlies the religious feeling. Kant, himself, clearly felt the desire for this certainty no less than other men and so came to his negative conclusions simply as an act of intellectual honesty. But while he is forced to conclude that pure conception cannot prove a metaphysical existence, yet it is equally impossible for the reason to prove the non-existence of a metaphysical reality. The incompetency, in this case, is merely such as that of the pure reason operating by itself. The possibility of some other way of knowing, whereby metaphysical reality may be the certain realization of man is not excluded. So in the absence of this other way of knowing, man has a right to faith which the pure reason is incompetent to deny, so long as the faith is oriented to a moral or spiritual order. But faith, by itself, justifies only the postulating of a metaphysical reality. It is less than knowledge and so may be conceivably grounded on nothing better than a fantasy. Kant, like William James, gives us a right to believe, but no real ground of spiritual security.

We may say that the great purpose of the German Idealists who followed Kant was to secure a more adequate ground for the orientation to spiritual or metaphysical reality than Kant left. The idealistic development was certainly not necessary for establishing the ground for a practical science, for Kant left this ground abundantly secured. But the greatest yearning of the human soul can never be satisfied by a practical science, however far it may be developed. Practical science never answers the question of the ultimate meaning of the whole of experience. Now it is possible that philosophy might accept Kant's conclusion as to the office of conception as final and, discrediting faith as a valid sign-post of the transcendental, then proceed to the

general handling of those problems which fall outside the range of particular sciences. Both Neo-realism and Pragmatism are philosophies that have followed this course, while the metaphysical conclusions found in Naturalism are clearly of the type that are untenable in the light of the Kantian criticism. To Idealism, alone, fell the task of finding a positive answer to the metaphysical or religious yearning of man in terms more positive than that of a permitted faith, with a right to postulate that which man feels or intuits.

Did Idealism succeed in its task? In the light of modern criticism the answer seems to be negative. One can find places in William James' writings where he says that the Idealists may be right in their insight, but yet they have not established that insight. He grants the right of a will to believe, but nothing more positive than that. With Neo-realism the outlook becomes even more discouraging, for here the logical outcome is the radical pessimism without hope expressed by Bertrand Russell.¹ Today the philosophical standing of religion — by which I mean the orientation to a metaphysical certainty — is very shaky indeed. After all, faith is only a crutch or boat whereby man may hope to cross the stormy sea of uncertainty to the further shore of certain Knowledge. Within some reasonable time faith must lead to transcendent Knowledge or it must be judged as tried and found wanting. So every truly religious man must feel the deepest wish for the success of the proposed enterprise of the Idealist. For any man to feel happy in the finding that Idealism has failed is the clearest proof that he lacks any real religious orientation. Intellectual honesty may compel the man with genuine religious orientation to acknowledge the force of modern criticism, but he must feel saddened by its success. And in the face of this success he must either feel a challenge to carry further the enterprise of the Idealists, or else acquiesce in devastating defeat. For no vital religious nature will ever be satisfied with an ersatz substitute for certain metaphysical Knowledge in the form of psychological permission to believe, since psychology offers to the religious orientation no more than a toy for quieting a wayward child. A real man will insist upon the real thing or nothing. There either is a Kingly Knowledge which can be known by man, or life is no more than a barren waste filled with mirages wherein childish souls disport themselves, and mature souls face despair which they may meet heroically or not. Doubtless there is something noble in the heroism which can face this despair with firm, upright posture and a smile, but it is entirely futile. Universal suicide would be a more rational answer.

¹ See the quotation on page 346 of Present Philosophical Tendencies- Perry; Longman's Green and Co, N.Y. (1912).

The three mundane philosophies give us no valid reason for eschewing wholesale racial suicide as the one and only adequate solution of the problem of life. Sufficient reason for another course can be found only in carrying on the enterprise of the great Idealists in the hope of correcting their technical errors. Long ago I proposed to carry on that enterprise and, finally, attained success. I know that the Kingly Knowledge is and that it is possible for man to know it. And I also know the Road by which it may be attained so completely that faith is finally consumed in certainty. But the Road lies in a way of consciousness very hard to find for him who looks forth exclusively upon the world-about, whether of sense or ideas. Yet this Road is very close at hand, since it lies locked in the psyche of every man. Looked for in the right way it can be found. With all of our extensive psychological and epistemological analysis we of the West have missed the greatest secret of the psyche. Now, once this Kingly Knowledge is known then the problem of its relationship to conception and the empiric world is only one of detail. The problem may be technically difficult, but since its solution is not vital, we have plenty of time for its resolution.

In the next chapter I propose to outline a new philosophic way which, while it lies close to the spirit and motive of Idealism, yet departs from the method of the latter in certain important respects, and orients itself to an ultimate conceived in different terms. So far I have simply traced a trail through the systems and ways of thought now existing, removing, in principle, barriers, where they appeared, and emphasizing pointings to a similar goal where they were found. With their ramifications in directions neutral to the present purpose I am not here concerned with the developments of extant philosophies. I admit finding much of relative value in all, and in many relations I may assume the attitudes of these other philosophies, but I find all modern thought falling short with respect to the great problems which man must solve if life is to be more than the resolving of a meaningless jig-saw puzzle. It is not enough somehow to wriggle through the span of life through the judicious employment of innumerable games. Durable satisfaction can come only when man has, at last, crowned his effort with the realization of an all-inclusive and significant Meaning.

PART II

INTROCEPTIONALISM

Chapter VII

INTROCEPTIONALISM

In the broadest use of the term, "idealism" means any interpretation of being or of experience wherein consciousness, in some sense, plays the determinant part. But the manner in which consciousness is determinant varies quite widely with different thinkers. Thus the external universe may be conceived as composed merely of ideas, in the sense of percepts or receipts, as in the case of Berkeley, or it may be a system of Reason as conceived by Hegel, or, of a Will lying behind the reason, as with Schopenhauer. Further, the empiric activism of Pragmatism may be conceived essentially in terms of consciousness, as was true in the case of F. C. H. Schiller. As in the instance of Kant, the idealism may be of an epistemological character in that it defines the form of possible experience and knowledge, without saying anything about the nature of the thing-in-itself. Idealism in this most general sense stands as differentiated from Realism in its broadest connotation wherein both primary existence and the constitution of knowledge are conceived as independent of consciousness. However, Idealism, in the sense of the specific philosophical school known by that name, is more definitely defined. In the latter instance, either the Reason or the Will of a universal or absolute SELF constitutes the metaphysical nature of the universe. So the general affirmaton that consciousness is a primary determinant is not sufficient, by itself, to lead to the classification of any thinker as an Idealist in the restricted sense of the idealistic school. Idealism, in the grand sense, is otherworldly as well as being oriented to the view that consciousness is primary, while in the more general sense of the term, the idealist can also be an Empiricist.

In the philosophic view, of which I am here giving an introductory outline, consciousness is again conceived as primary and constitutive, but the point of departure from the preceding philosophic theories is so considerable that a new classification seems necessary. I ground my thesis upon a new function of consciousness, which I have called "introception", and which implies a function differing from both the empiric and the conceptualistic, as those notions are currently understood. It also implies a function more profound than the conative principle of Will as understood by Schopenhauer. So I am calling this view "Introceptionalism", in which the word "introception" is given a dual reference, first, to a function of consciousness, and, second, to the content or state of conscipusness rendered accessible by the function.

As has been already noted, the validity of the present thesis rests upon the actuality of the function of introception primarily. Without at least assuming that actuality, the thesis loses its ground as a

possibility. But if the function is granted to be real, it does not therefore follow that the theoretical statement is necessarily correct throughout. It may be correct as a matter of fundamental principle, and yet fall short of correct interpretation in detail. This is true for the reason that all philosophical interpretation necessarily involves a correlation of the primary given material with a conceptual organization, with the result that the immediate element may not always be correctly conceived, or the laws of thought may be violated in the development. The latter is a problem for human skill, wherein the thinker is limited by the relativity of his proficiency. It is important that the critic should bear this distinction in mind and not judge the reality of a function by either the weakness or the strength of the proficiency in conceptual interpretation. I am much more concerned that introception should attain recognition as a genuine psychical function than that this system of interpretative ideas should be accepted.

The function of introception has been defined as the power whereby the Light of consciousness turns upon itself towards its source. This statement, bare and simple as it is, implies a good deal. For at once we have the implication that human consciousness is not exclusively of such a nature that it is dependent for its existence upon the presence of two terms, a subject and an object, that it unites in a relation. As I understand the Neo-realistic theory of consciousness, consciousness is conceived as exclusively a relation between two terms and not a self-existence nor a function of a subject taken in abstraction from all objects. Upon the basis of such a theory, the turning of the Light of consciousness upon itself and moving toward its source would be a meaningless and fantastic conception. I am, therefore, forced to deny at least the exclusive truth of the neo-realistic theory, though it might conceivably have a relative validity as a description of part of the total nature of consciousness.

It is further implied that human consciousness is of such a nature that it may be conceived of as flowing or streaming, in part at least, from the subject toward the object. This, again, implies that consciousness is not merely a relation, for a flowing involves the notion of a something or a somewhat that is flowing. Even when we speak of the relationship of flowing we do not mean that the relation of flowing flows, but have merely abstracted a feature from the total situation. So, while consciousness conceived as exclusively a relation might bind subject to object, it could not flow from subject to object. The whole notion of consciousness turning upon itself and moving towards its source thus implies that consciousness has a substantive character. This I shall later affirm on immediate grounds and not simply as an implication from a definition. Now, in implying that consciousness is substantive we are giving an affirmative answer to the question which William James asked in the form, "Does consciousness exist?" Since James gave a negative answer

in the sense in which we give an affirmative one, it follows that here we depart radically from James' position.

If, now, consciousness does flow from the subject to the object then it follows that the function of the senses is not purely receptive. Although I am unable to exclude the possibility that there may be also a flow of consciousness from the object to the subject, in which case there would be a sense or a degree in which the function of the senses is receptive, yet the flow from the subject to the object is the primary fact for our purposes. This implies, then, that in some measure the individual subject makes the object which is realized or experienced by him. However, I do not mean to suggest by this that the object is, or necessarily is, a consciously willed creation of the individual subject. It would be, at least more usually, a projecting process from the subject which is unconscious to the individual ego. There is, indeed, much evidence from analytic psychology which gives substantial support to this idea. Especially do we find in primitive psychology that the unconscious projecting of subjective elements upon the object plays a highly important part in determining the nature of the world-about as the primitive experiences it. We have the advantage over the primitive that we are now able to isolate this function in some measure for analysis, so that the world-about for us is something very different from what is is for the primitive.

As said above, it is possible that there is also a flow of consciousness from the object to the subject, thereby placing the subject in the receptive position. Such a theory does exist in the Indian Tantra. But while important implications would follow from this theory, I shall disregard this feature for the present.

The idea that, at least in part, human consciousness is of the nature of a flow from the subject to the object, is, fortunately, available to a degree of verification that can be applied more or less generally. I have applied a test both to myself and others that has afforded some very interesting results. The subject is asked to attend to some fixed object, preferably some seen object, and then, without changing the fixation of the sense-impression, he is told to focus his attention upon the perceiving rather than upon the object of perception. This is an effort to perceive perceiving. I find that most subjects report results having one or more of the following features: The object tends to grow dim. Often something like a dark shadow, which yet has a character different from ordinary darkness, begins to grow over the object. The object may disappear completely. A field of light may replace the object. Along with this there is very frequently a marked change of the affective state of the subject. It is a more or less intense feeling of felicity, of the general type reported from mystical experience, but not so far developed.

Of course, I am well aware that it is possible to invent other theories to account for this kind of experience, for alternative theories

for any experience whatsoever are always possible and only limited by the imagination of the theorist. But this test at least implies that the definition of introception as a turning of the Light of consciousness upon itself so that it moves toward its source, is a functional concept and, therefore, one that is scientifically useful in some measure, at any rate.

The facts of introceptive realization and experience definitely imply that human consciousness is of such a nature that, under the appropriate conditions or by the appropriate effort, it can be severed from the object and exist with no more than a one-way dependence upon the subject. This has a profound bearing upon the nature of the ecstatic trance of the neo-Platonists and of the Samadhi trance of the East Indians. Under the assumption of the theory that consciousness is exclusively a relationship dependent upon the two terms, known as subject and object, then the ecstatic or Samadhic trance would be interpreted as a state of complete unconsciousness. Leuba in his Psychology of Religious Mysticism has maintained this view. But manifestly his view is prejudiced by his assumed theory of consciousness and is not based upon knowledge. Both the neo-Platonic and the Indian literature on the subject imply that the state of ecstatic trance has a distinctly superior noetic and affective value, which is quite incompatible with the notion that it is a state of unconsciousness. The only proof here is, of course, immediate experience or realization, and then the proof exists only for the individual subject. My own experience has always been in the form of a separation in the flow of consciousness so that a minor portion of the stream continued toward the object, the result being that objective consciousness was dimmed but not extinguished. The object was extremely depreciated in that it lost all or nearly all relevancy, but always remained as sensibly or conceptually available. But the consciousness in the state of the reverse flow toward the subject was like a Light highly intensified. All objective consciousness, relatively, is only like moonlight contrasted to bright sun-light in a dry desert atmosphere. I know that the introceptive process is anything but a dimming or disappearance of consciousness, but rather a radical intensification of it. I must agree with the frequently recurring figure found in mystical literature wherein the introceptive state of consciousness is likened to the rising of another Sun so bright as to dull forever thereafter the light of the physical sun. Most emphatically, this experience of intensification of consciousness is real enough, entirely apart from the interpretation of its meaningful value for knowledge or feeling. A comprehensively true psychological theory of consciousness will simply have to incorporate this fact.

So far I have not attempted to define consciousness. As a matter of fact, I cannot any more define it than I can the distinctive quale of any perceptive state. One can, for instance, define a one-wave color as consisting of a given wave length, of a given wave rate and of a given wave form, but he cannot define the distinctive quale of the color

seen by an individual subject. This definition gives that which a man born blind could understand, but the distinctive quale of the color is something which cannot possibly be conveyed to him save by immediate personal experience. Consciousness, being of this same nature, is, therefore, indefinable. We can point to consciousness by saying that it is that which becomes less and less as a man sinks into dreamless sleep and that which becomes more and more as he slowly returns to waking consciousness, and no man who has never had this experience or its equivalent could ever possibly know what consciousness is. In other words, a state of continuous consciousness which never had stood in contrast with unconsciousness in some sense, could never be known as consciousness. It is thus conceivable that there could be a primordial consciousness that never knew its own conscious quality. Nay, more, even the so-called unconscious of analytic psychology may very well be simply a consciousness of this sort.

Now, while the starting point of the introceptive process is human consciousness, it by no means follows that our search will comprehend only human consciousness. Human consciousness is a form or way of consciousness, which is differentiated from animal and other possible kinds of consciousness. If consciousness qua consciousness is a continuum rather than a discrete manifold, then the search may carry us to a place where we shall see man as simply a zone of possible consciousness-forms among others. Perhaps it is just the significance of Kant's work that he delimited in principle — however defective in detail — the characteristic features of a human qua human consciousness while beyond there lay other possibilities of consciousness he either did not consider or did not know. Indeed, strange things happen when one starts the introceptive process, things of such revolutionary implication that the Copernican change in astronomy or in Kant's thought is distinctly mild in contrast. The would-be investigator may well think twice before he starts upon the enterprise, if he fears the loss of his gods, be they scientific or traditional, for once the door is opened — there is no turning back.

When an investigator is presented with an affirmation or evidence that there exists a psychological function which is not generally isolated so that it is commonly known, it is quite natural for him to question whether any means exists such that this function may be rendered consciously active. This is an enormously important question, but I shall not here consider it more than briefly since the present concern is oriented mainly to the office of introception and the significance of the content rendered available by this function. The problem of how the function of introception may be aroused into conscious activity is one of much difficulty and of vast ramification. There is indeed quite extensive oriental literature upon the subject, much of which being so largely oriented to the peculiarities of a psychical development foreign to the occidental organization that it is practically

useless for the Western student. But even a casual study of this literature will convince one that the oriental sages have given the problem very serious and profound consideration. There can be no doubt but that oriental students of the subject were as thoroughly convinced of the value of the investigation as we are of our own science. There is unmistakable evidence that positive results were attained and that such results were valued by the Oriental above all other achievements. The typical Western superciliousness of attitude toward the Oriental will not survive a serious study of Eastern wisdom. Oriental intelligence simply developed in a different direction from our own and achieved results in that direction which are in no wise inferior to our own achievements. Where we have progressed in the physical control of matter, the Oriental has progressed most in the understanding and control of the psyche.

The problem of method, whereby the latent introceptive function may be aroused to conscious activity, is peculiarly difficult, since the solution proves to be one which can never be completely attained by method. Further, effective method has been found to be relative to individual temperament. The means which have actually proven effective with an individual of one temperament, may fail completely with another with a radically different psychological organization. Recent work with respect to the differences of psychological types casts an illuminating light upon this aspect of the problem. So, clearly, the subject requires a vast amount of study.

But even though we knew the last word which could be uttered with respect to method, we would then be placed in control of only one side of the problem. The other part of the arousing process is autonomous or spontaneous and is thus something which no man can command by his consciously willed efforts alone. To use a figure in the oriental spirit, the individual through his faithful employment of method merely prepares a cup which is filled when something other, and quite beyond his control, acts on its own initiative. Sometimes it so happens that an individual may have unconsciously prepared the cup and then received the benefit of a spontaneous filling as a matter of complete surprise. So the conscious employment of method is neither an absolute essential nor does it provide a positive assurance of success within a prescribed time. But the consensus of oriental experience abundantly confirms the view that the application of appropriate method vastly increases the probability of success, so that work in this direction is well justified.

Back in the days when I was a university student this problem came to my attention and so largely challenged my interest that it ultimately came to occupy a central place. I finally proved that the discovery and use of the appropriate method could eventuate in a successful outcome, though success was not attained until after more than twenty years. And, yet, today though I am aware of the office of method and the meaning of what it can achieve, I still find it impossible to define the crucial step. In the end everything hung upon a subtle

psychical adjustment that is truly inexpressible, since the very act of expression gives it a false appearance of an objective character which is not all true to the real meaning. I found that the key consisted in attaining a moment within which there is a thorough-going detachment from the object and from the activistic attitude of ordinary consciousness. The simplicity of this statement hides its real difficulty for there is implied an uprooting of very deep-seated inherited habits. There is a sense in which we may say that thoroughgoing breaking of the dependence upon the object and of the activistic attitude is like a conscious dying, and long established psychical habits tenaciously resist this. It may take a lot of work to attain the critical state.

Certain habits place the Western scholar at a peculiar disadvantage. We have even made a virtue of an attitude which operates as a fatal barrier so long as it persists. This is the attitude of detaching intellectual understanding or apprehension from oneself. We study, think about and gather endless information about all sorts of subjects and pride ourselves in standing aloof from the content of what we study. With respect to much material this is a justifiable and useful attitude, but is not the way one attains a psychical transformation. One can raise a study to the status of an effective transforming agent only by giving himself to it with the same completeness which is characteristic of the more intense religious natures. Most scientific and scholarly minds seem to be afraid of this as of the devil himself. However, this fear must be mastered or the scholar will remain a stranger to his most valuable inner resources. Knowledge about becomes an effective agent only when it is transformed into knowledge through acquaintance, with the willingness to accept any practical consequences which may follow. Beforehand, one does not know but that he may lose just that which he values most, and it takes a good deal of the faith-attitude to face this. Of course, what does happen is a radical change in the orientation of valuation, so that a vastly greater Value replaces the old system of values. Thus it is not really value that is lost, but an old orientation, which is quite a different matter.

A secularistic kind of scholarship, no matter how extensively developed, will leave the scholar outside the sacred precincts, so long as the attitude remains secularistic. It is just the subtle change implied in the difference between secular and sacred which makes all the difference in the world. In principle, anything whatsoever can acquire the sacred value, it is simply important that the attitude of sacredness shall exist in some direction and shall absorb the predominant portion of the interest. Sacredness implies self-giving, while secularity implies self-withholding. In the transformation process, everything else is incidental to the attaining of the self-giving attitude. Mostly men attain this attitude only after a desperately painful crisis, but if it can be accepted without waiting for the crisis the individual simply saves himself a great deal of discomfort.

With this brief and passing reference to the problem of method I shall return to the problems of more specific philosophical significance. Yet, it should not be forgotten that philosophy itself becomes a part of method, provided it is united with the religious attitude. Most of current philosophic thought tends to destroy the sacred or truly religious attitude. For instance, thought when viewed as the Pragmatist views it cannot be used as an instrument of introreptional transformation. Further, a philosophy which views religion as merely a tagged-on incident of human psychology, as is the case of all the three secular philosophies, does not in itself favor the religious attitude.

It is possible, in considerable measure, to consider the office of introreption and also the content rendered available by introreption for philosophical development, without having direct personal acquaintance with this function. Admittedly, this implies an entertaining of abstract ideas in a sense that is different from abstraction based upon perceptual experience, but the intellect has abundantly proven its capacity to do this in the development of pure mathematics. One can treat the philosophy as if it were true and then follow out the implications to see if they may not lead to results that can be directly valued.

The turning of the Light of consciousness towards its source does not mean that the subject or "I" is transformed into an object. For if the "I" were an object, then it must be an object for another subject, with the result that the supposedly objectified "I" actually is no more than an abstract construct for the real "I" which now is in the position of the new subject. It is utterly impossible for the "I" to be an object, unless consciousness attains a transcendental position in a more comprehensive SELF from which it is possible to look down upon something like a discrete self which is a reflection of the former. But at the first stage of introreption this transcendental perspective has not been attained. The process begins with the consciousness of an individual human self and so there is no adequate base from which that self can be viewed as an object, since it does its own viewing. This is a point of simply immense importance, since here we have one of the most fundamental differentiating features of introreption as contrasted with the more familiar functions. It is extraordinarily difficult to give this part of the process a conscious recognition and then to interpret it in conceptual language. Where the process functions unconsciously, and this seems to be by far the predominant rule, the individual simply finds himself in the new orientation with no clear appreciation of how he got there. (There are amusing instances recorded where men have wondered about their own sanity.) The individual, in this case, is at one moment in the familiar world-field, at the next, in something which seems to bear no commensurable or intelligible relation to it. The transformation just happened like an act of Providence, and then everything that was true of the old world-field has suddenly become sheer nonsense — the wisdom of

worldly men is transformed into mere folly. And if the transformed individual himself tries to speak of his new way of consciousness he sounds nonsensical to the worldly wise. The result is a more or less mutual contempt.

St. John of the Cross in one of his poems has effectively presented the inner effect of an unconscious transformation. Below I quote a portion of this poem:

I entered in — I knew not where —
 And, there remaining, knew no more.
 Transcending far all human lore.

I knew not where I enter'd in
 'Twas giv'n me there myself to see
 And wonderous things I learn'd within
 Yet knew I not where I could be.
 I tell not what was shown to me:
 Remaining there, I knew no more,
 Transcending far all human lore.

It is not surprising that a man who knows only the more objective functioning of the intellect should regard this sort of thing as a kind of intellectual suicide and a general breakdown of organized consciousness. But the fact that men like St. John of the Cross have been enormously influential, not before, but after and because of the mystical transformation, implies in itself that we are in the presence of a highly significant process. They wield an immensely potent power upon the consciousness and motivation of their entourage; one that is of a distinctly profounder sort than the ordinary lines of influence. Both psychology and philosophy fall short of performing their full responsibility if they simply avoid the serious consideration of the problems presented by this transformation process. Unquestionably something does happen, even though our judgment is based only upon observable effects. It is just because of the transformation that men like Buddha and Christ become the incarnations of the most far-reaching powers known to history. Neither the personal lives of these men nor their moral and metaphysical theories supply us with any adequate basis for interpreting their influence. Actually, that influence operates mainly through the collective psychologic unconscious, thus affecting men at the very roots of their consciousness and motivation. It seems to me rather foolish for the scientific mind to avoid dealing with the

¹ From The Complete Works of Saint John of The Cross, translated and edited by E. Allison Peers, new edition, revised, Westminster, London (1935), Vol. II, p. 425.

problem presented, simply because it threatens the comfortable enjoyment of accepted presuppositions.

The quotation of St. John of the Cross is not beyond the possibility of analysis if one is familiar with the process. There is no necessary break-down of rational understanding here, provided the conceptual presuppositions are appropriately altered. Let us attempt this analysis of the portion of the poem quoted.

"I entered in — I knew not where —"

Clearly here we have a transformation of base. Familiar methods employed in mathematics prove of vast help here. The base of reference in mathematics is the beginning point of an analytic process. The base is taken arbitrarily — in the logical sense — while the following analysis proceeds in strict logical form. But we may change our orientation of the problem from one base to another, with a more or less radical change in the form of the analysis of a given problem. If one viewed the two treatments without knowledge of the change of base, the effect might be in some cases distinctly confusing, enough even to make the conjunction of the two treatments to seem irrational. Now this situation is analagous to the effect of an unconscious introceptive transformation. One gets into a new field with its system of orientation and valuation, but has no idea of how he got there. He knows that he has entered into something, but has no idea as to how or where. He knows immediately a new kind of consciousness with its content, or that which replaces all content, but the connection with the old kind of consciousness is completely broken. That is, the process of transformation from one base of reference to another is unconsciousness, but the field defined by each is immediately realized.

"And, there remaining, knew no more,
Transcending far all human lore."

The "knowing no more" implies a destruction of consciousness, but the "transcending far all human lore" implies that consciousness still is. This seems like a contradiction, but it is only a paradox. A contradiction is the affirmation that A can be both A and not-A at the same time and in the same sense, while a paradox implies opposite affirmations when taken at different times or in different senses, one or the other, but not both. This distinction shows that we are not dealing with a break-down of conceptual power, but are dealing with a new and more comprehensive kind of thought. Actually, in the above quotation, the "knowing no more" refers to the field delimited by the base of reference of ordinary consciousness. The knowing was not in terms of the old pattern. But the new position is transcendent with respect to the old. It comprehends much more and, hence, reaches far beyond "all human

lore". That this superior state is not only not unconscious, but even has positive noetic value is implied in the next portion of the quotation.

"I knew not where I enter'd in.
'Twas giv'n there myself to see
And wonderous things I learn'd within
Yet knew I not where I could be."

St John simply did not know how he got There, or where he was. This was mystery. But he learned tremendously valuable things, including the seeing of himself. This seeing of himself is the first most significant and distinctive fact of the introceptive process. the word "seeing", used here, is deceptive since it suggests a perceptual process. It is more like the seeing when one says "he sees an idea". It is a form of cognition which is neither perceptual nor conceptual, but is another way of consciousness. In earlier efforts to try to describe the process I found myself in considerable difficulty, since the available language gave an impression different from that intended. The development of the word "introceive" proved to be of substantial help once it was defined to mean a process which is neither perceptual nor conceptual. Strictly one should say "myself to introceive" rather than "myself to see". This is genuine acquaintance with the self or "I" without transforming it into an object of consciousness. That is, it is totally different from a perceptive process, which is confined exclusively to contents other than the self or "I". Perception is essentially extraverted and non-spiritual, even though having relatively introverted and extraverted phases, while introception is a radically introverted process.

St. John affirms that he learned wonderous things within. This is an explicit affirmation that the state was not only one of consciousness, but also one possessing the noetic quale. (I am, of course, assuming that St. John was neither a fool nor a liar but, on the contrary, an exceptionally intelligent and conscientious man.) However, the content of the new kind of cognition was beyond the powers of St. John to give it conceptual formulation, hence: "I tell not what was shown to me." This, of course, might be interpreted as a will not to tell, but one who is familiar with the state or with the difficulties in expression mystics always manifest, will realize that the true reason for not telling was the inability to tell. Concepts simply do not conform to pure introceptive meaning. But, equally, concepts do not conform to pure perceptive meaning. They, rather, delimit fields of possibility in a certain way of consciousness which may grow. They are forms in the Kantian sense which do not give actuality as it is apart from conceiving. But they do give command, and that is an office of the highest importance. We are generally familiar with this office in relation to the world of perception, but we are almost wholly ignorant of a corresponding potential office with respect to introceptive cognition. Too few mystics

have also been masters of conceptual thought, and so gave up the effort to tell even that which could be told, if the appropriate skill were employed. The concept does not and cannot give the distinctive perceptive quale, and the same is true with respect to the introceptive quale. But it has an actual or potential office both ways.

The "transcending far all human lore" carries an implication of far-reaching importance. It carries the meaning that a human-being can attain a state of consciousness which is not a human kind of consciousness. Extensive reading of introceptive literature, whether of the gnostic or more narrowly mystical type, reveals that such transcendence is quite generally implied or explicitly affirmed. In other words, there is a linkage between human consciousness and other kinds of consciousness such that a human self can either become more than a human self, or can participate in a more than human kind of consciousness. Here we see the reason why mystics are never Humanists, in the modern philosophic meaning of the term, although they may be highly humane and compassionate. Humanism conceives human consciousness as exclusively human qua human and incapable of being or becoming anything else. The content of the mystical realization is incompatible with this view and even affirms that there is available to man a superior kind of consciousness which is much more desirable than the only human. To the mystic the merely human problem can never seem to be vitally important, save as it may serve as an instrumental office for the arousing of the superior consciousness. In so far as human suffering may serve as an instrument for awakening, the mystic would say that it is good and should not be removed until it has completed its office. This gives an impression of cool detachment from human pain, but the real meaning is a heroic willingness to permit a pain that serves the end that is conceived as the only really desirable end. Some physicians feel the same way about child-birth with considerable showing of good reason for justifying their position.

In the sense of introception, the consciousness related to the "I" is not a consciousness of the "I". It is immediate "knowledge through acquaintance" in the most rigorous sense. One might even speak of it as a sinking into the "I", but the difficulty with all these formulations is that they suggest a connotation in the ordinary sense of language usage, which is quite different to the real meaning. "I am I" conveys the idea with more rigor, at the price of meaningless tautology for ordinary thinking. We might say, "I am and I am thus without dependence upon any objective setting." I am known as I in an empty world, which is empty because I am not projected as a not-self, in the sense of Fichte, while in the introceptive state. It is I, together with consciousness that I am, immediately known and not as a mere inference. To be conscious as the pure "I" is to be conscious of Nothing, which yet is infinitely more valuable than any thing. I am the pure Light, which by

illuminating everything gives to everything existence for me, and save as things exist for me there is no meaning in predicating existence of them.

Knowledge toward the self, in the introceptive sense, may be likened to a zero-state that is intensely illumined. As it were, the world contracts to a zero-point and becomes pure Light. Comparatively, the old world is darkness. The immediate effect at this stage is of an absolute emptiness filled with absolute value. We are here dealing with a very profound conception where, again, it seems that only mathematics can help us.

The one conception in mathematics which required the greatest amount of genius for its birth, is the conception of zero. This was the great mathematical achievement of the East Indians. Here we have notion which stands for nothing, and yet becomes the most vital unifying conception of mathematics. Zero is the foil which gives meaning to all numbers. The step from 0 (zero) to the numeral 1 (one) is a leap across a whole universe. From one and zero we generate infinite manifolds. Upon zero we build our systems of reference, which is merely a way of saying that with nothing as a center we have the fulcrum for control of all elaborations in form. Zero is the bare point, having only position, but no existence, on which we rest all else in our analysis.

The pure "I" is the zero-point of organized consciousness. It is the center of all systems of reference of our human kind of consciousness. When an astronomer takes the milky way as a base of reference, he really projects himself as a thinker to the milky way. This illustrates the real independence of body which is characteristic of the self or "I". I am at the point where I center my thought. If I habitually center myself in the body then I am there in an exceedingly narrow kind of bondage. (Such identification with body is the essence of materialism.) But I actually break this bondage every time I think myself away from body, as to some other base of reference. We are actually doing this sort of thing all the time, but commonly without realizing the significance of what we are doing. Simply to realize what one is doing in all this is to take a long step in the liberating process. I literally am where I think or otherwise function.

If one sinks into his own pure self-consciousness and carefully strips away all habitual or inherited interpretations, he will find that there is no meaning attaching to the notion of body. He will find consciousness with various modifications, and nothing else. He can call certain modifications 'body' and by various other names, but these are merely creative or fantastic constructs. He knows only consciousness. And that consciousness is centered in its own subject, and nothing else. That subject is, always has been and always will be perfectly free, and unaffected by any objective conditioning. To the self, the space outside and inside a granite mountain is one and the same, and access is equally free in both cases. When a surveyor establishes a point inside a granite cliff that has been pierced by no tunnel, he has

actually placed himself at that point. He has not placed another physical body there; he has placed his "I" there, and from that point inside the cliff of granite he can think further.

We often talk of unconsciousness; we never experience it. Dropping all inferences and habitual interpretations, and watching as closely as possible, I never find one moment of unconsciousness. I find the beginning and ending of states of consciousness, but I know nothing of unconsciousness. I find appearance and disappearance of contents, but no unconsciousness. Some change of states I call going to sleep and waking up — merely a habit — but not one moment of unconsciousness have I found. Sometimes I remember from one state to another so that there is a cross-correlation of content, but there is no change of consciousness — only of content. If I predicate that which is true of content as being true of "I", then I artificially bind myself through a fantasy. I, in reality, am quite free from content, and never for one moment unconscious. Now, all this any man can find if he will but just study himself with clear discrimination.

We, who are born today into a world transformed and molded by untold millenia of thought, find it exceedingly difficult to imagine the state of consciousness wherein thought has not yet arisen. Only with great effort during the waking state do we silence our conceptual processes and abstract from all experience the modifications of content produced by thought, so that we may once more regain the ancient primitive consciousness. We acquire knowledge of this state more easily when we recall our dreams during sleep. While dreaming we are wholly in a state of pure perception or, at least, nearly so. Here we have pure experience wherein the dreamer lives in an environment projected by his own psyche and where rarely is there a thought which stands detached from the experiencing. The dreamer moves in a self-produced environment, but he knows not the nature of his own production, or even that he has produced it. So he becomes the victim of the projection which seems to be not himself. Ordinarily he is quite unable to will anything counter to the circumstances which surround him, so he flows along as a conditioned pawn in the stream of his experiences. On awakening the dreamer recalls his experiences with something of shame for exhibiting so little capacity of command, for proving to be such an infantile weakling in the midst of mostly trivial circumstance. The waking man has long learned to conquer and command his course of life in far more formidable circumstances than those presented in the dream. There is something appalling in the realization that the man awake should be so strong, and yet so terribly weak when dreaming.

In our memory of the dream we have recaptured something of the pure perceptual consciousness which was the common form of consciousness of all earthly creatures before conceptual thought was born. To perceive only is to dream. To think primitively is to produce thoughts that are perceived; thoughts that are not yet freed from their pre-natal

dependency. To live thus is to live the victim of that which happens and not as a ruler in the kingdom. This is the life in the mother's womb where the autonomous forces of life rule with unbroken sway. Through untold ages did the race of men dwell as unborn infants in the womb of pure perception, and only very slowly was the birth of a self-determining will achieved. Even today, only the few, relatively, have become freed from the ancient racial womb. Most men have scarcely learned more than to creep or to walk a few steps on unsteady legs, ever ready at the first portent of crisis to return to the encompassing protection of the Mother. And this is why when surgings rise from the perceptual depths of life the mass of men are embraced in psychical currents over which they have no command. Whole crowds, even nations and races and humanities, are swept away by currents of feeling over which their own half-born ideas have no power. Thus, and thus only, arises the folly of warring nations and classes. Only in the more peaceful hours does the tender new-born life of thought possess a fragile and uncertain direction of the individual lives. So is it with the overwhelming mass of men. But there are a few who have grown sufficiently strong in the power of self-directed thought that they can face the surging storms from the perceptual depths of life and maintain in the midst of the hour of trial a free judgement and a free will. And this power which some have attained, all may some day yet attain, for no single man can achieve anything without proving a general possibility for all men.

The child becomes the man only by leaving the home of his birth and early protection and guidance, to go forth into a strange world, there to achieve for himself a place, or to fail in the effort. The youth, standing midway between the child and the man, is called forth by the call to adventure from the unknown and, yet, is called back by his home-sick heart. As the adventure becomes the austere trial of the solitary life which must rest upon its own unaided forces, the cry of the home-sick heart ever becomes stronger, and racial man, far more often than otherwise, heeds the cry of the heart and returns to his former home, where for him only the Mother is known and not the Father. In the life of a rising consciousness the home-sick yearning is for the irresponsibility and protection of the pure perceptual state. The austerity of the conceptual craving has proven too severe; the responsibility of conceptual thought too great. For when man conceives he builds his world; he becomes the architect of his own destiny. No longer does he rest secure in an inheritance provided by his source. And so it is that often, even men who have built much from their strength, come to a time when they direct the lines of their structure so as to provide a way of return to Mother perception. These are men who even philosophize their way back, thereby forgetting their love of Sophia. Great, indeed, must be the call of the Mother that her sons of such maturity yet should feel so strongly the desire of return to the womb! For conception, viewed as only instrumental to perception, is but a philosophic apology for the yearning

for the womb. Thus the great labor of conception is frustrated, since its first great purpose is to build a bridge to the realization of the unknown Father.

Man has become mature only when he has ceased to dream, whether asleep or awake. He has become adult when, instead of dreaming, he conceives and builds. To dream is the easy way; the way that grows of itself. To conceive and build is the hard way of mature consciousness. It is true that conceptual thought is instrumental, but it is not true that its total meaning lies in finding a way of return to mother-perception. It is also instrumental to the attainment of the Father-consciousness, realized through introception. And, finally, it is instrumental to a new-world building wherein are compounded the consciously realized forces of both the Father and the Mother. Here, through conception, man produces his own future estate, a domain which heretofore had abode in privation of form as a bare possibility, awaiting the office of conception that it might become existential. I do not oppose the instrumentalism of the Pragmatists as being in principle unsound, but as being far too narrowly conceived. The instrument of return to the Mother-perception is but one possibility and, when this is given exclusive recognition, man fails to assume his larger responsibilities. There is more than one kind of Truth and Meaning.

When the Youth has gone forth from his ancient perceptual home he carries with him an inheritance which, if used with reasonable discretion, will prove sufficient for him to build the bridge to the Father where he will uncover illimitable resources. But if he fails to make the crossing, then exhaustion will force him to return to the womb, there to gather strength for a new trial for manhood. Thus it is that we see human culture rising out of the matrix of life and, then, largely failing of its intended destiny, it falls back into the matrix, to rise once more in a new culture, and thus continuing time after time. This is the Vision that Spengler has seen so clearly. But he saw only the periodic risings and the Material Soil. He found nothing eternal but the Mother. This limits his Vision and renders his philosophy only a part truth. He failed to see that life below supplied the material, wherewith by appropriate usage, Life Eternal might be attained. He saw the rising and the failure and said this was all. He missed the occasional successes which stand as earnestings of final universal achievement. Profane history is mostly a record of failure and thus does not teach the more hopeful lesson. For this reason history can become a dangerous study, if one fails to extract the small amount of hidden gold in the otherwise worthless ore. If one can find the hidden gold in history, then, indeed, its study may prove to be highly profitable. Otherwise, it is better not to have consciousness too heavily laden with the vast record of failure. The real meaning of history is the striving of life for LIFE.

How is conception related to perception and to introception? This is a problem which ever grows in mystery the more one studies it. In

the more confused states of consciousness where concepts and percepts are so inter-blended that no clear distinction between them has arisen, the vast distinction between the two is by no means clearly apperceived. Only such a confusion could lead to the idea that concepts are simply copies of percepts. Once conception is isolated and realized in its own nature it seems like a world apart having no commensurable relation with perception. There is, indeed, something transcendental about conception, even though it is not wholly unrelated to the perceptual order as is made evident by the command it wields over the latter. The conceptual meaning can be defined, while the perceptual cannot, since its peculiar nature ever lies in that which the philosopher calls "quale". And, likewise, the quale of the pure introceptual realization is equally foreign in innate character from the conceptual order. Yet, despite the fact that there is something incommensurable between these three orders, it is true that somehow conception bridges the gulf between perception and introception. The gulf between perception and introception is far too vast for a self-conscious crossing to be effected without aid. Somehow conception partakes more of the nature of both perception and introception, than do either of the latter two of each other. In some sense, conception is the child of both perception and of introception, yet possessing something differing from both in its own right. Because of the dual heritage, it can serve as the bridge across the gulf between the Father and the Mother, though through its own peculiar quale it differs from both.

Immanuel Kant's critical analysis of knowledge has helped to clear analysis, /p up much of the problem of the relation of conception to perception. Frequently it has happened that men thinking in their towers of pure thought, without any concern of possible bearings upon perceptual experience, have defined the forms within which future experiences developed. So impressive has this fact become in these latter days of astronomic and intra-atomic rangings that Sir James Jeans remarked in his Mysterious Universe that the universe seems like the thought of a Divine Being who thought like a pure mathematician. This does, indeed, impress one as a strange and mysterious fact when first he contemplates its significance. Yet Kant's thought has prepared the way for our understanding of it in principle. For the basic structure of man's thought is an a priori determinant of the world which he thinks. It is not a question simply of thought conforming to a pre-existent order in a perceptual manifold or flux, but the reverse. The perceptual order manifests to the thinker only within the forms which thought allows. Other forms would reveal other worlds and have done so, within minor limits, in the cases of other cultures. So the form of our conception is the form of our possible thinkable experience, whatever the experience of other types of consciousness may be. Thus we can predict, when we think in conformity with the laws of our thought, not because we have guessed correctly, but because we have predetermined the possible. So, in a

sense we have created the world we later experienced, though there is something that we as merely men have not placed there. We cannot pre-determine the distinctive quale of experience, nor can we make over the underlying structure of our thought as we please. Thus there is a sense in which we can truly say that any self-consistent system of thought possesses existence and is real. Who can say that any such system will never be filled with a perceptive content? Thought destroys something and yet creates something to take the place of that which was destroyed. By thought some of us have been led far away from the primitive maternal soil of perception and, in that, we have known both impoverishment and enrichment.

But if man cannot live by bread alone, yet neither can he live by concepts alone, nor by these two however richly combined. Not all yearnings are fulfilled within this compound zone and, as passing time brings maturity, the unsatisfied yearnings grow in number and with ever larger intensity. More is needed to give the endless game of life durable Significance. And the longer the yearning lasts unsatisfied, the more empty becomes the game and the more insistent the demand for Significance. This yearning is an earnest that the total possible consciousness for man is more than that which he has generally realized. He is more than a sub-human perceiving creature that learned to conceive.

That which all but the few have neglected is the Father of consciousness — introception. Here is that which originally impregnated the Mother, and then was forgotten in the inner depths of consciousness, and was even denied by many. It is the return to the Father which completes the first cycle of the Pilgrim in the journey to full Enlightenment. Until mankind essays this final step there can be no true Peace, but only the return to the pre-natal stage of perception, when there is weariness from the labors of conceptual creation. This latter return is a kind of failure, though it may be unavoidable when weariness and weakness has become too great. But he who, before his powers have become too greatly exhausted, forces the Gate of introception, completes the first cycle of the Great Work, and may rest, if need be.

To arouse self-consciousness is the great office of the conceptual function. Within the dream-like state of pure perception there can be no awakening of self-consciousness. The child born in the womb is sustained by the psychical forces which it does not control. It is, but does not know that it is, and it is conscious but does not know its own consciousness. The labor-pains of conceiving first arouses the power of consciousness to be aware of itself. And when this power of consciousness to know itself has grown enough the introceptive door may be opened and, leaving even thought behind, consciousness may still retain the power not only to be, but to be aware of itself as well. Thus the crossing is consummated over the bridge of conception. Beyond lie further possibilities; among them, the union of conception with introception.

Conception is the son of the Mother, but the daughter of the Father. Thought gives eyes to blind perception and so leads it. But thought is led by introception and gives form to it. With respect to the transcendent realm, thought gives form to unlimited formless possibility. With respect to perceptual filling, thought determines the range of possibilities. It clothes Spirit in form and illumines the matter of perception. These are the dual offices of conception in its relation to introception and perception.

When thought moves towards its own roots then it comes near to the key which will open the door to the new function. Kant came close to this key, but either neglected it or did not use it aright. Those who received his mantle most directly went far on the new road. Within the writings of the post-Kantian Idealists there lies indubitable evidence of Vision, in the sense of Gnosis, but it is not at all clear that these men of vision ever clearly recognized that the authority of their insight actually rested upon a new function. Perhaps Schopenhauer glimpsed something of the truth when he grounded his world-view upon the conative principle of Will, but I regard this view as simply the accentuation of the activistic element in consciousness which always stands as the other of the contemplative. There is nothing inherently more profound in activism than in contemplation. The emphasis of one aspect or the other is more a reflection of individual temperament than of absolute validity of insight. Actually, Schopenhauer's Voluntarism is a metaphysical interpretation of insight, and not the instrument of insight itself. The function of insight gives a transcendental content which, when reduced to an interpretive system, becomes subject to the relativity of all subject-object consciousness. Therefore, there can be no such thing as an absolutely infallible interpretation. Thus we must distinguish between insight and its formulation. The voluntaristic doctrine is simply a formulation which gives accentuated valuation to the conative element in consciousness and depreciates the rational features. In the last analysis, Voluntarism is just as relative as Rationalism, and is no more profound.

I believe, however, that Schopenhauer did, in a measure, isolate the function of introception when he spoke of the intuition of genius and of the "temper akin to genius". This is clearly the function of insight if one considers the notion in the sense that Schopenhauer employed it. It is not the ordinary kind of intuition, but intuition moving toward the transcendental. Intuition is a general notion applying to all forms of immediacy reaching from the most primitive instinct up to the highest insight. Clearly this is a collective rather than a definite notion which will become more and more differentiated the more our consciousness of the function grows. The "intuition of genius" is not any kind of intuition, but a special kind related to the truly metaphysical side of being. It has a character which definitely differentiates it from other kinds of intuition and thus deserves a

special designation of its own. In Buddhistic psychology it is called "Dhyana". I have called it "introception".

Before leaving this reference to Schopenhauer it seems well to call attention to a weakness in his system which I am able to avoid. Schopenhauer gives to Will a fundamental and constitutive metaphysical character. It is the true nature of the underlying Reality. Spengler has very correctly shown that this metaphysical conception by no means implies Schopenhauer's ethics. In fact, Spengler has really carried out the metaphysics of Schopenhauer with fundamental consistency and derived an ethic, which, I believe, is a far truer derivative from that metaphysic than Schopenhauer's own ethic. For my part, I would maintain, in opposition to Spengler, that the really profound insight of Schopenhauer is to be found in the ethics rather than in the metaphysics, and the ethics actually controverts the metaphysics. For Schopenhauer affirmed in his ethics that the feasible way to salvation lay in the thorough-going denial of the Will, through the denial of the will-to-live. The ultimate salvation is a state wherein the Will is nullified. But if the Will can be nullified then it is not the ultimate ontological principle. There must be something still more ultimate. If we turn to the very end of Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Idea we find a very significant sentence and footnote. Here he says: "... we freely acknowledge that what remains after the entire abolition of will is for those who are still full of will certainly nothing; but, conversely, to those in whom the will has turned and has denied itself, this our world, which is so real, with all its suns and milky-ways — is nothing".¹ So the world that rests upon the will is nothing while the state which results when the will has turned upon and denied itself is nothing for those who are still full of will. This is not the same thing as saying that it is nothing, per se. Its nature is simply a somewhat beyond all conception, but the Root Source of every possibility. Clearly, Schopenhauer reaches a somewhat which is more fundamental than the Will. Here Schopenhauer and I converge to agreement, however far we may differ as to the relative status of the Will.

It is interesting and significant that in the second clause of the above quotation Schopenhauer used the expression: "those in whom the will has turned and has denied itself". This is a logical parallel of the "turning of the Light of consciousness toward its source" and of the recurring phrase in the Buddhist Sutras, i.e., "the turning about at the deepest seat of consciousness". It is this turning about which forms the very essence of Dhyana and of the function which I have called introception. Clearly, I am not discussing a merely private experience but something which was recognized as crucial for both religion and

¹ Schopenhauer, Arthur, The World As Will And Idea, translated by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London (1882) (11th impression - 1964) p. 532.

philosophy as much as 2,500 years ago and was, at least in some measure, appreciated by one of our leading Western philosophers. The "turning about" does involve conative factors and so it may be viewed as a turning about of the will so that it denies itself in its habitual movement toward the object. This aspect of the function of introception is certainly important and I shall discuss it later, but since I view the conative element as instrumental to noetic content I have naturally placed the emphasis upon the latter. I conceive the "turning about" of the will as more significant in relation to the problem of method than it is to the question of the ultimate constitution of Reality. In fact, Schopenhauer, despite his metaphysical theory, has implied this when he speaks of the will as denying itself.

At the very close of his book, Schopenhauer makes a very significant statement in the form of a foot-note added to the sentence quoted above. This note is as follows: "This is also the Prajna-Paramita of the Buddhists, the 'beyond all knowledge', i.e., the point at which subject and object are no more."¹ In other words, that which seems like nothing to "those who are still full of will", is precisely the same as the Prajna-Paramita. This leads us to the question of just what is meant by the Prajna-Paramita. As a matter of fact, the Prajna-Paramita is the central core of the Buddhist philosophy and the sacred objective of the religious practice. Everything else has only a relative or derived reality, but this is absolutely real. Through the realization of Prajna in the highest sense of the Prajna-Paramita one attains Nirvana and states of consciousness which are still more profound. I shall later discuss this subject at some length, but here I shall consider briefly whether this is merely another name for absolute nothingness.

Something of the meaning of both Prajna and Paramita can be derived from a study of exoteric Sanskrit sources. Let us take the dictionary definitions.

Prajna has the following meanings: (as an adjective) intelligent; knowing, acquainted with. (as a noun of feminine gender) information; discrimination, judgment, intelligence, understanding; wisdom, knowledge; purpose, resolve; the Universal Mind; the capacity for perception; Consciousness.

Paramita has the meaning: (as a noun of feminine gender) reaching the further shore, complete attainment.

Prajna-Paramita is given the value: (as a feminine noun) highest degree of knowledge or understanding.

We would reach even better the Buddhist meaning of this compound term if we give Prajna-Paramita the value of: the wisdom, knowledge or understanding attained by reaching the further shore. It is

¹ Ibid.

radically different from empiric or worldly wisdom or knowledge. In fact, neither form of wisdom implies the other since each is attained in different ways, yet one and the same individual may attain both by the appropriate effort in the two directions. The Indians differentiate between absolute Truth or Knowledge, known as, Paramartha satya, and relative truth or knowledge, known as, Samvrittisatya. This corresponds to the difference between Transcendental Wisdom and empiric wisdom.

It is clear that when Schopenhauer uses the phrase "beyond all knowledge" in his definition of Prajna-Paramita it is to be understood in the sense of being beyond Samvrittisatya or empiric knowledge or wisdom. It is not beyond Knowledge in the sense of Transcendental Wisdom (Paramartha satya) or of wisdom, knowledge and understanding attained by reaching the further shore.

Obviously the Buddhists do not mean by Prajna-Paramita an absolute nothingness, although they often do use in this connection the term Shunyata, which means literally Voidness. But the Buddhist Canon is clear on the point that the Voidness may be attained and abided in as a state for a great period as measured by objective time, and then may be left. Further, the realization of the Voidness may be the beginning point of a higher kind of evolution of such a nature that it simply cannot be conceived by ordinary relative consciousness. Sometimes it is spoken of as a super-cosmic evolution. All of this implies something totally different from an absolute annihilation.

However much the Western student may seem to be justified in questioning whether the Buddhist sages know what they are talking about, it is nonetheless perfectly clear that they do not mean by Nirvana and Shunyata a state of annihilation of all consciousness. On the contrary, these terms refer to states which are or may be states of consciousness and definitely possessing the noetic quale. This would imply that one would arrive at a better understanding of the Buddhist meaning by taking the metaphysics of Hegel in combination with the ethics of Schopenhauer, rather than by taking Schopenhauer's metaphysics and ethics together. However, we have here only an approach to the Buddhist meaning as the Hegelian Idea is something less than Shunyata. So far, no Western philosopher has quite made the crossing to the "Further Shore".

In my employment of the term "consciousness" in the phrase "the Light of consciousness turning towards its own source" I am implying something more fundamental than either the noetic or the conative. Consciousness, in its total meaning, includes these two aspects as well as feeling tone and more or less undetermined other qualities. Consciousness is the common denominator of all. "It is, therefore, the best neutral term."

Unquestionably one must employ the will in the appropriate way before the "turning about" can be effected. The mystical participation in the object holds mankind in an hypnotic spell which is harder to break than bars of iron. To break this spell a strongly willed effort is

required. Actually no objective achievement requires an equal degree of intensity and persistence of the will. Will, both conscious and autonomous, rules the empiric world and simply employs ideas or concepts as instruments. The result is that in ordinary experience, the will never has to face as great a battle as when it turns upon itself for the purpose of effecting a neutralization of its long established habit of outward flowing. Ideation can achieve a theoretical "turning about" much more easily and, if the will has been already trained to accept subservience to ideation, then the latter can lead the way in the "turning about" and the battle of the will is substantially reduced. But in this case part of the battle was already won when ideation achieved the subserviency of the will.

Without some degree of theoretical understanding of the whole process, the "turning about" implies an almost tragic climax, for from the standabout of conative and feeling consciousness the turning away from the object seems like self-annihilation. The mystical participation in the object involves both the will and the feelings far more profoundly than it does cognition. The intellect has already had so large a training in abstraction that it has become familiar with objects of high tenuity. This affords an enormous advantage, since between the object of highest tenuity and true objectlessness the gulf is relatively small. The labor whereby a man attains the point of working with objects of highest tenuity actually implies much of the austerity requisite for the achievement of true objectlessness.¹ The very "thinness" of concepts, that aroused the

¹One of my teachers in mathematics once told me of the psychological preparatory steps requisite for the production of creative work in the field of the Theory of Groups, a particularly difficult branch of mathematics. This preparatory work required about three months in which one studied his subject, worked on it, thought about it and dreamed of it. Meanwhile he religiously severed himself from any diversion, particularly of a type that was naturally attractive to him and which could absorb his interest without great effort. Only after a protracted period of this kind of discipline was the intellect enabled to move creatively in the tenuous field of that kind of mathematical thought. There was one case of a German professor who specialized in the same field, but who also loved the opera. He found that if he were going to continue his mathematical work he had to renounce the opera. The interest in the opera simply drew off too much of the libido, in a way that was an essentially easy and spontaneous activity, with the result that there was a fatal weakening of the creative will in the more austere field.

Now this illustrates the real meaning of the austerity requisite for the awakening of the introceptive function. The libido must be concentrated in the new direction until the function is awakened and established. All that the above mathematicians needed to add to their effort to effect the arousing of introception was the spiritual polarization of consciousness. As it was, they stopped somewhat this side of the Gnostic goal. But otherwise they employed essential features of the discipline necessary to break the mystical participation in the object.

protest of William James, actually becomes a superior merit when the concept is employed as an instrument for arousing introception.

Again, I am implying that the office of conceptual thought in relation to the function of introception is of instrumental character. But this is instrumentalism interpreted in a very different sense from that of the instrumentalism of the Pragmatist wherein conception is viewed as serving solely the end of more experience in the perceptual field. Actually, here, both knowledge and the conceptual function are to be viewed as relatively terminal with respect to experience. The kind of conception which has transcendental roots is not derived from experience. With respect to this kind of conception experience enters into the picture solely as a catalytic agent which drops away more or less completely as the conceptual process takes hold on a totally different kind of base. One comes to value experience for the knowledge it arouses and the conceptual process which it helps to start, rather than the other way around. The Pragmatist values knowledge and knowing because of the further experience to which it leads. Thus a radical difference of orientation is implied. In the end the conceptual process leads beyond itself, but, in the case of introception, the end is a spiritual realization, and not merely more experience. After the attainment and anchorage in the spiritual realization, the conceptual order may serve a new office, with bearings upon the field of experience. But in this case the relationship is hierarchical with conception serving as the law-giver with respect to experience and the perceptual order generally. But even in this case, conceptual knowledge is only a surrogate for the introceptive content for such individual consciousnesses as do not know the latter directly.

The "thinness" of concepts has a two-fold connotation. In the one sense, which William James employed in his Pluralistic Universe and elsewhere, the concept is "thin" because it lacks substance. It is like the blue-print and specifications of a bridge, building or machine, since in this case it is a practical instrument for the effecting of consequences in the realm of perceptual existence. Everything that can be conceived of the bridge, building, etc., can be conceived of the blue-print and specifications, but the corresponding perceptual existences have something which the latter does not possess. They lend themselves to empiric use. It is this latter functionality which constitutes the "thickness" in James' sense. But "thinness" takes on quite another meaning when it is understood in the sense of the Voidness (Shunyata) of the Buddhists. Shunyata is voidness only in its seeming as it appears to relative consciousness, particularly in the sense of perceptual consciousness. In its own nature it is the one and only self-existent Substance. The spiritual concept or, in other words, the concept when united with introceptual filling, can be called "thin" only in the Buddhist sense. Realized in its own nature it possesses a higher substantiality than perceptual experience. Thus it is

entirely possible to realize greater fullness, greater substantiality, in the case of some concepts than that given by experience. There is, consequently, a sense in which the most abstract knowledge — just precisely that which James would call most "thin" — is actually the most concrete of all. Unless one appreciates this fact he will miss the real force of the transcendentalistic thought.

If by the meaning of a concept we understand a perceptual experience, whether as an object for sensation, a program of action, an adjustment of life, etc., then in this case we would not say that the concept enrobes its meaning. It rather points towards its meaning. In much discussion this is the only kind of meaning recognized, but it is not the only sense in which significance can be understood. However, when concepts carry meaning only in this sense they are only sign-pointers and thus are instrumental relators exclusively. This is meaning taken exclusively in the objective or extraverted sense. But there is another form of significance which is related to the subject, and here the relationship of the concept to its meaning acquires quite a different form. It is not a meaning objectively experienced to which the concept or idea leads. The significance lies within the concept so that we would properly speak of the concept as enrobing the meaning, rather than pointing to it in the sense of the figure of the sign-post. One finds this second meaning, not by the appropriate kind of action, but by the correct kind of meditation, that is, by a process of introception. The difference between these two procedures is simply of enormous importance. For one thing, one must understand that introceptive meditation is not merely a process of reflection about an object, whereby one deduces or infers consequences. It is a movement of consciousness, such that, a successful outcome implies a transcendence of both thinking and perception so that consciousness enters something like another dimension. In fact, the inward penetration into the significance of a concept is the epistemological or psychological parallel of the introceptive movement toward the self wherein the self is not transformed into a new object, but remains unaltered in its subjective character. This is not a conceptual relation considered in either pragmatic or realistic epistemology.

A given concept may have both the perceptive and the introceptive kind of relations but, in general, it seems clearly evident that some concepts possess more the one kind of meaning, while others are more valuable in the opposite sense. We can say with a considerable degree of generality that the more concrete the character of a concept, the more it may be taken as meaning a particularized perceptual experience, while the more abstract it is the more the reference is to an introceptive content. In other words, increase in abstraction is a movement towards a spiritual orientation. As an illustration we may take two notions, such as, "a beautiful scene" and "beauty", the former being the more concrete, the latter the more abstract. Now the

notion of a beautiful scene implies a judgment related to a concrete perceptual object, while "beauty" is an abstraction of a bare quality. From the standpoint of a highly extraverted, concrete consciousness there is an actual referent which corresponds to the beautiful scene, but no such real referent for the notion of beauty. The latter notion may help to further the process of thought, but, taken by itself, has no real meaning, but only something like a flavor derived from concrete experience. At any rate, from this viewpoint beauty is not a self-existence apart from beautiful objects. But no one who has had any considerable experience with introverted penetration will agree with the above judgment. There is such a thing as a direct realization of beauty quite apart from beautiful objects. In fact, acquaintance with this realization leads to the discovery that there is actually no such thing as objective beauty. The beauty seen is superimposed upon the object by the observer, though generally this process is unconscious. Beauty cannot only be conceived in abstraction from objective content, it can also be realized directly apart from all objects. This is part of what is accomplished by the introceptive function.

When a concept enrobes an inner Significance it possesses "thickness" or depth. In other relations, the same formal concept may point, directly or indirectly, to a perceptual experience. In this case, it has the value of "thinness". Thus the "thinness" of a concept, when viewed from the extraverted perspective, may be transformed into "thickness" when the same concept is taken in an introceptive relation. Accordingly the "thinness" and the "thickness" are relative to perspective rather than being absolute or formal properties.

As the process of abstraction is carried further and further toward the limit of tenuity wherein conceptual thought can function, the growing "thinness", in the perceptual sense, corresponds to a growing "thickness", in the introceptive sense. There finally is reached a point where thought continues without the use of concepts or, at least, without the use of concepts which can be represented in words. In mathematics this process has, long since, reached the stage where words, in the ordinary sense, cannot express the thought, and only symbols can serve as the conceptual instruments. But there ultimately comes the point where there are no longer any symbols, even, that are adequate. Thought then deals with a disembodied Meaning. At this point the "thinness", in the extravert sense, has become absolute, while the inner "thickness" has virtually become infinite. This is an extremely pregnant Thought for, in this sense, a single Idea may require even volumes for its interpretation. Indeed, it is never wholly interpreted since no objectively thinkable elaboration can ever exhaust its possibilities. We may think of it as being in its own nature like the perfect summation of a converging infinite series, whereas the objectively thinkable interpretation is not more than approximation of that summation, proceeding term by term. At any point attained in the second process,

there still remains an infinite number of terms to complete the summation. So in speaking of the inner Thought as infinitely richer than the objective thought, the words "infinite" and "infinitely" are to be taken as strictly valid.

The relative substantiality of the inner disrobed Thought may also be suggested by certain notions taken from modern physics. Today we think of matter as composed of atoms which, in turn, are composed of protons, neutrons and electrons. The atom appears to be organized with a nuclear center, consisting of protons and neutrons, while there are electrons revolving about this nucleus. The total size of the atom is conceived as the space circumscribed by the outermost electron. Now, within this space, the total volume actually filled by electrons and protons is comparable to the space filled by the sun, planets, satellites, meteors, etc. In other words, the unfilled space, even in the densest of matter found in nature on this earth, is simply vast compared to the filled portion. Now, if protons, neutrons or electrons were actually packed tight so as to rest in contact with each other, the resulting density would be almost inconceivable to the imagination. In the case of some of the heavy stars it appears that this state is, in high measure, approximated, with the result that, according to calculation, a volume the size of a pea would weigh many million tons. If we liken ordinary conceptual thought to the atomic organization of matter as we know it here, then the disrobed or transcendent Thought would correspond to the tightly packed protons or neutrons. It is immeasurably more substantial.

Another way of presenting the idea is to say that the transcendental Thought consists of Meaning in its purity, disassociated from all form. And, in this sense, even the most abstract mathematical formula must be regarded as form. Clearly, this is not thinking in the familiar sense of the word, but, nonetheless, it is Thought, though of another order. One is justified in calling it "Thought" for the reason that it is a content most nearly related to thought among the more familiar human functions. We may call this the pure introceptive Thought, but it is not to be understood as identical with the whole of introceptive content. For instance, there is, as well, an introceptive quality that bears an analogous relation to feeling with a corresponding degree of relative intensity.

If I have succeeded in conveying my meaning, it will be understood that Voidness, in the sense of Shunyata, is only the Suchness as it appears from the perspective of relative consciousness. When It is realized in its own nature, it is absolutely substantial. This shift of value corresponds to a shift in the base of self-consciousness, as from one to another system of reference, in the mathematical sense. The transformation is effected by means of a reversal of the flow of consciousness, both in the sense of the will turning about and nullifying its normal flow, and of awareness consummating the same turn.

Chapter VIII

INTROCEPTIONALISM

Continued

Introceptionalism is a transcendental philosophy. But since the notion of the transcendental has a number of specific meanings in both philosophy and theology, it is necessary to render explicit the sense in which that notion is used here. In one sense, the transcendental is conceived as knowledge or truth beyond the range of human conception or acquisition. In this case, the judgment that such a knowledge or truth exists is based upon super-human revelation or upon the universalization of rational categories beyond the range of possible experience. In a second meaning, we have the use of the terms "transcendent" and "transcendental" as employed by Immanuel Kant. Here the "transcendental" is conceived as the a priori forms which delimit possible experience and what may be thought concerning it, while the "transcendent" is that which lies beyond all possible experience and, in conformity with the Kantian thesis, can never be an object of knowledge. In a third usage, transcendental philosophy is the systematic development of the view that the subjective component of consciousness stands as the determinant factor with respect to the objective, often implying that the experienced world is dependent upon the activity of the reason. In a fourth sense, transcendentalism is "any philosophy which emphasizes the intuitive, spiritual and super-sensuous; any mode of thought which is aggressively non-empiric or anti-empirical."¹

The present transcendentalistic philosophy has a good deal in common with all four of these uses of the terms transcendent and transcendental, yet possesses its own peculiar differentia. Introceptionalism affirms a Truth and a Knowledge which is not derived from experience and which is not dependent upon experience for its being. But it does not deny the existence of an inferior empiric sort of knowledge which is grounded upon experience and valuable mainly, if not wholly, in its relation to further experience. From the standpoint of the introceptive realization, empiric knowledge may be valuable exclusively as a catalytic agent which may, under some conditions, help to arouse the introceptive activity, but in this case the empiric factor supplies none of the content of the transcendental Truth or Knowledge, though it may supply symbolic figures of speech in connection with the

¹ Baldwin, James March, ed. Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology and Peter Smith, Gloucester, Mass. (1960) (Copyright 1901 MacMillian N.Y.) vol. II p. 711.

problem of suggesting a spiritual meaning. Thus experience remains valuable essentially for no larger purpose than supplying a language whereby hidden and pre-existent Meaning becomes objectified.

But while introceptive Knowledge transcends experience it does not lie beyond the possibility of direct realization by a human being. Since in quite common loose usage, "experience" is often given a connotation sufficiently broad to include what I mean by "introceptive realization", it is important to remember that here "experience" is given delimited meaning. First of all I understand by experience, "consciousness considered as a process taking place in time". This is the first sense given in Baldwin's Dictionary and it seems to be accorded general agreement. Further, I regard experience as the state of consciousness produced through the function of perception into which conceptual knowledge enters only as a ministering agent. Finally, I view experience as a mode of consciousness wherein the object is relatively ascendent with respect to the subject. The latter emphasis appears to be a necessary part of all empirical philosophy and constitutes a primary differentiation between Empiricism and Transcendentalism.

In relation to all three phases of the definition of experience, introceptive realization stands decisively differentiated. First of all, it gives consciousness in a state such that time is not at all relevant. Second, it is not a state of consciousness based upon perception, but upon another function or way of consciousness. Third, it definitely gives the subject the position of transcendence with respect to the object. Thus the introceptive realization is to be conceived of as something which can be known by a human being, but cannot be experienced.

Pure conceptual knowledge is also a somewhat which falls outside of experience in the above sense, but it is also not to be regarded as identical with introceptive realization. The distinction is highly important since, negatively considered from the standpoint of Empiricism, Introceptionalism may appear to be identical with Rationalism. In Rationalism, the object for knowledge transcends the object for experience, but it by no means follows that the subject transcends the object. Rational demonstration produces an effect that is, indeed, closer to the subject than any demonstration through experience, yet the most rigorous reasoned proof has yet a quality of objectivity and, therefore, of distance with respect to the subject. For this reason one cannot by pure thought alone think himself into the transcendental state of consciousness, though he may attain a highly rarified surrogate of that state — something which is far beyond the possibilities of mere experience. As a consequence, it requires more critical acuity to differentiate between this surrogate and genuine introceptive realization than it does between the latter and experience proper. Thus, for example, we can both conceive and introceptively realize a timeless

order, but we cannot experience it since a state of consciousness conditioned by time is an ineluctable mark of experience as such.

As will be shown more fully in what follows, the introceptive realization is a state wherein the subject and the object become so far interblended that the self is identical with its knowledge. This is a state of intimacy which never can be attained by pure rational demonstration alone. For this reason, the most rigorous logical proof, however far it transcends mere experience, nonetheless, falls short of certainty. The subject can be absolutely certain only of that knowledge with which it is itself identical. This is characteristic of introceptive realization, and thus differentiates Introceptionalism from Rationalism, though there is closer affinity between these two philosophic forms than there is between either and any Empiric philosophy.

The introceptional transcendentalism is not to be conceived as a form of revelation beyond the possibility of verification by the self within a human being. Revelation which cannot be verified directly, and not merely pragmatically, wields no authority worthy of philosophic respect. All religions based upon this notion of revelation fall below the level of philosophic respect. Revelation, in this sense, implies acceptance through blind belief, which is something considerably less than inner faith which may be regarded as an intuition that has not yet fulfilled itself as full knowledge in the Light of consciousness. Introceptionalism affirms no knowledge, truth or reality which may not be directly verified by the self resident within a human being. It is even more antagonistic to the attitude of blind belief than is physical science.

There is a sense, however, such that the knowledge of introceptive realization is not to be regarded as human knowledge. For this reason I use the form "verified by the self resident within a human being", rather than simply saying "verified by a human being or human subject". In the end we will have to regard the self as transcending the condition of being human. The complete impersonality of the Light of consciousness appearing as emanating from a self renders the distinction of a human, a sub-human and a super-human consciousness meaningless. It is only after this pure consciousness has been modified by form, tone or state that we are enabled to classify it as being consciousness of one or another order. Consciousness, as it is behind the categories of human consciousness, is no longer merely human consciousness, but simply capable of assuming the form of human consciousness.

Critical philosophy has generally derived the conclusion that a human consciousness can know only a content which is capable of being experienced; save that it may know also the a priori forms which define the limits of possible experience. Beyond this, human consciousness has only moral intuitions or faith which, while they give less than knowledge, yet provide an orientation to a somewhat transcending human consciousness. I am not only forced to agree with

this conclusion, but would even affirm it independently if it did not already exist. Thus the possession of a knowledge, which goes beyond experience and the conceptual forms which delimit possible experience, implies a consciousness which is more comprehensive than human consciousness per se. If the self which is resident within a human being is conceived as incapable of awareness in any other than the restricted human form, then a transcendental knowledge would have to be judged as impossible. Anything derived from a transcendental order would have to be regarded as a revelation which man would have to accept or reject blindly since he could not himself verify it. But if, on the other hand, the ultimate organization of consciousness is such that it is possible for the self resident in a human being to transcend the limits of the human form of consciousness, then it becomes possible, in principle, for such a self to realize a transcendent knowledge and then, to the degree that the individual had established a correlation between the transcendent and the conceptual, expression could be given to this knowledge. There would then arise the problem of how such an expression is related to the transcendent content, just as there is a problem of how conception is related to a perceptual content, but at least a way of correlation between transcendental content and human consciousness is established in principle. In this way it would be possible for man to check directly the content of purported revelation, thereby sifting the true from the erroneous. It thus becomes conceivable that man may consume faith and belief in the Fire of Knowledge.

Introception is the function whereby man transcends the limits of the merely human. It is the way to direct metaphysical understanding. But here sound criticism must be careful to draw the distinction between the pure metaphysical understanding and the conceptual framework which symbolizes it. What man can think conceptually is not a true portrait of the transcendent and never can be, for a conceptual order is objective with respect to a thinking self while transcendental knowledge is identical with its subject. As a consequence, the process of objectification inevitably implies distortion, however high the skill of the thinker. However, the conceptual order is a symbol which means the transcendent order, and defectiveness resident in the symbol may not rightly be predicated of that which is symbolized.

Of course, it is again clear that the conceptual form is instrumental in its relation to the introceptual content, but here the reference lies in the dimension of intensivity, rather than of extensivity, as in the case of the pragmatic theory of knowledge. Further, a conceptual order, having introceptive reference, when it is considered in its relation to the field of perceptual experience, is not a servant-function but a master-function. It legislates laws governing the range of future possible experience. As I have said before, this kind of conceptualism is a surrogate for transcendental realization in the

field of experience for all consciousness which is not in a state of direct realization itself. Conceptual cognition, in this sense, transcends experience and wields an authority beyond the testing of experience. It supplies the framework or base of reference of future possible experience, but such conditioned experience cannot check its own presuppositions, thereby rendering an objective pragmatic testing impossible. Transcendental insight alone is competent to test an introceptive concept, while experience can test an empiric concept by the pragmatic method. It thus follows that, from the standpoint of Empiricism, the introceptive concept bears a strong analogy to a rationalistic system, though its real nature is totally different from that of abstract Rationalism.

We are now in a position to develop a theory of both the doctrine of innate ideas and of natural rights. Whenever any individual from the level of an introceptual realization gives conceptual embodiment to a transcendental content, he imprints this as a form within the collective psyche. Such concepts are peculiarly vital forces. They are of a distinctly different order as compared with mere working hypotheses since the latter are merely invented constructs designed to integrate some empiric complex. Any number of working hypotheses may be designed to deal with such complex situations, and the choice among alternative hypotheses is governed by purely pragmatic considerations such as relative simplicity of formulation and application. Such formulations are proposed, used and abandoned, either when they prove inadequate or when some alternative theory offers superior advantages. Clearly, such constructions supply little more than scaffoldings which facilitate the growth of human understanding and command of the environment. Probably the Pragmatists have interpreted this process correctly enough. But a concept which is the embodiment of an introceptual realization carries a force of quite a different nature.

If a student can so far free himself from his own cultural matrix such that he may view other cultures with an attitude freed from prejudice, he will find that other cultures have world-views and sciences of a nature more or less incommensurable with our own. He will find that many of the features of older cultures which have formerly seemed merely crude or immature to him actually have a good deal more of enlightened sophistication than he had imagined. It will become clear that there is simply a number of different ways of viewing the world and conceiving a science, and that all such ways which have been part of an historically significant culture have actually proved themselves adequate by pragmatic tests. Our science and world-view may seem obvious enough to us but quite different orientations have seemed no less obvious to other peoples and have been no less effective in achieving an adjustment between the living human-being and the world-about. No one culture, not even our own, possesses the exclusively correct world-view. Now, what is it that causes any particular world-view to appear to be obvious or natural?

This is a question which leads us down into the generally unconscious determinants of the various ways of orientation possible to man. Some of these orientations we can trace to historic sources thereby clarifying particular instances of a general process.

Men like Pythagoras and Galileo are a good deal more than scientific workers. They are, rather, men of scientific deeds, in the sense of Spengler. They established ways of approach to the problem of such a basic source that those who followed in the respective cultures subsequently thought along the lines they laid down. Our science may even be called the Galilean science, while that of the Greeks may be thought of as the Pythagorean science. It is particularly significant that the use or understanding of number in these two sciences is so vastly different that it is quite difficult for one who belongs to the current of the one kind of science to understand the number concept of the other. These men actually established frameworks of approach which became like self-evident truths for those who followed in their foot-steps. We are not merely convinced of the soundness of these truths, we rather believe them with a religious sort of conviction. Now, what such men have actually done is to imprint within the human psyche of their respective cultures concepts which embody an introceptive realization. These concepts are pregnant and living and, within their respective spheres of influence, they possess the men who are subsequently born so that they find it exceedingly difficult to free themselves from the feeling that these concepts are necessary.

In the field of religion this process is even more notable. Thus to the Christian Protestant of conviction the Lutheran doctrine of "justification by faith" is not merely a philosophical theory to be entertained among alternative theories; it is rather a necessary ground-principle which is believed by all who realize the true doctrine. But this doctrine has never been universally held, either in the historic past nor at present, even among men of distinctly superior religiosity. The opposed doctrine of mediation appears to possess an even wider acceptance, and seems quite as natural and obvious to those who accept it. What we have here is simply an illustration of a process wherein a man of introceptive insight impregnated a concept with that insight and thus predetermined the view-point of large numbers of men who followed him. Through the insight of Luther, "justification by faith" became an innate idea.

Friedrich Nietzsche supplies us with another instance of this same process, closer to our own time. Nietzsche has his own peculiar insight and gave it conceptual form in his works with the result that it also possessed a sector of subsequent humanity within its folds. It is easy to see how much of the orientation of German National Socialism is predetermined by the thought of Nietzsche. To many students, the thought of Nietzsche may appear as merely another philosophic theory, but for

those who are possessed by it, it comes as an innate truth, regardless of whether they have read Nietzsche or not.

Every significant philosopher and every important social or religious leader has produced an impregnated concept from out of the hidden heights or depths. Not always are such concepts impregnated with Light, for they may also be born out of darkness. But they are always more than bare conceptual frameworks or theories. They always carry something of the nature of life within their depths, be it of a dark or luminous sort. As a result of this there is, in addition to the explicit logical consequences, an even more vital development such that they may grow in ways not foreseen by their originators. Doubtless Nietzsche did not mean by his "superman" the "super race" of German National Socialism, but this would simply mean that his impregnated concept had potentialities transcending his own private imagination. It is indeed a wise father who can foresee everything his son will become. When one gives life to anything he assumes a vast amount of responsibility. He may have started something better than he thought, but it may equally well develop into something considerably worse.

The foregoing illustrations are instances of a process within the range of historic observation. By studying instances of this kind one may learn much of the forces which predetermine the thinking and conduct of man. The consciousness of men moves within frameworks which are quite generally not examined and, frequently, not even known in their nature as frameworks which stand in contrast to other possibilities. Within those frameworks the possessed individuals may deal with their respective problems with greater or lesser measure of critical rationality, but the acceptance of the framework is something either more or less than rational. One can easily prove this point by subjecting the more or less unconscious framework of another to criticism in the presence of the latter. Almost inevitably he arouses a state of consciousness highly toned with affect. He makes no headway at all with his rational criticism and, in the case of the less mature religious types, runs the risk of being accused of possessing a satanic disposition. On the whole, this sort of thing is an unwise and dangerous course of procedure. Generally, it is better to let men sleep within their frameworks, so long as they are not too dangerous to other men. In this matter the Indians are wiser than we are, for they say that it is unwise ever forcefully to awaken a sleeping man. Rather, let the man awaken naturally before trying to teach him.

The basic frameworks possess men and thus have the nature of conviction, rather than of a theory which is accepted through being convinced. Now, it is these convictions which carry the force of innate or native ideas. A psychological or introceptive insight, which has penetrated to deeper levels of consciousness than the frameworks which predetermine the consciousness and conduct of most men, leads to a knowledge of the relativity of all such frameworks. Their innateness is

thus only relative and not absolute. But they are properly of the nature of innate ideas for those who are possessed by them since these frameworks are not for the possessed individual something derived from experience, but rather underlie and predetermine the form of his experience. It is impossible for the experience of the possessed individual to disprove them since they automatically exclude all possible experiences which are not confirmatory. It is no easy matter to transcend frameworks of this sort since the transcending implies something analogous to a dying process which precedes a new birth, either in a minor or radical sense. In this, the consciousness of the man of science is as greatly bound as is the representative of any religious sect. Transcendence of any sort is never easy, but all real advance of human consciousness, that is more than mere elaboration of old possibilities, is dependent upon it.

Enlightenment is a process of transcendence of the old conditioning frameworks. It is not merely the further development of possibilities subsumed by the frameworks. To continue the further development of a science delimited by the framework of Galileo's insight is not a progress to new enlightenment, but is merely an elaboration of Galileo's enlightenment. The enlightener always speaks from out the transcendent, while the continuer merely elaborates further or sustains. This is true with respect to science, religion and social orientations generally.

Enlightenment may proceed far or only a little way, but always something that formerly had seemed as necessary and innate is transcended. Old anchorages are broken while new ones are achieved. This is a serious business, for while the greatest values men have known have come by this road, yet every enlightenment is a destructive force with respect to old, more or less unconscious, presuppositions. For this reason, the enlightener is more likely than not to be an object of persecution. He appears to his milieu as the destroyer of established and precious values. In some respects, he is fortunate who is not understood in his own time.

Innate ideas are not derived from experience but have their origin either in introceptive realization, or by penetration in the more or less shadowy depths of the psychologic unconscious. They are thus not merely logically presupposed in all experience, but actually have a source in a realm other than that covered by experience. In their higher form, they are rooted in an introceptive realization and, therefore, are truly transcendent in the very sense of a transcendent knowledge which Kant conceived as impossible. Objectively, such ideas can neither be proven nor disproved. They are, thus, not to be judged as either true or false, but rather as the relative standard by which the true and the false are measured. Consequently, as an example, it is impossible to determine whether the doctrine of natural rights is true or false. Rather it is true that if this doctrine is a presupposition of a social consciousness, then a way of social thought and life follows as a consequence. There is

excellent reason for regarding this doctrine as defining the distinctive meaning of the American way since the moral ground for American autonomy was grounded upon this doctrine. Thus, if this doctrine is repudiated, then the distinctively American way is overthrown, to be replaced by something else, better or worse — probably the latter.

So far we have been investigating innate ideas as particularizing frameworks whereby different human cultures, religious sects and social movements are differentiated. But beyond these limits mankind as a whole has still deeper roots such that intercourse and cross-understanding becomes possible. Various human groupings are obviously different in innumerable ways, yet the whole human family still remains one, having certain similarities of feeling, thought and action in common. It is because of this that we differentiate some creatures as being human. How does a man differ from an animal or other kinds of creatures of either an inferior or superior order? The biologist would say that the differentiation lies in a distinctive anatomy. This answer is doubtless valid enough as far as it goes, but it reflects the superficiality which confuses the incidental with the fundamental. Actually, a creature which possessed the anatomy normal to men but which possessed the consciousness of, and behaved like, an animal, would be an animal in fact and not a man. Likewise, a creature possessing a human kind of consciousness, but in the form of one of the animals, would really be a human being. It is unimportant that man should be defined as "a featherless plantigrade biped mammal of the genus *Homo*", but it is highly significant that the Sanskrit root "MAN" should mean "think" or "the thinker". An intellectual donkey would be more of a human being than a stupid Australian bushman. If the most primitive "featherless plantigrade biped mammal of the genus *Homo*" does not think, then he is not a man.

A human being is a man because he thinks conceptually, and not because of any of his other functions, however highly they may be developed. Now, the conceptual thinker is one whose stream of consciousness is modified by the framework essential to thought as such. This framework includes the laws of thought in their totality of principles which cannot be derived from any other conception, save in the circular form of mutual implication. No one can repudiate these principles and continue to be a thinker, though he might continue to be conscious through the activity of other functions. These basic laws of thought are not derivations from experience, but are the ground-structure which renders the world-view characteristic of the thinker possible. They are not necessities of "things" or of consciousness in its abstract or, rather, concrete totality. Thus the laws of thought are of ontological importance for conceptual thought, but not for being as a whole.

The laws of thought are, thus, quite properly innate ideas which cannot be thought away without thinking away the very possibility of

thinking. They are real and objective enough for the thinker qua thinker. Thus to attain an insight which so far transcends them that they assume the character of relative determinants is to penetrate into consciousness beyond conceptually thinkable limits.

There are innate ideas truly enough, but they are themselves dependent upon a Source beyond experience and which is, therefore, genuinely transcendental. Within the circumscribing limits of the framework of consciousness predetermined by them they can only be known as terminal or border-line conceptions. They are the theoretical sum of an infinite converging series. While confined within the limits of this framework, man's consciousness cannot pass beyond this border-line. But this limitation passes when man finds a function by which he can reach consciously beyond the border-line. Every such movement is an act of transcendence. Now, if any man attains the point of introceptive realization such that he may look down upon the most basic principles which render conceptual thought possible, then he has transcended human consciousness in the rigorous sense. In terms of the Indian symbolism, this is the transcendence of the Manu or of Vaivasvata, in other words, it is a transcendence of the root framework of consciousness which literally is the progenitor of all thinking beings. Thus the laws of thought are the seed of Manu. It is indeed true that man cannot speculatively determine what lies beyond the deepest roots of conceptual thought. Kant's criticism is conclusive with respect to this. Speculation is valid within the framework of the thinker, but not beyond. But beside speculative thought there is in man's total psychical constitution a function — generally latent — whereby he can reach above and not merely below thought. (The processes described in Jung's psychology of the unconscious mainly lead to levels below conceptual thought.) It is this function which I have called introception. And by means of this function the self resident within a human being can know and check transcendental realities. Here is something a good deal more than faith, intuition or revelation. It is also not subject to the limitations which criticism has imposed upon speculative thought. We have, thus, at least a theory for an epistemological foundation for a transcendental knowledge.

Through introducing the notion of the introceptional function I have avoided, in principle at least, the logical difficulties which have, heretofore, dogged the heels of transcendental philosophy. The problem of the genuineness of transcendental insight or presupposition is reduced to the problem of the actuality of the function of introception as I have defined it. This is not a problem for logic but for psychology in the sense of meta-psychology. The actuality of the function must be determined, either by a search of the historic evidence for its existence, or by direct individual arousing of its activity. The latter method, of course, supplies the only absolutely certain demonstration that the introceptive function is a fact.

When the Light of consciousness turns upon itself toward its source, then if consciousness were dependent upon the object for its existence, the resultant state would be one of complete unconsciousness. But actually the resultant state is, not only not one of unconsciousness, but is, indeed, a state of greatly intensified consciousness. Thus if consciousness depends upon anything at all it is exclusively dependent upon the subject or self. Now, when consciousness turns upon itself the object vanishes, thereby proving the contingency of the object. Whether or not there is an external world existing as a thing, outside the relation of being an object for a subject, is really a matter of no importance. Actually to predicate existence or non-existence of such independent thinghood is a meaningless judgment since no meaning attaches to the notion of existence apart from consciousness. If anyone attempts to define such existence he inevitably finds that in the very act of defining he has transformed it into an object, that is, into a somewhat which exists for consciousness. The arguments for the existence of the independent thing do not have any sounder logical basis than the old formal arguments for the existence of God that Kant criticized so effectively. The existence of the independent thing is not a necessity for thought, and that which actually takes place in an introceptive realization shows that it is not a necessity for consciousness. Thus it is wholly unnecessary either to affirm or deny the existence of the independent thing. It is simply irrelevant.

At the first stage of the introceptive transformation the object vanishes, while the subject persists. This implies at least the relative transcendency of the subject with respect to the object, a consequence of the very highest importance, not only for philosophy and religion, but for sociology as well. The relationship between subject and object is not equalitarian but hierarchical, with the subject occupying the transcendent position. As between the subject and the object, authority inheres in the subject. An instance drawn from history illustrates the practical bearings of this relationship.

It is related that during or after his conquest of India, Alexander the Great learned of the Indian Yogins and their strange powers and was highly interested. Ultimately he had the opportunity of meeting one seated upon the bank of the river. The Yogin graciously condescended to converse with Alexander and answered his questions at some length. Alexander was greatly impressed and wished to have the Yogin return with him to Macedonia, and so proposed to the latter that he should follow this course. But the Yogin refused. Alexander commanded, but the Yogin still refused. Finally, Alexander threatened to employ all the compulsive means he had in his power, including the threat of death itself. But all this left the Yogin as unmoved as ever. Ultimately, Alexander retreated in defeat. Though the great soldier could conquer a world, yet he could not influence the will of a single naked Yogin. Stated in psychological terms, Alexander exerted the greatest power of his time over the objective

situation but was powerless with respect to the self, for the very essence of being a true Yogin is single-pointed identification with the self. The world-ruler, no matter how great or powerful, never commands the Yogin, but in all relations with the latter, seeks from him what he may graciously bestow. Here the proud ruler must play the humble part.

The objective situation dominates only those who are weak and deluded — unfortunately the vast majority of human beings. The objective situation does not dominate because it transcends the Subject. Metaphorically stated the beggar (object) in life has stolen the royal throne, while the true ruler (the self) has permitted himself to become the scullion who seeks largess of the real beggar who appears in royal robes. If one has a large wealth of compassion he may pity the true royalty who imagines himself to be only the scullion, but since the latter has no one to blame but himself and could reaffirm his status at any time, he really merits only contempt. When all this is clearly understood our whole conception of social organization and method will be radically altered. Today because we have permitted ourselves to fall under the hypnotic domination of the object we conceive of government in terms which fit only the psychology of the deluded scullion.

Philosophy has fallen far from its high estate when it sells itself to the object. That physical science should do this is not so surprising, but one expects more from philosophy. Not only do the explicitly realistic schools do this, but one even finds the Pragmatists assuming the same orientation. Consider the following quotation from William James: "As I myself understand these authors, we all three (including Schiller, Dewey and James) absolutely agree in admitting the transcendency of the object — provided it be an experienceable object — to the subject, in the truth relation."¹ The final phrase suggests that possibly the pragmatic theory does not affirm the transcendency of the object in all possible relations, but it is clear that in the pre-eminently important relation of truth it does. What does this imply?

It certainly means that truth is not a transcendent relation which exists prior to experience. The truth relation is a function of experience and not of introceptive realization. One finds truth by an adjustment to an objective situation, not by an inner and super-sensual attunement. In the one case one attains truth by achieving adjustment with an already existent world, even though it is merely the world which is given through perceptual experience, while in the other the realization of truth actually destroys the world as possessing any sort of real independence. Consciousness, as known through the introceptual realization is independent of the objective world and merely permits the latter to be. Knowing the true nature of this objective world is a very

¹ James, William, Meaning of Truth, Greenwood Press, N.Y. (1909) pp xvii-xix, (underlining mine.)

essential feature of the truth of inner realization. Awakened self-consciousness may choose to act as though the objective world were real in itself and thus play the game on those terms. In this case there are various relationships, some of which may be called "correct" and others "incorrect" but here we have something less than the truth-relation. It would be better to speak of empiric correctness and incorrectness, meanwhile leaving the loftier term "Truth" for the more fundamental adjustment which determines the real relationship between the subjective order and the objective order taken as a whole.

Chapter IX

INTROCEPTIONALISM

Substantiality Is Inversely Proportional to Ponderability

In the psychology of the transformation process it is a known fact that the process is generally accompanied by a presentation, either in the dreaming or waking state, of a series of symbols that convey a particularly significant meaning to the individual. The culminating symbols tend to take a form, technically known as Mandalas, which are generally sensuous presentments or actions. Once the content of these symbols is adequately assimilated the transforming process is completed and the individual has achieved integration upon a new level. Both the Western psychology on the subject and the manuals of Oriental Yoga agree that these symbolic instruments are highly important. But it is not invariably the case that the symbol takes a sensible form, either as a receipt or a sensible act. In my own psychological organization there seems to be a distinctly limited capacity for fabricating sensible images autonomously, with the result that I stand in a defective position for the direct personal criticism of this process. I have never known visible or other sensible presentations of this sort during the waking state and only rarely even in dreams. But I have had acquaintance with conceptual presentations of a semi-autonomous sort which proved to be of enormous importance in the transformation process.

A conceptual presentation is not to be understood as a conceptual representation since, in part at least, it enters consciousness in much the way a percept does. It is not more than partly a conceptual construction and may, indeed, apparently be an almost wholly autonomous development. As I know this kind of presentation it is marked by the complete lack of concrete perceptual or sensible elements. It is more like a newly born and full grown idea — a birth well symbolized by the stepping forth of Minerva fully grown from the head of Jupiter. It is highly abstract as though coming directly from a consciousness to which what we call abstract is more immediate and direct than the concrete and particular. Here I must diverge from C. G. Jung when he insists that the abstract idea is exclusively a development from an essentially concrete and perceptual primordial image. As far as my acquaintance with this kind of Idea goes it actually is so abstract in its original nature that in order to formulate it at all it is more or less distorted by a process of concretion. Our language fails because it is not abstract enough, thus the distorting effect of conceptual representation is the reverse of that which occurs when a concrete perception is given conceptual formulation.

I must insist upon this point as it has an important bearing upon one of my theses, i.e., that our most abstract language is the best vehicle of ultimate Truth.

The immediate conceptual presentation is much more like the manifestation of a mature consciousness than of the primitive kind of consciousness suggested by the primordial image. This leads to some very startling implications for it seems to imply that in its total meaning the collective unconscious is not merely filled with a primitive kind of primordial content. Unquestionably there is such a primitive primordial content, but I see no good reason for doubting the equal existence of a deposit in the collective unconscious of ancient and unknown cultures of a very high order of maturity. Indeed, the history of the past, in so far as we know it at all, definitely does not reveal to us a stage when the earth was without its Sages of a very superior order. Our current idea of a development from exclusively primitive roots is really little more than a mythical construct, probably very largely the result of prejudices induced by the influence of Darwin. The archetype of the wise old man which Dr. C. G. Jung has isolated does not at all carry the symbolic meaning of primitivity but, rather, of something that is distinctly mature. It is not at all improbable that there were ancients who were wiser in their day than we are in ours. It is by no means a self-evident truth that the process of time inevitably implies progress in wisdom. Degeneration is just as likely and even becomes rather probable when we consider possible social implications of the second law of thermo-dynamics.

I most certainly do insist that the Sage is the child of introception rather than of perception, so that Wisdom in the spiritual sense is a Root, rather than a flower growing out of perceptual experience. Thus Wisdom descends from the sky and does not ascend out of the earth, and without the down-pourings from the sky the earth would be parched and cultured life would gradually disappear. It is for this reason that earth-born philosophies are sterile.

A conceptual presentation differs from a conceptual representation in the further respect that it carries an enormously clarifying authority. It is entirely possible that through unaided intellectual speculation an individual might develop a formulation precisely the same as that of a conceptual presentation, but the effect would be entirely different so far as the transformation process is concerned. The speculative construct would be only a theory, from which systematic conclusions could be drawn, but it would not yield the authority of insight. The thinker is not made into a different man by it. But a conceptual presentation carries with it a superlative order of assurance — one knows that without doubt here is Truth. The Knowledge does not seem external to the self, as is the case with purely speculative constructs. One can transfer his anchorage to the conceptual presentation with the same certainty that formerly he viewed himself as

the world-bound man. Subsequently, the influence of inherited and traditional ideas may introduce doubt if the individual permits them to do so and, in that case, the transformation process will be hindered if not prevented entirely. Unquestionably mere habit and tradition must be heroically depreciated. But here we have merely the dangers which must be conquered along the Way. At any rate, at the moment of the presentation itself the authority of the insight is unequivocal. One has found a base on which he can stand against the opinion of the whole world, if that is necessary.

In my own experience the crucial key to the transformation process lay in a sudden and highly authoritative recognition which finally took the aphoristic form: "Substantiality is inversely proportional to ponderability". At a particularly lucid moment I simply saw that this must be true. Sensible presentations and conceptual representations in that moment acquired the value of voidness, surrounded by fullness which is forever hidden to a consciousness operating exclusively under those forms. In other words, I found real fullness in just those zones where sensation and conception reported absence of anything. This was a radical inversion of all habitual values. But it removed the remaining barriers to the awakening of the introceptual process.

If one analyzes the aphoristic formula he will find that it implies a phase of the process of "turning about". In terms of our ordinary understanding and habits we conceive of all development and progress as a movement toward further elaboration of perceptual and conceptual content. We imagine that such content is, of course, something and, indeed, something valuable. Enrichment is a process of increasing it. But all of this valuation is reversed. Both perceptual presentation and conceptual representation have the significance of an empty phantasmagoria of essentially no more substantiality than dream-stuff. Particularly is this true of sensible presentments, though it is somewhat less emphatically the case with concepts. Sensible fact, instead of having the greatest reality-value, as is the case with most men, is seen as most empty of reality. All the relationships of the sensible world are seen to have only the significance of a sort of painful game, which doesn't lead much of anywhere. But, in contrast, the assurance of a super-sensible actuality is much more profound than any former belief in sensible reality. Here is indubitable evidence of another way of consciousness which receives practically no recognition in our psychology and philosophy.

I conceive it to be highly significant that the transformed point of view leaves the substance of the logical processes of thought unaltered. The content of meaning given to the indefinable terms which enters into logical systems is simply given a new reference. In other words, rational thought remains the mediator between the perceptual and introceptual orders. We can view the perceptual contents as negations, instead of positive actualities, and then proceed with the systematic

development of either a science or a philosophy as formerly. One can think as well or better than ever before, but the valuation of the content of the thought is radically altered. As a consequence this transformation does not imply anything like an alogical attitude. I feel, therefore, justified in affirming that there is more relative reality in logical process and form than there is in any perceptual presentment or experience. But even this reality is only relative.

It is not implied that experience is wholly without value, but the value which it does have is symbolical and instrumental. A negation can very well serve as a symbol of that which is negated. It is all a question of how the meaningful reference is interpreted. Experience simply is not an end-in-itself, nor does it mean something which can be attained by more experience. Its real reference is to that which is realized directly only by the turning about in consciousness. Movement of consciousness in the direction of experience ultimately always leads to disappointment and frustration.¹ But with the turning about the frustration and disappointment vanish.

Of course, a theory of the nature and office of experience is needed. Experience arises out of a conative attitude of hunger or craving. In a state of complete satisfaction there is none of the desiring or yearning which leads on to experience. But in the absence of satisfaction all sorts of strivings are aroused which are oriented in whatever direction it may seem that satisfaction may be achieved. So long as consciousness is oriented toward the object this leads to a search for more and ever more experience. But somehow every experience is a disappointment in that it fails to supply the satisfaction sought, and so the same effort is repeated again and again through a seemingly endless series. But the content of experience is like a worthless piece of quartz rock in which there once lay a nugget of gold, but where now there remains only the mold of that nugget. It is like the gorgeous color on the inner pearly surface of a seashell, which color is no substance in the shell but is the light as it is refracted from the surface. It is the rainbow's end of promise which ever recedes the farther, the nearer it is approached. Yes, experience ever gives endless promise of fulfillment, but which is always snatched away at the moment of grasping. And this is true since there is no substance in the content of pure experience.

The office of experience is to frustrate and to cheat, and yet not for a malicious purpose. Experience brings pain so that consciousness may be gradually awakened to self-realization. For if consciousness flowed freely toward the object and thereby found the fulfillment of its yearning, there would be none of the shock necessary, such that consciousness could become aware of its own true nature.

¹ In this connection the reading of the fourth book of Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Idea is an illuminating experience.

Empiric consciousness is like an alien in a distant and strange land but who is yearning for all that has been lost. He seeks widely in this land for the old companions but who are not to be found anywhere in that region. To find these companions, consciousness must return to the source from whence it came, and it is the office of experience to lash the wanderer until he finally awakens to the need for the return.

The values which experience symbolizes lie behind the outward flowing stream of consciousness, and thus are actually closer to the wanderer than the objects which lie before him. These values are just precisely those which never are the content of any presentment nor of any idea. They are thus symbolized by the void of unfilled space which seems to the objectively streaming consciousness to be nothing at all. So experience gives just that which Reality is not; it is the thin and insubstantial surface which bounds and hides the Real. The frame-work of empiric consciousness is such that it ever veils the durable and substantial.

It is characteristic of the critical analysis of our day that it finds no substance anywhere. There is real acuity of understanding revealed in this criticism, for it is indeed true that form of our outward-going consciousness is just such that it never can give us a realization of substantial actuality. Terms in relation are truly empty and as thin as a mathematical surface and this is indeed all that experience ever gives. But to say that this is all that there is or all that may be realized is equivalent to saying that the experiential kind of consciousness is the sole possibility. However, he, who has once found the way to turn the stream of consciousness backward toward its source, knows that this is not so, and he who has not done this is in no position to know. The denial of the actuality of substance is valid for the zone delimited by possible experience, but not beyond that.

In this day when one attempts again to reintroduce the notion of substance into a philosophic system he is moving against the current of the times. In the older philosophies the notion had an honorable place, but not so in our time. In part this may be explained as a result of the development of critical philosophy and in part as a result of change of the psychological focus of consciousness. When consciousness is oriented more to the extraverted attitude there is a tendency to spread widely in a consciousness of surface, at the price of a loss of depth. This means that content of consciousness becomes valued only as experience or as mere terms in relation, with no underlying substantiality. The result is a state of essentially soulless consciousness, separated from its roots, in the sense of a conscious correlation with the roots. In this case knowledge as Assurance is lost and there remains either only probable knowledge or a knowledge which has only a tentative value because of its empiric working. That there should be something substantial behind this knowledge is an idea without weight. At best it is an unknown and unknowable somewhat which is of no practical

significance and certainly is not logically necessary. It appears as though all we had was simply the play of phenomena and from this it is a short step to the philosophic standpoint of Phenomenalism.

I am forced to agree that if we restrict knowledge to the combination of pure reason and experience, the notion of an underlying substance is reduced to a speculative construct. And there is, indeed, much to be said for the elimination of all speculative constructs which are not theoretically necessary. For many purposes no efficiency is lost if we assume that no substantial substrate exists behind either the phenomenal object or the empiric subject to consciousness. Further, this standpoint receives considerable support from the better known doctrines of the most philosophical of religions, i.e., Buddhism. There is, in fact, a very considerable rapprochement between modern Western speculation and the phenomenology of Buddhism, so we clearly face a problem which calls for careful examination.

In its more important signification the concept of substance means the substrate underlying all experience, which is not itself a direct object of experience. Since the time that the problem of knowledge attained recognition as being crucial, the notion of the substrate has acquired two contrasted meanings. In one sense, it is conceived as the underlying thing-in-itself and, in the other, as a supporting and constitutive subject. These contrasting substance-philosophies are respectively realistic and idealistic in perspective, but both agree in predicating a reality behind the scenes. Both also agree in affirming a somewhat that is perdurable throughout all change, such as, for example, the unchanging mass of matter throughout all changes of state of matter, or a persistent self which remains identical throughout all modifications of consciousness.

Opposed to the substantiality theory is the view that both the object of experience and the subject to experience are merely complexes of insubstantial elements, either material or psychical. All entities are, therefore, simply phenomenal effects of complexes, rather than being perdurable substrates. It is interesting and very striking that a doctrine as modern as this should have been formulated by Buddha 2,500 years ago. It was the main point of departure between Buddhism and Brahmanism proper and seems to have been the source of considerable bitter controversy. Since the practical ethical objective of Buddhism was the dissolution of the complexes, it is not surprising that the phenomenology of Buddha should have suggested that the Nirvanic state was literal annihilation. For how could there be any real immortality if there is no such thing as a perdurable self?

I am not aware of any philosophy more subtle or more difficult to understand than Buddhism if one is solely familiar with the more public teachings. There seems to be neither a subject nor a thing-in-itself behind the phantasmagoric play of phenomena. But the Sanskrit Sutras, which were written down some five or six hundred years after the final

Nirvana of the Buddha, reveal a much more positive metaphysical teaching. There is something behind the empiric subject and phenomena that does endure, thereby giving to the Nirvanic state a positive meaning, but it is by no means an easy task to isolate the logic of the total teaching. I doubt that real clarity in this matter can ever be achieved without passing through the process of the direct Realization or Transformation individually. But, in any case, the Buddhist philosophy does affirm a somewhat which is perdurable and thus does teach a substantialistic metaphysics which is the counterpart of the phenomenologic treatment of empiric consciousness.

The fundamental idealistic doctrine, that existence is identical with being known or otherwise determined by being in and for consciousness, would lead to the most rigorous kind of phenomenalism if knowledge were conceived as restricted to experience and the pure reason alone. In this case, the notion of substance would be confined to the realistic view which held that there were real existences independent of all consciousness and were, in their own true nature, different from their appearance to consciousness. But a study of the idealistic thinkers reveals, quite generally, either an implication of another way of consciousness, or an explicit reference to such. I have already referred to Schopenhauer's "intuition of genius" and "temper akin to genius" as implying a kind of cognition other than either perception or conception. Schelling is even more explicit. The following quotations from Transcendental Idealism are impressive:

1. "By this act of separation (the two affirmations, I am and There are things outside of me) when it is completed, one transports one's self in the transcendental act of contemplation, which is by no means a natural, but an artificial one."¹
2. "The sole organ of this method of philosophizing is therefore the inner sense, and its object is of such a nature that, unlike that of mathematics, it can never become an object of external intuition."²
3. "The whole object of philosophy is no other than the action of intelligence according to fixed laws. This action can be conceived only through a peculiar, direct, inner intuition, and this again is possible only through production."³
4. "For whereas production in as art is projected outward, in order to reflect the unconscious by products; philosophical production

¹ Quoted from the System of Transcendental Idealism, translated by Benjamin Rand in Modern Classical Philosophies, the Riverside Press, Cambridge, Mass (1908), p. 540.

² Ibid. p. 544.

³ Ibid. p. 545.

is directed immediately inward, in order to reflect it in intellectual intuition."¹

It seems to me abundantly clear that the phrases, "transcendental act of contemplation", "inner sense", "peculiar, direct, inner intuition" and "intellectual intuition", refer to essentially what I mean by introception. This "inner sense" is explicitly conceived as an organ and, hence, implies a function of consciousness. It is thus clear, that this is not the same as introspection, for the latter activity does not imply a new organ essentially different from the functions employed in ordinary perceptual observation. Introspection is merely a kind of observation.

We have now arrived at a position such that we can define the notion of substance in idealistic terms. Substance in this sense does not mean an unknown substrate, in every possible sense of knowing. It means, rather, a substrate which cannot be known as an object of perceptual experience, nor can it be known through pure conceptual thought. It is known through the introceptive function of consciousness, that is, through the process whereby consciousness turns upon itself toward its source. There is thus a sense in which substance remains as the unknown perdurable substrate, for it is unknown so long as the introceptive function is not awakened and active. At the same time, in the more comprehensive sense, consciousness remains as the constitutive determinant of being, at least in so far as the notion of being can have any conceivable meaning. Indeed, we may say that consciousness is itself the substantial substrate, but not that any given isolated phase or function of consciousness is such a substrate.

We are now in a position to define, in general terms, how it is possible that the whole of being may be constituted by consciousness, and yet may appear to empiric man in part as objectively determined. The objective world as a whole is a precipitate from Consciousness in its most comprehensive sense, but it is only partly determined by perceptual and conceptual consciousness. The precipitate from Consciousness beyond perception and conception appears as objective and independent to the empiric individual. It is what it is, despite his individual wish and will. He must come to terms with this objective appearance, and direct his willing through various adjustments, rather than by free action. But if any individual became completely conscious there would be no longer any objective world, save in so far as he willed it into being and voluntarily accepted a degree of binding or veiling of his own consciousness. But such an individual would have become more than a mere private individual; he would, indeed, have become identical with the collective Self of all creatures.

¹ Ibid. p. 545.

Substance has the psychological value of depth, whereas the notions of terms in external relations and of experience imply consciousness as surface exclusively. Therefore, it may be said that substance philosophies alone have soul, though in the case of materialism the soul would be dead, but not non-existent. There is soul only when there is something more felt or realized than that which appears upon the surface of consciousness alone. Thus soul never can be a part of the material available for objective analysis, with the result that any philosophy which views its whole problem as concerned exclusively with material completely available for objective analysis, in principle, must be regarded as soulless. It is for this reason that a philosophy like the New Realism is more deadly to the religious feeling than even outright Materialism itself. It is better to have a dead soul than no soul at all.

The meaning of Depth, in the above sense, is not easy to define, though it may be so clearly realized or felt that its actuality is indubitable. A positive and comprehensive definition is impossible, so that most that can be said of a definitive character is mainly negative. Thus depth is that which is not comprehended by any concept, nor any part of experience, in the definitely delimited meaning we have given to the latter term. It is that which is always "felt", at least, in every genuine religious experience. It is that for which men would readily sacrifice their lives. It can be directly and consciously Realized only by the conscious introceptive movement, in which consciousness turns upon itself toward its source. Here there is immediate, direct and positive realization of the depth dimension in consciousness. But this depth quale is just precisely the inexpressible element in all Gnostic and Mystical Realization. Every expression that has come out of such Realizations fails to convey explicitly the depth quality. The surface meaning of all such expressions can be interpreted in such a way that there is no depth, but in so doing the real meaning is lost. One must always be at least a near Mystic in order to understand a Mystic.

The direct Realization of depth alone gives certain assurance with respect to perdurability. Without this Realization there can be no certainty with respect to immortality, however conceived. On objective grounds, the notion of immortality can never be more than a speculative extrapolation which reaches far beyond its grounds. Even a real communication with disembodied entities — assuming that such a communication could be established — would not prove that such entities were perdurable. Their existence might be as much conditioned by time as embodied life in the world, and the affirmation of a disembodied entity to the contrary is not sufficient to establish any certainty. To establish the actuality of a disembodied entity would prove only that living beings can exist in such a way that they are not apparent to the normal sensorium. More is required to give the notion of immortality a positive meaning.

It is equally true that the mere event of physical death is not sufficient to prove perdurability or immortality. There is no reason

whatsoever to suppose that mere physical dying is enough to awaken consciousness in the depth or transcendental dimension. One may die to find himself still living, with much the same kind of consciousness he had while in physical embodiment. With most men this would still be a case of consciousness moving on the surface. It is quite significant that the Buddhists speak of the death of a Buddha as the final Nirvana, but not so in the case of other men. The direct acquaintance with Depth not only may be attained before death, but there is even no reason to believe that there is any advantage for such attainment in an after-death state. If we or if consciousness is perdurable, we or consciousness are so now no less than at any future time.

Kant was quite correct when he viewed the problem of immortality as belonging to metaphysics. Thus, save in so far as man has awakened the function of transcendental cognition, he can find no certain answer to this problem. Beyond this, faith may build a positive presumption and considerations of practical psychological therapeutics may render the inculcation of belief in immortality and important heuristic method, as Dr. C. G. Jung has found in his practice. But great as is the psychological value of belief and faith they still fall far short of supplying certainty. No truly rigorous and heroic thinker can ever be satisfied with the crutch of mere believing or disbelieving. Nor is the standpoint of agnosticism better than a confession of defeat, if it is accepted as more than a temporary position. It is simply sound and conscientious thinking frankly to acknowledge, after adequate search and analysis, that, by ordinary means, knowledge of the metaphysical cannot be attained. But it is a moral failure to be willing to accept nescience in any dimension as a final state. The true soldier in the ranks of inquiry will never be content to rest short of certainty, in any direction, be the results wishfully acceptable or not.

A resolution of the three metaphysical problems recognized by Kant, i.e., God, freedom and immortality, is attained through the awakening of the function of introception. Yet certainty thus attained by the awakening of this function cannot be conveyed merely by conceptual thought, however skillfully developed, to one who is introceptively blind. This is the analogue of the similar impossibility to convey the immediate certainties of ordinary vision to a man born blind. At best one can suggest something of how it is possible that introceptive insight can give certainty.

A rigorous analysis of the ordinary processes of knowledge reveals that this kind of knowledge does not give us certainty in any direction. Bertrand Russell is quite correct when he says that this knowledge, at best, gives us only probable truth. Why is this so? The answer is really very simple. It lies in the fact that, in the case of ordinary knowledge, the knower stands in a relation of distance or difference from the object of his knowledge. He has, therefore, no ground of certainty with respect to the content of his knowledge. But, in

contrast to ordinary knowledge, introceptive cognition is in the form of an identity between the knower and the known. Thus the certainty-destroying factor of distance or difference is eliminated, with the consequence that introceptive cognition is absolutely certain on its own level. Undoubtedly, subsequent error can be introduced when one proceeds to a conceptual interpretation of the introceptive content, but such error does not attach to the pure introceptive cognition itself. In fact, one can secure himself from error of the interpretative type only by carefully avoiding saying anything positive concerning introceptive content, beyond saying that such content exists and is certain. There would remain, then, only the task of the destructive analysis of all relative knowledge. However, I conceive that the value of a conceptual interpretation outweighs the evil of interpretative error.

The Knowledge through Identity given by introceptive cognition gives an immediate relation to a comprehensive content which would have for ordinary relative knowledge the character of an indefensible extrapolation. Thus the notion of the infinite, such as the idea of the sum-total of all terms of an infinite series, is a border-line concept for relative thought. Ordinary conception does not actually comprehend the infinite but projects the notion as a logical extrapolation. But introceptive cognition may be said to begin with just such border-line concepts as immediate and instantaneous realizations. The infinite is not an extrapolation for introception any more than is the immediate content of ordinary vision an extrapolation for perceptual consciousness. Perhaps for a being that lacked completely the power of ordinary vision, but had the capacity for conceptual thought highly developed, the actual content given by vision would appear as an infinite or border-line concept. The psychological significance of the notion of infinity is by no means comprehended in the formal mathematical definition of infinity. I submit that in terms of its psychological significance, the infinite is the border-line of any function, which may become the immediately comprehended content of another function. Thus the seen world is infinitely distant from the world of sound, but yet is the immediately given for sight. If one bears this point in mind he will realize that there is no undue pretension in saying that introceptive cognition gives immediately that which for ordinary conception is the border-line notion of infinity. The immediate realization of infinity would not be the literal step by step summation of an endless series — an impossible task — but would be the direct comprehension of that which appears as an endless and, therefore, impossible summation. This means that the notion of infinity enters into the picture simply as an interpretative device when one seeks to convey an introceptive content within the inadequate form of ordinary conception.

To ordinary consciousness God appears as the Infinite and immortality as an infinite extension of time. In the light of what I have said above, this means that we are dealing with border-line concepts for a

function for which neither God nor immortality can be a direct content. Except in so far as he is also a conceptual thinker, the introceptively awakened man would have no need for the notion of infinity. God and immortality are simply immediate realizations which have very little to do with our ordinary theological notions on the subject. Actually, for instance, we can say that the whole of Eternity can be realized in an instant. In other words, the relativity of time as an infinitely extended manifold is transcended.

We are now in a position to see why the post-Hegelian Idealists had to introduce the notion of infinite regressions. They were simply trying to convey a meaning through conceptual thought which can be truly apprehended only through introceptual realization. The figure that they develop naturally seems impossible if it is taken literally. It is indeed absurd to conceive of the absolute consciousness as actually moving through a process of infinite regression, and I do not believe that the post-Hegelians ever meant anything like that. They are dealing simply with a problem of interpretation by a function that was inadequate for the content in question. It is a serious error to predicate the unavoidable defects of a symbol as being a defect of that which is symbolized.

The implications of the theorem, "Substantiality is inversely proportional to ponderability", are indeed far reaching and often startling from the standpoint of habitual valuations. For here by "ponderable" I mean, not merely everything which can be measured in the usual sense, but everything which can be an objective content of consciousness, whether perceptual or conceptual. In other words, everything objective and tangible is insubstantial and, therefore, ghost-like. The content of empiric consciousness is real emptiness. The empiric world is a mirage, though innocent enough until it is taken to be something real in itself, in which case it becomes the source of all sorts of delusions and bondages.

To be sure, empiric man must come to terms with his environment since by no ordinary means can he simply imagine it as not there and then successfully act along the lines of his imaginings. But the meaning of this objective resistance, which forces man to meet its terms, does not consist in a thing which is independent of all consciousness. It is rather a reflex of that portion of consciousness which has not yet been awakened and assimilated. The extent of man's awareness of the universe is the measure of the degree of his own unconsciousness. To the degree that man's consciousness awakens to that degree the universe tends to vanish until, with complete consciousness, there is no universe left at all. This is the stage wherein at last complete freedom is attained. Man is bound by unconsciousness, and is conditioned by nothing else. The completely liberated man could, if he so chose, reintegrate his universe, but this would not be a process of adding to his consciousness. It would be very definitely by a process of

selective self-veiling. Being aware of an external world would be achieved by narrowing the field of awareness, and not by expanding it.

One may object to the idea that the "extent of man's awareness of the universe is the measure of the degree of his own unconsciousness" on the ground that this implies that the increase of scientific knowledge is tantamount to an increase of unconsciousness. But if we analyze our most advanced special science, i.e., physics, we shall find that its development actually confirms my thesis. For the content for the physicist's thought has become progressively etherealized and intangible. Actually the ponderable universe has become very largely merely an appearance for the physicist, so there is much in this science which sounds decidedly like the Indian doctrine of Maya. Matter is first reduced to elemental parts, such as electrons and protons, and then these cease to be merely small hard balls. It is found that they are essentially of the nature of electricity and that their behaviour is such that it cannot be represented through any sensible model. In the end we find that the only effective description of this behaviour lies in a group of differential equations which do not give a picturable meaning. Further, even the electrons and protons can be destroyed as units, to become flashes of radiation, spreading indefinitely throughout space. Now all of this is simply a disappearance of the universe in the sense of being something real as it appears, while that which remains determinant is a mathematical statement, a somewhat which exists for thought. This simply means that our physicists have become highly conscious and thereby caused a substantial vanishing of the ponderable universe. Thus, so far from discrediting my thesis, actually the late development of our most fundamental special science strongly confirms it.

As I use the term, the Substantial is that which is Real, Perdurable and Self-existent. In contrast, the Phenomenal is that which depends upon something else than itself as it appears. But the Phenomenal is not conceived as a direct manifestation of the Substantial so that by a direct movement of consciousness in the direction of the noumenal, the substantial can be attained if the movement is but maintained far enough. Rather the phenomenon is produced by what might be called a relative withdrawal of substance, so that a movement of consciousness toward the phenomenal is equivalent to a movement away from the Real. The Real is attained by a movement of consciousness in the opposite direction from that by which the phenomenon is experienced. The key to the realization of the Real lies in the turning about of the stream of consciousness towards its source.

The movement of consciousness toward experience as an end-in-itself is equivalent to a growth of spiritual poverty. The ultimate effect of this movement is a state of complete slavish bondage to the object, in which the entity becomes a mere appendage to appearance. Consciousness in this state is quite without depth, i.e., it is a state of soullessness in the sense that all the values connoted by soul are

completely unconscious. But since the unconscious depths of the individual are by no means inactive, simply because the individual consciousness is not aware of them, it follows that one in this state is completely at the mercy of autonomous psychical forces. Individuals and nations in this state are continually drawn into impossible and tragic situations wherein that is done or has to be done which one would prefer to have been otherwise. The conscious individual or national will has no control over the factors which are unconscious to it. The state of the world today simply illustrates just how serious such a situation can be.

Chapter X

INTROCEPTIONALISM The Meaning of Divinity

When we come into the presence of the notion of Divinity we face that which is both the Supreme Value for all consciousness and, yet, in most of its representations the greatest source of evil. Far more often than not, when we hear a man refer to God he is conceiving of only a human invention, which has been handed down by religious institutions and by traditions. Yet, at times, this same word is used to designate the one Reality which genuinely underlies all that is and which may be directly known as the universal Substrate. Thus it is meaningless either to affirm that God is or that God is not, if one does not consider the specific sense in which the term is employed. The God of direct mystical or gnostic Realization is very different from the God of theological speculation and of priestcraft generally. So we can define the term in such a way that it has the highest philosophical and psychological validity, but, in that case, we shall mean something very different from the most common notions on the subject. There is a meaning centering around the notion of Divinity that I find to be of the very highest importance and, yet, I could equally well employ or avoid words commonly used to designate God. With either line of procedure difficulties of a psychological sort are introduced, for, on the one hand, if familiar words are used with a specially delimited connotation, still inherited presuppositions in the mind of the reader are almost certain to confuse the issue, while, on the other hand, the denial of any reality to traditional God-conceptions is equally likely to be interpreted as a sort of atheistic materialism. And both views would be a false understanding of my real meaning. I shall, therefore, have to discuss the senses in which I find the notion of Divinity sound, on one hand, and untenable, on the other.

There is one sense of the God-notion that can be dispensed with very readily. Often in the history of man priests and political rulers have invented or modified an already existing God-notion as an instrument of psychological power and control over the human beings that are ruled. That in this we have a supreme manifestation of evil intent I believe to be so self-evident that little supporting argument is needed. In this connection it may be well to quote the words of a modern Buddhist adept.

And now, after making due allowance for evils that are natural and cannot be avoided — and so few are they

that I challenge the whole host of Western metaphysicians to call them evils or to trace them directly to an independent cause — I will point out the greatest, the chief cause of nearly two-thirds of the evils that pursue humanity ever since that cause became a power. It is religion under whatever form and in whatever nation. It is the sacerdotal caste, the priesthood and the churches. It is in those illusions that man looks upon as sacred, that he has to search out the source of that multitude of evils which is the great curse of humanity and that almost overwhelms mankind. Ignorance created Gods and cunning took advantage of opportunity. Look at India and look at Christendom and Islam, at Judaism and Fetishism. It is priestly imposture that rendered these Gods so terrible to man; it is religion that makes of him the selfish bigot, the fanatic that hates all mankind out of his own sect without rendering him any better or more moral for it. It is belief in Gods and God that makes two-thirds of humanity the slaves of a handful of those who deceive him under the false pretence of saving them. Is not man ever ready to commit any kind of evil if told that his God or gods demand the crime?; voluntary victim of an illusionary God, the abject slave of his crafty ministers. Remember the sum of human misery will never be diminished unto that day when the better portion of humanity destroys in the name of Truth, morality and universal charity, the altars of these

false gods.¹

Thus speaks a representative of one of the greatest religious philosophies. I think that, if we can free our minds from inherited prejudice, we must agree with this indictment. Today, one needs but to observe the procedure of the totalitarian and other nations to see how false gods are invoked to arouse men to most inhuman and uncharitable action. The gods are variously named. They have been called, "the Collectivity", "the Race-nation", "Shinto", "the whiteman's burden", and by other names. But the effect is always the same, i.e., to cause men to act and think unrighteously, though believing that they are righteous in doing so. The most sacred motivation in man is harnessed by a mundane will to accomplish the most malicious kind of objective. There is no evil greater than this. If ever a nation would make war to enforce its will with clean hands then it must carefully avoid invoking the notion of Divinity as a means of building a fighting morale.

¹ The Mahatma Letters, Rider and Company, N.Y., eighth impression (1948), Letter X, p. 57-58.

If divinities of the above type were the only kind of divinities there are, then it would be better that the God-notion should be completely eradicated from the mind of man. But, fortunately, the God-notion has a much more sincere meaning, even though in some manifestations we will have to judge it unsound. Here, at least, we move in a field of philosophical dignity.

When sincerely, but unsoundly, believed in, God is the name of the unknown cause of effects men have not been able to trace to their roots. In this sense, "God" is only a speculative conception which comprehends all that of which man is ignorant but which seems to be necessary to account for that which is known to happen. Thus the "Independent Thing" of the Realist is actually a God of this sort. So also is "Experience", when it is spelled with a capital "E". In this sense, God begins where reason and knowledge end.

It is unquestionably true that, so long as men have awakened only part of the functions of consciousness, there are problems which cannot be solved. Experience and reason alone are incapable of resolving the most ultimate questions, which can, nevertheless, arise in the rational consciousness. In the presence of such a situation there are three possible courses of procedure.

1. A speculative construct may be invented which is conceived to be such that it is the resolution of the problem, but yet is of such a nature that it cannot be directly verified. If one places unconditional confidence in such a construct, it is a God-notion in an unsound and indefensible sense.

2. It is possible to conceive the resolution of the problem as unknown and eternally unknowable. This is systematic agnosticism and is a voluntary surrender to ignorance.

3. One may honestly acknowledge that at present the resolution is unknown, and yet maintain the attitude that possibly by appropriate means a resolution may be possible. This is simply a tentative and honest agnosticism, without implying the ultimate failure of knowledge.

All three resolutions imply ignorance. The first is proud and pretentious in that it places before men a pretention to knowledge which is not genuine. The second is also proud in that the individual implies that his own ignorance must necessarily characterize all men, and not be merely the mark of the limitations of particular functions of consciousness. The third also implies ignorance, but it is frankly acknowledged and humble, thereby supplying a condition most favorable to the awakening of a superior and more comprehensive knowledge.

In the case of a speculative construct which is viewed only as a pragmatic device for handling some practical problem, there is no objection to be raised. Such a construct has the value of only a temporary scaffolding and is known to be such. A positive evil arises when such a construct is uncritically given a transcendental authority

and thus discourages a genuine search for Truth and the acceptance of self-determined moral responsibility. As a general proposition, it may be said that the Gods of theology are of this sort and are a hindrance, rather than an aid, in the progress of man toward genuine Enlightenment. It is better for a man not to feel sure, provided he continues the search for certainty, than to build his structure of assurance upon the quicksand of false gods.

Yet, though it is true that most God-conceptions will not withstand the light of critical examination, still a psychological study of the religious consciousness reveals that the general notion of God points to something genuine. There is a secular kind of consciousness — the kind which most men possess most of the time — and there is a sacred kind of consciousness. The latter always contains some sort of super-mundane content or reference. This content or reference is of a somewhat which is of very superior value when compared to any of the values of the ordinary secular consciousness. In this sacred consciousness there is That which stands as the Supreme Value, often symbolized as the Jewel beyond all price. It is entirely unnecessary to give this Supreme Value any delimiting definition in order to recognize that it exists and is of the highest moral importance to the individual who is oriented to it. All of this, so far, is within the limits of fact available for the appropriate kind of psychological investigation, regardless of whether the introceptive function is awakened and active within the investigator or not. Now, this Supreme Value, when realized, may be, and generally is, given the name for the Divinity that is current in the society of which the individual is a part. When used in this sense, the word "God", or any other name for the Divinity, not only corresponds to a reality, but it points to a Reality that is far more important than anything lying within the limits of secular experience. In this sense, the introceptive Realization has the value of an indubitable proof of the reality of God, for the individual who has awakened this function.

The God of Gnosis or of Mystical Realization is not the God of theology or of priestcraft and political rulers. So great care should be taken not to confuse the one meaning of the word with the other. There are God-conceptions which really are no more than opiates for the dulling of the reason of dominated peoples. But there are also God-conceptions that are filled with the brightest and purest kind of Light. Always is it possible to find counterfeits of real values, but it is ever necessary to be on guard against emotional reactions which all too easily lead the disillusioned man to discard genuine coins once he has been deceived by the counterfeits. Here our means of discrimination between the true and false coins is fairly clear. The true Divinities are known to be by direct and individual realization, and do not exact from man blind and indiscriminating belief. The false Gods rest upon inculcated and constrained belief: Further, the true Gods never demand of man that he should commit rational or intellectual suicide by arbitrary believing of

systematic absurdity. On the contrary, the more intelligent the devotion the more the true Gods are honored.

The Gnostic Divinity may be quite properly known by other names than those most commonly employed. It may be with perfect justice called "LIFE", "CONSCIOUSNESS", "TRUTH" or "SUBSTANCE", though always there is something implied in these names when thus used that reaches beyond any formal definition. The true Divinity can never be completely dissected by conceptual analysis, and this is so, not merely because of a failure to think clearly, but rather for the reason that more is involved than can be comprehended by conceptual process alone. Analysis can accomplish a great deal, but it still remains limited by the fact that it is a functional modification of consciousness that is, in important respect, less than the sum-total of all consciousness. Whenever any individual comprehends anything through his analytic power, that which he comprehends stands on a lower level than himself. So the value of Divinity cannot be given to anything which a man can analyze, for the whole notion of Divinity implies something more comprehensive and superior than the individual himself. Do I possess and command Life, Consciousness, Substance and Truth, or do they possess me? If they possess and fundamentally condition me, then they stand in the relation of the Divinity to me. As some men possess and command far more than others, it follows that the Divinities of some men are equalled or even transcended by other men. It is quite possible for man to transcend his former Gods. So we are delving here with a relative rather than an absolute status.

It is an idea of the more evolved religious consciousness, as exemplified in the case of true Buddhism, that man can attain a position superior to that of his Gods. From this superior level he can even become a teacher of his former Gods. Thus we find the Gods pictured as attending the discourses of the great Buddha and even of others who have attained comparable status. Of course, in such a case the man has become equal or even superior to the Gods, and so they cease to bear the former relationship to him. Now, all of this gives to the conception of Divinity a meaning quite different from that common to our Western theology. The Gods have a relative, rather than an absolute character. But, on the other hand, their existence is much more than an arbitrary predication of a speculative construct. Their existence is known by direct realization and so rests upon solid ground.

To call Life, Consciousness, Truth or Substance the Divinity implies that in these notions we are dealing with something a good deal more than mere abstractions or hypotheses. In the true sense, that only may be called Divine with which man may realize the most intimate relationship, that is, a really vital relationship. This is not true of a merely abstract construction. Of course, the notion of Divinity implies that the Divine is also something superior and more comprehensive, so intimacy of relationship is a necessary but not sufficient condition.

Now, we speak of life in general as a sort of abstraction but so long as it means only that to us it is not known as a Divinity. But if one attained a state of conscious unity with universal Life he would know God. He would be in the Awakened or Enlightened state behind the scenes of empiric activity. This means being conscious in just precisely the zone which commonly is quite unconscious and this, in turn, implies that such an individual can will and direct subtle activities, where formerly he was merely acted upon. Simply enormous implications follow from this, for the individual who attains this state can, from a personal standpoint which is quite rational and governed by law, produce effects which, from the perspective of others who are more largely conditioned by unconscious powers, seem to be actually magical or miraculous. Yet there is nothing more involved than the awakening of a latent human possibility and an activity which, on its own level, is completely rational and governed by its own laws. A change of perspective is equivalent to a magical transformation of the world. There is nothing here transcending the possibilities of philosophic understanding.

I hope that what I have said will supply a more intelligible and acceptable meaning to the idea of God-consciousness. To be directly conscious of Life as such, of Consciousness in its unorganized purity, or of Substance as perdurable depth is to be conscious of the Divinity and, possibly, even as the Divinity. There is no question here of setting up a relationship with an infinitely distant Being that stands apart from the universe, a notion that would be quite absurd. It is all simply a matter of achieving a conscious relationship with one's own supporting roots, and one could even dispense with the language commonly associated with religion, provided he did not depreciate the significance of the roots. Often the awakened man can afford to be privately amused or saddened by many of the notions which many men view as sacred, though a compassionate consideration may cause him to veil his own feeling. For the feeling for the sacred is very important, even though it is oriented to inadequate and even inferior notions.

Now, having said this much concerning what I mean when I refer to the Divinity, I trust that I shall not be misunderstood in subsequent use of the term.

In the chapter on Idealism I have already noted the fact that the state of consciousness wherein consciousness is dissociated from the object and united only with the subject is only transitory. Almost immediately consciousness acquires a new kind of content. But the new content is wholly of a sacred character and is not the world as formerly known. What is meant by this is very easily misunderstood since it does not mean or, at least, does not necessarily mean that the photographic image of the sensible world is altered. I shall try of make the distinction between the new and the old content clear.

The transformation which I am describing has no effect upon the sensible form of the world as it appears. If one were an engineer when

he passed through the transforming process and continued to function as an engineer, his methods of practical operation upon objective nature would remain the same. There would be no reason for his dispensing with pragmatic conceptions which had proven to be of practical value. His superior insight might guide him to more effective conceptions and methods, but still there is no reason to expect that these would be of radically different type as compared to those commonly used by engineers and scientists. The transformation affects the attitude toward the sensible world, rather than its apparent form. It is the reality-value which undergoes a radical alteration. I may illustrate this by a familiar experience of the student of geometry. In the case of the more familiar Euclidian form of geometry we conceive of the various configurations as existing in a space which is unaffected by the presence or absence of material bodies. The straight or other lines will pass through the earth as little altered as when passing through so-called empty space. The surveyor constantly makes use of this principle. But the employment of this conception by no means interferes with the power to perceive material bodies. Those bodies are merely irrelevant to the geometrician. For the sensible man they exist, but for the geometrician they are unreal and are in no wise a barrier to his thought. Here we find that the object as seen is one thing, while the object of thought is quite another. For the concrete man, in this case, we have a practical separation of the functions of perception and conception and, except for periods of special concentration, both functions are active simultaneously but essentially independently.

In the foregoing case, we have a situation such that a problem of relative reality arises almost inevitably. Two individuals of equal intellectual ability may give to the geometric and sensible worlds diametrically opposite reality valuations. One may say that the sensible world is the more real while the other may say that it is the geometric world that has reality. In both cases some form of the problem of appearance and reality arises and each predicates a reality-maya contrast, though in the reverse senses. And this is a difference which cannot be resolved either by logical reasoning or by reference to empiric fact. For both individuals may resolve the specific geometric theorems equally effectively. And, further, a study of the genesis of the original geometric conceptions would not resolve the difference. Even though it is shown that geometric conceptions first arise in connection with an empiric problem, this does not imply that the geometric knowledge comes from the perceptual field. The empiric situation may be interpreted as simply an occasion which aroused into activity a latent geometric understanding. No, neither a reference to fact nor logical reasoning can resolve the difference between the two valuations. The difference is one of fundamental attitude and, hence, essentially religious. The one individual is more materialistic in his attitude, the other more spiritual, although the intellectual ability may be

practically equal. But the significance of the objective world in the two cases is totally different. The problem of adjustment takes quite diverse forms.

Now, in this instance, we have an illustration of the effect of the introceptive transformation upon the world-view. The new sacred content of consciousness affects radically the reality-valuation without altering the photographic image of the sensible world. The consequences which follow are enormously important, though they are of such a subtle nature that they do not readily lend themselves to description. For instance, one knows the universe to be the best possible world and everything is as it should be, despite all the seeming disharmony and barbarism. It is realized that the seeming out-of-joint world is an effect of incomplete consciousness — the kind of product one receives by the collaboration of perception and conception when the introceptive function is not awakened. The latter is like the reverse side of an embroidered cloth where the effect is chaotic and there are many loose threads. But on the other side we have a perfectly orderly design. On the one side, it seems that mere chance accounts for the pattern and that man lives in an alien world which has no inner sympathy with his purposes and yearnings, while the other side reveals a perfect order in complete sympathetic rapport with the deepest yearnings and aspirations of the human being. In the sacred world one feels himself to be perfectly at home, and nothing is strange. There is no problem of melioration. There is no problem of making a better world, since that which is, is the best that possibly could be.

The practical moral problem is completely transformed. It is no longer oriented to meliorating conditions or making the world better, but to the awakening of a sleeping human consciousness. The transformed individual may devote himself to this moral problem in the social body with all the energy of which he is capable. In this activity he may will to face the severest kind of hardship. His heart may be touched most profoundly with sympathy for human suffering. But his treatment is radically different from that of the meliorator. He knows that mere melioration, which is not united with an effort to awaken the introceptive function, is merely a movement down a blind alley. Indeed, there are even situations, such that, melioration will have a delaying effect upon the awakening process and, in this kind of situation, he would view the melioration as unwise and tending to delay the real resolution of the problem of suffering. To the all-too-human consciousness he may even appear to be cold, though actually his heart may be bleeding at the sight of what he knows to be needless suffering. Indeed, the moral problem tends to become more vital than it ever was before, but the way of resolution is totally transformed.

The sacred universe is identical with Divinity and is exclusively Divine. There simply is nothing else. For one who has been captured by the view that the Divinity is merely a grand sort of entity

designed on the lines of the human being, the meaning of the Divine universe will be, almost inevitably, misunderstood. There is very considerable testimony that some individuals have seen appearances in the form of vast and grand human-like forms, but such are much less than what I mean by the Divinity. At present I am not discussing the significance of such appearances, though there is evidence that they do have enormous significance, at least in some cases. I am referring, rather, to a substrate underlying all forms whatsoever. Subtle appearances of the above type may, indeed, enrobe an aspect of Divinity, but no less is such the case of every visible aspect of the universe. The Divinity is equally embodied in a mountain-chain or in a ocean. The fact is that all these appearances are simply symbols of a Reality which, in its own true nature, is unseen, though it may be introceptively realized and thus known in the Gnostic sense.

Clearly what I mean by Divinity is a somewhat that is quite impersonal. Yet, this somewhat can be directly realized by the function of introception and, when so realized, it is found to be much the most intimate of all things. It is the fulfillment of all the deep yearnings of the human heart and it illumines the mind with a Light which is far more brilliant than any light of the intellect either operating in its purity or in relation to experience. This combination of impersonality and intimacy poses a real difficulty to unawakened consciousness, for we commonly associate the intimate with the personal. But actually that which is personal is segregated into a sort of differentiated cell, so that between personalities there are always separating boundaries. Mostly what we find in other personalities is, at best, but a hidden aspect of ourselves. Between us and the other, there is a distance which is never crossed until mutual identity is achieved by the realization of common roots. It is not difficult to see that we are actually much more intimately related to space than to any personality whatsoever, for space interpenetrates our being at every point. So is it when one comes into conscious realization of the underlying Divinity; it interpenetrates our being with the same completeness that space does our physical manifestation. But whereas objective space seems to us as something quite cold, the hidden Divinity is warm.

To attain a direct realization of Substance, Life, Consciousness or Truth is a good deal more than solving a scientific problem. When one has solved a scientific problem he has mastered something of instrumental value, he has achieved a means for facilitating some human purpose. But, clearly, this is much less than the ultimate fulfillment of purpose and yearning. The growth of scientific knowledge is merely progress in a series where each last term leads on to a new problem with, apparently, no end. But the introceptive realization provides a terminal value. At one step the individual has reached the culmination of the infinite series of relative consciousness. This gives to the realized value a unique significance. It is more than an

instrumental knowledge and more than the temporary satisfying of one desire in an endless series of desires. Desire as a genus is fulfilled, and the knowledge realized is culminating. For this reason we are dealing with an order quite other than that of secular consciousness. Because I can find no other language which will suggest its meaning I must call it the sacred order, and speak of the content of this consciousness as Divine. Yet the common attitude toward religious values suggests features which I do not at all intend. Thus we often associate religion with an attitude wherein discriminating thought is allowed to take a holiday. It is the zone where rational men often allow themselves to take an irrational holiday and are permitted a kind of intellectual irresponsibility. This is not at all true of the Gnostic realization, which requires the most serious application of the will and the exercise of the keenest discrimination. What I mean is suggested by a combination of the religious motif with scientific alertness and discrimination. Thus it is, in a sense, neither religion nor science as ordinarily understood, and yet combines features belonging to each.

For the individual who is both introceptively and perceptually awake the universe is cognized in two ways which may be more or less completely blended. As perceived, the universe is known to be a drama which is not itself its own meaning, but as introceived it is known to be an effect of realities hidden to perception when functioning alone or in combination with thought. One sees the drama and yet is united with the consciousness of the director of the drama. He has an introceptive understanding of underlying purpose even though his power of conceptual interpretation may be highly defective. He may even Know, and know that he Knows, without being able to conceive of what he inwardly Knows. For conception in these matters requires all the skill of a superior intellect, and it appears that skill of this sort is by no means a condition of introceptive awakening. Hence we do have many inadequate interpretative statements from those who have attained some degree of this awakening. Perhaps, more often than not, the Mystic does not possess the best conceptual understanding of his own insight, and I believe that this is one of the main reasons why genuine mystical consciousness is so generally depreciated by scientific and philosophical minds. Yet rational man should make allowances for this and not condemn a content because of inadequate presentation.

The substantial substrate behind the perceptually apparent world is the Soul of the Universe. Through the introceptive union with this Soul it is possible to establish an inner communion with all things. Through man's own participation in that Soul, he partakes of the soul of all creatures and things; he finds a phase of consciousness underlying all objects. So he finds that the universe is, in reality, neither dead nor blind. And so it results, that for him who has attained introceptive realization a mystical communion is, or may be, established with all objects. They are no longer merely lifeless values which may be

substituted for x in general propositions. They are rather parts of a universal brotherhood, which is by no means exclusively confined to human beings.

PART III
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
CRITIQUE OF
MYSTICISM

Chapter XI

JUDGMENTS OF MEANING AND EXISTANCE

When we consider any conception, our way of viewing the conception may be oriented to one or the other of two attitudes, or to a combination of these. We may think of the conception as an existence in time and thus having a history, possessing an externally observable constitution and standing in discernible relationships with other conceptions, and all of this may be done without an inner understanding of the significance of the conception. But we may also think of the conception in the sense of its meaning or value and from this standpoint it may be viewed quite out of relation to its history and various external relationships. Thus, for example, if the object of interest was some important theorem in mathematics we might be, on the one hand, especially interested in its historic development, the psychological processes which led to its discovery and the part which it played in its impact upon the social body. Conceivably, the historian or the psychologist might proceed with a reasonably comprehensive and competent investigation of these circumstances without being able to understand the theorem itself. The theorem would be simply a non-understood somewhat which had had such and such a history and influence upon life in general, and possessed of more or less determinant psychological antecedents. But, in contrast to all this and, indeed, with complete ignorance of all these facts, the student of the theorem might be interested exclusively with respect to its inner content, its logical development and its relationship to other parts of mathematical theory. For this purpose, it would be a matter of no moment whether the theorem had a human history or had been precipitated "out of the blue", as it were, and was somehow there before consciousness.

Indeed, most of the mathematician's interest in pure mathematics is of this latter sort.¹

These two ways of thinking of a conception are recognized in logic and supply judgments of two different orders. The first kind of judgments may be called a "judgment of existence" and the second a "judgment of significance or value". The former is a determination that a somewhat is, and traces its observable history and relations, while the latter is a determination of what a somewhat is, thus giving its inner meaning. We might say, the first deals with considerations of fact, while the second is concerned with Truth value. However, in saying this I acknowledge that I am forming an evaluation judgment as to the relations of the two types of judgment. Other philosophic orientations exist that would not support this judgment, but as we must all assume, consciously or unconsciously, some philosophic orientation in the approach to the subject-matter under consideration, I conceive it to be better to be frank about the matter at the beginning, rather than to hide oneself under the appearance of false omniscience. As William James has clearly stated in his first chapter of The Varieties of Religious Experience, the one type of judgment does not lead immediately to the other, at least in so far as our relative experience goes. Thus, any judgment as to how the one type of judgment is related to the other is, itself, a judgment of value, involving subjective factors, and is not an objective determination of fact.

It appears to me that the relationship between judgments of existence and judgments of significance is not a uniform one for all possible kinds of objects which may come under consideration. Thus, if the object is of that sort which Spengler has called "physiognomic" or "political", it may well be that the existential judgment is, in high degree, determinant with respect to the judgment of significance. For, in this domain, a difference in history clearly effects a difference in meaning. But in the domain of the "systematic", in Spengler's sense, the existential and meaningful judgments may be nearly, and possibly wholly, independent. Certainly, the independence is very clear in an instance such as that of the mathematical theorem. For the truth-value of the

¹ An instance is afforded in the case of the Relativity Theory of Einstein. An aspect of that Theory leads to the formula, $E=mc^2$ where E represents energy, m is mass and c is the velocity of light in centimeters. This formula led to the development of the atomic and hydrogen bombs. The impact of these upon history and the mass-psychology of the world is an all too painful present fact. The historian and psychologist is, no doubt, abundantly aware of all this and, yet, this by no means implies that they have a competent understanding of the inner content of the Special and General Theories of Relativity, of complex conception of simultaneity with respect to bodies in different velocities with respect to each other, of the increase of mass toward infinity as velocity approaches the speed of light or of the properties of a non-Euclidian geometry.

theorem has nothing whatsoever to do with the background of its discovery. Whether the psycho-physical condition of the discoverer was judged pathological or normal has not the slightest bearing with respect to the soundness or value of the theorem.

The great discoveries and creative developments, which so largely differentiate the life of man from that of the animals, are usually the work of genius. But the study of geniuses, as psycho-physical existences, has demonstrated that, in this sense, genius, as a whole, stands closer to the pathologic types who occupy asylums, than it does to the ordinary normal man. Thus, from the standpoint of the valuation which views organic adjustment to environment and fitness to survive in the biologic sense as the adequate measure of the worth of a man, the genius would be judged in the same way as the ordinary psychotic. In this sense, genius is a weakness and liability which might better be exposed to death in childhood, as was the custom of the Spartans. But, from the standpoint of the valuation of one who sees the contribution of genius as affording the highest of all values for individual and social consciousness, it might well appear that the worth of the psycho-physical normalcy of the Philistine is very much in doubt.

The issue we face here is, whether, on the one hand, we shall take our stand with or near those who give exclusive approval to survival and adjustment value of a psycho-physical organism, or, on the other, shall we stand with those who give exclusive or primary value to the meaningful offering for consciousness. Not all men agree, or can be brought to agree, as to which point of view to adopt. Some, in essential agreement with the former German National Socialists, will take the stand that fitness for psycho-physical survival is all important, while the contribution of genius is to be tolerated only in so far as it contributes to biological survival. Others, in essential agreement with the philosophical mystic and the pure mathematician, will affirm that enrichment of consciousness is all-important, and bio-physical existence is of worth, only in an instrumental sense. Unequivocally, I take my stand with the latter group and affirm, categorially, its superiority since there is no logical way to prove that superiority to the satisfaction of all men. I would not deny to those with the bio-physical orientation the right to go to perdition by their own route.

The psycho-biological study of genius has not generally led to a depreciation of the contribution of genius as a result of the general finding of an abnormal psycho-physiological make-up in the constitution of genius. The worth of genius to the sciences and arts is a too well attested fact to permit a serious consideration of such a judgment. In fact, the psychological and biological sciences owe their existence far too much to the achievements of genius for such a judgment to be a safe weapon. Indeed, it would prove to be a boomerang, since, if the soundness of the contribution of genius is conditional upon the soundness of psycho-biological constitution of the genius himself, then many of the

conceptions fundamental to biology and psychology would be vulnerable before such a criticism. Hence, the psycho-biological judgment would be self-destroying. So, on the whole, this kind of study has not led to a confusion of existential and meaningful judgments. But in one particular field this discrimination has not been consistently maintained. That is the field of religious genius. Here, in instance after instance, the psycho-physical facts in the lives of religious genius have been employed to evaluate the conscious value produced by the genius, and generally in the direction of depreciation of that value.

Both consistency and integrity are violated in arbitrarily treating religious and other genius by divergent canons of interpretation. This arbitrary discrimination in treatment is not a manifestation of an impersonal scientific spirit. It reflects, rather, the personal prejudice of the investigators and is less than ethical, to say the least. It is simply a manifestation of wishful thinking in an anti-religious direction.

Psycho-biological investigation has been extended beyond the special study of genius. It is assumed, with considerable justification, that all states of consciousness, with whatsoever content and of whatever value, are associated with psycho-physical states or modification of function. Hence, it appears, a correlation may be established between conscious attitudes and contents, on the one hand, and the psycho-physical states and modification of function. There is substantial evidence to support this view as a general principle, and there is no logical reason to suppose that it is not universally true with respect to all embodied consciousness. But the establishing of the fact of such a correlation is by no means equivalent to a determination of the nature of the correlation. Thus, the relationship might be one of parallelism or of causal connection, and if the relationship is causal, there are then three possibilities of interpretation. The causal priority may be biological, or it may be psychical or, finally, it may be an interacting combination of these two. Further, the question arises, Is the causal connection essential and constitutive, or is it like a catalytic agent? It is no simple matter to answer these questions satisfactorily so that objective determinations become decisive. On the whole, it appears that personal predilection or, possibly, insight determines the manner in which the correlation is viewed.

Now, in so far as the psycho-biological approach has been employed in the study of mystical states of consciousness, whether or not the subjects of study were geniuses, there has been a strong tendency to interpret mystical content from the perspective of observed psychical and physiological states and modifications. There is a quite considerable tendency to view the psychical and physiological as causally determinant, and largely the doctrine of organic evolution is assumed as a valid interpretative principle. As shown in the first chapter of the present work, there is much in this that is simply assumption and, therefore, much

less than proven fact. One is not less scientific because he does not accept these assumptions, provided he can proceed from another basis with logical consistency and does not affirm a position incompatible with determinant fact.

In the present psychological critique of mystical states of consciousness I shall assume as a working principle the primacy of conscious-content to psycho-biological state and function. This is equivalent to affirming that significance is primary and determinant, while fact, in the sense of objective determination, is derivative and secondary. Applying this principle in the case of mathematical production, we would start with the theorem, and its directly known value, and from that perspective, interpret the psychical and biological facts that are observed in the study of the productive mathematician. This I conceive to be a much more significant approach than the reverse. For we are much more certain about the theorem than we are relative to the psychical and biological facts. If there is room to doubt mathematical assurance, there is certainly much vaster reason for doubting the empiric determination of fact. Further, I would assume, as a starting point, the mathematical understanding of the best developed mathematical genius, and would determine such genius by the general consensus of mathematicians, and not of psychologists and biologists.

I believe the foregoing principle of selection is generally recognized in the professional world as the only valid one for the valuation of special talent. I simply propose to apply this principle consistently in the field of religious mysticism.

This is frankly an approach to the subject from the perspective of the greatest and most perfect manifestations of the mystical consciousness. It, therefore, is a radical divergence from the approach of both James H. Leuba and William James who explicitly start with inferior manifestations, though arriving at divergent conclusions. It also varies from the approach of Dr. Carl G. Jung, but not so radically. There will be many points in respect to which I shall stand in agreement with the conclusions of both William James and Dr. Jung, though my conclusions and treatment will diverge fundamentally from that of James H. Leuba.

As a case of a rather extreme divergence from the standpoint taken here, I shall have occasion to give special attention the the thesis of James H. Leuba as developed in his The Psychology of Religious Mysticism. In this work Leuba claims to find the root-sources of mystical states of consciousness in the practices of barbaric peoples, this being based upon the assumption that these barbaric peoples are true primitives. I believe this assumption to be in error, and conceive the truth to be that these peoples are degenerates, rather than primitives, and, accordingly, the seemingly mystical practices of such are degraded end-terms and counterfeits of the real practices, rather than the root sources. The justification of this viewpoint I have outlined briefly in

the first chapter of the first part of this work. I do not believe that an adequate understanding of a true and sound coin can ever be achieved through the perspective afforded through the study of counterfeits. The base metal of the counterfeit may well contaminate the understanding so that the power to recognize the essence of the true coin is lost. This contamination very clearly colors Leuba's work.

Chapter XII

CHRIST BUDDHA AND SHANKARA

In the great Indo-European racial block, to which most of us in the West belong, it is not difficult to pick three mystical geniuses to which general and competent consensus of opinion would grant the status of primacy. These three are Christ, Buddha and Shankara. Christendom would obviously accord such a status to Christ, and with this judgment Christian mysticism agrees. The same status is granted Buddha in the vast Buddhist community and, also, by a number of Western scholars and aspirants. Shankara is granted a comparable position in the Brahmanical community and, especially, by those who follow the Advaita Vedanta. I know of no evidence which would support any claim of superior mystical profundity on the part of any generally known Sage of the non-Aryan races. Of the non-Aryans, I know of but one of comparable stature, i.e., Lao-tzu, but we do not know him well enough, nor is his meaning clear enough to our non-Mongolian minds, for Him to serve our present purposes satisfactorily.

The question as to whether these three great religious geniuses and leaders are actually instances of mystical realization is not one, as I think, that needs to delay us for long. None the less, for the purpose of clarity, I shall briefly outline the ground for classifying Them as mystically awakened Men. For this purpose it will be necessary to define just what is meant by "mystical consciousness", etc.

The words "mystic" and "mysticism" have both a wider and narrower definition. There is, in addition, a loose usage in which "mystical" is understood as meaning a reproach thrown "at any opinion which we regard as vague and vast and sentimental, and without a base in either facts of logic". (Varieties of Religious Experience p. 380) But this usage is of no use to us and is, in addition, quite incompetent. The word as employed here has a much more definite reference. I shall give several definitions derived from standard sources. (a) The Century Dictionary gives the following: "Mystic" means "hidden from or obscure to human knowledge or comprehension; pertaining to what is obscure or incomprehensible; mysterious; dark; obscure; specifically, expressing a sense comprehensible only to a higher grade of intelligence or to those specifically initiated". "Mysticism" means, (1) "Any mode of thought, or phase of intellectual or religious life, in which reliance is placed upon a spiritual illumination believed to transcend the ordinary powers of the understanding", and (2), "Specifically, a form of religious belief which is founded upon spiritual experience, not discriminated or tested and systematized in thought." (b) The Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology gives as the preferred meaning: "Those forms of speculative

and religious thought which profess to attain an immediate apprehension of the divine essence or the ultimate ground of existence." This source notes, but does not recommend, a usage which defines "Mysticism" as "any philosophy which does not limit itself to the world of 'the visible' and 'our logical mensurative faculty'". It is further noted that several mystics or mystically oriented thinkers insist upon a special organ, faculty or mode of apprehension, other than the senses and discursive intellective, as the means of mystical apprehension or realization. Thus we have the "scintilla" or "spark" of Bonaventura, the "Funklein" or "spark" of Eckhart, the "intellectual intuition" of Schelling and the similar requirement of Schopenhauer. (c) Leuba in his Psychology of Religious Mysticism defines mysticism, for the purposes he has in hand, as "any experience taken by the experiencer to be a contact (not through the senses, but "immediate", "intuitive") or union of the self, with a larger-than-self, be it called World-Spirit, God, the Absolute, or otherwise". (d) James in The Varieties of Religious Experience defines mystical experience by four marks, two of which are essential and sufficient, while the remaining two are generally present. The two essential and sufficient marks are (1) "ineffability" as marking the quality of the state of consciousness immediately experienced by the mystic, and (2) "noetic quality" of a sort "unplumbed by the discursive intellect". The secondary marks, not necessary but usually present are (1) transiency of the state of mystical experience, and (2) passivity of the individually directed will or activity in the presence of a superior power which takes over.

In India the word "Yoga" carries the meaning of our "mystical practice" and "mystical realization". Deussen in his The System of the Vedanta defines Yoga as "preparation" (for union with the world's spirit), but the term is also used to designate the realized state of union itself. In India also the actuality of a mystical organ, faculty or mode of apprehension is affirmed. Thus "Samadhi" and "Dhyana" both refer to a "concentration" or "meditation" as a process other than sensual reception or intellective activity which leads to realization of the "Supreme Soul" or, as with the Buddhists, "the Prajna Paramita", or Transcendental Wisdom. Specifically the term "Samahindriya" means the organ of ecstatic meditation.

One who is familiar with the mystical state of consciousness as a type, either through objective study or, especially, through direct acquaintance with the state itself, will recognize these definitions as all substantially correct with respect to either some phase of the state, or to the thought oriented to such a state. However, the definitions are manifestly not identical. In fact, a careful study of them reveals definition from three points of view, as follows: (a) The religious (also possibly the metaphysical). Mystical realization or Yoga, conceived as "union" with the "World-Spirit", the "Void", the "Absolute", the "Divinity", the "Supreme Self", or any supernal Largeness that is

to the personal self as the Infinite is to the finite, involves the very essence of the religious spirit. This is definition by a conceptual reflection of the immediate value which the state has for the mystic himself. (b) The epistemological. In this case, the definition is by means of the instrumentality whereby the mystical consciousness is attained, not in the sense of a practice, but in that of an organ, faculty or mode of apprehension other than those of the senses and of intellectual functioning. Definition from this angle emphasizes the noetic quale of the mystical state. The consciousness is conceived as possessing an immediate, but non-sensuous, noetic value, which may serve as the fountainhead of philosophic systems. Mystical states that are mainly or wholly states of feeling are not adequately comprehended by this definition. (c) The psychological. The definitions of Leuba and James fall primarily in this category. In this case, the state is approached primarily as an "experience", and hence something which may occur in the lives of empiric men as they live in time. This is not definition of the state from the perspective of the realized content nor from that of an awakened way of consciousness. It is rather mysticism as viewed from the outside, i.e., as it can be observed by a consciousness which has no immediate acquaintance with the state. This is the objective view, but it is not restricted to the extreme objectivity of the behavioristic psychologist. It includes introspective observation, but not the introceptive insight which is essential for the study of, what we might call, the meta-psychology of the process.

The ordinary psychological approach — excluding metapsychology — is largely dependent upon the autobiographical material of actual mystics that have included more or less introspective material. Unfortunately, the Orientals have supplied us with almost none of this type of material. There are elaborate rules governing practice, metapsychological descriptions of the processes and interpretations in the abstract of the resultant, but almost no report in objective terms of what happened in the experience of an individual. Material of this sort from Western mystics is also restricted, and, in the few cases where it is fairly ample, we do not have the most mature development of the consciousness.

The immediate purpose in developing an adequate definition of mystical states of consciousness is that of justifying the selection of Christ, Buddha and Shankara as the outstanding exemplars of such states. But, in as much as we do not seem to have any introspective material from any of these Men, satisfactory identification of these Men as mystics from the standpoint of Western psychology is not easy. Especially is this true from the standpoint of the test to which Leuba seems to attach chief importance. I refer to the test of the ecstatic trance.

So far as I know, there is no clear evidence that either Christ or Buddha entered into the full trance state. The references in the Gospels to Christ's going into the wilderness to pray for protracted intervals almost certainly means periods of meditation rather than prayer in the common sense. But meditation can lead to Samadhi without black-out trance. The Buddhist Sutras do distinctly speak of the Master as being at times in states of deep Samadhi, particularly at the time of the initial Transformation. But, again, Samadhi does not necessarily imply black-out trance, and, judging by the record as given in the Sutras, Buddha regarded trance as unnecessary and did not recommend it, though not repudiating it. Some incidents in the biographical account of Shankara's life do imply full trance, but in these cases it appears to have been a deliberate transference of consciousness for a specific purpose, rather than for the attainment of spiritual insight. Since Patanjali was Shankara's Guru, it is not unlikely that the early Recognitions of Shankara might have involved trance states. But it is known that in his own teachings Shankara did not recommend the methods of Patanjali, but rather a technique of exceptionally keen intellectual discrimination.

We are faced here with a problem of major importance. Are trance states, of greater or less degree, essential to the Yogic and Mystical Awakenings, even of the highest order? Leuba seems to regard this test as decisive as he develops his case throughout his book, though this criterion is no part of his definition. He starts with drug-intoxication and colors the whole subject with that perspective. I believe him to be guilty of gross misrepresentation here. I appreciate the methodological convenience of the test, since a trance state can be objectively determined, but such procedure is equivalent to sacrificing substance to method. It is not exactly a case of throwing out the baby with the bath but, rather, throwing out the baby and keeping the bath. I am well aware that some Yogic techniques do develop trance of extreme degree, but these techniques fall under the general group known as Kundala Yoga. I have found no evidence that Yoga-practice of the type known either as Jnanayoga or Dhyanyoga necessarily implies trance, and it is just this latter form of Yoga which, it is said, can reach to the highest Samadhi. Finally, my own experience is a clear confirmation of the view that black-out trance is not necessary, at least as far as my consciousness reached. Now, how does that state which I realized appear in the light of the above definitions? First, take the four marks listed by William James. (1) The immediate content of the state was ineffable. (2) It had most positive noetic value. (3) The periods of penetration were temporary. (Indeed, I found it necessary to restrict the period because the state does impose a subtle strain upon the nervous organism.) (4) There is a flow of consciousness that is autonomous, and even when in the personal sense I initiated a thought, it developed of itself without intellectual labor. Second, judging by

the Leuba test, clearly the consciousness involved union of self-identity with an Other which was larger than the personal self, though in the first instance It was a Transcendent Self, and later transcended all selfhood and all being. Third, by the more philosophical standard of definition, I believe that what has been written in the three earlier parts of this work clearly places the speculative treatment within the class of mystical conception. Further, I know that the most profound state, if formulated strictly, rather than symbolically, can only be represented by absolute negation of every possible conception. I confess, if I had in former years come across such a definition or description of a state, it would have seemed to me to be simply unconsciousness, for that would have been the only thing I could have imagined as satisfying the description. However, I know it is very highly conscious and the difficulty lies in the limitations of conceptual imagination. In any case, the state goes far beyond one in which subtle appearances of beings would have been imagined to be substantial realities. Yet, through all this, objective awareness of the sensible environment remained unbroken and relative thinking continued, either in a subdued form, or even as a rather intensive activity. I know the state is possible in the presence of other persons, and even on the lecture platform, and can be analyzed and discoursed upon to those who are present, and without breaking the state if care is used. There is in this, however, a dissociation in consciousness so that two and even three parts are recognizable. Discrimination must be employed to keep the two or three phases isolated. This, I think, accomplishes the essential office of the trance. Further, consciously self-directed bodily motion is possible. But the dynamis in the motor sensory and intellectual fields is, generally, definitely reduced. However, I do not find that the energetic reduction in the sensory field is greater than that involved in any heavy intellectual abstraction, as is required in mathematical thinking, for instance. It is not a state favorable for close objective observation, for this requires concentration in the sensory field. But the objective sensible images, as seen, do not seem to be less clear than in the normal state. They are, however, quite empty in the sense of having no relevance whatsoever. They are seen clearly as a definitely defined mirage is seen clearly, but they have as little reality as a mirage that is known to be a mirage. Thus, there is a subtle sense in which the objective world is destroyed, but not as perceptible sensible fact.

In the light of all the foregoing, I am forced to be positive in saying that Leuba's trance test is not necessary. Later I shall analyze its sufficiency. Here I shall anticipate my conclusion by saying that I believe that I can show that it is not sufficient, since trance consciousness may include many states that are not truly to be classed as mystical, except in a loose sense.

Without more ado I shall abandon the tests of Western objective psychology for justifying the inclusion of Christ, Buddha and Shankara among the mystics. I shall judge Their mystical status by Their lives and teachings.

A. Mystical signs in the life and teachings of the Christ.

In considering the life of the Christ as represented in the records that have come down to us, I shall disregard entirely the miraculous powers He is said to have possessed and manifested, since it is not my intention to deal with the sensible theurgic side of mysticism at all. We do not have any way of dealing with the problem of theurgy which is scientifically adequate. For the most part we can only accept or reject theurgic claims or reports blindly, and that is not at all satisfactory. Further, I am convinced that the mystical state can be vindicated entirely apart from any consideration of sensible powers. Finally, I do not consider myself competent on this question, at least in so far as theurgy is concerned with phenomenal effects. In any case, I do not consider that the record of sensible miracles either adds to or detracts from the stature of the Christ. The non-sensible theurgic powers are, however, quite a different matter. They are important. Magical effects which produce moral and spiritual revolutions in the entourage are of the highest importance. This is one of the major mystical signs, and in the case of the Christ they are particularly outstanding. There is no question but that innumerable human beings in the past 1900 years have become changed as to the center of their motivation and valuation as a result of the influence of the Christ. And this has been brought about in a way that is much more magical than intellectual. On the whole, the change has been in a direction of greater selflessness of attitude, together with a shift from worldly to other-worldly orientation. As this is definitely in the direction of the norm of the inner state of mystical realization. We have indirect evidence of the mystical character of Christly consciousness. This is simply a massive instance of the "leavening" or "inducing" power of the mystical consciousness. It is highly contagious.

Enhancement of moral energy in the character of the followers is further evidence of prime importance. The strength of character with which the Christians faced their centuries of persecution is a major miracle in itself — one, in fact, that is a good deal more significant than the feeding of the 5000. As contrasted with what we might call the counterfeit or "mystoid" states, such as those induced by drugs, true mystical consciousness leads to increased power of self-determined will — a will that is all the stronger because it does not have an egoistic centering.

One who reads the record of the life and teachings of the Christ objectively, and then proceeds to integrate the whole about a single idea which shall reflect the primary significance of that whole, finds that it consists almost wholly of an ethical teaching and a personal

exemplification of that teaching. One does not find philosophical interpretation nor psychological analysis, though there is an implied philosophy and an implied psychology. Christ did not teach the doctrine of the absolute primacy of ethics, as such, but, rather, a specific kind of conduct and moral orientation, which He exemplified in His own life in extraordinary degree. It is the kind of morality inculcated and exemplified that is significant for our purposes. There have been various types of moral orientation promulgated by men, and there have been innumerable individuals and groups who have organized their lives around one or another of these systems quite heroically. The exemplars of Christic and Buddhist morality have no monopoly of moral heroism. The history of the world has afforded us a number of examples of professional soldiers who have thoroughly believed in the militarist's moral code and made their lives to conform with it as thoroughly as has any Christian or Buddhist saint in his counter moral-orientation. The thorough-going militarist is not without a code, but his code is diametrically opposed to that of the Christs and Buddhas. Indeed, morale may mean as much to the militarist as it does to the saint, but it is a radically opposed kind of morale. A quite different philosophy is implied. So, for us, it is the kind of ethics taught and practiced by the Christ which is significant, rather than that ethics, as such, was given prime importance.

The Christic ethics centers around four inter-connected principles or foci that are of the highest significance. These we shall consider in sequence.

1. First of all the Christic morale is centered around primary consideration for otherness and is, therefore, radically anti-egoistic. In this respect it is in complete accord with Buddhist morality which is explicitly and emphatically anti-egoistic. Self-depreciation is implied in the concern for the good of others that shall at least equal one's concern for his own good. This exaltation of otherness has two phases, (a) the primary self-giving to the God or Transcendental Principle, and (b) the valuation and regard for the neighbor that shall be not less than the valuation and regard of one's self.

2. The Christic morality implies a denial of the will-to-live, or the desire for sentient existence. There must be not thought for the morrow; no provision for one's own sustenance or self-protection; no thought or action motivated by prudential considerations. This is mystically equivalent to a will-to-die, and, again, is identical with the Buddhist motivation. Life is to be lived so long as the automatic dynamis supports it and external circumstance permits it, but there must

be no egoistic clinging to life or striving to maintain it. There is no teaching that life should be hated and, hence, destroyed, but on the contrary, all manifestations of it outside of one's self are to be carefully cherished. The total attitude is one of compassionate indifference. That which comes, is to be accepted, but with loving compassion, not with cold stoicism.

One who succeeds in living this kind of life reasonably well will find that it is full of rich compensations. He will become seemingly defenseless and harmless, but actually more secure than ever before and a particularly potent force with respect to his milieu. He will feel more secure with the doors of his house unlocked than when they are locked. He will feel more secure without weapons than when armed. He will feel more secure and be more certainly provided for when he is unconcerned about money, than when he concentrates upon the securing of it. He accepts what comes and will be surprised to find that, while some painful experiences do come, yet, on the whole, he lives more happily and more comfortably than ever before. He will feel relieved of a great load. He will also find that he wields a deeper influence upon those who come near to him than do any of the men of great worldly power. We have in all this the very essence of the mystic morality. There is, in addition, another effect which is of the greatest social importance, particularly in a war-torn world. The exemplar of the Christic morality will find that fear dies in him, and with the death of fear the major cause of cruelty is destroyed. The primary cause of the cruelty of our present dark age is really fear. The hurting of the feared object has the psychological significance of wielding power over that which is feared. But as the real cause of fear does not lie in any object but in the inner psyche, the wielding of power over the object never brings the security sought. There are always new objects on which to project the fear, and thus always something to be fought and to be treated cruelly. Proceeding in this direction there is no peace anywhere, but only periods in which it is no longer possible to fight — for a season. but he who has renounced the clinging to life has destroyed fear at its source, and then there is nothing outside to be feared.

3. The third principle of Christic morality is orientation to other-worldliness. Christ often said, "My Kingdom is not of this world." The moral practice which is equivalent to a denial of the will-to-live in the objective world, implies, in positive terms, a will to live another life in another world. Properly understood, Christ's attitude toward this world is just as pessimistic as was that of Buddha, though the latter was more explicit. Fundamentally, Christ taught an ascetic attitude toward objective life, but not active self-flagellation. The true discipline is moral, and not bodily torture. Detachment toward the objective is the real key, and detachment

teaching, I quote the whole of the relevant passage. When the above words aroused in Nicodemus' mind only a literal meaning, the Master said: "Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born of water and of Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. That which is born of the flesh is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit. Marvel not that I said unto thee, Ye must be born again. The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but cannot tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth: so is every one that is born of the Spirit." (St. John, III:5-8) The Christic morality is negative with respect to life as will-to-live, but this is so in order that the dynamis may be given another polarization or direction. The positive meaning of the morality is found in its effect of directing the vital dynamis toward a new birth. The real meaning of all of Christ's teaching lies in the idea of the second birth. Melioration in the objective life is only incidental. In fact, some of the words of the Master are more than a little severe as they express His attitude toward the purely objective field, as when He said, "Let the dead bury their dead"; and again, "If any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple." (Luke — 14:26) Christ's moral teaching is not pragmatic, but uncompromisingly other-worldly. And in this there is revealed in the clearest possible terms the mystical motif, for genuine mysticism is always uncompromising with respect to fundamentals. It does not work out diplomatic deals. It cuts sharply like pure logic. One must choose mammon or God; he cannot cling to both at the same time. He is either for or against; there is no neutral point between. The compromisers are the luke-warm, and Christ clearly preferred the cold ones to such.

In the above quotation from the discourse held with Nicodemus there are two statements of peculiar significance. First, to enter the kingdom of God man must be born of the water and of Spirit; and second, one that is born of the Spirit is likened unto a wind that bloweth where it listeth, and though its sound may be heard, the hearer cannot tell its source or whither it goes. The latter statement clearly identifies the spontaneous character of the new-birth. He who is born anew is possessed by a Power beyond his personal self, and this Power is a law unto itself, i.e., cannot be commanded by any man. Any man who is familiar with the mystical transformation will readily recognize the truth contained in this statement.

The being born of water and of Spirit is a highly significant statement which is clarified by psychological analysis. It is a fact, well known in analytic psychology, that "water" is one of the most important symbols of the Unconscious. In the terms of analytic psychology the new-birth is viewed as the establishment of a new Self-center, located in the Unconscious, and that is quite other than the personal ego which rules the conscious attitude of the unregenerate

man. I do not find, however, that our present analytic psychology has discovered the meaning of "Spirit" in the above quotation. In the Integration of Personality, Dr. Jung briefly discusses the idea of a Super Consciousness, differentiated from the Unconscious, but while he does not exclude the possibility of such a Consciousness, he views its actuality as not yet empirically determined. If we turn to the psychology of the Indian Tantra we have more light thrown upon this. In this system, it is easy to identify "Spirit" with Pure Passive Consciousness or Shiva, which corresponds to the top of the head in the subtle body. Also, "water", as the feminine counter-part of Shiva, is identifiable as Shakti in the sense of Kundala, or the Power aspect of consciousness. In the Kundala Yoga, Shakti is awakened and caused to arise from her resting place in the lowest Chakra and to ascend to the place of Shiva, thereby bringing about the union which accomplishes the new-birth for the individual.

While it is true that church council theology has given to the life and teachings of Christ an externalistic interpretation, revealing thereby the great ingenuity of man in working out artificial interpretations, yet the truly valid interpretation is mystical. This fact is virtually self-evident to one who is acquainted directly with the mystical consciousness itself, but I believe, as a matter of simple logic, that the Gospel record fits this interpretation better than any other. Of course, it implies that Christ was not a unique Son of God in a sense that could not possibly be true of any other man. Christ was simply an exemplar, in extraordinary degree, of that which is possible to man as such.

Mysticism, in the comprehensive sense, is not merely an attained state of consciousness, but includes, as well, a philosophy and a method. As to philosophy, Christ is silent, and He says little concerning the ultimate State, save in a few parables. His practical teaching falls in the field of method, and His method is almost exclusively ethical. In the emphasis of the ethical He is in primary agreement with Buddha, but the latter gave fuller interpretations and very keen psychological analyses, in addition. Christ does not give the rationale of His ethics, nor do I find Buddha wholly clear with respect to this. But if one turns to the Vedantic teaching of Shankara, he will find the rational ground of the morality very clearly presented. However, this rationale becomes clear in the light of a well-developed philosophy.

In the philosophic form of Shankara, the goal of Yoga is the realization of the Supreme Self. The Supreme Self is related to the empiric self in a way analogous to that which correlates the sun to its image in a drop of water. The only reality possessed by the little sun, seen in the drop, is the great sun of which it is an image. The object of devotion of the Yogi is the Supreme Self or Great Sun. To be attached to the little sun, or personal self, is a barrier to the realization

of the Great Sun. So there must be a demotion of the little personal self from the false position of royalty which, in the ordinary state, man gives to it, yet all honor must be given to its original, the Supreme Self. The Supreme Self is one with its reflection, but no more so with one reflection than with another. Thus the ultimate Self, which I am, is identical with the ultimate Self of every creature. It follows, therefore, that I cannot honor the Supreme Self truly unless I regard equally the empiric selves of all creatures. That which I really am is not different from what all creatures really are. Hence, regard for the Other is identical with regard for Myself. The good of all men and all creatures is identical with my own good. From this follows both the Christic and Buddhistic moral practice.

In the Psychology of Religious Mysticism, Leuba, in speaking of the Yoga of Patanjali, says: "— the removal of all ethical considerations would leave its essential structure unaffected; for, after all, ethical considerations have no logical place in a system that aims at the breaking of all bonds connecting the individual to the physical and social world." (p. 45) I regard this statement as revealing the grossest misunderstanding of the real nature of mysticism. Certain it is that in the techniques of Christ, Buddha and Shankara practical ethics is given a place second to none. Patanjali aimed at the same end, the only differences lying in methodological emphases. In fact, Shankara was his greatest Chela, and one who always honored him though differing with him on points of method, a purely technical question. But on the question of ethics all four of these great religious leaders stand together. And this is so for a reason more profound than the high moral character which each of these men possessed in his own right. The moral practice is a logical part of the whole practice. In fact, I very much question whether without the mystical ground there ever could be developed a true morality, that is, a morality that was other than mere social expediency. The mystic's morality would be just as imperative for the last man in a dying world as for a man in the midst of a living society, while mere sociological morality would have no ground whatsoever in such a setting. Stated in terms of the logic of classes, the mystic's attitude toward the class of The Other is the same whether that class contains members or is empty. And this is so because the attitude is a fundamental both of the process and of the attained state, entirely apart from objective empiric considerations. If there is no objective situation, the attitude remains the same, but is not manifested in action, while if there is an objective situation, then, without any alteration of the attitude, it is manifested in practical action. I believe the logic of mystical ethics is adequately outlined in the last paragraph.

In the question of the relation of ethics to mystical consciousness I believe that we are dealing not only with an important part of the whole problem but, indeed, with the very heart of it. It is certainly not empiric science that can bring any indictment here.

The real guilt lies on the other side, and this, I believe, is not hard to show. Authentic mysticism affirms the primary unity of all, and this implies that the Liberating or enlightening Truth can only be known to the whole man, not to a mere functional part of him. And this applies, not only in the sense of a necessary unity as between man and man, but equally in the sense that one psychical function needs the collaboration of its companions. Thus, a science that is grounded on the intellect and sense, but divorced from a spiritually oriented ethics, can achieve only a distorted knowledge. All such learning lacks something essential to the very constitution of the knowledge itself. It is not so much that there is effected a difference in the bare fact or that the formal logic is altered, but rather that there is a change in the perspective which affects the total integration of knowledge. There is a fundamental difference in its meaning. Outstanding examples of the separation of ethical perspective is found in the practice of vivisection and in military science. Thus in vivisection moral regard for the creature experimented upon is repudiated. Inevitably this results in the callousing and blinding of the experimenter. His vision is narrowed as well as hardened in an invidious sense. As a result, he cannot see the processes he studies in their relation to the whole. He may acquire considerable command over the physical manifestation of disease, yet, with that, he will simply drive the pathological condition into a more hidden place in the psyche. He may be enabled to free bodies from physical symptoms at the price of increased psychical sickness, particularly in the sense of moral blinding and stultification. From the standpoint of mystical or spiritual morality such a condition is infinitely worse than a very high death-rate and a very low life-expectancy at birth, combined with much physical suffering from disease. Such is the valuation which the mystical consciousness places upon morality.

In the instance of military science the case is even worse. The practice of thinking of the most outrageous moral action in terms of cold calculation is probably the most effective existent way of destroying the moral sense. The mystic, or spiritually oriented man, would say that the physical death of an individual, group, race or nation is preferable to any survival based upon such thinking. For such survival would be at the price of spiritual death. Man, in such a case, progressively ceases to be a spiritual and human being, and becomes more and more a mere animal with an unilluminated intellect — a creature that is more a curse than a blessing to himself and those around him. There are values infinitely more important than physical survival.

One needs but look at the world today to see what a curse science can become when it is only an intellectual achievement divorced from spiritual morality. It has become more an instrument of darkness than of light. No longer are we civilized. One must go back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to find a reasonable degree of

civilization. And in this progress in degradation our science must share a large, if not a principal, part in the responsibility. Again, this is not due to science, as such, being anything bad, but to the severance of the intellect from spiritual ethics.

It is far better to over-emphasize the ethical factor than to undervalue or neglect it. There is an error in such over-emphasis, but it does not produce a serious problem. Over-emphasis is possible since ethics is not the whole of being. Knowledge and aesthetic appreciation, for instance, are equally a part of the whole, and, since the mystical spirit is integrative, these and all other parts must be included. At this point, the teachings of Christ, as given in the record, are open to criticism. The Christic message is defective from the standpoint of noetic need. But this simply means that the offering of Christ should be supplemented. Trouble arises only by trying to make the Christ the all in all. It is not necessary or desirable that He should be regarded as all in all. He can be accepted along with other possibilities of consciousness.

B. The Mysticism of Buddha.

That the Great Buddha was a Mystic, in the profoundest and highest sense of the word, is a fact so evident from a study of His recorded life and teachings that no time need be given to demonstrating it. The Illumination under the Bodhi Tree is explicitly through the mystical meditation process. The Doctrine teaches the attainment of Nirvana through a righteous living, thinking and feeling which destroys the Sangsaric state. The religious method was exclusively Yogic in the highest sense. Since the time of Buddha corruption has entered into parts of the Buddhistic community by the accretion of foreign elements, so that in modern Buddhism there is a good deal of tantric ritualism. But this is no more a true part of Buddha's doctrine than was the Inquisition a part of Christ's teaching. Real Buddhism is to be understood as it left the hand of its Founder and was continued by Those who attained the Buddhistic Realization in the centuries that followed. In the light of these sources Buddhism, as a religion, is the purest sort of non-tantric Yoga. Hence, here, as nowhere else, it is possible to determine just what Yoga or Mystical Realization is.

The two great factors which implement the motivation underlying the drive toward Mystical Realization are (1) love of Truth, and (2) Compassion. He who is motivated by a desire for Bliss will fail, since such a motive is selfish. Desire for voluptuous pleasure may lead to practices, such as the use of drugs and certain psycho-physical performances, which will induce temporary experiences of the type sought, and at the price of intellectual and moral degradation. This voluptuous pleasure is as different from the Beatitude of true Yogic Realization

as is a sensuously seductive dream different from the state of aesthetic delight realized by a mathematician when he has made a new integration in thought. The voluptuous state may be mysticoid, but it is a different from a true mystical state as is a base counterfeit from a true coin. The Beatitude of the Genuine Mystical State is a fruit of renunciation of all personal satisfaction and attainment. It is very real, but is an effect, not a valid objective. Compassion and love of Truth are the only valid and effective motivations, and the Compassion must be utterly self-disregarding, and the seeking of Truth must be so pure that every pre-conception is offered up on the altar of sacrifice.

From the record of the early life of Gautama, as well as from the subsequent life and teachings of the Awakened Buddha, we know that the central motivation was Compassion. There probably never was a life less frustrated than was the early life of this Prince. He seems to have been a well-nigh complete stranger to suffering on his own account, and for the first 29 years of his life did not know of the suffering involved in human life in general since his father saw to it that he should not know. But when he did learn of human suffering he simply had to start on the search for the means whereby suffering could be destroyed. This entailed the search for Truth, not so much as an end in itself, but more as a means to serve the office of Compassion. He sought assiduously for seven years, including a six-year unsuccessful experiment with extreme asceticism, and finally achieved Realization of Truth through mystic meditation by his own method. Through the Realization He organized His redeeming doctrine and devoted the balance of His life to spreading the doctrine among men. The one purpose of the teaching was relieving mankind, as far as might be, from the ubiquitous burden of suffering. But since relief from suffering is equivalent to attainment of Transcendental Wisdom, or Prajna Paramita, the doctrine lends itself to the more positive interpretation of attainment in terms of the Noble Wisdom. But the emphasis of Compassion is the pre-eminent character of this Great Buddha, although He is also the wisest of the Wise.

From the study of the authentic Buddhist Sutras one achieves probably the best understanding of the profoundest development of the Mystical Consciousness that is to be had anywhere, provided the student can understand them. Unfortunately they are excessively obscure, and it is doubtful if anyone who is not himself a mystic could possibly understand them. Other treatments of the subject, particularly that of Shankara, are much more comprehensible to an intelligence in which the mystical door has not yet opened. This Buddha did not have the best skill in cross-translation for a thinking consciousness and, as a result, He was not wholly successful. This is clear in view of the fact that vast groups among His followers have understood His Nirvana as meaning literal annihilation in the absolute sense, though it is perfectly clear that Buddha did not mean that at all, if one but studies the Sutras deeply

enough. Since able Western scholars have fallen into the same error and several other mystics, including the pseudo Dionysius, have fortified the impression, it is necessary to give this misconception some serious attention.

In the Sutras, over and over again, one finds descriptions of the Ultimate in the general form of the following logical pattern. The Ultimate is not-A, where A is any predicate whatsoever. Then, it is said, IT is not not-A, nor is it that which is neither A nor not-A, nor is IT that which is both A and not-A. Now, if one were to define absolute nothingness, in every possible sense, that is, absolute annihilation or absolute unconsciousness, without any potentiality in it, then he would find the above definition just about perfect. The definition fits absolute annihilation, beyond question. But it does not follow that it does not fit a Somewhat which is not absolute annihilation. Now, just what is it that is negated in such a thorough fashion? The answer is really very simple. It is simply the conception as a type, not particular conceptions, but the thinkable conception as such. This is not a denial of Being as other than thinkable conception, unless it were proven that Being in the absolute sense is thinkable conception. But there is no such proof. The positive meaning, then, comes out at once: Enlightenment is transcendence of thinkable conception. Now, since anything that can be imagined is a thinkable conception, it follows that the State of Enlightenment cannot possibly be imagined. But this does not preclude the possibility of realizing the Enlightened State, provided the means are other than relative thought as well as other than sensation. If we conceive of a mystical organ or faculty, such as the Samadhindriya, we have a schematic clarification.

No mystic was ever more rigorous in his use of language than Buddha, but that rigor is well-nigh devastating to anyone but a near Arhat. This means that, pedagogically, Buddha was less than successful, but in the ethical dimension no man has ever been more successful, not even Christ. Indeed, the reports of adequate observers indicate that even to this day the followers of Buddha live more nearly consistently by the Buddhistic ethics than do the followers of Christ, or of any other great religious and moral leader. It seems that they even do this when the expect to achieve absolute annihilation! For instance, through the centuries the Buddhist community has been far less a community of killers than has been the Christian community, yet the morality of Christ, no less than the morality of Buddha, implied non-killing. Of all religious leaders, Buddha has had the greatest success upon the visible plane, even though He had His failures.

That Buddhism is fundamentally Yogic or mystical in its method and objective is further revealed in the following quotation from the Buddhist Catechism of Subhadra Bhikshu:

Buddhism teaches the reign of perfect goodness and wisdom without a personal God, continuance of individuality

without an immortal soul, eternal happiness without a local heaven, the way of salvation without a vicarious Saviour, redemption worked out by each one himself without any prayers, sacrifices and penances, without the ministry of ordained priests, without the intercession of saints, without Divine mercy. Finally, it teaches that supreme perfection is attainable even in this life on this earth.

From this quotation it is clear that the Buddhistic redemption of attainment does not depend upon external revelation or authority; nor upon the use of ritual or other formal religious practices; nor upon the intermediary function of any human agent; but is something achievable by each individual directly. While various subsidiary aids of this sort may be employed and may be of assistance to certain or even most individuals, yet none of these are, in principle, necessary. This means that the essence of Buddhism is individual realiation, and that is Yoga or mystical awakening purely and simply. Without Yoga no man would ever have attained Buddhahood nor would there be an Buddhism. Hence, he who would know just what Yoga or Mysticism is, in its essential and purest form, should study Buddhism.

It may be objected by the Western scientist that this is impractical because the Buddhistic consciousness, practice and doctrine are too foreign to the understanding of the scientist's mind and thus supplies no usable base for research. It is suggested that since the mystic-like state of drug-intoxication is closer to the understanding of the Western scientist it affords a better starting point. Well, it may be that some scientists are in closer rapport to the states induced by drug-intoxication than they are to Buddhism, but, for my part, I have a better opinion of the Western scientific mind taken as a whole than that. At any rate, the minds of our mathematicians and modern theoretical physicists seem to me to rest in closer rapport to Buddhism than they do to the state of drug-intoxication, however it may be with our more materialistic physiological psychologists. Doubtless we can learn something concerning psychological states from the study of drugged and other abnormal consciousness, but there is a fundamental danger in drawing conclusions concerning the normal and proper from the pathologic. It is the danger of distortion and of drawing unsound conclusions from improper or inadequate perspective.

Authentic Buddhist teaching and practice does not at all encourage soft or dreamy-mindedness, but, on the contrary, calls for the keenest analytic discrimination. As little does it encourage the cultivation of empty-mindedness, as one finds quite evident when he reads of the scorn the sixth Chinese Buddhist Patriarch had for such practices. The following quotations should make this clear: "People under delusion believe obstinately that there is a substance behind appearances and so they are stubborn in holding to their own way of interpreting the Samadhi of specific mode, which they define as, 'sitting quietly and

continuously without letting any idea arise in he mind'. Such an interpretation would class us with inanimate objects; it is a stumbling block to the right Path and the Path should be kept open." "Some teachers of concentration instructed their disciples to keep a watch on their minds and secure tranquility by the cessation of all thought, and henceforth their disciples gave up all effort to concentrate the mind and ignorant persons who did not understand the distinction became insane from trying to carry out the instruction literally. Such cases are not rare and it is a great mistake to teach such practice." (A Buddhist Bible, p 523.)

True Buddhist Yoga, as well as other authentic Yoga, requires accentuation of intellectual discrimination and concentration, while drug-intoxication and the conditions produced by false asceticism lead to intellectual dullness and to all sorts of confusion.

In the final conclusions which he draws from his study of mysticism, as given in The Psychology of Religious Mysticism, Leuba states that he finds himself in agreement with Henri Delacroix and George A. Coe as to the illusory nature of the mystical claim. He then quotes the following from Coe's The Sources of the Mystical Revelation (Hibbert Jr. vol. VI, p 367.): "The mystic acquires his religious convictions precisely as his non-mystical neighbor does, namely through tradition and instruction, auto-suggestion grown habitual, and reflective analysis. The mystic brings his theological beliefs to the mystical experience; he does not derive them from it." Now there can be no doubt but that much of the interpretative teaching given by the general run of mystics is more than a little colored by the general background of instruction and traditon. Interpretative differences as between different mystics of different times and cultures, when such interpretations are in conformity with the beliefs of the milieu, indicate at least some such coloring. But when we study the really great mystical geniuses we are impressed with a reverse tendency. Such is the case with the three figures we are especially studying in this chapter. Each one did more or less violence to the current convictions of his milieu and, at times, diverged radically. Both Buddha and Christ called down upon themselves or upon their following active persecution just because of such divergence. Let us consider the principal doctrinal divergence of Buddha.

Two of the principal tenets of Brahminism, the religious setting in which Buddha was born, are reincarnation and the doctrine of a permanent and unchanging individual Atman, or soul, which persists from incarnation to incarnation. It is this permanent soul which, persisting as a sort of central core, takes on the clothing of various embodiments, both subtle and gross. According to the record, when Buddha first started on his search he queried certain Brahmin Pundits and they propounded to him the above doctrines. Buddha, through the powers of concentration and meditation, penetrated into these doctrines and

pronounced one sound and the other false. He said reincarnation is undeniable, but there is no persistent Atman or individual soul. This is the point of most radical divergence between exoteric Brahminism and Buddhism, both exoteric and esoteric. It proved to be a serious bone of contention and affords one of the main reasons why Buddhism never has taken a firm hold in the land of its birth. This doctrine is, perhaps, the most obscure phase of Buddhist psychology, but I shall do what I can to outline it, since it is, most emphatically, not a teaching taken into the mystical state from the instruction and tradition of the milieu, but is born out of the insight.

Buddha taught that the self or "I am" is not persistent from incarnation to incarnation and, indeed, if it were, there could be no liberation from the cycle of birth and death and endless sorrow. The doctrine is thus of absolutely central importance. The man that is born is a congeries of psychical functions or faculties which integrate an illusive personal self which lasts only as long as this congeries persists. At times the congeries separate and, after a period of rest, reintegrate to form a new personality having a new ego, or I am. The following quotation from The Gospel of Buddha as told by Paul Carus, presents the argument and teaching in especially clear form. The words are given as the words of the Buddha.

People are in bondage, because they have not yet removed the idea of I.

The thing and its quality are different in our thought, but not in reality. Heat is different from fire in our thought, but you cannot remove heat from fire in reality. You say that you can remove the qualities and leave the thing, but if you think your theory to the end, you will find that this is not so.

Is not man an organism of many aggregates? Do we not consist of various skandhas, as our sages call them? Man consists of the material form, of sensation, of thought, of dispositions, and, lastly, of understanding. That which men call the ego when they say 'I am' is not a entity behind the skandhas; it originates by the cooperation of the skandhas. There is mind; there is sensation and thought, and there is truth; and truth is mind when it walks in the paths of righteousness. But there is no separate ego-soul outside or behind the thought of man. He who believes that the ego is a distinct being has no correct conception of things. The very search for the atman is wrong; it is a wrong start and it will lead you in a false direction.

Is not this individuality of mine a combination, material as well as mental? Is it not made up of qualities that sprang into being by a gradual evolution? The five roots of sense-perception in this organism have come from

ancestors who performed these functions. The ideas which I think, came to me partly from others who thought them, and partly they arise from combinations of these ideas in my own mind. Those who used the same sense-organs, and thought the same ideas before I was composed into this individuality of mine are my previous existences; they are my ancestors as much as I of yesterday am the father of I of today, and the karma of my past deeds conditions the fate of my present existence.

In a later discussion Buddha uses the figure of a candle which is lighted, the flame representing the self, and the candle the congeries of skandhas or psychical elements that make up the entity. Then, if the flame is extinguished and lighted again, the question is, Is it the same flame? Buddha says it both is and is not. It is not because there is a break in continuity, but it is the same in the sense that it has the same size and quality as the original flame, in that it comes from the same source. Then, further, if there is a group of candles of the same composition size and shape, then their flames are and are not the same flames for identical reasons.

Any creature, animate or inanimate, is the product of past causes, and the father of future effects, with no conceivable beginning or ending point in time. But the congeries of elements which constitute these beings are eternally inter-weaving in a process of becoming and dying in the resultant phenomenal effects. The phenomenal effects float like mirages upon this inter-weaving stream, and, likewise, the discrete series of personal egos are born upon this stream as the counterpart of the mirages. There is thus a subjective and objective phantasmagoria, one of the series of personal egos, the other, the various appearances of the phenomenal universe. Both of these have no substance in themselves. The relatively durable thing-in-itself is the inter-weaving congeries. But the stream of congeries is compounded and therefore subject to birth and decay and the cause of all suffering. The really durable is the Uncompounded, and this lies behind the congeries as their support. The realization of this is Liberation and Enlightenment.

We have here a conception which definitely differentiates Buddhism from all other religions and from the Western philosophies. It differs from Brahminism in that there is a denial of a permanent Self, though there is agreement as to the mayavic character of the objective universe. It diverges from Christian theology which grants reality to the objective world, and predicates a permanent soul. It is different from Western Realism in that it grants no substantial existent thing, and from Western Idealism in so far as that Idealism centers around a persistent transcendental Subject. However, much of Schopenhauer is congruent with Buddhism, though I do not find his Will as carrying the same meaning as the Buddhist "Essence of Mind" of Shunyata. In some respects Von Hartmann is closer to the Buddhist position.

Prior to the Recognition of September 1936 I had never been able to grasp the anatomic doctrine, but as a result of that Recognition I saw the necessity of the doctrine and for the first time realized the relativity of Nirvana in the simplest sense. This Recognition confirmed a conception which, only later, I found in the Sutras of Northern Buddhism, unknown to me up to that time.

Now, the point of this rather lengthy argument is that here we have a case of knowledge not derived from instruction and tradition, but originating in mystical insight. It is not a case of taking into the mystical state the conceptions which are born forth from it. It is, in my mind, most positive evidence that the mystical Door is one from whence comes new Knowledge which makes a difference in thinkable concepts. Undoubtedly, imperfectly developed mystical states can be misinterpreted, and the sense of certainty may be incorrectly predicated of the erroneous interpretation. All of which simply means that there is a need for a critique of mystical consciousness, just as we have found a critique of the reason necessary. But just as the latter critique showed in what way we may trust the intellect, as well as in what ways it cannot give reliable knowledge, the same is true of a mystical critique. Later I shall consider this subject in more detail.

Before entering upon the discussion of Shankara, a brief discussion of the Buddhist conception of reincarnation will prove to be of value. In both the Western Christian and scientific worlds the conception of reincarnation has been unpopular, and sometimes is even opposed with affective reactions. However, the idea is not wholly foreign to indigenous Western thought, quite apart from the acceptance of the idea on the part of some due to the introduction of it through the Theosophical Movement. It is often more than implicit in the writings of the German Idealists from Kant onward. Thus, consider the following quotation from the third Book of Fichte's The Vocation of Man: "These two orders — the purely spiritual and the sensuous, the latter consisting possibly of an innumerable series of particular lives, — have existed since the first moment of the development of an active reason within me, and still proceed parallel to each other." Yet, on the whole, the idea is unacceptable and even repugnant to Westerners, for reasons that I have not yet been able to fathom. Now, it is true that, in cases where the idea has been accepted, it has often been misconceived. It seems to be a process that is untraceable by the Western intellect and, therefore, must be accepted or rejected blindly. To the scientific mind it generally seems better to believe too little rather than believe too much or, rather, better to deny with inadequate reason than to affirm with inadequate reason. This attitude is extra-logical, but it exists nonetheless. I believe that the Buddha's conception of reincarnation may prove less unacceptable, since the process in this case is partly traceable objectively.

The Buddha's conception is that where in the historic stream we find individuals manifesting essentially the same character, with a quality of feeling of the same form, and of largely identical intellectual quality, the later individual in time is a reincarnation of the earlier. But the personal ego of each is different, in the sense that the ego is a sort of epiphenomenal effect of the character without possessing any substance in itself. Since the stream of existence is a process of development, or decay, the identity of character of individuality would not be absolute, but there would be a root-similarity. Now such similarities, approaching identities, are sometimes traceable when the necessary historic records exist. One might very well, for instance, consider the similarities in the conception of Cardinal de Cusa and Copernicus and reach the conclusion that the latter was a reincarnation of the former, or that Joseph Stalin is a reincarnation of Genghis Khan. Basic similarity of character, thought and feeling would be the criterion. Now, since in the Buddha's sense, it is a character or individuality that reincarnates, rather than an egoistic self, recognition of similarity of character and individuality is all that is necessary to determine a case of reincarnation. It is not said that the two personal egos are the same. Taken in this sense, it appears to me that reincarnation is objectively provable.

There are certain other implications which follow from the Buddhistic conception. There may be such a thing as fusing of individualities, character, conceptual forms, modes of feeling, etc. A given physically embodied individual may manifest one character at one time, and another at other times, he may manifest quite different modes of feeling in what we call different moods, and he may think in one pattern at one time and in quite others on other occasions. In extreme cases, he may exhibit quite discrete differences of personality, such as in the instances of multiple personality. This leads to the idea that reincarnation is not restricted to a one to one correspondence between different embodied entities at different places in time, but that there is also such a thing as conjoint reincarnation of two or more in one, of temporary, partial and superimposed reincarnation, and also of one in two or more, either permanently or temporarily. On the whole, the idea becomes very complex, but it is more readily understandable in the light of objective experience. Indeed, much that the chemist observes in the life history of chemical substances parallels the above patterns. The chemist finds persistence through all sorts of transformations which can be quite well viewed as chemical reincarnation in the Buddhistic sense.

It is said that the mystic sense includes, among its various possibilities, the capacity to trace backward the stream of transformation of the psychical congeries. Thus identity with other incarnations can be established, but this would by no means necessarily imply a unique one to one relationship. He who unites in himself, either

temporarily or relative persistently, several psychical currents, would find himself identical with many who live in the past, even contemporaneously. It would be possible even to acquire incarnations in the past by assimilating the corresponding psychical current out of the past. In the extreme ideal case, it would even be conceivable for one living now to find himself formerly incarnated in all men and being born again in all men of the future. Whether or not any being has ever succeeded in achieving such an integration, I would not presume to say, but the theoretical possibility is contained in the Buddhistic conception. In an case, it is certainly interesting to conceive of the possibility of attaining additional incarnations in the past as well as indefinitely laterally expanded incarnations in the future, perhaps, in the end, actually to live in all men. Thus it is that the Sage, the Saviour or the Guru is born in and lives in His disciples, more or less completely as the latter assimilate His consciousness, character and individuality. So there would be, on this view, a valid sense in which the Christian mystic puts on Christ, as St. Paul said. And all of this becomes quite reasonable and intelligible once we have broken down the egoistic delusion and see that the Christ, in essential reality, is not a particular personal entity, but a continuity of character, individuality, thought, feeling, etc. The Christ literally lives in His followers to the degree and extent they have assimilated this character, individuality, thought and feeling. Thus interpreted, I believe the not infrequent claims of Christian mystics are not unreasonable. And that which is true of this example would also be true of all others, even when the discipleship does not lie in the realm generally regarded as religious. Newton would live again in his followers just as truly.

This interpretation clarifies greatly the Buddhist doctrine of the multiple incarnations of the Nirmanakayas. The Nirmanakayas are said to be those who have attained full Enlightenment but have refused complete withdrawal from objective relationship. But such Beings abide at the very roots of Consciousness itself and, hence, are present in a latent sense in all embodiments of consciousness. Thus he who pierces inwardly into the depths of his own consciousness will find himself identical with the Nirmanakaya and, thereby, conversely, becoming an embodiment of the Nirmanakaya. In general the deeper the level at which an individual integrates his consciousness and individuality, the wider the field of his future incarnation.

Now, bearing in mind that which has just been said it is easy to trace a tie-in between the three great individualities who form the subject of the present chapter. The extreme moral and spiritual similarity between Buddha and Christ clearly identifies the latter as an incarnation of the former, in exceptional degree. We will find a corresponding identity between the Buddha and Shankara, though in this case the similarity is more predominantly evident in the noetic agreement. Thus we may say that, in exceptional degree, these three

are one entity, even though each may have ramifications of individuality developing in different directions. Other great Sages have lived who are not so closely conjoined as these three. These three stand as one in peculiar degree.

C. The Mysticism of Shankara.

Of all the great Three, Shankara's life and teaching is most explicitly Yogic in the technical sense. However, He deals with Yoga, or Mystical Realization, exclusively in the highest sense, since He is interested solely in the final Liberation and seems to scorn any attainment less than that. Now, Shankara discourses upon the technical problems of method and philosophy to a degree not found in the teachings of Christ or even Buddha, for the two-fold reason, (1) He was qualified for this by Brahmanical birth and training, and (2) He worked exclusively with a public which needed and could understand this treatment. He is, of all men, the philosopher Sage, par excellence. Apparently, He did not attempt to reach simple minds, but was rather a Teacher of Teachers. In principle, Buddha spoke to all men, but due to certain temperamental and intellectual barriers, was not acceptable to the more learned, with some exceptions. Christ frankly oriented Himself to the lowly of this world and thus reached some, at the price of being unable to reach others. But the saving Wisdom is for all men, and is not the exclusive right of the simple and lowly. However, no one embodiment of the Sage can reach all equally, hence the Divine Wisdom incarnates in many forms, which, while seemingly different, are really complementary.

Shankara's philosophy is not presented by Him as something original and de novo. On the contrary, He presents it as a clarification and explicit logical development of the Vedic meaning. But the Veda is not to be understood as exclusively the recorded literature which goes by that name. It is even more fundamentally the innate Wisdom resident in the depths of all consciousness. Hence, by means of Yoga, the Yogin attains realization of the Veda quite independently of all scholarship, though such attainment does not of itself imply mastery of the best formulation. As a result, the best statement is the resultant of Yogic penetration, scholarship and the development of intellectual acuity and profundity. In terms of this combination, Shankara is the greatest of all exemplars. Yet Shankara is not wholly satisfactory to the modern Western mind. For one thing, He is not concerned with science in the modern sense, and, indeed, there was no such science in His day. For another, there is a good deal of the scholastic form in his reasoning. But then, for that matter, there is a good deal of the scholastic coloring to be found in the rationalistic language of Kant, yet Kant is the gateway to post-rationalistic and post-scholastic thinking. The similarity to

Kant runs even deeper. Shankara, too, is a critical thinker, at a time on the order of two thousand years earlier than Kant. A fact which makes Shankara all the more remarkable. In a third respect, Shankara is not altogether satisfactory to the modern Westerner in that He continually introduces references to the written Veda as an authenticating argument. It sounds to us too much like the theological argument which justifies a thesis because of statements in the Bible. But, in this connection, it must be remembered that Shankara spoke to a public for whom the Veda was regarded as authority, and no hearing could be attained save by conformation with Vedic authority. But Shankara is never content to rest His case on the visible Veda alone. The Vedic argument does not stand by itself. He establishes His thesis, point by point, by reference to reason and experience independently of the written Veda. Clearly, for Himself, His source is not the written Veda, though the record of His life indicates that He was thoroughly familiar with it from childhood. The real source is Yogic Realization attained while a Chela of Patanjali. Thus He writes meanings which, while reconcilable to the written Veda, could have hardly been derived from it by the methods of unaided external scholarship.

We are here, again, brought face to face with the question which forms a central interest of the present volume. Is the Mystic Realization an authentic source of Knowledge or Gnosis? That is such, is well nigh the main thesis of Shankara, after the importance He ascribes to Liberation. Indeed, He even says that the Gnostic Knowledge is not merely a means to Liberation but is Liberation. To deny the validity and actuality of Mystical Knowledge would be equivalent to denying all significance in the work and thought of Shankara. With no man, so far as I know, is the noetic element in the Yogic consciousness so fundamental. Further discussion of this question is indicated.

Von Hartmann said, "Gnosis is knowledge acquired by immediate perception (intuition) instead of by intellect." (From criticism of Esoteric Buddhism by Sinnett, published in Weiner Zeitung, reprinted in The Theosophist for May 1885.) But Von Hartmann continues that if this direct perception stands alone it may be so colored and dominated by a preconception that it may become quite unreliable and needs the correction of intellectual examination and of any other source of knowledge there may be. Mohini Chatterji in his criticism of Von Hartmann's criticism admits the justice of the above statement and proceeds to say that Oriental Esotericism does not teach the exclusive dependence upon the "immediate perception". The test of reason is applied and the insight of one individual is checked by that of others, just as is the case in Western science. When a body of philosophico-scientifico-religious teaching or doctrine is established, it is the combined product of many highly trained minds in all of which the mystical sense is highly developed as well as the intellect. It is true that in many instances the mystical insight may be prepared for

by previous study and the content of the insight may be in accord with the study. But this does not mean that the mystic merely takes out of the state that which he brings to it. The mystical knowledge is of another dimension. Chatterji gives a very suggestive illustration from Western science. Thus, a mathematical astronomer might — as has been done — calculate the location and determine the existence of a formerly unknown planet, through analytic interpretation of the perturbations in the orbits of known planets. Following the directions resulting from the calculation the same man, or another astronomer, might then direct a telescope to the indicated portion of the sky and see with the eye that which had been predetermined by calculation. (This has actually been done.) Now, would we be justified in saying that the observing astronomer merely took such knowledge from his observation as he took with him in the first place? In the purely schematic sense, the answer might be "yes". But he did acquire new perceptual knowledge, that which James called "knowledge through acquaintance". The looking through the telescope did more than simply to add feeling tone to an already existing knowledge. He added perceptual knowledge to the formal schematic knowledge of the intellectual calculation. Now, in this illustration, the telescope represents the mystic sense which gives a dimension of knowledge as much different from the intellectual conception as is the perception. Something is added, even though subsequent intellectual formulation might differ in no way whatsoever from already extant teaching or doctrine. Essentially the new knowledge is as incommensurable with intellectual conception as the latter is with sensible perception. But in several ways the two can cooperate just as the percept and the concept can cooperate, and do so continually in our daily lives.

Once I had a dream-experience which I think is illustrative of the difference in dimensions of two kinds of related sense. Some years ago a group of us had planned an extended trip through the Painted Desert of northern Arizona. Our proposed course was to take us over the Mormon Dugway which gave access to the Lee's Ferry crossing of the Colorado River — the only crossing then in a distance of hundreds of miles. This approach was one of the most nerve-racking for drivers, due to its narrowness, its winding roughness and, most of all, the very rapid current of the Colorado River below. I had been over this course formerly and knew that it was a trial. Well, one night, while lying in bed waiting upon sleep, I was thinking of this drive, outlining the course rather clearly in my mind. During the process I fell asleep, as I found out later. But there was no break in my mental continuity; I simply found myself actually driving a car over the course concerning which I had been thinking. I was driving along nearly, or quite, identically in the way I had been thinking, that is, driving slowly and carefully as was the way one would be compelled to do actually. In the dream, the road wound in and out, around coves and points, and climbed

upward, essentially as I knew it did from my previous experience. Suddenly, as I rounded a point of rock, I saw way up on furthest visible portion of the road another car coming toward me. But it was a very strange car, such as I had not then seen. It was extremely streamlined, very much like the designs of the racing cars later used on the Salt Lake salt-flats. And this car was coming toward me with unbelievable speed, indeed fully as fast as the fastest racing car, taking the turns with great precision. To my consternation, Mephisto was driving the car — and he was a magnificent driver. There was no place for a passing and no time for me to do a thing. I saw that I would be struck, which then happened, the strange car and Mephisto passing right through me and my car. With which I woke up. I then had the chance to analyze what had happened.

In the first stage, while awake, I had been thinking of a process in terms of idea. There was the normal dual consciousness of thinking, with an undertone of awareness of myself as an organism. There was the normal clear differentiation between a process thought about and a process performed by the activity of the organism. Then, without knowing the shift, I was actually performing the process with the consciousness of the organism lying in bed dropping away entirely. The idea had become performance, in another state of consciousness, but in harmonious conformity with the previous purely ideational process. Now, this was a different state of awareness, not simply one state of awareness with a different feeling tone. I was aware of a content in a different way which I believe is quite validly defined as a addition of another knowledge, even though not diverging in pattern from the original schema. But there was also something added, that was not in the original schema. I had not at all anticipated Mephisto and the wonderful car. This became new material for my intellect to think about. And the "Old Boy" poses some very intriguing problems. In fact, he added much to my interest in Jung's treatment of the transformation process when I read the latter some years later. Definitely, I did acquire something valuable for thought out of the experience.

It is not suggested that this bit of dream-experience has anything of the mystical about it. The whole incident falls in the range of the subject-object type of consciousness. There is not ineffability save that which always is present in the relationship between the perceptual and conceptual orders. It is offered simply as an illustration, (a) of how a conceptual series may become a perceptual series which is a schematic duplicate and yet adds new knowledge, and (b) of how in addition such a perceptual series may react upon the conceptual to add new material for thought. The whole is a schematic pattern of the relation between conceptual and mystical knowledge. The same principle is involved in the figure of the telescope used to verify the existence of a planet predetermined by mathematical calculation. In this case, the cognizing of the planet as a perceptual object may well

have added nothing necessary for the purposes of calculation. Calculation determined a somewhat which might be called n and probably could establish both orbit and mass, so that n thereafter was as fully known as was necessary for all purposes of calculation alone. But such a knowledge of n is not sufficient for the establishment of all significant astronomical knowledge relative to the new body. It would not give data, such as temperature, amount and kind of light radiation and possible chemical composition as the latter might reveal. For this purpose n must be realized as an object for perception, directly or indirectly. Hence, n, as perceptually realized, becomes a source of possible additional development of conceptual knowledge which could not have been derived from calculation alone. So experience of the planet adds to the knowledge of the planet through pure calculation two increments of knowledge, as follow: (a) it added knowledge as perceptual cognition, and, (b) it added physical and chemical knowledge, in the conceptual sense, which could not have been derived from calculation alone.

There is some dispute as to whether perceptual cognition may be properly called "knowledge". As a matter of general practice, "knowledge" is defined as "the cognitive aspect of consciousness in general", of which two forms are recognized, i.e., "knowledge of acquaintance" or perceptual cognition, and "knowledge about", or conceptual cognition. Thus, "to know may mean either to perceive or apprehend, or, to understand or comprehend". A blind man could not know light in the first sense, but he could know about light in the second. But while this division of knowledge into two classes is a matter of general practice, yet John Dewey challenges the correctness of calling "knowledge through acquaintance" knowledge at all. He calls it "experience" and restricts "knowledge" to the conceptual order. Of course, this is largely a matter of definition. It certainly is clear that simple perceptual awareness is distinguishable from conation or will and affection or feeling. If, then, we are to follow the more general practice of classification of the modes of the mind into two or three modes, (a) cognition and conation, the latter including affection, or (b) cognition, conation and affection, perceptual awareness, apart from all feeling tone and activistic element in consciousness, is certainly a cognition. Thus perception is a kind of knowledge. In my discussion I am following the general practice rather than that of John Dewey, particularly as his practice is part and parcel of a philosophic interpretation and attitude with which I do not agree.

Of the two branches of knowlege, the mystical recognition is most nearly like "knowledge through acquaintance" and hence bears a relationship to conceptual knowlege analogous to that of perception. But there are important points of departure. Thus the perceptual awareness is closer to the conceptual particulars and singulars than it is to general and universal concepts. The reverse is the case with mystical

recognition, for this kind of cognition comes into closest affinity with the most universal and most abstract conceptions. The more general a conception the further it is from the perceptual order and the closer it lies to the mystical. In the thought which recognizes solely the perceptual and conceptual, only particular concepts have true referents, i.e., perceptual existences which they mean. The general concepts are viewed as lacking true referents, and are regarded as valuable only as instruments in the manipulation of ideas which ultimately lead to concrete ideas having perceptual referents. But to the mystic, at least the profounder sort, the reference of the most universal concept is most immediate and, therefore, most concrete. The particular concept and its referent have the value of abstraction away from concrete reality and, hence, greater or less unreality. Such value as the latter have is instrumental only.

There is another respect in which mystical recognition diverges from perceptual awareness or "knowledge through acquaintance", in the usual sense, and that lies in the fact that the mystical consciousness, when developed deeply enough, is not concerned with an object. The general definition of "Cognition" is, "the being aware of an Object". In the well-developed mystical state subject and object fuse or coalesce, so that the normal relationship of experience and thought does not exist. So cognition or knowledge, in the sense of being aware of object, as distinct from the subject, is not a mystical kind of knowledge. Hence, knowledge in the sense of "Gnosis" or "Jnana" is knowledge of a different sort. It falls outside current philosophical definition. Yet the use of the word, in this sense, goes back to the ancient Greeks and Indians and thus has a hoary justification. "Knowledge" in the sense of "Nous" and the adjective "Noetic" has the essential meaning of "Gnosis" and "Jnana", being a non-discursive knowledge in which the knowledge and the thing known are identical. The denial of "Nous" is a denial of mystical knowledge, and vice versa, and this denial is equivalent to materialism in the invidious, though not in the technical, sense.

We now face this fundamental question: Are we justified in viewing a state of consciousness in which there is a coalescence of subject and object, of knowledge and thing known, as a case of knowledge? So long as the state stands in complete separation from relative consciousness, the answer is "No". But equally we cannot predicate affection or conation of such a state. It is simply beyond all relative predication and can only be defined by universal negation. But the pure mystical state may impinge upon the relative consciousness in greater or less degree, producing effects for the latter. The resultant is a compound consciousness in which either, (a) the mystical and relative form an impure effect, or (b) the two forms of consciousness exist side by side. In either case, the relative consciousness is affected. It is the relative consciousness that experiences (a) Bliss or Beatitude,

(b) reorientation of the will, and (c) a new noetic orientation and content. In terms of content, the relative consciousness now knows, as an object, the state of consciousness in which subject and object, and knowledge and thing known, both merge. This is an increase of relative knowledge of most profound significance, both in the theoretical and pragmatic sense, since it tends to make an enormous difference in life and conduct, in valuation and meaning. The new orientation is like changing the base of reference in mathematical analysis. The material of relative consciousness enters into a new perspective which tends toward radical difference in theoretical organization. There is thus addition to knowledge in the conceptual sense both in the sense of content and of altered theoretical organization.

A discussion of the foregoing sort is quite appropriate in connection with the study of Shankara. Whether or not He wrote the parallel of this argument in its entirety, I do not know, but it is improbable that He ever did since the intellectual nexus of his time was different from our own. It is rather the way Shankara would have written were He living today.

The problem of Liberation is preeminently a problem of knowledge for Shankara, both in the sense that knowledge is the primary means and, in the deeper sense, that Knowledge itself is Liberation. With Christ the compound mode of affection-conation was given nearly exclusive emphasis, while with Buddha it was given primary emphasis, at least in the popular discourses. But Buddha did give substantial attention to the Noetic factor, particularly in the discourses to advanced disciples. This difference, in the orientation to the problem of Liberation, Salvation or Enlightenment, proves to be a matter of very considerable psychological and speculative interest. For one thing, it correlates beautifully with the hereditary background of these three Men, as given in the record. Buddha was a Prince; Christ, according to the Gospel account, was a descendent of David and thus also a Prince of the blood; while Shankara was a Brahmin. This would give to Buddha and Christ the normal perspective of hereditary rulers, thus contrasting to Shankara who belonged to the caste preeminent in metaphysical thought. But to the natural ruler, will and feeling have ascendancy and leadership over thought, while with the natural thinker the reverse is the case. It is significant that the largest influence in the extensive sense was ultimately won by Buddha and Christ, while Shankara's influence was more restricted and specialized. In terms of emphasis, the contrast between Christ and Shankara is most marked, while Buddha occupies a more intermediate position.

We are presented, here, with one of the most difficult recurring problems of philosophy and psychology. Which is most fundamental in the constitution of the universe, Will or Idea? Which is most determinant in the life of an individual, knowledge or feeling-conation? There is good reason for reducing the three modes

of cognition, affection and conation to two by combining feeling and will. For manifestly there is a very close connection between pleasure and desiring while pure knowing may leave desire largely unaffected. Ethical consciousness as an attitude is a manifestation of the will, and depends upon the intellect simply for the resolution of ethical problems. Hence accentuation of the ethical is equivalent to giving primacy to the will. Of course, in the present discussion will must be understood as including the whole of the activistic element in consciousness, and thus includes desire and the autonomous will-to-live. It is not restricted to conscious volition. The usage is close to, if not identical with, that of Schopenhauer. Buddha's emphasis of the destruction of the desire for sentient existence seems to place Him somewhat closer to the emphasis of Christ than to Shankara, but, on the other hand, the doctrine of the Prajna Paramita accords more closely with Shankara.

Modern philosophy has not finally resolved the problem of the relative primacy of Will and Idea. The impact of Hegel and Schopenhauer does not destroy either contestant. The Truth would seem to be, much as Von Hartmann suggested, that Will and Idea are component parts of a more ultimate incognizable reality. There is, then, no ultimate primacy for either the Will or the Idea, but relative primacy in different contexts, in stages of processes and in individual organizations. In the very practical question of which way will lead successfully to Yoga with a given individual, we must consider whether Will or Idea dominates the individual life. Method must be adjusted accordingly. Unquestionably, with the overwhelming mass of people, Will does dominate and, hence, ethico-affective techniques are indicated. But there is a smaller number of individuals with whom the cognitive development is not only large, but also occupies the commanding position in life-determination. In such cases the Will has been brought into subjugation to the Idea. Hence, in such cases, the problem of Yoga, as a means, becomes simply the achievement of the right conception, there being no effective autonomous resistance on the part of the Will. With most men right conception is not enough because the amount of undomesticated autonomous Will is far too large.

Schopenhauer is right when he says emancipation depends upon the reversal of the Will, so that will-to-live becomes denial of the will-to-live: though I do not find that he has adequately established how such a reversal is possible if Will is the all-powerful. When Will is subjugated to Idea, practically as well as theoretically, the problem of reversal reduces to realization of the conception of what is to be done and how to do it. Now, Shankara is not concerned with Yoga in all its ramifications as method, but primarily with the problem as it appears after subjugation of the Will to Idea has been achieved. Explicitly, He does not view all men as possible candidates for this at their present stage of development. They must have qualifications. The nature of

these qualifications is indicated explicitly in the following quotation from Shankara's Discrimination of Spirit and Not-Spirit (Atmanatma Viveka).

After stating that the unredeemed state of man is due to Ignorance, Shankara goes on to say:

Therefore it is clear that Ignorance can only be removed by Wisdom.

Q. How can this Wisdom be acquired?

A. By discussion — by discussing as to the nature of Spirit and Not-spirit.

Q. Who are worthy of engaging in such discussion?

A. Those who have acquired the four qualifications.

Q. What are the four qualifications?

A. (1) True discrimination of permanent and impermanent things; (2) Indifference to the enjoyment of the fruits of one's actions both here and hereafter; (3) Possession of Sama (calmness) and the other five qualities; (4) An intense desire of becoming liberated (from material existence)."

Clearly one who has these four qualifications has already gone a considerable way on the Path. Somehow or other much self-discipline has been achieved, passionateness has been quieted, the direction of desire has been reversed and the habit of discriminative analysis developed. The anti-egoistic ethic is presupposed. It is possible that various technical means have been employed to achieve the four qualifications. At any rate, from this point on, Shankara abandons all ritual, sacrifice, technical expedients — in a word, all objective sensible action, or works, as agencies that are, in principle, necessary. An intellectual process of discrimination, including discussion, is well-nigh the only agency. In the end, when this discrimination has completed the final preparation, the Realization comes at its own time, spontaneously. All preparation has the value of purification or destruction of barriers, but is not a magical agent which commands the Realization. The Awakened State is not an effect of causes set up by the candidate, for it has nothing to do with conditions. It is as though at some moment in the process of preparation the right balance is achieved and an obscuring curtain drops, simply revealing what has always been there, and has always been the Truth. Indifference to specific method or technique is not only allowed: it is mandatory. For by attaching importance to any means, the candidate is clouding his mind with the delusion of efficient causal connection. Meditation ceases to be a

matter of set method or of specific seasons, but becomes something spontaneous and capable of being super-added to reflective process or even objective activity. The Samadhi that is attained is the Nirvikalpa or undifferentiated Samadhi, which by no means necessarily implies black-out trance. For, to require trance is to impose a visible means as causally effective, and this is contrary to the primary principle that the State of Realization is not the effect of a relative cause.

It is a significant fact that the Highest state of Samadhi may appear to the incompetent observer as the most casual and indistinguishable from ordinary consciousness. Actually, it effects an integration such that the usual and ordinary is seen as one sameness with the undifferentiated, and the practitioner may not know the difference between meditation and non-meditation. The practitioner has transcended the duality of this, as ordinary consciousness, and that, as mystical consciousness, and the one sameness of the permanent and undifferentiated is known to underlie and interpenetrate all states. The state of consciousness is peculiarly indescribable and obscure. It is no more disembodied than it is embodied, no more of one aspect of any duality than it is of the other. About all that one can positively say is, "IT IS", but IT cannot be imagined. The man of such Realization is no longer identical with his embodiment; he is both there in the body and not there, and the activities and death of the body are merely events within him and, therefore, not involving him.

There is a seeming discrepancy between Buddhism and the teaching of Shankara of high importance. It has been already shown that the doctrine of Anatman, or the non-reality of the self, is fundamental to Buddhism. In contrast, Shankara taught the Atmavidya, or Knowledge of the Self. In fact, the name of the source of the above quotation, Atmanatma Viveka may be translated "Discrimination between the Self and Not-Self". Shankara gives the positive value to Self-Realization. But, in other respects, the fundamental similarity between Shankara's teachings and Buddhism has been well recognized. Here is a subject matter that calls for serious investigation.

There is no reasonable ground for doubt that the Way taught by the Buddha served as an effective means whereby an undetermined number of individuals achieved Enlightenment. This Way, in so far as it involved an orientation by a doctrine, involved the teaching of anatman. This, at the very least, gives the teaching a pragmatic justification, since it facilitated the primary objective of the Buddha's mission. But the same may be said of Shankara's teaching of the Atmavidya, or Knowledge of the Self. This, also, has provided an effective Way. Further, I know that it can initiate a process which, in its final stage, gives the Buddhist State of the two-fold egoselflessness. The implication is that the apparent incompatibility of the two teachings is not a real contradiction.

For my part, I am convinced that the apparent contradiction is actually a paradox. Now the paradox is a very common conceptual form employed by mystics, and a very fruitful source of misunderstanding indeed. It is necessary to attain an appreciation of its logical significance. First of all, the mystical state of consciousness is integrative in lesser or greater degree depending upon the relative depth of mystical penetration. It is integrative in the sense that elements, or phases or states which are mutually incompatible when apprehended by ordinary consciousness, actually do become compatible parts of a larger whole. Just as the dynamical conception of the parallelogram of forces achieve a logical integration of forces operating more or less in opposition, such as the centrifugal and centripetal forces, so the mystical state effects analogous integration for consciousness. But a purely mystical integration, without the collaboration of the intellect, is not a logical conceptual integration, as is the case in the instance of the parallelogram of forces. It is an immediate integration through what we have called the mystical sense. It is quite possible that when the mystic attempts to express conceptually the value of the mystical insight he finds his intellectual capacity inadequate for the task of constructing a logically connected symbol. In this case, the intellectual level, being correspondentially inferior to that of the insight, the formulation appears in paired statements that seem to negate each other, or in the form of substantives seemingly contradicted by adjective modifiers, such as "the teeming desert", "the whispering silence", etc. But through competent analyses, these apparent contradictions are found not to be true contradictions, for they do not affirm that A can be both A and not-A at the same time and in the same sense. Usually they mean that the realization is like a somewhat which is one sense is A, but in another sense is, or incorporates, the opposite of A, and all at the same time. That which is separated, and of necessity must be separated, in ordinary experience, because of the structural framework of that experience, is united in simultaneity in the mystical state. There is no logical contradiction in this.

At times in the development of physical science the scientist may become aware of new phenomena which, in part, conform with previous conceptions, but, likewise, in part, violate those conceptions. This is recognized as a sign that there is need for a new conception on a higher level which shall incorporate both forms of the behavior of the phenomena in a logical whole. The same need arises when the doctrines coming forth from authentic states of mystical insight result in an unresolved paradoxical complex. The mystical insight may have developed well ahead of the intellectual evolution of the individuals or even of the race as a whole. In that case, the paradox remains until such time someone with the requisite intellectual development, perhaps at a much later stage of human history, deals with the problem and who, if successful, resolves the problem. The development of the logical sense

in modern mathematics renders possible the resolution of many a paradox that had to remain a paradox for centuries and even millenia, as is illustrated by the paradoxes of Zeno. I believe we have today developed the necessary logico-conceptual equipment for the resolution of the seeming contradiction of the anatomic doctrine of Buddha and the Atmic doctrine of Shankara. At any rate, if the resolution is not complete, it will be substantial though, I confess, far from simple.

First of all, let us return to Buddha's conception of the "ego", "the self" or the "I am" as employed in the Sutra from which our quotation was taken. From the context, the reference is primarily to the personal ego, that which I mean when I speak of myself as distinct from other persons and that which has various desires, inclinations, points of view, etc., which differentiate me from other beings. It is the manifest ground of competitive activities of all sorts, including the wars of nations. This it is that Buddha affirms is impermanent and, concerning which, He says it is the cause of of ubiquitous suffering which can never be destroyed so long as bondage to this egoism remains. In the Sanskrit Sutras, which largely constitute the basis of departure of Northern from Southern Buddhism, there are at least implicatory references to a higher egoism and so the profoundest states of Enlightenment involve the realization of twofold egolessness. But this portion of the full conception we shall leave for the moment, and focus upon the simple personal egoism.

Now, what is the ego in the simpler sense? We find that Emanuel Kant and Dr. C. G. Jung, among other Western thinkers, give us much help here. This ego is a power of subjective awareness. It is I who sees; it is I who hears and otherwise senses; and it is I who thinks, who feels, who intuits, and who wills. At least it seems so. But there is more than pure awareness involved in this complex process. The sensing, intuiting, feeling, thinking and willing involve forms of being aware. The awareness operates in certain ways which by psychological and epistemological analyses, even we of the West have been able to study in considerable measure. But a way or form of awareness is distinguishable from pure awareness in the abstract. Abstract awareness is without any form or conditioning whatsoever; it could not be described as thinking, sensing, intuiting, feeling, willing or as conditioned by any other possible mode. If we mean by subjectivity this, and only this, then it is not the same as the ego or the subject in the concrete sense. If we conceive of Shankara's Atman as pure subjectivity, or the bare power of awareness unmodified by any form whatsoever, then it is clearly distinguishable from the egoism of Buddha, both in the lower and the higher sense. Bare subjectivity, being uncompounded, is not subject to change and, therefore, neither grows nor decays. But the concrete subject is compounded and, thus, subject to process. Hence, bondage to the concrete subject involves unending suffering.

Full analysis shows that we must make a further distinction between the concrete subject and the ego proper. The ego appears to stand as a sort of framework or form through which the concrete subject operates upon the objective, in so far as the process falls within the field of the personal consciousness. There remains an undeterminate zone in which the interaction between the concrete subjective and the objective takes place without passing through the personal ego. This is the zone of the psychologic unconscious. Much of the adjustment of the individual entity to the environment in which it lives does not pass through the framework of the conscious personal ego. From time to time, incursions from the unconscious enter into the egoic field of consciousness without being integrated by the ego and often without being capable of such integration unless the egoic framework is dissolved. The literature of both psychosis and of the transformation process is full of references to such incursions. We must, therefore, enlarge the conception of the concrete subject quite beyond the limited field commanded by the individual personally conscious ego.

Concrete subjectivity, in addition to the abstract power of pure awareness, includes innumerable forms and, therefore, may be said to have a structure. Ordinarily the individual is not conscious of these forms directly. They enter into determining the form of experience, but are not immediately apparent to the individual consciousness. Seemingly, this consciousness contains only the objective content as something given from outside. The view, either naively believed in or theoretically affirmed, that the content is exclusively objectively determined, is materialism. Strong conviction of this sort has serious effects which will be considered later. But analysis does not have to go very far for one to see that actual experience is a compound effect of a subjective and objective determination. For instance, an individual who has a defect of vision which is corrected by glasses, most of the time when reading or looking at the objects of his environment is either not at all, or only slightly, conscious of his glasses. He might imagine that his experience of the seen world was only objectively determined. But let him remove the glasses and the seen-world is altered, probably becoming quite blurred. His actual experience is changed, but not by a change from outside. If, in addition to his ordinary glasses, he were to put on various colored glasses, or glasses producing distorted images, he would find his actual experience is changed in each case. From this it is easy to take the further step of realizing that the way of seeing as conditioned by the structure of the eye plays its part in determining the world as seen. The eye of a fly would give a different kind of world. But, still, back of the conditioning imposed by the visual organ there are determinants of a more psychical nature. Seeing, as a function, has laws other than the optical limitations of the eye. We see in the form of the visual kind of space. The objective as experienced in terms of seeing must fall within this kind of space. Whatever there

may be that cannot fit within that kind of conditioning could never be seen, in the visual sense.

Now, the foregoing illustration applies to all the senses and to thinking as well. So the actual conscious content of our experience and our thought is the mutual product of subjective and objective factors. But in order that there may be mutuality of interaction the subjective and the objective must have a common substratum. They cannot be of wholly disparate natures. As a result, the object can be introjected into the subjective and the subjective can be projected into the objective, facts which are well known to analytic psychology. Ordinarily this happens only with respect to part of the contents, but once the actuality of the complementary processes of introjection and projection is recognized, it is then seen that a thoroughgoing reversal is, in principle, possible. In such case, that which was objective becomes subjective and that which was subjective becomes objective.

When the focus of consciousness is extraverted, — the predominant state of most objectively embodied waking consciousness most of the time, — the egoic consciousness is solely aware of objective content. For such consciousness, introversion into sleep is equivalent to personal egoic unconsciousness, for the field of established consciousness has vanished. But going to sleep is equivalent to a fairly thorough reversal of the subjective and the objective. When the objective of waking consciousness has become the subject, this objective has become the unseen, in the same sense that the subjective of waking consciousness is unseen. Now, the extravert consciousness is typically not conscious of the subjective determinants during the waking state and thus has not built the power of personal egoic awareness in the objective of the sleeping state. What dreams there may be then are projections of the sleeping subjective, — identical with the waking — into the sleeping objective, — identical with the waking subjective. As a result, such dreams are composed of distorted objective forms, that is, objective in the sense of corresponding to the waking state. This is the kind of dream Freud analyzed.

Now, in the case of individuals who are more or less familiar with conscious introversion, either spontaneous or deliberate, the waking subjective is not a wholly unfamiliar field. They are more or less conscious of the subjective structure and may have acquaintance with the archetypes of the unconscious which Jung has discussed in the Integration of Personality. In such cases, the sleeping state may be more than a state of personal unconsciousness or dream, but may be from slightly to wholly conscious, — this latter being possible as a result of superior attainment. In this case, the conscious experience during sleep is not a dream, but is as objectively real as ordinary waking experience. No superior reality value may justly be predicated of the objective waking experience as compared to this.

The possibility of reversal of the objective and the subjective implies certain important consequences relative to pure abstract subjectivity and abstract objectivity. Without a common ground — that which the Hindu calls Sat — there could be no reversal. This common ground is pure subjectivity and pure objectivity combined. In other words, it is pure subjectivity when underlying concrete subjectivity and pure objectivity, or the bare field of consciousness, when underlying concrete objectivity. In Itself It is neither. Its character as subjective or objective is functional, not substantial.

Death has the value of a profounder introversion than sleep, but psychologically it has essentially the same significance as going to sleep. But, whereas sleep is a state wherein certain unconscious psychological processes continue in the extraverted sense — namely, those that maintain the organism as a breathing and living entity — death involves the introversion of all psychological processes, both conscious and unconscious. In death, then, the reversal of the subjective and objective is more complete. That which was objective for the outwardly living man becomes the subjective in terms of both the conscious and unconscious psyche. In turn, the former subjective, just as completely, becomes the new objective. These reversals are not merely -1 -2 successive introversions and extraversions, but they are compound introversion-extraversion and extraversion-introversions. One side introverts coincidentally with the extraversion of the other side. It is both a successive and coincidental diastole and systole.

We are now in a position to deduce certain necessities of after-death states. First, the introversion of the objective implies that, in its essential nature, the objective body becomes subjective. The visible matter of the body is not involved in this, for it simply disintegrates into physical elements or compounds. But it is easy to see that the objective body is not merely the visible matter. It is known that the physical matter of which the objective body is composed does not remain with it permanently during life. This matter passes into the body and, then, after remaining for a time, passes away, being replaced by other matter. Thus this physical matter may be viewed as streaming through the body. The relatively persistent factor is the form and appearance of the body, though this also changes from birth to death, but always within the limits of a recognizable human pattern. The relatively persistent element is an unseen form or paradigm, without which new accretions of matter would develop anarchically, as illustrated in the case of cancer growth. This form is an energetic zone and its pattern is essentially of the nature of an idea, objectified. It is this which becomes subjective in the death transformation, along with other psychical elements.

That which was subjective, during objective visible existence, becomes objective after death. Henceforth the egoic state has three possibilities. It may be simply unconscious, it may be aware as in a

dream, or it may be awake to relative realities that are not inferior in their reality-qualé to objective realities during objective life. These states depend upon the preparation during objective life. An exclusively extraverted orientation of egoistical consciousness during physically visible life is not aware of the introverted part of the diastolic and systolic pulsation. Part of the pulsation is quite unconscious in the egoistic sense. In rational man, however, there is one relatively introverted activity of which he is conscious even when the orientation is strongly extraverted. For rational man thinks as well as experiences. As thinker he is more introverted than as experiencer. In the reversal of death, this thought becomes objective as experience. As he has thought he subsequently experiences. Hence, one who during objective life thought strongly and persistently that death was wholly annihilation, experiences complete unconsciousness, until such time as the energy resident in the thought is exhausted. If, however, without this idea he yet was wholly objectively oriented during life, the only consciousness he can know after death is a dream. Not having developed consciousness of the subjective during objective life, the only possible content which can exist for him in the new objective, after death, - which is the old subjective become objective, - is projected contents from the new subjective, - which is the old objective become subjective. These contents have only the value of dreams; they are parts of the old waking life, experienced over again but guided by the thought conceptions held during life. Hence, inevitably, such a one experiences in the forms of the religious teachings, if any, which he has accepted and believed in during life. But their nature is that of dreams. In the case of one who has become discriminately conscious of the subjective determinants during objective physical life, the new objective experience, after death, has material around which to develop, which is no less real than the experience of physical life. Discrimination continues beyond death and, consequently, this state becomes more than a dream-state.

It is said that those who have aroused into activity the appropriate mystical organ can trace these processes after death by means analogous to physically objective observation. What I have said, above, does not depend upon this as far as it goes. It is in the nature of deduction from primary premises. If it is called a kind of seeing, it is so in the same sense that the mathematician saw Neptune by calculation alone. The seeing as through the appropriate mystical organ would be like the seeing of Neptune through the telescope and would involve the corresponding problems of mastery of technique in handling the telescope and of interpretation of the image seen. An amateur with the telescope might get the wrong object and fail to understand what he saw, even if he got the right object. But, none the less, he would have an invaluable instrument the functions of which can be only partly replaced by calculation.


This rather extensive digression into sleep states and after-death states serves the two-fold purpose, (a) of preparing the way for a more complete understanding of the mystical function, and (b) of preparing the way for a clearer understanding of egoism both in the lower and the higher sense.

As here employed, the term "mystical" carries a compound meaning including states and functional forms of consciousness. It is recognized, even by Western psychologists, that mystical consciousness may be more or less developed, and consequently deal with more than only one exclusive possibility. Qualitative differences there certainly are in different mystical states, and it is only in the profoundest development that we find identity of approach to identity of meaning. So, the mystical sense may be, in a given case, of a minor order. But there is a psychological similarity in all mystical development. It is always a process of introversion which reaches a level more interior than conception thought. Thought stands, as it were, in the center with the mystical, on one side, and the perceptual on the other. To penetrate mystically is to become conscious, in greater or less degree, of the subjective. It is a reversal of direction of the libido, which, most commonly in waking consciousness, moves toward the perceptible object. It is a "turning about" of the focus of consciousness. For this reason, the mystic tends to become conscious in the realm of life commonly called sleep and death, and in grand mysticism the process goes much, much deeper. But the mystic differs from his non-mystic brother in that he does this while yet alive in the objective sense. There is, undoubtedly, a tendency towards the trance state, since beyond a certain critical point the libido tends to burst out completely in the new direction. But it is possible by conscious control to keep the stream of the libido divided, in which case the objective and the subjective states can be experienced simultaneously. But, in many respects, the man in trance is just where the ordinary man is when we call him dead, save that self-consciousness at least tends to be much greater. However, as I have said repeatedly, the trance is not essential and undoubtedly it is easier to maintain critical self-consciousness without it than with it. In any case, the mystical movement is an exceptional introversion with self-consciousness.

In one of its lesser significances, mystical development is a preparation for death. It prepares the way for an after-death state for which there is bona fide reality-quale, not inferior to the objective perceptual reality, and thus guards against a state of mere dreaming or one of complete egoistic unconsciousness. Preparation for death is a matter of exceedingly great importance, and should be the prime interest of the latter half of life. Dr. Jung is emphatically right on this point. We of the West have been very foolishly negligent with respect to this matter.

We come now to the crucial consideration of egoism. Analytic psychology has, quite correctly, differentiated the personal ego from the subject. The subject includes, in addition to the conscious field of the ego, an indeterminate zone, which to the personal ego is quite unconscious. Analytic psychology conceives of the transformation as the establishment of a new self-center in the unconscious, behind the ego, as it were. This process is fundamentally mystical. It places the personal ego in a position of objectivity with respect to the new subject. Much that was formerly unconscious to the personal ego becomes conscious. But in order to take this step in transformation, attachment to the personal ego must be weakened, at least, if not wholly severed. So far, this is certainly in line with the Buddhistic process. The ego that has become possessed by me is no longer a fixed determinant. Instead of taking the false valuation of a sun, it is reduced to its proper status of a planet moving in an orbit about the self or subject. The ego continues to condition the appearance to the milieu of the individual entity, but is not identical with that entity. Now, the ego, as contrasted to the objective contents of consciousness, has a relative fixity and unity. It is not a true invariant, but is rather like a parameter, in the sense I have already discussed. From birth to death man does not remain identically the same man. In the sense of egoic continuity he is the same man, but his personal character is subject to change, generally more or less imperceptibly, but, in the aggregate, often considerably and, at times, even catastrophically. The man who gets up in the morning is not quite the same ego he was the night before, and close self-analysis as well as observation will disclose this. Actually, the ego may be viewed as a continuum in time that is, at every point, the center of a flowing world of experience. Experience may thus be viewed as a continuum centering upon another continuum which, at every point, is relatively fixed with respect to the former. The conception here is schematically familiar to much of mathematical thinking. Thus, in mathematical language, experience is a locus of a locus. We may view the ego as a locus of a point which is a variable dependent upon the self behind the ego.

We may now abstract two continua, one the continuum of the stream of experience, the other the continuum of the ego. In order to represent the systolic-diastolic movement in which the objective becomes subjective and the subjective becomes objective in a periodic rhythm we may construct two sine curves, as given in the accompanying figure. In this case the two curves will be drawn symmetrically with respect to the X-axis. The origin, Zero, will be taken arbitrarily at any point where the broken line E crosses the X-axis and rises above the axis. The Y-axis will represent the field of Consciousness both subjective and objective. +Y will represent the subjective field during waking physically embodied consciousness, while -Y will represent the objective aspect of the field during waking consciousness. The X-axis will



- X-AXIS = TIME
- Y-AXIS = FIELD OF CONSCIOUSNESS
- +Y = SUBJECTIVE OF WAKING CONSCIOUSNESS
- Y = OBJECTIVE OF WAKING CONSCIOUSNESS
- CURVE LE = PROGRESSION IN CONTINUITY OF INSTANTANEOUS STATES OF PERSONAL EGO IN TIME
- 0 = INSTANT OF BIRTH
- π = INSTANT OF DEATH
- 2π = INSTANT OF REBIRTH

represent Time, $-X$ time in the past with respect to the arbitrary point of beginning, $+X$ the future with respect to that same point. The broken curve E is the continuum of the ego, this curve being the form $\sin x$. The solid curve O is the continuum of experience, the curve being of the form $-\sin x$. From mathematics it is known that these curves will intersect with X-axis at Zero, at π and at any integral multiples of π .

The point Zero is the moment of birth of a new ego and the simultaneous beginning of experience, represented by line P. This is the experience of embodied objective life. The rising of the egoistic curve represents the maturing of egoistic consciousness, followed by its normal recession in old-age up to death. The descent of the curve of experience marks intensification of experiential content, followed by a corresponding decline. π is the point of death of the objective phase and the transition point to the reversal of the subjective-objective. Between π and 2π the curve of the ego lies in what was the objective phase of physically embodied consciousness. The experiential curve moves in symmetrical balance on the opposite side of the X-axis. Zero to π covers the cycle of embodied experience, while π to 2π covers the cycle of after-death consciousness or experience. In the second cycle that which was thought or contained in the subjective in the first, becomes objective as experience, and vice versa.

I am indebted to Mohini Chatterji for the initial suggestion that the permanent ego of an incarnation may be viewed as the time integral of all the instantaneous states of the ego through the continuum of a life-time. I have found that the use of the definite integral in this connection brings out a fuller figure. If we take the definite integral of the curve E between Zero and π we get the area enclosed by this arc of the curve and the X-axis. Curiously, it has the value of 2, quite an interesting fact since we are dealing with dualistic or subject-objective consciousness. We may regard the definite integral, or the above area, as the total unified ego of the incarnation. In other words, the "I am", which in the first instance seemed like a point, fixed at any instant, but actually flowing in time, becomes as a totality, space-like. Psychologically, its significance shifts from the significance of the contained, to the container. But it is the container of subjective psychological contents. If we take the definite integral from π to 2π we have the same result in the reverse sense. So the definite integral from Zero to 2π has the value of zero. This is the conclusion of the cycle of the given ego. The following new birth is the beginning of a new ego which may be viewed as the son of its predecessor. This is in conformity with the Buddhist doctrine of the ego.

The constant factor throughout all this process is the Field of Consciousness which takes on subjective and objective coloring depending upon whether It appears as objective as the ground of experience, or as subjective as the ground of the ego. In/Itself in

Its own nature, It is neither subjective nor objective, but only appears as one or the other depending on the coloring given by the approach. Approached through the ego, It appears as Pure Subjectivity.

The approach of Shankara is through the ego and, hence, the Ground is reached as pure subjectivity or the potential of all awareness — an absolutely permanent principle containing time. The diametrically opposite approach, by piercing through the objective, is suggested as theoretical possibility.

To approach the ultimate through the subject appears to me the easiest way. Pure subjectivity, when reached or realized, by its own nature transforms into the subjective-objective, and then to Its real nature as neither subjective or objective, and then there remains only the ineffable Ground of Consciousness-without-an-object and without-a-subject.

The Ground lies outside all conditioning and therefore may not be said to develop or evolve. Evolution or development has a one-way dependence upon the Ground. The cycle of progression of the personal egoic consciousness is an endless series in its own dimension. Yet there is such a thing as real progression. But this we must conceive, not as continuation along the line of the sine curves, but as a progressive integration rising in another dimension in such a way that earlier stages are embraced within the latter.

It is readily suggested to us that if we take the indefinite integral of the sine curves we would arrive at a higher integration. I did this and in working out the consequent interpretations I had several surprises. Some of the consequences were quite at variance from certain preconceptions which I had held, but, in studying the logic of the whole complex, I reached the conclusion that my preconception had been in error. Actually, a number of mystical elements began to slip into place in a larger thinkable whole. I do not by any means suggest that we have in the final effect the whole picture, but I do find the integration quite remarkable. As a thinkable schema the whole is pretty complicated, however simple the direct Realization itself is.

The indefinite integral of $\sin x$ is $-\cos x$. This gives the broken curve HE in ink, with respect to which the solid curve in ink, marked G, corresponds in the same relation that curves E and P have to each other. It will be noted that these curves are at their respective maxima and minima at the points Zero, π , 2π , --- $n\pi$, the precise points at which the curves E and O intersect the X-axis. Similarly, at points $\pi/2$, $3\pi/2$, etc., where curves E and O are at their respective maxima and minima, the curves HE and G intersect the X-axis. HE represents the Higher Ego and the curve G represents the Divinity or God, or the Higher Ego in its aspect as objective. Since subjectivity by itself is an abstraction, but no real existence, all entities are subjective-objective. This principle would have to apply to the Higher Ego as well as the lower ego. Thus, just as the lower ego, when

objectively considered, is man, so also the Higher Ego would have its objective counter-aspect. For reasons that will become clear later, I have called this the Divinity or God.

The points π , 3π , $---(2n + 1)\pi$, are the points in time of the death of the personal man, though in a more superficial interpretation, they are also the points of going to sleep, and in a profounder sense, they are the points of mystical death. The complex of curves is thus a generalized schema lending itself to major and minor interpretations. It will be noted that, fundamental to the whole interpretation, the curves stand in relationships of perfect symmetry, which is just another way of saying that they represent processes in perfect equilibrium. Hence, this symbolism is consonant with the conception that Equilibrium is the essence of Law, an idea developed in the commentaries on the Aphorisms on Consciousness-without-an-object.

The Points Zero, 2π , 4π , $---2n\pi$, are the points in time of the birth of personal man, of the waking up from sleep, and of return from the mystic state to objective polarization of consciousness, corresponding to ordinary waking consciousness. The points $2\frac{1}{2}\pi$, $4\frac{1}{2}\pi$, $---(2n+1/2)\pi$, are the points in time of the birth of the God, in the phase analogous to the birth of the personal man. The points $1/2\pi$, $3\frac{1}{2}\pi$, $---(n + 1\frac{1}{2})\pi$, are the points in time when the God dies objectively. It must be kept in mind constantly that birth in one phase is, at the same time, death in the opposite phase, and vice versa. The words "birth" and "death" thus refer to transition in phase, and not to de novo becoming or to extinction.


In studying the E curve we find that when personal egoism rises to a maximum the objective life of man is in its objective development. In terms of psychical energy, the libido has developed furthest into the objective. This corresponds to the lowest point of the curve 0, which means that seen man is then at his prime. But at this point the curves HE and G intersect the X-axis, the point of greatest recession of psychical energy in the divine counterpart of man. At this point, $1/2\pi$, the God dies inwardly, and thenceforth grows outwardly as the man decreases toward outward death. At this latter death, the transference of the Libido to the outwardly manifest God is at a maximum.

At the moment of personal death the God is objectified in maximum degree. In other words, the introversion of the personal life corresponds to the infilling of the God with life, while extraversion draws life from the God. This leads to a remarkable clarification of the famous dictum of Nietzsche; "God is dead". The God is dead whenever the individual or collective man achieves maximum extraversion. Fixation in extraversion is equivalent to killing God. This will explain the spiritual barrenness of the more intensively empirical sciences. Darwinism, in the philosophic sense, is equivalent to the death of the God, i.e., loss of spiritual consciousness, since Darwinism, in this sense, is the acme of materialism.

Our primary interest here is connected with the mystical processes, rather than with the ordinary periodicity of birth and death. We must generalize our conception of time represented by the X-axis. This time in some situations, such as ordinary birth and death, night and day, etc., may well be regarded as identical with the cosmic or objective time determined by the stars. But this is a sort of collective time which may not synchronize with the individual time sequence. The base of time is succession of states of consciousness. In the case of the mystic, the time sequence is not identical with the time of the objective stars. The succession of his states of consciousness introduces a periodicity of its own which, while symmetrically balanced in its own scale, may appear asymmetrical in its relation to objective star-time. When the succession of states of consciousness is very rapid, in terms of the objective star-time, the life-cycle may appear very short, and vice versa. Hence, the oscillation of the mystic may be — indeed is — a true periodicity, even though the arrangement of phases in terms of star-time, as noted by the observer, may be quite asymmetrical. If, in the mystic's development a certain step in transformation takes ten years, in one case, and ten minutes in another case, in the mystical sense the time interval in the two cases is the same. The life of the mystic qua mystic, is to be isolated from the visible cycles of the visible man. We shall consider the complex of curves in relation to the mystic, in abstraction from the ordinary lives of men.

The moment of mystical death — which is identical with the moment of inward birth — is the moment of extreme introversion when life in the man is reduced to a minimum and the life of the God reaches a maximum. God is the Presence realized by the mystic and, with some psychical organizations, can be a seen Presence. It is easy to identify this Presence with the Heavenly Father of Christ. This is the pattern normally followed by those whose reality orientation is primarily objective. For those whose primary orientation has been to the subjective, the realization is equivalent to identification with the Higher Ego, which is the same as being identical with God, rather than experiencing Him as Presence. Mystical records give the two patterns. Christian mysticism is mainly of the former type.

If we integrate the curves HE and G we get the original curves E and O. This implies that the pairs, E and HE, O and G, stand in interdependent relation to each other. The higher and lower egos are not separable and, in the last analysis, the distinction of higher and lower is not absolute. This conclusion is sound. "High" and "low" have meaning only from the perspective of a relative base. From the standpoint of the ultimate Ground there is no meaning in this relativity. The same point applies in the relationship between God and man. The obvious conclusion may be somewhat shocking to some pietists, but it has strong mystical support. It is significant that it is said that Buddha taught the Gods as well as men. Also Meister Eckhart said "For man is truly




..... HE or Y = $\cos x$ - HIGHER EGO

- · - · - M or Y = $-\cos x$ - METAPHYSICAL WORLD

----- LE or Y = $\sin x$ - LOWER EGO

———— P or Y = $-\sin x$ - PHYSICAL WORLD



God, and God truly man." Angelus Silesius said: "I am as great as God, and He is small like me; He cannot be above, nor I below Him be." It is, indeed, true that man's reality is not a whit greater than that of God, but man's reality is as great as God's. The mystical need is mutual. Only the God-man attains superiority, for only He has attained the dual consciousness, synthesized. Only He has freed himself from dependence upon the cycle of evolution. In so far as He continues in the interweaving of evolution, it is as a process within Him, not as something which possesses Him. This is the Liberated State.

From the standpoint of the Ground, all Gods and all men, all egos, whether higher or lower, inhere in the Ultimate which is neither subjective nor objective. Meister Eckhart reveals his profundity in that he has realized the relativity of God and man and also the ultimate inherence of both in the Godhead, which is not subject to becoming. This Godhead is identical with the Ground, or Consciousness-without-an-object and without-a-subject.

Just as the complex of sine and cosine curves extend to plus and minus infinity, so also, evolution has no beginning nor end. But the Enlightened One is free just because He is consciously one with the Ground and so the evolutionary stream flows within Him, instead of He upon it. It is a mistake to think that the evolutionary stream ceases after full Enlightenment. It remains as it always has been and ever will be, but for the Enlightened One it is no longer a source of bondage, no longer a well of sorrow, but it is, as it were, the revelry of the Eternal. The two Doors of Ashvaghosha are, neither of them, ever closed.

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The foregoing is not a metaphysical dissertation but, rather, a determination of how a metaphysical reality and experience is possible. If we regard the physical as the objective of ordinary waking experience, then we may regard the metaphysical as the objective in the inverse phase or after-death consciousness. In another sense, the metaphysical is the objective aspect of the consciousness of God, but it must be remembered that God and man are interdependent phases of one entity. The Ground underlies both the physical and the metaphysical.

This discussion is psychological in the sense of Metapsychology. By "Metapsychology" I mean that portion of psychical structure which is not accessible to objective empirical methods, as such. Empirical methodology, being limited by sensible determination, is delimited to a zone of possibility and, though development in this zone may be indefinitely extended, it can only give a certain type of knowledge. Immediate acquaintance with the material of Metapsychology is possible only through the arousal and development of the mystical organ in the appropriate degree. Something of indirect acquaintance with Metapsychology is possible through what we might call the "eye" of mathematics. Just as through mathematics we can "see" into the structure of matter further than it is possible to follow with the senses, so

likewise, we may "see" in this same way into the more ultimate structure of the total man's psychical nature. It is not a total knowledge, just as the knowledge of Neptune through calculation is not total, but in its own dimension it may develop without limits, save that of the capacity of human understanding. There is a view, held by some, that no science becomes truly science until it achieves mathematical formulation. The premathematical stage of a science might be viewed as its adolescent phase. When the concepts assume mathematical form, then the science achieves maturity. I have always been a friend of this view.

Why is it that men may think in terms of pure mathematical construction, without thought of any application beyond mathematics itself, yet later this structure proves valuable for other than purely mathematical ends? The geometry of Riemann was such a structure, yet it rendered possible, much later, the conception of the general theory of relativity. Einstein supplied the necessary integration with physical determination, but independently as pure thought, Riemann supplied the structural form. And this is by no means an isolated instance of this sort. Since the development of the non-Euclidian geometries it has been evident that mathematics is not an existence beyond thought. In other words, it is not a structure in an external and independent nature. It is rather the necessitarian aspect of thought. But a necessity of thought is also a necessity of nature just so far as nature is determined by thought. Certainly nature derives a portion of its determination, as experienced by us, through our thinking. So, I believe we may say with justice that the "eye" of the mathematician actually sees into the deep structure of the subjective psyche, although the formal mathematician may not realize the psychical significance of his construction. Dr. Jung calls attention to the interesting fact that the profound poet, following only an aesthetic ideal, so far as his personal consciousness is concerned, actually reveals truth of great psychological significance. It may require great psychological understanding to interpret the poem, but when this is done, meaning is revealed of which the poet creator knew little or nothing. Thus it is also with the pure mathematician, I believe, in even profounder degree. Even though the mathematician may start with seemingly meaningless phantasy, yet the thought does not develop arbitrarily, but in the line of rigorous necessity. In this we have revealed underlying law in its nakedness. The pure thought of mathematics is actually a study of the ultimate nature of that total being, revealed to us objectively as man. May it not be that the mathematical thought is the speech of the Divinity in the inner consciousness of man? Then the mathematical thought is inner communion.

In this discussion of Christ, Buddha and Shankara I have dealt but lightly with the lives and teachings of the Great Men. I have striven to show that these outstanding fountainheads of religion and philosophy are surpassingly great exemplars of grand mysticism. Because of the lack of introspective biographical material, I have not been enabled to employ the methods so dear to the heart of the empiric psychologist. I have derived the evidence of the mystical quality of the Men through the following kinds of manifestation: (a) The external evidence from the biographies of the men so far as they exist relative to the period prior to the beginning of their missions. The record is silent concerning this significant part of the Life of Christ. Buddha clearly employed the samadhi-method under the Bodhi tree, and Shankara was the Chela of Patanjali, one of the leading authorities of Yoga-technique. (b) The evidence from the lives lived during the fulfillment of the missions. Each of them lived the typical life of the Sannyasin, and that is identical with the life of the Yogin. (c) The evidence from the type of influence exerted upon the entourage. There was developed in the followers a desire for the mystical realization, which in many instances was fulfilled. The influence was only in part through the teachings but, perhaps, more largely through the personality of the Teachers. (d) Evidence from the inner content of the teaching. This evidence is decisive. All teach the objective of other-worldliness. The methods of attainment taught varied, but the objective had the same essentiality. The conceptual interpretation of the end varied both in form and extent of development, but I believe I have shown the essential congruence of all.

The approach to mysticism, here, as a psychological problem has been governed by the two following canons: (a) That the understanding of any way of consciousness is better achieved by dealing first with the inner meaningful content, and then proceeding to its more objective behavioristic aspects. Thus the content stands as monitor, rather than the behavior that forms the material of empiric psychology. (b) That it is better to look high first, before looking low, since thus our view is the broad one of the mountain top, rather than the restricted one of the valley, often a narrow ravine.

The popular hypothesis of development associated with the name of Darwin is repudiated. It is maintained that, in the abstracted naturalistic sense, the tendency of life and consciousness is toward degradation, in conformity with the second law of thermodynamics. Hence, actually experienced progress in superiority is evidence of the in-pouring of energy from a transcendental source. Thus the flow is from the high to the low, and from this it follows, just understanding can be attained only by beginning with the high, and not with the degraded end terms.

Having established our base of approach, the next task will be the consideration of detailed psychological criticism of the mystical

states of consciousness. This I shall do in the remaining chapters, following primarily Leuba's criticism as given in The Psychology of Religious Mysticism.

Chapter XIII

ON THE NATURE OF MYSTICAL KNOWLEDGE

The central interest of the present work, taken as a whole, is concerned with the noetic value of mystical states of consciousness. Almost wholly the preceding discussion deals with noetic content, either as native to the mystical state, or as a precipitated effect within the intellectual consciousness. Some attention, particularly in the last chapter, has been given to a critical consideration of the problem as to whether we are justified in viewing the noetic element as true knowledge or only a delusion. The time has come when we must deal with this problem more completely and more systematically. This I propose to do in the present chapter.

In his The Psychology of Religious Mysticism, James H. Leuba has devoted much research and thought upon the problem of mysticism and in the end comes to the conclusion: "For the psychologist who remains within the province of science, religious mysticism is a revelation not of God but of man. Whoever wants to know the deepest that is in man, the hidden forces that drive him onward, should become a student of mysticism. And if knowing man is not knowing God, it is nevertheless only when in possession of an adequate knowledge of man that metaphysics may expect to fashion an acceptable conception of the Ultimate." (p. 318) This is by no means a denial of all value to mystical states of consciousness. Indeed, it gives a much higher valuation than one who has read through the book would have expected, since the general effect of the book is a rather radical depreciation of the mystical state with its contents. Anyone who has read through this present work and its companion, Pathways Through to Space, and who has understood the real meaning of what has been said, will not find any interpretation of the mystical state as meaning an authentication of an extra-cosmic, anthropological or personal God. The word "God" has been used to symbolize the Supreme Value in human consciousness, but not as meaning a self-existence in the sense of a being or entity which serves as the Ground of the universe. The conception of "God" as a personal force which can interfere with the operation of "law" has been repudiated either directly or by implication. I am quite willing to agree with Leuba when he said mysticism is a revelation of man, provided "man" is not defined beforehand in such a way as to be prejudicial to such revelation of him as mystical insight may give. In such case, we must be prepared to find that "man" may mean as much, or more, than the theistic religions have attributed to "God". In that

case, "man" is immeasurably more than a "plantigrade, featherless, biped mammal of the genus homo".

Also, I do agree that it is "only when in possession of an adequate knowledge of man that metaphysics may expect to fashion an acceptable conception of the Ultimate". But it must, indeed, be an adequate knowledge. The assumption of an unsound epistemology would destroy the adequacy of the knowledge gained. The epistemological assumptions of physical science are, themselves, subject to criticism. They have not been held eternally in the past, but are the result of development. It is sheer egotistical conceit for the physical scientist to imagine that his knowledge is the ultimate end-term of such development. Thus, if the subject-object framework of knowledge is a distortion of Ultimate Truth, as the mystical philosopher maintains it is, then physical science as a whole is such a distortion, along with all other cognition of the relative sort. To know in a trans-subject-object sense is to know mystically, regardless of whether there is a trance-state or not.

So the study of mysticism, in order to know man, must be much more than the study of mysticism from the outside by the methods of scientific methodology which are grounded in certain epistemological assumptions. One must have himself achieved directly the inside view of the mystical state, and not content himself with the conceptual reports of the mystics. It is as little possible to derive the state from the conceptual portrayal of it, as it would be for a man born blind to know the immediate actuality of light from the conceptions related to light. Much that we know of the light-world depends upon the immediate sensuous intuitions of the light-world, and these intuitions are a component part of most that we actually say about light. Undoubtedly we can write a mathematics of light phenomena which would not involve this intuition and which could be understood by a blind man who had the mathematical ability. But the mathematical letters or expressions would have no referent for him. If he imagined a referent that satisfied the mathematical definitions, and then somehow acquired sight, he would almost certainly find the actuality in its immediate quale wholly unexpected. The quale of that which he had imagined would be conditioned by his sensuous imagination in terms of the senses he already possessed. The experience of the immediate value of the seen-world might well add nothing to the purely mathematical conception of light-phenomena, though it might suggest further development, but the non-mathematical knowledge of the light-world would be vastly extended. There could, for instance, be an experience of beauty, quite other than the intellectual beauty which might be contained in the mathematical conception, and there could be a development of aesthetic criticism, that was quite impossible for the born-blind who had not gained vision.

Taken with the above reservations and interpretations, I am prepared to accept Leuba's final conclusion, as far as it goes. But,

before he reaches this final conclusion he develops a searching critique of the significance of the mystical state of consciousness which, in the end, is a virtual denial of all spiritual value for it, particularly in the sense of spiritual knowledge. Further, he orients his whole approach through the phenomena of drug-intoxication. Now, entirely apart from the methodological criticism of this kind of approach which I have already developed, there is something in it that hits one with the force of a moral shock. From the evidence, there are mystoid states which can be induced by the use of certain drugs and other chemical substances, but to imply that these states are substantially identical with the realizations attained by most exacting moral, spiritual and intellectual discipline involves something that is little, if any, less than profanation. It is rank injustice, to say the least, for the investigator to assume there is no fundamental difference between a drunkard and men like Christ, Buddha and Shankara. Morally the atrocities of the Japanese soldiers upon helpless civilians is less outrageous than this. It is like classifying an honorable and upright householder with the panderer to the lusts. How must one feel who has striven for decades to live by the exacting moral code of Yoga, when he finds his ultimate realization thus evaluated? Remember, the price of true attainment is always high. The Way is straight and narrow. The aspirant must be prepared to offer all upon the altar of sacrifice; his private yearnings and loves, his ambitions and fond convictions, his life and worldly honor and, in the end, even his hope of attaining the Goal. Only thus is the barrier of personal egoism dissolved. Thus he must labor as the ambitious labor, but without the urge of personal ambition. He must study assiduously as the scholar, without hope of professional recognition. He must maintain a compassionate consideration for the suffering of all other creatures, and deal sternly with his own private suffering. He must be prepared to pass through the valley of despair and yet keep on. Indeed, on occasions, he may skirt the abyss of madness and yet falter not. Not with all is the trial the same, nor equally severe, but, always, of all labors known to man, it is the most severe. In the end, after many years, perhaps near the end of life, he stands before the Gate, which opens not until the consummation of the final renunciation. This is the realization there is nothing to be attained, with which the candidate abandons his search, content that the Gate should never open. But at that moment he has turned the Key. The mystic Gate has opened! Is it not the acme of unwisdom to imagine that all this brings no greater fruiting than the dream of the drunkard and the drug-addict? Shame to him who thus suggests. Not worse did the lust-ridden monsters of Nero's Rome do to the followers of the Christic Light.

Real search into the nature of the states of consciousness induced by narcotic and hypnotic drugs, anesthetics and alcohol is possible only by him who has passed through them. In this I am not qualified and am quite unwilling to pay the frightful price in the way of

damage to the mystic organ in order to qualify. The only experience I have had with a drug effect was from three one-fourth grain tablets of codeine taken over a period of some nine or ten hours to relieve extreme pain from an injury some twenty years ago. By the end of this period I decided that the pain was less painful than the effect of the drug. At about the close of the above period I experienced psychical effects induced by the drug. The intellectual, judging consciousness was present, and while not capable of concentrated and clear-cut effort, still knew that the psychical state induced was an illusion and was interested in it in a half amused fashion. I was lying in bed when I found myself also outside the window by the bed. Then, continuing conscious in the bed all the while, I was over by the east corner of the house and saw there an immense hawser lying in a somewhat serpentine line along the ground. Presently, this was the Von Hindenberg line in western Europe of the First World War. The hawser being, rather than becoming, the Von Hindenberg line seemed perfectly reasonable to the state of consciousness. Yet, all the while, the intellectual consciousness in the bed knew this was an hallucination. Qualitatively, the state had no pleasant value. The feeling might be likened to the way one would feel if he were immersed in a mucky, muggy pool of a sticky, viscous liquid. It was intensely unpleasant. Nothing that I know of is so completely the opposite of the state of genuine mystic realization as this, in its affective and noetic effect. It was a blurred, twilight kind of consciousness, and if that is the sort of thing Leuba means by trance-consciousness, his characterization of it as degraded is quite justified. But it is as little like the genuine mystical state as essence of skunk is like attar of roses, or modern swing music is like a Bach Fugue. I do not consider that the true approach to the understanding of fine perfumes lies in a self-saturation with essence of skunk, or that just evaluation of lofty classical music can be attained by attending the maudlin orgies of swing. Yet, all too often, such seems to be the predilection of the physiological psychologist.

The state of mystical realization, as I know it, is in a measure comparable with an experience, known by some, that is not generally classed as mystical. In my academic life there were occasions when I had to master, or wished to master, conceptions which I could not understand at all at my normal level of concentration. I shall describe the process involved in two instances of this sort. Once I had to prepare a paper on Kant's transcendental deduction of the categories, and on another occasion, in a class in the Theory of Groups, I had to read an article in a mathematical journal and prepare an analogous paper which was possible only by understanding the article. In both cases at first readings, at the normal level of concentration, I simply got no understanding at all. Later, in each case, I concentrated to an extreme intellectual pitch and, in the resultant state which had a luminous value, I was able to assimilate the articles and write my theses, which passed

the criticism of my instructors. Yet, this did not mean that at the normal level of concentration afterward I understood either what I read or what I wrote. Some "pitching up" still remained necessary. All of which suggests differences in intellectual level which can be crossed by the appropriate effort and by the willingness to pay the price exacted. One gets a pain in the head, literally, and the organism takes quite a bit of punishment. But at the level of high pitch, certain values are known that are not realized at other times. There is a sense of light and, at times, of ecstatic beauty when integrating conceptions are born in the mind. This comes the nearest to paralleling the mystical state of anything that I know. The main difference is that the mystical state has a much greater luminous value, the intellect sees deeper and more keenly, the ecstatic value is vastly greater and includes moral beatitude and all of this develops in a state of relaxation with no intellectual strain. The organism gains refreshment rather than takes a beating.

There is a difference between "clear-seeing" with the "eye" of the mind when the intellect is relaxed but alert, and intellectual seeing under the strain of heavy concentration. In both cases, one may gain understanding of the same conceptions, but, in the former case, the understanding is not something forced but, in large measure, spontaneous. In the latter case, one is operating on a lower level of mind and straining to reach above himself; in the former case, he stands on a higher level and uses resources below that level with ease. This is part of the meaning of mystical awakening. Something, which may be likened to a new organ, begins to function.

Here we are not dealing with the ultimate depths of the mystical consciousness nor, from the records, would I judge it a part of all mystical experiences. Vaughan in his Hours with the Mystics distinguishes between the mysticism of sentiment and of thought. My own study has led me to feel that there is justice in this distinction. It appears that the mystical Gate opens into a realm of many possibilities. Some of these I know directly while of others, that I have found reported, I can see the possibility. For all who know this land, there is a common basic language, the sign of a common brotherhood. But to be born into this realm is not enough to be master of all its possibilities. One proceeds to the sub-regions for which he is naturally best fitted and to which his inclination leads. Doubtless, here, as in the ordinary world, there are those who feel most and know little, but there are those who value most the mystic knowledge, colored by the mystic feeling. In the far distance of that mystic land there rise the snowcapped mountain peaks, and, among them, that vast mountain of mountains which reaches beyond the vision of relative consciousness into the sky of the inconceivable. Here only does definition by absolute negation strictly apply.

There is a mystic thought, which is by no means the same as the objective language of words in which the mystic writes or speaks his thought, more or less crudely or more or less well. There is a thought

beyond all words and this thought is like a stream within the mind. It has no part with definable concepts. With respect to this supernal realm the definitive concept may be likened unto a vessel immersed in the sea. The form of the vessel is the definitive concept while the water which it contains is its substantive meaning. But the water, in its own nature, has not the shape of the concept. The concept has truth bestowed upon it by reason of the water which it holds, but many vessels may hold water. The thought which is of identic nature with the sea is like the oceanic currents which flow from shore to shore, distinguishable as currents, yet not distinguishable from the whole ocean as water. In the end the flow of any current mingles indistinguishably with the whole. He who finds thought thus thinking within him discovers no words therein nor concepts which his personal understanding can embrace. But the truth of the thought he knows and that remains with him. Then, later, out of this thought is born another thought, which partly thinks itself, and partly he thinks with his own contributed effort. It is all exceedingly clear and employs word-concepts, seemingly as one might speak or write. But they are not yet speakable or writable. They are thoughts of which the words are the cream of human abstraction. They fly like the royal bird from peak to peak of the best of mundane apprehension. The continuity is the flight of the bird, and for this, mundane human verbal construction fails. Once again it must be thought, this time by laborious effort, tracing the way from peak to peak through the stony valleys between, and, at last, there is the thought of words and syntax. But, at best, this is only a poor product, a fraction of a fraction, in which some drops of the supernal waters remain.

It is the self-moving, inarticulate, flowing thought which constitutes the primary ground of the noetic aspect of mystical consciousness. I do not see any possible means of achieving direct acquaintance with this thought, save by deep introversion. It may well be an unseen determinant in all thinking, and it is not inconceivable that a sufficiently acute analysis of objective thinking might have to hypothesize such an unseen thought. At present I am unable to speak more positively with respect to this possibility. In any case, by means of sufficiently profound introversion this inner spiritual thought may be known directly. It certainly is not under the direction or control of the personal ego. At the appropriate level of mystical penetration wherein both the personal egoic thought and the higher thought are conscious, within a common zone of consciousness, the personally directed thought may query the higher thought, either by a direct question or tentative predication, and this will initiate a responsive activity in the higher thought. The effect of this process is partly assimilable by the personal mind, but it continues on into depths that the latter cannot follow. But the effect upon the personal mind is that of unequivocal demonstration not unlike and not less convincing than rigorous mathematical demonstration. At this level the mystic can say he knows in

the identical sense that the mathematician can say he knows after the formal demonstration of a theorem. The logic of the higher thought is, to the one who stands consciously in its presence, manifestly no less conditioned by logical inevitability than is the case with the more objective mathematical thought. Is one justified in calling this "knowledge", and the determination of the thought, "truth"? Unconditionally, I would say that it is no less "truth" and "knowledge" than is the process of demonstration and the consequent of pure mathematics legitimately viewed as "truth" and "knowledge". But does pure mathematics give truth and knowledge? This question leads us into already extant philosophic controversy. In the most general sense, it leads to the perennial dispute between Rationalists and Empiricists. Of course, I shall not attempt to do what no philosopher has yet been able to do, i.e., to achieve a final resolution of the issue which shall be universally acceptable. In this, I simply take my stand with Rationalists and deny the adequacy of Empiricists definition of "truth" and "knowledge", letting the issue rest there. All that I seek to establish at this point is that the question as to whether mystical content is noetic is identical with the issue as to whether the content of pure mathematics is noetic and, hence, becomes a logico-epistemological question, rather than one of physiological psychology. The controversy is thus raised to a level of much higher dignity

In the above thesis I have affirmed direct acquaintance with a thought process which is accessible at a certain level of mystical penetration and, so far as I know and can see, only thus accessible. From the standpoint of general discourse it is, admittedly, unsatisfactory to introduce as a necessary constituent an element which is not part of common acquaintance. The higher thought is not discursively proven to be an implication from commonly known elements. Of course, as a matter of formal discourse, there is a begging of the question here. I admit all this. I simply oppose to this fact that in the anti-mystical view of the physiological psychologist analysis will also show analogous, conscious or unconscious, philosophical presuppositions which also beg the question. Every philosophy and every philosopher is vulnerable before this charge. It is a common liability in all discourse which is carried to root attitudes. All I hope to prove is a way, if not the way, in which noetic mystical content is possible in principle and, in the negative sense, to disprove the anti-mystical pretension of disproof of the possibility. Success in this would mean that henceforth, for discourse, the issue is an open one, and incapable of being closed by the methods of physiological psychology. The zone wherein discourse must be neutral faith or predilection has the logical right to be determinant in the personal attitude. In this case the anti-mystical attitude is unassailable if it grounds itself in mere wishfulness, but in this case the position has lost all right to pretend to scientific and discursive dignity.

An objectively formulated thought, i.e., a thought in terms of word-concepts and conforming to the rules of syntax, that has its source and reference in the transcendental thought has only incidental relationship to sensible objects and relatives. A fruitful source of confusion lies in the fact that, in large degree at least, the word-concepts have a perceptual derivation and are mainly employed with a perceptual reference. Hence the objectively formulated mystical thought, on its surface, appears to be a statement concerning the objective world. One who assumes this kind of meaning for this thought will scarcely find anything intelligible in it. It will not have any conceivable relationship with actual objective experience. Hence, it is easy to judge it as meaningless phantasy. The judgment of non-relationship to empiric content is largely true, but the further judgment of meaningless phantasy is wholly false. Again we find our parallelism in pure mathematics. Here also we have a language which, in part, is composed of word-concepts normally having a perceptual reference, but the mathematical reference is non-perceptual. Indeed, it is for this reason that mathematics has been humorously defined as the science of simple words with hard meanings. A mind which is in too great bondage to the empiric is hopelessly lost in the thought of pure mathematics and, for substantially the same reason, it is lost in the mystical thought. The weakness here does not lie in the pure mathematical thought nor in the mystical thought but in the intellect which is in bondage to the empirical.

From the standpoint of active participation in the external world of affairs the mystical thought may render little or no assistance. It may even lead to a disconnectedness with external affairs. This, however, is quite as irrelevant as the similar effect which pure mathematical thought has upon the mathematician. Pure mathematicians are rarely ever effective, in their own persons, in the field of affairs. (In this, the German mathematician, Leibnitz, is an outstanding exception.) With their absentmindedness with respect to the objective is notorious. From the perspective of the standard of values of the pugilist or soldier they are apt to seem mostly like ineffective babes. But none of this is relevant in the estimation of their true attitude. Too much of the real power of pure mathematical thought has been precipitated through applied mathematics into the field of empiric powers for the intelligent non-mathematician to deny the worth and potency of the pure mathematical thought. The same power, in another dimension, exists in the mystical thought, though its demonstration to the empirically bound mind is considerably more difficult. However, the influence of the Buddhas and the Christs does constitute part of this demonstration.

The second sense in which I affirm mystical consciousness manifests noetic value is related to the ultimate stage of mystical penetration. In this case, I mean "ultimate" from the standpoint of the objective witness. I do not mean that there are not still further depths, as I know the reverse to be true. But from the objective standpoint the ultimate is the point of universal negation of everything relative. To the objective consciousness, the language of the mystic at this point suggests absolute unconsciousness, though the inference that it is simply unconsciousness is not logically necessary nor true in point of fact. It will not profit us to consider whether the state of consciousness beyond the point of disappearance may be called one of knowledge or not. For objective concepts simply have no relevance there. But may it be viewed as a state of knowledge in its relation to the relative? I think we must say "yes", quite positively. Is knowledge as negation of everything relative. It is genuinely knowledge because to know as negation is as truly knowledge as to know as affirmation. We may take as an illustration the case of a man who perceives what actually is a mirage, but which he does not yet know is a mirage. In affirmative terms, he says: "There is a lake, with boats upon it and trees along its border." This is like knowledge in the ordinary empiric sense. But later the man recognizes that the seeming objects are only a mirage and then he says: "There are no lake; no boats or no trees." This is like the mystical negation of all discursive concepts and all sensible perceptions. But it clearly is an accession of knowledge, even though relative to the earlier state that cognized a lake, boats and trees, it is knowledge as pure negation. Actually in our common practice in such a situation we do not regard the man who cognizes a lake, boats and trees as the man of knowledge, but rather we call him the true knower and discriminator who realizes "it is only a mirage". Here attainment of knowledge is equivalent to absolute negation of the earlier state. To know that formerly believed in being is, in reality, non-being is attainment of true Knowledge.

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There is a third sense in which mystical orientation affects knowledge and, therefore, is a knowledge determinant. To one who has had no more than passing mystical glimpses we may properly speak of such as experiences, since the orientation still remains centered in the personal ego. We have simply what seems a strange content which cannot be successfully integrated in the old system. It remains as an unassimilated irritant which tends to raise doubt as to the socially inherited reality-orientation. But he who has passed through the mystical transformation has shifted his center of self-reference. In mystical language, he has perished and been born again. In so far, this

is not change of content of cognition, but change of the base of orientation to cognition and is, therefore, not experience. Again, disregarding the relationship of the new born to the proper content of the mystical consciousness, we have to consider the effect of the change of base of self-identity to relative cognition. Henceforth, from the time of the new birth, when thinking in terms of his essential reality thought — but not in his more or less frequent as if thinking from the base of the old ego — the mystic integrates the whole of relative cognition about a new center or base of reference. This is equivalent to a radical alternation in the significance of the whole body of relative cognition. Shift in significance is a noetic alteration and, hence, accession of knowledge.

May the shift in base of reference be called, validly, change of knowledge? Excluding the real possibility of new content becoming possible directly as the result of change of perspective, we have two components which I believe are to be viewed justly as noetic. First, change in meaning. Second, acquaintance with the fact of base of reference and its determinant place with respect to cognitive content and, also, with the possibility and actuality of more than one base of reference. The above question has its analogues in the three following events in the history of science and philosophy: (a) Was the Copernican change in astronomy, considered exclusive as a change of base of reference from the earth to the sun, an addition to knowledge? (b) Was the analogous shift in base in the Kantian philosophy an addition to knowledge? (c) Is the concept of base of reference, and the use of change of base, in mathematical analysis properly a part of knowledge? I can see no possible valid ground for denying a noetic accession in all three of these instances. If, then, the answer in these three cases is "yes" then consistency demands an equally affirmative answer with respect to the effect of the mystical shift of base.

Let us consider briefly the function of the base of reference in mathematical analysis. The analytic formulation of a problem invariably depends upon a base of reference, most commonly in the form of rectilinear Cartesian coordinates. Generally, this base is no explicit part of the analytic development, but is implicit in the very form of the development. The expressions and equations are what they are, partly, because the chosen base of reference is what it is and, partly, because of the specific nature of the configuration analyzed. A transformation of base changes the analytic development. Now if we think of the analytic development as thought-content, then the base of reference does not appear explicitly in the content. Yet the specific pattern of that content stands in functional relationship to that base. Now, if the noetic element were conceived as exclusively the content, then the base would stand apart from knowledge. But if the noetic is understood as including its own roots as well as the content, then the base of reference is part of the noetic order. I believe the latter conception is the

sounder. So, in that sense, we may affirm that the mystical change of base is noetically significant.

So far I believe I have established, either presumptively or definitely, three senses in which noetic value may be predicated of mystical consciousness. In summation, these three are:

A. The transcendental thought which, at a certain level of mystical penetration, is realized as a self-moving process, in terms of a stream-like cognition incommensurable with the granular relative conceptions which are capable of definitive differentiation. This thought may be precipitated in such a way as to determine a pattern of relative thought, using word-conceptions; which thought, however, has an exclusive or predominant transcendental, rather than a perceptual, reference.

B. The noetic value of the knowledge of the negation of all relative predication and of sensible presentation. This is the noetic value, appertaining to the highest discernible ascension of mystical consciousness from the relative perspective, in its relationship to all relative cognition.

C. Noetic value growing out of the New Birth, in the sense of change of base of reference, with manifold effects in the meaningful evaluation of all relative knowledge.

Leuba's anti-noetic argument relative to evaluation of the mystical is sketched most clearly in the twelfth chapter, headed "Religion, Science and Philosophy". The central burden of his argument is concerned with the actuality of God as determined by experience and, more especially, mystical "experience". Leuba quite clearly views belief in such a God as central in all historic religions and, accordingly, the ground of such religions would be undermined if the belief is shown on scientific grounds to be untenable. Leuba's position is made definite in the two following quotations: "The question raised by the affirmation we are discussing is that of the relation of science to the belief which makes the religions possible, i.e., the belief in a sympathetic God in direct communication with man". (Page 301, underlining mine) "The God to which this dominant trend of metaphysics points is an impassable, infinite Being — a being therefore who does not bear to man the relation which every one of the historical religions assumes to exist and seeks to maintain by means of its system of creeds and worship." (Page 304, underlining mine.)

Before proceeding with the outline of the argument there are two points to be clarified; one, a gross error of fact in Leuba's statement, and, the other, the divergence of our position from the assumed position of Leuba.

First of all, it simply is not true that "everyone of the historical religions" assumes the existence of a "sympathetic God in direct communication with man". The teaching of Buddha and, so far as I know, of all the illumined Buddhistic Arhata affirm an atheistic (Nastikata) position. The central religious objective is the attainment of the State of Enlightenment. Buddhism does not, in principle, deny the existence of beings invisible to the gross physical senses, but these are in no sense equivalent to the Gods of Christianity, Judaism and Mohammedanism. For Buddhism there is no God in the sense of root causal source or as an intermediary who can intervene and set aside the action of law, either in response to prayer or otherwise. I trust that Leuba will grant that a religion 500 years older than Christianity is an historical religion. This error is hardly excusable on the part of one who is a special student of the psychology of religion. Buddha is the outstanding psychological analyst in the religious domain in all history.

As my own position with respect to this point is in fundamental agreement with the thesis of Buddha, Leuba's argument relative to the empiric Gods does not score in connection with the thesis of this work. But, schematically, his thesis is identical with the denial of noetic value in the mystical state and thus is, in so far, relevant.

The essential steps in the argument of Leuba I shall give in a series of numbered statements with corresponding page references.

1. "the Gods of religion are not beyond scientific investigation unless they are exclusively transcendental objects". (Page 300)

No exception can be taken to this statement as it is in principle correct, so far as I can see, for whatever is experiential in the strict sense of being a content determined by the senses falls within the field of empiric or physical science, as a general possibility. Methodological difficulty may place portions of such subject-matter out of the range of our science as it is at present developed. But it is always possible the development of method will correct this limitation, so we are not justified in setting an a priori limitation upon scientific possibility within the limits of this circumscribed domain. But a transcendental object or state is, by definition, unavailable to empiric method and, therefore, not a potential object of investigation by empirical science. We should recall also that since the analysis of Kant it is known that the pure reason is incapable of reaching the Transcendent. Thus, if it is assumed that sense and reason are the only avenues of knowledge, then the Transcendent cannot by any possibility be known ever. There would be no logical or other right to affirm its

existence or possibility. If there is a transcendent Reality which may be affirmed it must be realizable by a way of consciousness which is neither sense nor reason. Such a way of consciousness, in its purity, would not be an empiric nor conceptual system. It is my thesis that mystical realization or introception is such a way of consciousness. Thus, by hypothesis, such a way of consciousness would be inaccessible by the methods of empiric or physical science. But a mixed consciousness which is partly introceptual and partly empiric would be somewhat accessible to empiric science, though it would be a borderline zone in which physical science could never be sure of its determinations.

2. "Belief in God which is derived as the results of naive interpretation of phenomena and inner experience is accessible to

empiric science." (Pages 302-304)

In principle, no objection can be taken to this statement.

3. "Should there be no ground of belief other than physical phenomena and inner experiences, then, for those who are acquainted with the modern scientific conceptions, there could be no belief in God." (Page 304)

Superficially, this statement seems to follow from the foregoing, but as a matter of logic it does not. Because a subject-matter is available for the investigation of empiric science, it does not follow that the conceptions which the Scientific investigator presents carry authority. The inherent limitations of inductive method are such that no conception derived through this method is ever authoritative, but only has the character of "warranted assertibility", to use the terminology of John Dewey. Warranted assertibility is always only tentative. There is ever the possibility that it may be so altered that, while remaining conformable with the scientific determinations, it is also consonant with an extant or future God-conception, without the latter being exclusively transcendental. Further, scientific investigators are as much subject to the limitations imposed by predilection as are men of religion. Over and over again this influence is traceable in the offered theoretical constructions. These men have their over-beliefs as well as men of religious feeling. Some of these men simply replace belief in God with a belief in the Darwinian ape which they worship in their peculiar ways. I do not see that Gargantua has any logical advantage over God, but it certainly does possess large aesthetic and moral disadvantages.

4. "When one believes with the mystics that God, the Absolute, the Ultimate Reality . . . is directly experienced in ecstatic trance and nowhere else, it would seem to follow that knowledge of the trance-consciousness includes a knowledge of God." (Page 305)

From a study of this statement one begins to gain a pretty clear idea of the line which Leuba is following. Careful study of the statement, however, reveals that there is much ambiguity in it, so that,

as a matter of strict logic, the implications are not clear. None the less, Leuba apparently means — and this is borne out by what follows later in the book — that by the study of the trance one can gain a true evaluation of the meaningful aspect of the consciousness, without the investigator, himself, realizing directly the trance state, or else, possibly by realizing it in one way he has the key to its nature as a whole. This is borne out by the following quotations: "However, it may be produced, ecstasy is ecstasy, just as fever is fever whatever its cause. The truth-kernel of religious ecstasy is, as we have shown, no other than the truth-kernel of narcotic intoxication and of the ecstatic trance in general." (Page 309) In discussing two ways of unification Leuba says with respect to the second way: "The terms may lose their individual features and be degraded to a level of undifferentiated simplicity. That, as we have seen, is the mystical way of producing 'harmony' or 'unity'. It is a way which does not secure any knowledge."

As a matter of strict logic, the terms "trance-consciousness", "ecstatic-trance" and "ecstasy" are not necessarily identical in meaning, but the study of the book forces upon one the conclusion that Leuba employed them as synonyms. In the analysis I shall assume this as his meaning. Thus the clause, "ecstasy is ecstasy" would stand identical with "trance-consciousness is trance-consciousness". The over-all implication is that if one has psychological acquaintance with trance-consciousness in any form he has the key to the meaning of religious mysticism, however highly developed, in so far as its source lies in the ecstatic state. Thus the differentia between mystics as to their doctrines, feeling valuations and moral conceptions and practices are factors from outside the trance that have colored its meaning. I believe I have justly presented Leuba's meaning in this abstract.

There are a number of assumptions in this which, I believe, break down completely under analysis. Thus, are we justified in saying ecstasy is always a trance-consciousness and, conversely, that a trance-consciousness is always an ecstasy? This is like asking: Is gold always a glittering yellow substance and, conversely, is a glittering yellow substance always gold? One who has had experience with mining placer gold will rise up and shout a most emphatic "NO". By reason of an error in his conceptions in this matter many an amateur has expended painful labor gathering worthless mineral while he has thrown away real gold. (Just precisely what Leuba has done in his book, as I believe.) Gold may appear as a glittering yellow substance, as it does do when it is perfectly pure and uncoated. But in nature it may be black with a coating of manganese oxide or with a red rusty stain, or so alloyed and even chemically combined with other minerals that it does not at all look like real gold. Further, mica, in certain lights, and pyrite may look for all the world like gold. The experienced miner soon learns to discount appearances and comes to judge by fundamentals such as specific gravity

and chemical reactions. Here we are presented with the real test. That is gold which means the group of qualities which belong uniquely to gold. And, likewise, that is mystical insight which gives the mystic meaningful value, whatever the appearance of the process.

To be sure, the above illustration is by no means logical demonstration that "seeming" is never dependable. It is possible that there may be subjects of which the seeming is so unique that the logical proposition may be converted simply. But this can never be assumed justifiably. Yet, everlastingly, the inductive thinkers do just this. That master logician, Bertrand Russell, has said: "What is called induction appears to me to be either disguised deduction or a mere method of making plausible guesses" (The Principles of Mathematics, page 11n) The aim of the inductive thinker is the justification of a universal proposition from one or more observations which lead to particular judgments. There is manifest logical error in a step of this sort. The observations themselves do not give any universal whatsoever. But through the imagination of the scientist, working in directions suggested by the observations, a general hypothesis is invented of such a nature that the consequences or observation can be deduced. If, then, the hypothesis suggests further consequences which can be checked by observation, and the results of such checking are positive, a presumption is built for the hypothesis. The only differences between an hypothesis of this sort and scientific theories and laws is that the latter have stood such checking over a wider field and during a longer period of time. The difference is only one of degree. There is no guarantee that the so-called "law" is truly such, i.e., one having ontological character from which there could be no deviation by way of exception. From the standpoint of logic the supposed "law" of science is only a lucky guess. The history of science shows that such "laws" often fail, even after they have stood the tests of generations. Then the advance of theoretical science marks time until some genius comes along who can make a better guess. But a guess is a guess no matter how brilliant the genius.

Quite commonly, if not always, the scientific problem has the following form. It is desired to investigate some zone of manifested fact which we will designate by the letter "A". But A, it so happens, is of such a nature that it cannot be directly known by means of scientific observation. However, it may be determined that A is associated generally with certain phenomena of a sort that can be observed, which we will call "B". We have then the initial proposition "A is B" or, more exactly, "The class A is a member of the class B". Then instances of B are studied by the methods of scientific observation. Some uniformity of character is found in these observed instances. These are generalized as always true of B. Then the original proposition is converted simply and we get "The class B is a member of the class A". This, of course, is an elementary logical fallacy, but science justifies herself by securing a number of results that do work. But this means that the justification of

scientific results is pragmatic only. Empiric science does not determine Truth and Law in an objective or ontological sense.

Leuba employs the above method with respect to religious mysticism and trance-consciousness. He takes as his primary proposition, "Religious mystical insight is a member of the class of trance-consciousness". He adds as an arbitrary affirmation that Ecstasy is ecstasy, just as fever is fever whatever its cause". We have seen that he means by this, "trance-consciousness is trance-consciousness". The assumed truth of this proposition justifies the further conclusion: If we can explore one or more cases of trance-consciousness by scientific means, then we know the nature of trance- as a whole. Thus we will find the real nature of mystical ecstasy as isolated from content derived from the individual character, beliefs and knowledge of the mystic. The next question is: How can we secure instances of trance-consciousness that are suitable for scientific observation and experiment? Manifestly the moral disciplines of Yoga are far too exacting for this purpose. They would require that the scientist would have to become a superior kind of saint before he could investigate, and not many scientists are so great lovers of truth that they are willing to be that heroic. Further, the process is very slow, in general, and may need not less than the whole of a lifetime. So that method of experiment is not chosen. Now, the student of the appropriate literature will find that statements of certain kinds of psychotic persons, epileptics and the users of some drugs and other chemical substances, have certain similarities to the expressions of genuine religious mystics. It is, perhaps, expecting too much heroism of the investigator to become a voluntary psychotic, and one can hardly become an epileptic at will. The remaining route to the trance-state, then, is through chemical intoxication that is, scientific research by becoming drunk: It is easy to do and not too heroic, like becoming a saint.

Undoubtedly it is possible to determine certain neural and other physiological alterations in connection with chemical drunkenness. I am not at all surprised that Leuba should view the psychical condition as one of degradation. Any other conclusion I would have found unexpected. But it does not therefore follow that all psychical states which for a distance parallel these are moving towards degradation. Thus, in the case of insects and some other creatures, the transformation from the larva to the chrysalis involves a process very much like a degradation, though it does not have the significance of death or decline, but of transformation to a higher form. The meaning of a butterfly is not identical with that of a drunk caterpillar, nor with that of a caterpillar that is simply degenerating. The road to rebirth is not through intoxication, even though there may be a psychical parallelism for a distance. Dissolution as part of the process of new integration means something very different from mere dissolution alone.

The important point is that the assumption that trance-consciousness, as such, has a uniform significance is not justified. A man in a cataleptic state may be, superficially, indistinguishable from a dead man, but actually his state has a very different meaning. The whole process of reasoning is unsound. So obvious is this the case that one suspects that wishful thinking guided the whole research. If William James is vulnerable before the charge of wishfulness by Leuba, no less is James H. Leuba himself, but in an opposite direction.

Two ships at sea, having quite different points of departure and equally divergent destinations, may, none the less, move in the same identical course for a portion of a total trip. He who has knowledge only of the coinciding portion of the two courses and the points of departure and destination of one of the ships cannot deduce the point of departure and destination of the other. So is it true that the end of a process cannot be known without full consideration of the means. Where wholly different means are employed resulting in passing stages that are similar, it is impossible to deduce identity of ends. So he who becomes a mystic by means of protracted exacting moral discipline and keen intellectual discrimination is moving toward something vastly different as contrasted to the instance of the man who is merely intoxicated with chemicals.

In the end, we are forced to the conclusion, based upon logic alone, that knowledge of any kind of trance-consciousness is not sufficient to give us knowledge of God or, more correctly and more generally, knowledge of the values and noetic elements of bona fide mystical states. But there is also another error made by Leuba. He has confused judgments of existence with judgments of meaning or value. Trance-consciousness, in so far as it is available for study by empiric psychology, is only a temporal phenomenal existence. The inner meaningful content of the consciousness is something quite different and is not at all to be judged by the state of the organism.

5. By all odds, the most important argument raised by Leuba concerns the step from immediate state of consciousness to the predication of an objective existence corresponding thereto. In the case of mystical states of consciousness it is not questioned that there is generally, at least, the following qualitative modifications: (a) A sense of Presence, (b) A sense of Illumination, (c) A sense of Communion, (d) A feeling of reconciliation, (e) A conviction of vastness, (f) A sense of repose, (g) A feeling of safety, (h) A sense of union, (i) A feeling of harmony. The state in its immediacy is thus qualified and this is attested so overwhelmingly that its actuality is not questioned. But, apparently more often than not, the mystic, himself, goes beyond these immediate qualities and predicates objective existence corresponding to them. Very often, he says, in effect, all this means direct knowledge of and relation to God, or some other metaphysical existence, thus imposing upon the unquestionable immediacy an objective interpretation. Leuba

then says, in effect: "The objective interpretation does not possess the invulnerability of the immediacy and is subject to rational criticism." This takes us to the heart of the problem relative to the authority of the mystical state.

Here, Leuba's criticism is a just one as far as it goes. It is true enough that we are in the habit of ascribing an objectively existent cause for experienced states of consciousness. We do this continually in the field of ordinary consciousness. For instance, perhaps we feel a sensation, which we call a blow upon the arm; at the same time, we have a visual experience which we call a falling limb of a tree. We infer the conclusion that an external existence called "a limb of a tree" fell and hit us on the arm. We have thus projected an objective cause to explain a group of sensible experiences. We have explained an immediate state by a somewhat which involves more than the immediacy. Most mystics unquestionably do the same thing.

The statement which says that the predication of an objective existence from immediacy is not justified is one with which I quite agree. The immediacy itself is the only certainty. The criticism is quite valid, so long as it is applied with absolute consistency. But when it is applied to that which one does not like and not applied in the direction of one's preferences, it becomes merely vicious.

The predication of an external physical world, in the last analysis, is grounded only upon psychical immediacy. It thus rests upon the same base as the metaphysical world predicated by the uncritical mystic. The logical analysis which discredits the metaphysical existence, when applied consistently, equally discredits the objective physical world. The fallacy of hypostatization arises just as much in the one instance as the other. Strictly, then, the only thing we know beyond all doubt is immediacy. All else rests upon an "as if" basis. We can act as if there were a physical world which werved as the cause of certain immediate psychical states. But, also, we can act as if a metaphysical reality, such as God, caused other of our immediate psychical states. The logical ground of either position is equally weak.

If Leuba had been consistent in the refusal to accept hypostatization he would have won my respect as another Buddhist. But he was not consistent. He repudiated the Gods of the mystics but proceeded to replace these with his own hypostatization in the form of a psycho-physiological existence. This is just another kind of god which serves the habit of seeking an external cause of an immediate state. Well, Leuba a right to his god, if he likes that kind, provided he grants equal logical right to the mystic to choose his own kind of God. For my part, I do not admire the kind of taste which prefers what Shankara calls "a compound of skin, tissue and bones, filled with odure, urine and phlegm". It smacks too much of the refuse pile.

The one indubitably sound position is to repudiate all hypostatization, whether physical or metaphysical. Then we ground

ourselves upon pure immediacy. Law becomes the necessary connection between various states of consciousness, both of a more objective and more subjective sort. But when one has arrived at this position he has become a Buddhist, regardless of whether or not he ever heard of Gautama Buddha or of the Buddhist religion and philosophy. Here, we have actually retained only that of which we are absolutely certain and which is absolutely necessary. The immediate qualities of conscious states are their own existence; they do not depend upon or hang upon either a physical or metaphysical somewhat beyond themselves. Consciousness is the one self-existent Reality. The goal of religion and practical philosophy is not union with a metaphysical Being, but realization of the state of consciousness known as Enlightenment. This is the word of the greatest mystic of all and, I submit, no standpoint has ever been more logically rigorous.

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In conclusion, we may say that the final knowledge of the mystic takes the following form: (A) Negatively, it is a denial of all substantial reality to all worlds, physical or metaphysical and an equal denial of all selfhood in the same sense. (B) Positively, it affirms the indubitable reality of consciousness and of all its immediately realizable states. In the as if sense there may be all sorts of worlds, objective and metaphysical, with their corresponding kinds of beings and selves. This supplies everything that is necessary for all kinds of possibilities.

Chapter XIV

THE MEANING OF THE IMMEDIATE QUALITIES OF MYSTICAL STATES

We know with unequivocal certainty the immediate content and toning of our various states of consciousness. When we interpret these states as inhering in, derived from or meaning a somewhat, other than consciousness itself, we are moving beyond the range of true knowledge. The states imply only that which is absolutely necessary to their existence. Beyond this, our thought is merely speculative or the extrapolation of wishful thinking. These considerations are of universal validity and, as we have seen, extrapolative interpretation or explanation is as unsound in the case of the immediately given of ordinary experience as it is in the case of mystical states of consciousness. The predication of the unreality of the world, as is done in the case of the illusion or maya-philosophies, is not a denial of the presence of the immediate states. It is a denial of the extrapolative construct which, though occasionally it is conscious speculation, is mainly an automatic habit handed down by social heredity. Among these philosophies, those, which have been thought through consistently, deny reality not only to the assumed physical world beyond immediacy but, as well, the similar metaphysical existences. But this thoroughly consistent and rigorous viewpoint and orientation of life is actually accepted both as a way of thought and as a way of life by only the relatively few among mankind. Both consciously and unconsciously other attitudes and interpretations are assumed.

Beside this rigorously consistent standpoint three or four other interpretative orientations can be isolated and classified.

A. The extrapolated physical world of things and human society may be viewed as a real existence while the metaphysical order is viewed as unreal. This is the standpoint of materialism in both the technical and practical senses. In its more extreme and naive development those who hold this view may regard the supposed external existence of things and men as the only real existence, while the immediacy in consciousness is viewed as a dependent effect. All such thinking is an effort to explain the clearly and immediately known by that which is unknown and theoretically, as well as practically, unknowable. It is thus interpretation and orientation of life through the myth of external things. This is a standpoint and attitude of extremely wide currency and colors much of scientific thought, particularly that part which is not philosophically self-critical. The Marxist social philosophy assumes this standpoint both in practice and in conscious theory. But this extreme position may be modified by the recognition of ordinary sensuous immediacy as it is found variously toned by feeling.

B. The extrapolated metaphysical worlds of the Gods may be viewed as real in itself, while unreality is predicated of the physical universe. This is the standpoint of Spiritualism, using this word in its original and proper sense. For those who are thus oriented, the Gods are real-in-themselves while physical men have only a shadowy existence. It would appear that not many in this class are to be found in this world.

C. Both the physical and metaphysical worlds may be viewed as real in themselves. This seems to be the standpoint of most of the religions, including Christianity. For such, both Heaven and this world are actual external existences in themselves. It would appear to be the most general, naive popular view. It has, however, the merit of being more consistent than either of the preceding views, but shares with them the error of viewing as given that which is really only extrapolation.

D. The fourth viewpoint is that already discussed in the first paragraph and is the perspective of this whole philosophy of Consciousness-without-an-object. One who is familiar with the "Essence of Mind" of the northern Buddhist Sutras will recognize the similarity of the conception. While this philosophy affirms that appearance is the sole nature of existence of the physical and heavenly worlds and of their respective denizens, yet, in terms of such existence, it affirms equal reality of both orders. When truly understood, it will be found that this philosophy involves the loss of no real value, but it does strike away the chains of bondage and fear which are the cause of perennial human suffering.

Toward the close of the last chapter I listed nine modifications of consciousness which are, admittedly, qualitative characterizations of mystical states of consciousness. It may be that not all of these are present in a given single instance, but some of them always are and, in the sum total, they characterize the state as to its most common features. Here I propose to interpret these qualities in the light of the present philosophy.

First of all, the reason why so many efforts at interpretation of these realizations has led to indefensible consequences lies in the fact that the problem has been falsely conceived. It has been assumed that the meaning of the state of consciousness lies in something other than itself. Actually, it is its own meaning. Imagined, supposed, or seeming otherness acquires its meaning from the immediately realized state, and not the other way around. Thus, Presence does not mean God, but the God-notion or God-appearance means Presence. The Presence is real, while the notion or appearance is a construct. It is not necessary to interpret Presence as meaning something beyond itself. It is the superlative value itself, without the intervention of agency. He who has realized Presence needs no God. He, himself, is the reality that has been called Divinity. Presence is Identity, not relationship. Conceiving it as relationship produces delusion. Presence is fullness of Life or of Consciousness. It is the normal condition and, for a being that had

always been normal, the idea of Presence could never have arisen. Only those who were deluded through abnormal existence could ever feel the arising of a state of Presence, because, when realized, there is produced a contrast with the abnormal state. The realization of Presence is the sign that an insane man has at last become sane. It is conceived as a rare and strange state of consciousness in this world because this humanity has the perspective of the inmates of a lunatic asylum. For the truly normal it is so natural as not to be noticeable.

In our ordinary usage we think of "presence" in the sense of "presence of". It is thus conceived as the "presence to a self of someone or some thing". This is not the meaning of the mystical realization of Presence though, I must confess, a mystic who did not discriminate clearly between the mystical state, per se, and a subsequent complex of the memory of that state together with the ordinary consciousness might confuse the meaning. The mystical significance is nearer to the dictionary meaning as "the state of being present". The mystic is in the state of being present to himself, that is, in concentric relationship, rather than in the ordinary state of excentric relationship. Becoming consciously centered in the Center is to realize Presence.

In the discussion of the subject of Presence both James H. Leuba and William James correlate the mystical realization of Presence with a "sense of presence", fairly frequently experienced, wherein the subject feels that some one or some thing is somewhere in his vicinity. Very often and, perhaps, typically, there is a sense of a somewhat localized somewhere near in space. Connected with this there are various reported sensations of a more or less indescribable sort and, quite often, a sense of fear which may approach the intensity of terror. This effect has been produced experimentally. For my part, I do not remember ever having had an experience precisely of this sort, but there have been a few rare experiences that seem to be related; Once at night near a mountain stream, when in the company of others, I heard a distinct shout, which I thought at the time might be a call by a man who was expected to arrive about then. The shout had not been generally heard by the others, though it had seemed very clear to me. Investigation did not uncover any normal physical source of the sound. But the curious part of the whole experience was an impression of a series of cold shivers passing up and down the spine with a tendency toward terror panic which I found rather difficult to control. Rational analysis had no effect upon the affective reaction. Only by abstracting the mind and use of will was I able to achieve control. Intellectually, at the time, I did not view this as a presence of something, but as a psychological curiosity of some interest. But, autonomously, another part of consciousness seemed to feel as though something alien and inimical were present. The descriptions of the experience of localized presence include certain qualities so much like what I experienced that I suspect the phenomenon was of a similar sort. If such is the case, then I can say quite definitely that it is not at all

like the mystical realization of Presence. It is more like the diametric opposite of that. It had a felt-effect like invasion by the alien or, rather, threatened invasion. It was definitely distasteful. In contrast, the genuine realization of Presence might be said to have the value of escape from the alien, and centering in the proper. (These words used in approximately Spengler's sense.) If the mystical realization of Presence may be called centralization, the other sense of presence had the value of decentralization. The first had integrative value, the latter a disintegrative tendency. The realization had the value of being Home, in the most fundamental sense possible, of being right at last, of "being on the beam", in terms of modern technical slang, of everything being just what it should be, of at last being truly rationally attuned, and in every way in all stages, at the time, and ever since, it was most welcome. Thus the contrasts between the two states is radical in a most profound sense. Scientific research that follows the line of "sense of presence", as contrasted to realization of Presence, is definitely off the track, so far as understanding real mystical consciousness is concerned.

Meaning and Value are achieved when the seemingly distance and alien are transformed into the near and proper. Thus explanation and other labor has performed its office when the distant and mediate are elevated to the immediate. Thus it is not the immediate value in consciousness which needs explanation and justification. These are, what they are, as given. The immediate modification of consciousness can't possibly carry any injurious potency, since the whole support of its existence is consciousness itself. The modification of consciousness cannot destroy consciousness.

The immediate experience of the mystic is its own justification and its own authority. Thus the realization of Presence is the realization of all it implies. It is Reconciliation, Repose, Security, Union, Harmony and the rest. It is not that in the mystical state something new is gained or attained, but a false condition, like the above belief in the snake, is lost. It is because men had been in a deluded state in which they felt unreconciled, restless, insecure, lost and at war with themselves, that the mystical awakening takes on the positive values corresponding to the negative conditions of the deluded state. The mystical realization does not prove a metaphysically existing God, but it disproves the mirage of the world.

In much of our thinking we have confused means and ends. Thus food is not an end, but a means. Nutrition is the end. The relationship with the other fellow is not an end, but a means. Communion is the end. Travel is not an end, but a means to filled or enriched consciousness. God is not an end, but a means to the realization of Presence. So we can list all the searchings and strivings of ordinary human life and find that all of them are valuable only as they lead to an enhancement of immediate consciousness. But he who has found the key to all the immediate values directly has no longer need of the means which so occupy the thought and

effort of men in the state of delusion. The genuine mystical awakening achieves just this. And that is why its Assurance is absolutely justified. It is not an assurance as to external relations which compose all the various means of life, but it is Assurance in the sense of realization of all ends. The science which is competent only in the world of means or instruments is wholly impotent when it attempts to assail the immediate Assurance of the mystic.

It is true that when the mystic steps out of the immediate mystical state and attempts to interpret its meaning in relative terms he may make errors in discrimination and thus develop interpretations which will not stand objective criticism. By mystical awakening he has not acquired authority to pronounce what is so in the realm of the science of means. He has a perspective from which he may approach the problems of physical science which may give him superior advantages, but he will have to labor with the resources of non-mystical men. His pure knowledge as mystic is of quite another order.

William James, in his search for the unassailable kernel of mystical consciousness, found what he called a "higher power", which possessed, over-shadowed or enveloped the mystic. In analyzing this, Leuba points out that in the conception of "higher-power" we have more than pure immediacy. There is involved a judgment of comparison as between something lower and something higher. This criticism is valid. The immediate content of the pure mystical state does not give the sense of higher power. As the state deepens toward purity the capacity to apprehend in the comparative sense tends toward dissolution. I am sufficiently familiar with this tendency to be able to analyze a good deal of it. It is as though there were a process in which, in intellectual terms, there was a progression in an infinite series which the intellectual side of the mind followed as far as it could. The conceptual side becomes more and more subtle and the concepts less and less granular or definitive until, at the utmost limit of abstraction, the concepts together with the process of conceiving and judging begins to dissolve into a state wherein there is no more thinking. At this point I stopped the further process, since I was interested in maintaining the intellectual continuity. But the direction of the development is intellectually clear in must the sense that the thinking mind can apprehend an infinite series from the nature of a developing progression. By such a process we are able mathematically to sum an infinite series without actually passing over the infinitely large number of terms in the series. The summation is a reaching beyond the consciousness of the concrete mind, but its truth and actuality is not, therefore, less certain to the mathematician. Now, we may liken the pure mystical realization as the actual culmination of that, which to the intellective consciousness is a converging infinite series. Thus the intellect can apprehend the culmination in the mathematical sense. The final term is the point wherein intellection is reduced to zero. The extent to which this process

can be followed with conscious intellection depends upon the equipment of the individual mystic.

For the pure mystical state there is no high nor low, since it transcends relativity. Evaluation is intellective. To a consciousness dwelling on earth it is natural to take the earth as the base of reference. From that base we are in quite general agreement in regarding that as low which is in the direction of the "pull" of gravity, and that is viewed as high which stands up against gravity. Hence, the submarine descends while the airplane rises. But if we abstract the world from these two objects while in their relative motion of descent and ascent, we would no longer have any ground for saying that one was going down while the other was going up. They would simply be tending in opposite directions. It is movement relative to the direction of gravity that defines the meaning of up and down. Now, in terms of conscious states, gravity is orientation to objects and negation of gravity, or levity, is orientation away from objects. The mystical movement is away from objects, as can be observed by the witnessing intellect. Hence, in the familiar sense of "high" and "low", it is movement to the higher. In terms of "power", then, it is movement toward "higher power". But in the absolute sense there is neither higher nor lower.

There is another sense in which we commonly differentiate between higher and lower. We say that consciousness which comprehends more, as compared with another consciousness which comprehends less, is higher than the latter. In conceptual terms, that concept which subsumes more is higher than the concept which subsumes less. Hence, the genus is higher than the species. Now, as the intellect joins flight with the mystical sense it clearly soars into greater comprehension and so the judgment of a higher consciousness is quite consonant with common evaluation.

Here I have been speaking of deepening mystical process. In the strictest sense there is no process but only sudden Enlightenment which is absolutely complete. The effect of process belongs to the conjunction with the intellect. Inevitably all that can be said in these matters is valid only with respect to a sort of compound consciousness which, in part, is mystical and, in part, is intellective. The only absolutely perfect "Word" is absolute silence.

EPILOGUE

This writing has no logical end. It is brought to an end rather arbitrarily, in much the way that a fugue composition in music is brought to an end. The latter could have continued forever as a flight of musical voices. The development from that base of reference which was defined by the Realization called the High Indifference could have continued through all fields of human thought, and there is no conceivable end. In the development that has been presented, there are only two points covered that are of a central importance: First, the factuality of a third organ, faculty or function of cognition, which was called Introception, and second, the possibility through its office of a metaphysical knowledge. The problem is fundamental. Is a metaphysical knowledge possible? I think we may conclude from the works of David Hume and Immanuel Kant, that a pure metaphysical knowledge is not possible if we are limited to the cognitive forms of sense perception and conceptual cognition. Efforts at metaphysical statement have typically been dogmatic and not in agreement with each other, as was known at the time of Immanuel Kant, and there existed no means of critical discrimination between these more or less incompatible dogmatic statements. It is not only Immanuel Kant, but also Dr. Carl G. Jung, who challenge the validity of any metaphysical conception. Jung says, and this is completely in conformity with the position of Immanuel Kant, that our conceptions concerning a supposed metaphysical subject matter are only statements concerning the structure of the mind. I will quote from his essay, or psychological commentary, introductory to the Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation:

In the first place, the structure of the mind is responsible for anything we may assert about metaphysical matters, as I have already pointed out. We have also begun to understand that the intellect is not an 'ens per se', or an independent mental faculty but a psychic function, dependent on the conditions of the psyche as a whole. A philosophical statement is the product of a certain personality, living at a certain time, in a certain place, and not the outcome of a purely logical and impersonal procedure. To that extent it is chiefly subjective. Whether it has an objective validity or not depends on whether there are few or many persons who argue in the same way. The isolation of man within his mind as a result of epistemological criticism has naturally led to psychological criticism. This kind of criticism is not popular with the philosophers since they like to consider the philosophic intellect as the perfect and unconditional instrument of philosophy. Yet this intellect of theirs is a function dependent

upon an individual psyche, and determined on all sides by subjective conditions, quite apart from environmental influences. Indeed we have already become so accustomed to this point of view that mind has lost its universal character altogether. It has become a more or less individualized affair with no trace of its former Cosmic aspect as the 'Anima Rationalis'.¹

This would challenge any possibility of an a priori determination. Let us turn to Immanuel Kant, who recognized that the problem was not quite so simple as that. Quoting from the introduction of the Critique of Pure Reason, (Meiklejohn translation):

That metaphysical science has hitherto remained in so vacillating a state of uncertainty and contradiction is only to be attributed to the fact that this great problem, and perhaps even the difference between analytical and synthetical judgments, did not sooner suggest itself to philosophers. Upon the solution of this problem, or upon sufficient proof of the impossibility of synthetical knowledge a priori, depends the existence or downfall of the science of metaphysics. Among philosophers, David Hume came the nearest of all to this problem; yet it never acquired in his mind sufficient precision, nor did he regard the question in its universality. On the contrary, he stopped short at the synthetical proposition of the connection of an effect with its cause, insisting that such proposition a priori was impossible. According to his conclusions, then, all that we term metaphysical science is a mere delusion, arising from the fancied insight of reason into that which is in truth borrowed from experience, and to which habit has given the appearance of necessity. Against this assertion, destructive to all pure philosophy, he would have been guarded, had he had our problem before his eyes in its universality. For he would have then perceived that, according to his own argument, there likewise could not be any pure mathematical science, which assuredly cannot exist without synthetical propositions a priori — an absurdity from which his good understanding must have saved him.

In the solution of the above problem is at the same time comprehended the possibility of the use of pure reason in the foundation and construction of all sciences which contain theoretical knowledge a priori of objects, that is to say, the answer to the following questions: How is pure mathematical

¹ C.G. Jung, Commentary, W. Y. Evans-Wentz, ed., The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation, Oxford University Press, London (1954), 1977 reprint p. xxxii-iii.

science possible? How is pure natural science possible?

How is pure natural science possible?

Respecting these sciences, as they do certainly exist, it may with propriety be asked, how they are possible? — for that they must be possible is shown by the fact of their really existing. But as to metaphysics, the miserable progress it has hitherto made, and the fact that of no one system yet brought forward, as far as regards its true aim, can it be said that this science really exists, leaves anyone at liberty to doubt with reason the very possibility of its existence.¹

And then there is a further question put by Immanuel Kant: "How is metaphysics, as a natural disposition, possible?"

These questions, in my mind, are just about as fundamental as exist anywhere. If our knowledge is empiric, and only empiric, we are helplessly shut in the world of phenomena without even the faintest knowledge of law or necessity or order. We could have no certainty concerning the great problems of God, Freedom or Immortality. We could have no certainty in the domain that properly belongs to religion.

Concerning mathematics, I wish to give a quotation from something said by Einstein: "How can it be that mathematics, being, after all, a product of human thought, independent of experience, is so admirably adapted to the objects of reality?" The quotation from Einstein carries one back into the history of the development of the general theory of relativity. He found the mathematical pattern which could give form to that theory in the work of a pure mathematician known as Riemann. Riemann was a mathematical thinker in an ivory tower without any reference in his thought to experience. He was concerned with a pure problem that from the ordinary point of view would seem very abstruse. The problem grew up out of the question as to whether the parallel axiom in Euclid was actually an axiom or a proposition or theorem which could be deduced from previous so-called axioms. The effort in this direction failed. Then the effort was made to see if a system could be developed in which the assumption of the parallel axiom was altered. Out of this grew at that time two systems of non-Euclidian geometry that were associated; one with the names Lobatchewsky and Bolyai, and the one associated with the name of Riemann. The former assumed that through a point on a plane outside of a given line on a plane, that two parallel lines could be drawn that would not meet the given line in a finite distance; and that between these two lines there were an infinite number of other lines that were called non-intersectors. A perfectly logical and coherent geometry was built upon this assumption.

¹ Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason, translated by J.M.D. Meiklejohn, J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., London (1934)p.35.

Riemann followed the other course, and assumed that no line could be drawn through such a point which could not meet the given line in a finite distance. In other words, parallelity in the sense of two lines that meet only in Infinity was abandoned. This would mean that if you have two lines such that the interior angles formed on one side of a transversal were in their sum equal to two right angles instead of these lines continuing separate to infinity they would meet in a finite distance. This defines a conception of a limited or finite space when carried through to final conclusions. The only image we have that we can imagine of such a space is the two dimensional surface of a sphere, where the great circles are the analogue of straight lines and, in that case you can have great circles that meet in the finite distance. Now this was a pure construction, a pure development, without any thought of its having a practical application. But many years later Einstein found that it and a further generalization of geometry by Riemann supplied the basic mathematical conception which served to integrate his general theory of relativity. And the question thus arose in his mind: "How is it possible that the pure, a priori thought of the mathematician could ultimately prove to fit the domain of experience so well?"

What I submit is: that the problem of how pure mathematics is possible is closely connected to the problem of whether a pure metaphysics is possible. The thought of the pure mathematician moves everlastingly to the Infinite, as also does the disposition of a man to think metaphysically concerning the Infinite. The call of the metaphysical is a fact in the psychology of man's mind. But how can it be justified? How can he attain to a metaphysical certainty analogous to the certainty he does attain in pure mathematics? I think the two problems are very closely related. The importance of the thesis that there is a third organ, faculty or function of cognition other than sense perception and conceptual cognition, is that this, it is maintained, leads to metaphysical certainty. However, it is viewed as a function latent in the total psychology of man, active generally only as an unconscious influence, and that because of this influence man has a metaphysical disposition, an urge to achieve metaphysical certainty. It is also suggested that this function is in the background, operating and influencing the work of all genius, and thus distinguishing the thought of genius from the thought of mere talent. But the influence of the third organ of cognition may be present without that organ having been isolated as an object of cognition itself. No doubt, the emergence and isolation of this function calls for that which we regard as Yogic Realization or Awakening. It is not a general fact among men but a fact with the few, and presumptively potential in all men. If the actuality of such a function is entertained as a possibility, then we may see how metaphysical certainty is possible, and thus the resolution may be available of all basic philosophic and religious questions, so that we

are no longer dependent upon faith alone. The truth of this thesis, that there is such a third organ of cognition, cannot be proven on the basis of the two-fold form of cognition through the sense perception and conceptual cognition alone, and is vulnerable to criticism from that point of view. Its validation is dependent upon at least the assumption that there is such a thing as a realization that gives not only affective value and moral elevation, but also essential knowledge. This point is the central one of the whole text of the book.

There is frequent reference in the book to mathematical analogues. There is a reason for that. The underlying thesis is that the factuality of pure mathematics is as much in doubt as the factuality of pure metaphysics. But as the factuality of pure mathematics is abundantly proven, there is the presumption that equally well the factuality of pure metaphysics may be proven. In any case, unless the philosopher seriously considers this possibility, he has not completed his obligation to the determination of Truth.

I do not reject criticism in the sense that Immanuel Kant used that term, and in the sense that Jung used it. It simply means discriminative evaluation. I, in fact, solicit it. I am more concerned that this conception shall be given serious consideration than that it should be simply arbitrarily accepted. But criticism, to be competent, involves a good deal. Only he can be a competent critic who also has awakened within himself the introceptive function. For all others, it can only be entertained as a possibility. But that is enough. I seek that the mind should not be closed in this direction. I do not seek that it should accept or reject blindly, but to entertain simply this possibility. Competent criticism would require the equipment of a Shankara or a Plotinus plus a knowledge of modern epistemological criticism and psychological criticism, as well as a knowledge of pure mathematics. Therefore there are not many who can qualify as competent critics. I present the evidence as far as possible, for the factuality of this organ or samadhindriya, if you please, or inner organ of Fichte, and this involved the explicit report of the events that led to the awakening of the function. This falls within the field of subjective biography, a field that one is a bit sensitive about in giving it formal expression. It does open the door, however, to psychological criticism and evaluation, and it seemed to me that it was an obligation to render this material available. For the last thing I want is blind acceptance or rejection. Most psychologists are not competent in this field, least of all the Freudians, who see in all culture only a perversion of sexuality. I call to their attention that they're not saying only that all metaphysical thought and all religion and all art is only a perversion of sex, they are also saying that pure mathematics is only a perversion of sex, and it was pure mathematics in the last analysis which was the principal factor in making the landing on the

moon possible, an empiric fact. I submit that this orientation reflects mainly the distortions of Freud's own mind. Something rendered rather clearly in Jung's account of his meeting with Freud as given in Jung's book, Memories, Dreams and Reflections.

When Jung says that our thought is only an expression of our personal limitations or subjective conditionings of the mind, and that it attains a general validity only by its corresponding to a similar impress in the thoughts or consciousness of others, it must be borne in mind that his charge of subjectivism would apply equally well to pure mathematics as to pure metaphysics. And I submit that the authority of the pure mathematician is as objective as anything we know, and that its truth is not determined by the vote of persons who read his works, that it is authentically universalistic, and that it works in the pragmatic domain of experience. But I submit that the proof of its truth is not simply the fact that it works pragmatically, but lies in the fact that it follows logically from its premises. I owe a good deal to Dr. Jung and I feel that he said much that is very valid, and while his statements are pejorative with respect to the possibility of metaphysics in general, yet there is one place I remember where he said that if we clear away certain things, we may find such metaphysical truth as there may be.

Truth is a complex of two determinants: one is the form and one is the substance. In the empiric realm the form is logic and the substance comes from experience of the senses. I submit that the same holds true on the metaphysical level — that there is a substantive Truth attained only by the function of Realization, and that there is a logical form in which it is dressed; and that the logical form without the Realization becomes, with respect to metaphysical material, only speculation; but in combination with the introceptual content, it becomes a transcriptive presentation of a Transcendent Reality.

This thus is a brief summation of the principal theses presented by the whole volume, represented so that the reader may judge as far as may be for himself, being freed as far as possible from all mere dogmatic assertions or categoricalisms, but having the ideas presented in such a way that discriminative evaluation may be possible.